London, Friday, March 24, 1854 

Although Lord J. Russell’s dispatch* may, upon the whole, be 
described as a polite refusal of the Czar’s proposition to enter into 
a previous concert on the eventual partition of Turkey, there 
occur some very strange passages, to which I call the attention of 
your readers. Lord John says: 

“There is no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep 
peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbors.” 

Now, nowhere in the confidential communications of Sir 
H. Seymour do we meet an allusion to the Czar having proposed to 
intimate to the Sultan anything of the sort. We must, therefore, 
conclude either that Lord Russell, while simulating opposition to 
such a step, meant to insinuate it himself, or that some of Sir 
Hamilton’s confidential communications are suppressed in the pa- 
pers laid before the House. The matter looks the more suspi- 
cious as, only 16 days later, on Feb. 25, 1853, Lord Clarendon, 
on his accession to the Foreign Office, gave the following instruc- 
tions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe: 

“Your Excellency will, with all the frankness and unreserve that may be 
consistent with prudence and the dignity of the Sultan, explain the reasons which 
lead Her Majesty's Government to fear that the Ottoman Empire is now in a 
position of peculiar danger. The accumulated grievances of foreign nations which the 
Porte is unable or unwilling to redress, the mal-adniinistration of its own affairs and 
the increasing weakness of executive power in Turkey, have caused the allies of the 

i See this volume, pp. 80-82.— Ed. 
Ibid., p. 81.— Ed. 

The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence 85 

Porte latterly to assume a tone alike novel and alarming and which, if persevered 
in, may lead to a general revolt of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and prove 
futal to the independence and integrity of the Empire, a catastrophe that would be 
deeply deplored by Her Majesty’s Government, but which it is their duty to 
represent to the Porte as considered probable and impending by some of the Great 
European Powers.” (See the Blue Books on the Rights and Privileges of the Latin 
and Greek Churches, Vol. 1, pages 81 and 82.) 

Was this not “intimating” to the Sultan, on the part of England, 
in plain words: “that he cannot keep peace at home or preserve 
friendly relations with his neighbors?” The Czar had told Sir 
Hamilton in a very off-hand way that he would not allow England 
to establish herself at Constantinople, but that he, on his part, 
intended to establish himself there, if not as proprietor, at least as 
depositary.*. How does Lord John reply to this impertinent 
announcement? In the name of Great Britain he renounces “all 
intention or wish to hold Constantinople.” He exacts no similar 
pledge from the Czar. 

“The position of the Emperor of Russia,” he says, “as depositary, but not 
proprietor, of Constantinople, would be exposed to numberless hazards, both from 
the long-cherished ambition of his own nation and the jealousies of Europe.”” 

The jealousies of Europe, but not the opposition of England! As 
to England, she would not allow—no—Lord John Russell dares 
not speak to Russia in the same tone in which Russia speaks to 
England—she would “not be content to see Constantinople perma- 
nently in the hands of Russia.” She will, then, be content to see it 
temporarily so. In other.words she fully concurs in the Czar’s own 
proposal. She will not allow what he himself renounces, but is 
prepared to suffer what he intends doing. 

Not “content” with installing the Czar as the eventual depositary 
of Constantinople, Lord John Russell declares in the name of the 
English Government that “they will enter into no agreement to 
provide for the contingency of the fall of Turkey without previous 
communication to Russia.” * That is to say, although the Czar told 
Sir H. Seymour that he had entered into an agreement with 
Austria before making any previous communication to England, 
she on her part pledges herself to communicate with Russia 
previously to entering into an agreement with France. 

“ See this volume, pp. 78-79.— Ed. 
» Thid., p. 81.— Ed. 
“ Thid., p. 82.— Ed. 

> 

“Upon the whole,” says Lord John, “no course of policy can be adopted more 
wise, more disintexested, more beneficial to Europe than that which His Imperial 
Majesty has so long followed.” 

His Cossack Majesty happens to have followed, without ever 
swerving from it, the policy inaugurated at his accession to the 
throne, and which the liberal Lord John declares to have been so 
disinterested and so beneficial to Europe. 

The ostensible and main point of dispute in the present Eastern 
complication is Russia’s claim to a religious protectorate over the 
Greek Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The Czar, far from 
disguising his pretensions, told Sir Hamilton plainly that “by treaty 
he has a right to watch over those several millions,” that he “made 
a moderate and sparing use of his right,” and that it was 
“attended with obligations occasionally very inconvenient.” Does 
Lord John Russell give him to understand that there exists no 
such treaty, and that the Czar had no such right? That he had no 
more right to meddle with the Greek subjects of Turkey than 
England with the Protestant subjects of Russia, or France with the 
Irishmen of Great Britain? Let him answer for himself. 

“Her Majesty’s Government wish to add, that in their view it is essential that the 
Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects in conformity with the 
principles of equity and religious freedom: ...The more the Turkish Government 
adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the 
Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which His 
Imperial Majesty has found so burdensome and inconvenient, though no doubt 
prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty.” 

Russia’s exceptional protectorate over the subjects of the Porte 
sanctioned by treaty! No doubt about that, says Lord John, and Lord 
John is an honest man,* and Lord John speaks in the name of Her 
Majesty’s Government, and Lord John addresses the Autocrat 
himself. What, then, is England quarrelling about with Russia, and 
why doubling the Income tax, and troubling the world with 
war-like preparation? What was Lord John’s business when, some 
weeks ago, he arose in Parliament, with the aspects, and in the 
tone of a Cassandra, screaming and bouncing and gesticulating 
bombastic imprecations against the faithlessness and perfidy of the 
Czar? Had [he] not himself declared to Caesar that Caesar’s 

* Apparently an allusion to Antony’s words 
“But Brutus says, he was ambitious; 
And Brutus is an honourable man” 
from Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act HI, Scene 2.— Ed. 
Lord John Russell’s speech in the House of Commons on February 17, 1854. 
The Times, No. 21668, February 18, 1854.— Ed. 

The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence 87 

claims to the exclusive protectorate were “prescribed by duty and 
sanctioned by treaty?” 

What the coalition had to complain of, was certainly no 
dissimulation or reserve of the Czar’s but, on the contrary, the 
impudent familiarity with which he dared to unbosom himself 
before them and make them the vessels of his most secret designs, 
thus transforming the cabinet of Downing-st. into a private cabinet 
in the Alexander Newski.* A man confides to you his intention to 
murder your friend. He entreats you to enter with him upon a 
previous concert about the booty. If the man be Emperor of 
Russia and you an English Minister, you will not call him to 
the bar, but thank him in humble terms for the great confi- 
dence placed in you, and feel happy “to acknowledge his moder- 
ation, frankness and friendly disposition,” as Lord John Russell 
did. 

Let us return to St. Petersburg. 

On the night of the 20th Feb.—only eight days before Prince 
Menchikoff’s arrival at Constantinople—the Autocrat came up to 
Sir Hamilton Seymour at the soirée of the Grand Duchess 
Hereditary’s,” when the following conversation took place between 
these two “gentlemen.” 

The Czar: 

“Well, so you have got your answer, and you are to bring it to me to-morrow.” 

Sir Hamilton: 

“T am to have that honor, Sire, but Your Majesty is aware that the nature of the 
reply is very exactly what I had led you to expect.” 

The Czar: 

“So I was sorry to hear; but I think your Government does not well understand 
my object. I am not so eager about what shall be done when the sick man dies, as | am 
to determine with England what shall not be done upon that event taking place.” 

Sir Hamilton: 

“But, Sire, allow me to observe that we have no reason to think that the sick 
man is dying; countries do not die in such a hurry. Turkey will remain for many a 
year, unless some unforeseen crisis should occur. It is precisely, Sire, for the 
avoidance of all circumstances likely to produce such a crisis that Her Majesty’s 
Government reckons upon your generous assistance.” 

The Czar: 

“YT will tell you that if your Government has been led to believe that Turkey 
retains any elements of existence, your Government must have received incorrect 
information. I repeat to you that the sick man 1s dying; and we can never allow such an 
event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding.... And 
remember, I do not ask for a treaty or a protocol; a general understanding is all I 

* Nevsky Prospekt.— Ed. 
> Maria Alexandrovna.— Ed. 

require—that between gentlemen i is sufficient.... So no more for the present; you will 
come to me to-morrow.’ 

Sir Hamilton “thanked His Majesty very cordially,” but having 
hardly left the Imperial saloon and returned home, suspicion 
overcomes him, he sits down at his desk, reports to Lord John on 
the conversation, and sums up his letter with these striking 
marginal notes: 

“It can hardly be otherwise but that the Sovereign who insists with such 
pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighboring State, must have settled in his own 
mind that the hour, if not of its dissolution, at all events, for its dissolution, must be 
at hand.... This assumption would hardly be ventured upon. unless some, perhaps 
general, but at all events intimate understanding, existed between Russia and Austria. 

“Supposing my suspicion to be well founded, the Emperor's object is to engage Her 
Majesty’s Government, in conjunction with his own Cabinet, and that of Vienna, in some 
-scheme for the ultimate partition of Turkey, and for the exclusion of France from the 
arrangement.” 

This dispatch arrived at London on the 6th of March, tien 
Lord Russell was already supplanted in the Foreign office by Lord 
Clarendon.” The impression produced on the mind: of this 
whining lover of Turkey by the Embassador’s anxious warnings is 
quite surprising. Being fully aware of the Czar’s treacherous 
design to partition Turkey to the exclusion of France, he tells 
Count Walewski, the French Embassador at London, that “they,” in 
contradistinction to France, ““were disposed to place reliance in the 
Emperor of Russia”—that “a policy of suspicion ‘was neither wise 
nor. safe”—-and that “although he hoped the Governments of 
England and France would always act together, when their policy 
and their interests were identical, yet he must frankly say that the 
recent proceedings of the French Government were not the best calculated 
to secure that desirable result.” (See Blue Books, Vol. 1, pp. 93 and 
98.)° 

Be it also remarked, en passant, that at the same time when the 
Czar indoctrinated the British Embassador at St. Petersburg, The 
Times was repeating at London, day after day, that the state of 
Turkey was desperate, that the Ottoman Empire was crumbling to 
pieces and that there remained nothing of it except the phantom 
of “a Turk’s head dressed up in a turban.” 

The morning after the interview at the Imperial soirée Sir 
G. H. Seymour, according to the invitation received, waits upon the 

* Sir G.H.Seymour to Lord John Russell. Rebruary 21, 1853.— Ed. 
See this volume, p. 84.— Ed. 

: © The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley. March 22 and 29, 1853.—Ed. 
The Times, No. 21383, March 23, 1853, leader.— Ed. 

The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence 89 

Czar and a “dialogue lasting one hour and twelve minutes” takes 
place between them, on which he reports again in his dispatch to 
Lord J. Russell, dated Feb. 22, 1853. 

The Emperor began by desiring Sir Hamilton to read to him 
aloud Lord John’s secret and confidential dispatch of the 9th of 
February. The declarations contained in this dispatch he declared, 
of course, to be very satisfactory; he “could only desire that they 
should be a little amplified.” He repeated that a Turkish 
catastrophe was constantly impending, and 

“that it might be brought about at any moment, either by an external war, or by 
a feud between the old Turkish party and that of the ‘new superficial French 
reforms,’ or again, by a rising of the Christians, already known to be very impatient 
of shaking off the Mussulman yoke.; 

He does not allow the opportunity to slip without bringing forth 
his worn-out bravado, that “if he had not stopped the victorious 
progress of Gen. Diebich, in 1829, the Sultan’s authority would 
have been at an end’’—while it is a notorious fact, that of the 
200,000 men he had then marched into Turkey 50,000 only 
returned to their homes, and the rest of Diebich’s army would have 
been annihilated on the plains of Adrianople but for the combined 
treason of Turkish Pashas and foreign Embassadors. 

He insists on his not requiring a system altogether arranged 
between England and Russia, as to the previous disposal of the 
provinces ruled by the Sultan, and still less a formal agreement to 
be concluded between the two Cabinets, but only some general 
understanding or exchange of opinions, each party confidentially 
stating what it did not wish, 

“what would be contrary to English interests, what would be contrary to Russian 
interests, in order that, the case occurring, they might avoid acting in opposition to 
each other.”* 

By such a negative understanding the Czar would obtain all he 
cares for: Ist, the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire settled 
between England and Russia as a fait accompli, although in a 
negative and conditional form, while it would rest with him so to 
embroil matters as to be able to declare to England, with some 
show of reason, that the contingency foreseen had arrived. 
Secondly, a secret plan of action between England and Russia, 

* Quotation from the confidential memorandum of the Russian Cabinet to the 
British Government dated February 21 (March 4), 1853 which was communicated 
by Count Nesselrode to Sir Seymour on March 7, and sent by the latter to London 
on March 9, 1853 (see this volume, pp. 92-93).— Ed. 

however vague and negative, brought about behind the back and 
to the exclusion of France, and thus necessarily setting England 
and France by the ears. Thirdly, England being restrained by her 
negative pledges as to what she would not do, he would have 
liberty to elaborate very tranquilly his own plan of positive action. 
Besides, it is evident that two parties agreeing as to what they will 
not allow each other to do, in a given case, are only settling in an 
evasive way what they will This negative sort of understanding 
gives only the greater facilities to the more cunning of the two 
parties. 

“Perhaps your Majesty,” perplexed Sir Hamilton muttered, 
“would be good enough to explain your own ideas upon this 
negative policy.” The Czar, after some show of coy resistance, 
feigns to yield under the gentle pressure and made the following 
highly remarkable declaration: 

“T will not tolerate the permanent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians; 
having said this, I will say that it never shall be held by the English, or French, or 
any other great nation. Again, I never will permit an attempt at the reconstruction 
of a Byzantine Empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a 
powerful State; still less will ! permit the breaking up of Turkey into little 
republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis and other revolutionists of 
Europe; rather than submit to any of these arrangements I would go to war, and as 
long as I have a man and a musket left would carry it on.” 

No Byzantine Empire, no powerful extension of Greece, no 
confederation of little republics—nothing of the sort. What, then, 
does he want? There was no need for the British Embassador to 
guess. The Emperor himself, in the course of the dialogue, bursts 
upon his interlocutor with the following proposition: 

“The Principalities are in fact an independent state under my protection: this 
might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of government. So again 
with Bulgaria: there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an 
independent state. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of 
that territory. I can then only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of the 
Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of 
Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. 1 would say the same thing of Candia: 
that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English 
possession.” 

Thus he proves that “in the event of the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire, it might be less difficult to arrive at a 
satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed.” 
He declares frankly what he wants— the partition of Turkey—and 
he gives the clearest possible outlines of that partition; clear as well 
from what he reveals as from what his silence conceals. Egypt and 

The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence 9) 

Candia for England. The Principalities, Servia and Bulgaria to 
exist as vassal states of Russia. Turkish Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina he intentionally abstains from mentioning, to be 
incorporated with Austria. Greece to be extended in a “not 
powerful way”—say lower Thessaly and part of Albania. Constan- 
tinople to be temporarily occupied by the Czar, and then to 
become the capital of a state comprising Macedonia, Thracia, and 
what remains of Turkey in Europe. But who is to be the definitive 
possessor of that little empire, perhaps to be aggrandized by some 
portions of Anatolia? He keeps close upon that point, but it is no 
secret that he has some one in reserve for that post, viz: his 
younger son,” who longs for an empire of his own. And 
France—is she to receive nothing at all? Perhaps so. But no: she is 
to be put off with—who will believe it?—with Tunis. “One of her 
objects,” he tells Sir Hamilton, “is the possession of Tunis,” and 
perhaps, in the event of a partition of the Ottoman Empire, he 
might be so magnanimous as to indulge her appetite for Tunis. 

The Czar speaks throughout in an affected tone of the most 
haughty disdain of France. “It looks very much,” he says, “as if 
the French Government were endeavoring to embroil us all in the 
East.” As for himself, he cares not a straw about it: 

“For his own part, he cared very little what line the French might think proper 
to take in Eastern affairs, and that little more than a month ago he had apprised 
the Sultan that if his assistance was required for resisting the menaces of the 
French, it was entirely at the service of the Sultan! 

“In a word, the Emperor went on to observe, ‘As I before told you, all I want is 
a good understanding with England, and this not as to what shall, but as to what 
shall not be done; this point arrived at, the English Government and I, I and the 
English Government, having entire confidence in one another’s views, I care 
nothing about the rest.’” 

“But Your Majesty has forgotten Austria!” exclaims Sir 
Hamilton. 

“Oh!” replied. the Emperor, greatly to his surprise, “but you must understand 
that when I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well; what suits the one suits the other, 
our interests as regards Turkey are perfectly identical.” 

When he says Russia, he says Austria. As to Montenegro, he 
states explicitly “that he approved the attitude taken by the 
Austrian Cabinet.” 

Having treated in a former conversation the Sultan as the 

* Mikhail Nikolayevich.— Fd. 

“Grand Turk’* of the Vaudeville, he designs him now, after the 
fashion of Paul de Kock, as “Ce monsieur.” And how forbearing did 
he not behave toward ce monsieur? He has only dispatched a 
Menchikoff to Constantinople. “If he chose, he certainly could 
send an army there—there is nothing to stop them,” as he proved 
afterward at Oltenitza and Chetatea, and by his own army’s 
glorious retirement from Kalafat. 

His Cossack Majesty dismissed Sir Hamilton with the words: 
“Well, induce your Government to write again on these subjects— 
to write more fully, and to do so without hesitation.” 

On the 7th of March, shortly after this curious dialogue, or, 
rather, monologue, the British Embassador is summoned to 
appear before Count Nesselrode, who places in his hands “a very 
confidential memorandum” which His Imperial Majesty had 
caused to be drawn up, and which was intended as an answer to, 
or a comment upon, the communication” of Lord John Russell.‘ 
Count Nesselrode invites him to read the paper, which, in fact, 
“was intended for his use.” Sir Hamilton, accordingly, peruses the 
document, and he who had not found a single word of protest 
against the Muscovite’s* elaborate insults against France, all of a 
sudden trembles at discovering that “the impression under which 
it has been framed is an incorrect one; that impression being 
evidently that, in the disputes carried on between Russia and 
France, Her Majesty’s Government had leant partially to the latter 
power.”* The very next morning he hastily sends a billet doux to 
Count Nesselrode, asserting that, 

“far from having inclined, as has been stated, to France in the course of the late 
critical transactions, it has been the desire of the Queen’s advisers, to the full extent 
permitted (!) to a Government compelled (!!) to observe a neutral attitude, that ample 
satisfaction shall be given to the demands which His Imperial Majesty’s Government 
were justified in making.” 

In consequence of this begging letter, Sir Hamilton has, of 
course, another “very amicable and satisfactory conversation with 
the Chancellor,” who comforts the British Embassador with the 
assurance that he had misunderstood one passage of the 
Emperor's memorandum which did not intend reproaching 
England with any partiality for France. “All,” said Count 

* See this volume, p. 79.— Ed. 

> Of February 21 (March 4), 1853.— Ed. 

“ See this volume, pp. 80-82.— Ed. 

¢ Nicholas I.— Ed. 

* Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon. March 9, 1853.— Ed. 

* Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode. February 24 (March 8), 1853.— Ed. 

The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence 93 

Nesselrode, “what was desired here was that, while appealing to the 
Emperor’s magnanimity and feelings of justice, the British Government 
should employ some efforts toward opening the eyes of the 
French Minister.” There is nothing wanted “here’ but England’s 
creeping and cringing before the Kalmuk, and assuming a tone of 
dictatory severity against the Frenchman. To convince the 
Chancellor of the conscientious manner in which the British 
Government had executed the latter part of their service, Sir 
Hamilton reads him an extract from one of Lord John Russell’s 
dispatches,* “as a specimen of the language held by an English 
Minister against the French Government.” Count Nesselrode 
finds his boldest expectations surpassed. He only “regretted that 
he had not long ago been put in possession of evidence so con- 
clusive.”’? 

The Russian memorandum in answer to Lord John’s dispatch is 
described by Sir Hamilton, as “one of the most remarkable papers 
which have been issued, not from the Russian, ‘Chancellery’, but 
from the Emperor’s secret Cabinet.” © So it is. But it is superfluous 
to dwell on it, as it merely resumes the views of the Czar as 
developed in his “dialogue.” It impresses upon the British 
Government that “the result, whatever it might be, of these 
communications, should remain a_ secret between the two 
Sovereigns.” The Czar’s system, it observes, has, “as admitted by 
the English Cabinet itself, been always one of forbearance” against 
the Porte. France had adopted another line of conduct, thus 
compelling Russia and Austria to act in their turn by intimidation. 
In the whole memorandum Russia and Austria are identified. One 
of the causes which might lead to the immediate downfall of 
Turkey is expressly stated to be the Question of the Holy Shrines, and 
“the religious sentiments of the orthodox Greeks offended by the 
concessions made to the Latins.” At the close of the memorandum 
“no less precious” than the assurances contained in Russell’s 
dispatch are declared to be “the proofs of friendship and personal 
confidence on the part of Her Majesty the Queen, which Sir Hamilton 
Seymour had been directed on this occasion to impart to the 
Emperor.” These “proofs’ of Queen Victoria’s allegiance to the 
Czar have been wisely withheld from the British public, but may 
perhaps, one of these days, appear in the Journal de St.-Pétersbourg. 

In commenting upon his dialogue with the Emperor and on the 

* Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley. January 28, 1853.— Ed. 
> Sir G.H.Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon. March 10, 1853.— Ed. 
© Sir G.H.Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon. March 9, 1853.— Ed. 

Muscovite memorandum, Sir Hamilton again draws the attention 
of his Cabinet to the position of Austria: 

“Assuming, as a certain and now acknowledged fact, the existence of an 
understanding or compact between the two Emperors as to Turkish affairs, it 
becomes of the deepest importance to know the extent of the engagements entered 
into between them. As to the manner in which it has been concluded, I conjecture 
that little doubt is to be entertained. 

“Its basis was, no doubt; laid at some of the meetings between the Sovereigns 
which took place in the autumn; and the scheme has probably been worked out 
since under the management of Baron Meyendorf, the Russian Envoy at the 
Austrian Court, who has been passing the winter at St. Petersburg, and is still 
here.” 

Does the British Government on receiving these revelations, call 
Austria to account? No, it finds fault with France only. After the 
Russian invasion of the Principalities, it appoints Austria as 
mediator, chooses Vienna, of all other towns, for the seat of the 
conference, hands over to Count Buol the direction of the 
negotiations, and to this very moment continues to stultify France 
into the belief that Austria is likely to be a sincere ally in a war 
against the Muscovite for the integrity and independence of the 
Ottoman Empire, although it knew for longer than a twelvemonth 
that Austria had agreed to the dismemberment of that Empire. 

On March 19, Sir Hamilton’s report on his dialogue with the 
Czar arrived at London. Lord Clarendon now fills the place of 
Lord John, and continues to improve upon his predecessor. Four 
days after the receipt of that startling communication, in which the 
Czar no longer deigns to dissimulate, but frankly reveals his 
conspiracy against Turkey and France, the noble Earl sends to Sir 
Hamilton the following dispatch: 

“Her Majesty’s Government regret that the alarm and irritation which prevail at 
Paris should have induced the French Government to order their fleet to sail for 
the waters of Greece; but the position in which the French Government stands, in 
many respects is different from that of Her Majesty’s Government. They have not, 
to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, [received] assurances from the 
Emperor as to the policv he was determined to follow toward Turkey.” (See Blue 
Books, Vol. 1, page 95.)° 

If the Czar had communicated to France also that “the sick man 
was dying,” and a complete plan for sharing his succession, France, 
of course, would have felt neither alarm nor hesitation as to the 
fate of Turkey, the real objects of Prince Menchikoff’s mission, 
and the Emperor of Russia’s immovable determination to maintain 

“ Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon. March 9, 1853.— Ed. 
> The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour. March 23, 1853.— Ed. 

The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence 95 

the integrity and independence of the Empire, which he averred 
contained “no elements of existence.” 

On the same 23d of March, the Earl of Clarendon sends 
another dispatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour, one not “cooked” for 
the Blue Books, but the secret answer to the secret communication 
from St. Petersburg.* Sir Hamilton had closed his report of the 
dialogue with the very judicious suggestion: 

“I might venture to suggest that some expression might be used in the dispatch to be 
addressed to me, which might have the effect of putting an end to the further consideration, 
or, at all events, discussion of points which it is highly desirable should not be 
regarded as offering subject for debate.” 

The Earl of Clarendon, who feels himself the true man to 
handle hot coals, acts in strict compliance with the Czar’s 
invitation, and in direct contravention to his own Embassador’s 
warning. He commences his dispatch by declaring that “Her 
Majesty’s Government gladly comply with the Emperor’s wish that 
the subject should be further and frankly discussed.” The 
Emperor is “entitled” to “the most cordial declaration of opinion” 
on their part, because of the “generous confidence” placed in 
them that they will help him dismembering Turkey, betraying 
France, and, in the contingency of the overthrow of the Ottoman 
rule, suppressing all possible efforts on the part of the Christian 
populations to form free and independent States. . 

“Her Majesty’s Government,” continues the freeborn Briton, “are fully aware 
that, in the event of any understanding with reference to future contingencies 
being expedient, or indeed possible, the word of His Imperial Majesty would be 
preferable to any Convention that could be framed.” 

At all events, his word must be as good as any Convention that 
could be framed with him, the law advisers of the British Crown 
having long ago declared all treaties with Russia at an end, through 
violations on her part. 

“Her Majesty’s Government persevere in the belief, that Turkey still preserves 
the elements of existence.” 

To prove the sincerity of that belief, the Earl gently adds: 

“If the opinion of the Emperor, that the days of the Turkish Empire were 
numbered, became notorious its downfall must occur even sooner than His 
Imperial Majesty now appears to expect.” 

“ The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G.H.Seymour. March 23, 1853.— Ed. 
> Sir G.H.Seymour to Lord John Russell. February 22, 1853.— Ed. 

The Kalmuk, then, has only to divulge his opinion that the sick 
man is dying, and the man is dead. An enviable sort of vitality 
this! There is wanted no blast of the trumpets of Jericho. One 
breath from the Emperor’s august mouth, and the Ottoman 
Empire falls to pieces. 

“Her Majesty’s Government entirely share the opinion of the Emperor, that the 
occupation of Constantinople by either of the great Powers would be incompatible 
with the present balance of power and the maintenance of peace in Europe, and 
must at once be regarded as impossible; that there are no elements for the 
reconstruction of a Byzantine Empire; that the systematic misgovernment of Greece 
offers no encouragement to extend its territorial dominion; and that, as there are no 
materials for provincial or communal government, anarchy would be the result of 
leaving the provinces of Turkey to themselves, or permitting them to form separate 
republics.” 

Observe that the British Minister, prostrate at the feet of his 
Tartar master and servilely reechoing his words, is not ashamed 
even to repeat the monstrous lie that in Turkey there are “no 
elements for provincial or communal government,” while it is 
precisely the great development of communal and provincial life 
that has enabled Turkey to withstand till now the heaviest shocks 
both from without and from within. By indorsing all the Czar’s 
premises the British Ministry justifies all the conclusions he 
intends to draw therefrom. 

In the contingency of a dissolution of the Turkish Empire, says 
the gallant Earl, “the only mode by which a pacific solution could 
be attempted would be that of a European Congress.” But he is 
afraid of the consequences of such a Congress—not because of 
Russian trickery, which cheated England at the Congress of 
Vienna to such a degree that Napoleon at St. Helena exclaimed: 
“Had he been victorious at Waterloo, he could not have imposed 
more humiliating conditions upon England”*—but from fear of 
France. 

“The treaties of 1815 must then be open to revision, when France might be 
prepared to risk the chances of a European War to get rid of the obligations which 
she considers injurious to her national honor, and which, having been imposed by 
victorious enemies, are a constant source of irritation to her.” 

Her Majesty’s Government “desire to uphold the Turkish 
Empire” not as a bulwark against Russia, and because its downfall 
would force England to fight out with Russia her diametrically 

* The quotation from the book: Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Héléne, T. VI, 
p. 186, is freely rendered.— Ed. 

The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence 97 

opposed interests in the East. Oh, no, says the Earl: “The interests of 
Russia and England in the East are completely identical.” 

They desire to uphold the Turkish Empire not from any 
Eastern consideration at all, but “from their conviction that no 
great question can be agitated in the East without becoming a source 
of discord in the West.” An Eastern question, therefore, will not 
bring about a war of the Western Powers against Russia, but a war 
of the Western Powers among themselves—a war of England 
against France. And the same Minister who. wrote, and _ his 
colleagues who sanctioned these lines, would stultify us into the 
belief that they are about to carry on a serious war with France 
against Russia, and this “on a question agitated in the East,” and 
although “the interests of England and Russia in the East are 
completely identical!” , 

The brave Earl goes further. Why does he fear a war with France 
which he declares must be the “necessary result” of the dissolution 
and dismemberment of the Turkish Empire? A war with France 
considered in itself would be a very pleasant thing. But there is 
this delicate circumstance connected with it, 

— “that every great question in the West will assume a revolutionary character, 
and embrace a revision of the entire social system, for which the Continental 
Governments are certainly in no state of preparation. 

“The Emperor is fully cognisant of the materials that are in constant 
fermentation beneath the surface of society, and their readiness to burst forth even 
in times of peace; and His Imperial Majesty will probably therefore not dissent 
from the opinion that the first cannon shot may be the signal for a state of things 
more disastrous even than those calamities which war inevitably brings in its train.” 

Hence, exclaims the sincere peacemonger, “hence the anxiety of 
Her Majesty’s Government to avert the catastrophe.” If there lurked 
no war with France behind the partition of Turkey, and no 
revolution behind the war with France, Her Majesty's Government 
would be as ready to swallow the Grand Turk as his Cossack 
Majesty. 

According to the instructions received from the Russian 
Chancellery, through the means of Sir H.Seymour, the gallant 
Clarendon winds up his dispatch with “appealing to the Emperor’s 
magnanimity and feelings of justice.” 

In a second dispatch of our Earl, dated April 5, 1853, Sir 
Hamilton is directed to instruct the Russian Chancellor that 

— “Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe was directed to return to his post, and a 
special character was given to his mission by an autograph letter from Her Majesty, 
under the impression that the Porte would be better disposed to listen to moderate 

councils, when offered by one of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe’s high position 
and great knowledge and experience of Turkish affairs..., to advise the Porte to 
treat the Christian subjects with the utmost leniency.” 

The same Clarendon who gave his particular instructions had 
written in his secret dispatch dated 23d March, 1853: 
“The treatment of Christians is not harsh, and the toleration exhibited by the 

Porte toward this portion of its subjects might serve as an example to some 
Governments who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous Power.”