London, Tuesday, March 21, 1854 

A most important event is the compulsory publication by 
Ministers of their secret correspondence with the Emperor of 
Russia during the first three months of their administration, as 
also of the memorandum of the interview between the Czar and 
Lord Aberdeen in 1844, which the Journal de St. Pétersbourg 
challenged the latter to produce. 

I begin with an analysis of the “memorandum” by Count 
Nesselrode, delivered to Her Majesty’s Government, and founded 
on communications from the Emperor of Russia, subsequent to his 
visit to England in June, 1844. The present status quo of the Ot- 
toman Empire is “the most compatible with the general interest of 
the maintenance of peace.” England and Russia agree on this prin- 
ciple, and therefore unite their efforts to keep up that Status quo. 

“With this object, the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, 

without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, and without interfering, 
without absolute necessity, in its internal affairs.” 

Now, how is this “system of forbearance” to be successfully 
carried out? Firstly, by Great Britain not interfering with the 
interpretation Russia may think fit to put upon her treaties with 
the Porte, but forcing it, on the contrary, to act in conformity with 
those treaties as interpreted by Russia; and, in the second place, by 
allowing Russia “constantly” to meddle between the Sultan and his 
Christian subjects. In a word, “the system of forbearance” toward 
the Porte means a system of complicity with Russia. This strange 
proposition is, however, far from being expressed in rude terms. 

The memorandum affects to speak of “all the great Powers,” 
but at the same time plainly intimates that there exist no great 
Powers at all besides Russia and England. France, it is said, will 

“find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between 
St. Petersburg and London.” 

Austria is represented as a mere appendage to Russia, enjoying 
no life of her own, following no distinct policy, but one “closely 
united by the principle of perfect identity’ with that of Russia. 
Prussia is treated as a nonentity, not worth mentioning, and 
consequently is not so much as mentioned. “All the great Powers,” 
then, is only a rhetorical figure for the two Cabinets of St. 
Petersburg and London; and the line of conduct to be agreed 
upon by all the great Powers means the line of conduct drawn up 
at St. Petersburg and to be acted upon at London. The 
memorandum says: 

“The Porte has a constant tendency to extricate itself from the engagements 
imposed upon it by the treaties which it has concluded with other powers. It hopes 
to do so with impunity, because it reckons on the mutual jealousy of the Cabinets. 
It thinks that if it fails in its engagements toward one of them, the rest will espouse 
its quarrel, and will screen it from all responsibility. 

“It is essential not to confirm the Porte in this delusion. Every time that it fails 
in its obligations toward one of the great Powers, it is the interest of all the rest to 
make it sensible of its error, and seriously to exhort it to act rightly toward the 
Cabinet which demands just reparation. 

“As soon as the Porte shall perceive that it is not supported by the other Cabinets, it will 
give way, and the differences which have arisen will be arranged in a conciliatory 
manner, without any conflict resulting from them.” 

This is the formula by which England is called upon to assist 
Russia in her policy of extorting new concessions from Turkey, on 
the ground of her ancient treaties. 

“In the present state of feeling in Europe, the Cabinets cannot see with 
indifference the Christian populations in Turkey exposed to flagrant acts of 
oppression or religious intolerance. It is necessary constantly to make the Ottoman 
Ministers sensible of this truth, and to persuade them that they can only reckon on 
the friendship and on the support of the great Powers on the condition that they 
treat the Christian subjects of the Porte with toleration and with mildness.... 

“It will be the duty of the foreign representatives, guided by these principles, to 
act among themselves in a perfect spirit of agreement. If they address 
remonstrances to the Porte, those remonstrances must bear a real character of 
unanimity, though divested of one of exclusive dictation.” 

In this mild way England is taught how to back Russia’s 
pretensions to a religious Protectorate over the Christians of Turkey. 
Having thus laid down the premises of her “policy of forbear- 
ance,” Russia cannot conceal from her confidante that this very 

forbearance may prove more fatal than any policy of aggression, 
and fearfully contribute to develop all the “elements of dissolu- 
tion” the Ottoman Empire contains: so that some fine morning 

“unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall, without its being in the power of the 
friendly Cabinets to prevent it.” 

The question is then raised: what would have to be done in the 
event of such unforeseen circumstances producing a final catas- 
trophe in Turkey. 

‘Vhe only thing wanted, it is said, in the event of Turkey’s fall 
becoming imminent, is England and Russia’s “coming to a previous 
understanding before having recourse to action.” “This notion,” we are 
assured by the memorandum, “was in principle agreed upon 
during the Emperor’s last residence in London” (in the long 
conferences held between the Autocrat on the one hand, and the 
Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and the Earl of Aberdeen on 
the other hand). The result was 

“the eventual engagement that, if anything unforeseen occurred in Turkey, Russia 
and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in 
common.” 

Now, what means this eventual engagement? Firstly, that Russia 
and England should previously come to a common understanding 
as to the partition of Turkey, and secondly, that in such a case, 
England was to bind herself to form a Holy Alliance with Russia 
and Austria, described as Russia’s alter ego, against France, who 
would be “obliged,” i.e., forced to act in confotmity with their 
views. The natural result of such a common understanding would 
be to involve England in a deadly war with France, and thus to 
give Russia full sway to carry out her own policy on Turkey. 

Great stress is again and again laid upon the “unforeseen 
circumstances” that may accelerate the downfall of Turkey. At the 
conclusion of the memorandum the mysterious phrase, however, 
disappears, to be replaced by the more distinct formulation: “If 
we foresee that the Ottoman Empire must crumble to pieces, 
England and Russia have to enter into a previous concert, etc....” 
The only unforeseen circumstance, then, was the unforeseen 
declaration on the part of Russia that the Ottoman Empire must 
now crumble to pieces. The main point gained by the eventual 
engagement is the liberty granted to Russia to foresee, at a given 
moment, the sudden downfall of Turkey, and to oblige England to 
enter into negotiations, on the common understanding of such a 
catastrophe being at hand. 

Accordingly, about ten years after the memorandum had been 
drawn up, due notice is given to England that the vitality of the 
Ottoman Empire is gone, and that they had now to enter upon 
their previously arranged concert to the exclusion of France, i.e. to 
conspire behind the backs of Turkey and France. This overture 
opens the series of secret and confidential papers exchanged 
between St. Petersburg and the Coalition Cabinet. 

Sir G.H.Seymour, the British Embassador at St. Petersburg, 
sends his first secret and confidential dispatch to Lord J. Russell, 
the then Foreign Minister, on January 11, 1853. On the evening 
of the 9th January he had the “honor” to see the Emperor at the 
Palace of the Grand Duchess Helen,? who had condescended to 
invite Lady Seymour and himself to meet the Imperial family. The 
Emperor came up to him in his most gracious manner, expressing 
his great pleasure at the news of the formation of the Coalition 
Cabinet, to which he wished long life, desiring the Embassador to 
convey to old Aberdeen his congratulation on his part, and to beat 
into Lord John Russell’s brains 

“that it was very essential that the two Governments—the English Government 
and I, and I and the English Government—should be on the best terms; and that 
the necessity was never greater than at present.” 

Mark that these words were spoken in January, 1853, at the 
very time when Austria, “between whom and Russia” —according 
to the memorandum—‘“there exists an entire conformity of 
principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey,” was openly engaged 
in troubling the waters at Montenegro. 

“When we are agreed,” said the Czar, “it is immaterial what the others may 
think or do. Turkey,” he continued, in a hypocritical manner of condolence, “is in 
a-very critical state, and may give us all a great deal of trouble.” 

Having said so much, the Czar proceeded to shake hands with 
Sir H.Seymour, very graciously, as if about to take leave of him; 
but Sir Hamilton, to whom it “instantly occurred that the 
conversation was incomplete,” took “the great liberty” humbly to 
pray the Autocrat to “speak a little more explicitly with regard to 
the affairs of Turkey.” 

“The Emperor’s words and manner,” remarks this observer, “although still very 

kind, showed that His Majesty had no intention of speaking to me of the 
demonstration which he is about to make in the South.” 

Be it remarked that already in his dispatch of Jan. 7, 1853, Sir 
Hamilton had informed the British Government that 

“orders had been dispatched to the 5th corps d’armée to advance to the frontiers 
of the Danubian provinces..., and that the 4th corps ... would be ordered to hold 
itself in readiness to march if necessary;” 

and in a dispatch dated Jan. 8, 1853, that Nesselrode had 
expressed to him his opinion of the “necessity that the diplomacy 
of Russia should be supported by a demonstration of force.” 

“The Emperor,” Sir Hamilton continues his dispatch,” “said, at first with a little 

hesitation, but, as he proceeded, in an open and unhesitating manner: 

“<The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganized condition; the country itself 
seems to be falling to pieces (menace ruine); the fall will be a great misfortune, and 
it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good 
understanding upon these affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step of 
which the other is not apprized.’ 

““Stay,’ he exclaimed, ‘we have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man: it will 
be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away 
from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made. But, however, 
this is not the time to speak to you on that matter.” 

The patient, in this bear’s eyes, is so weak that he must eat him. 
Sir Hamilton, somewhat frightened at this “unforeseen” diagnostic 
of the Muscovite physician, answers in the true spirit of courtesy: 

“Your Majesty is so gracious that you will allow me one further observation. 
Your Majesty says the man is sick; it is very true; but Your Majesty will deign to 

excuse me if I remark, that it is the part of the generous and strong to treat with 
gentleness the sick and feeble man.” 

The British Embassador comforts himself by the consideration, 
that this concurrence on his part in the Czar’s view of Turkey and 
sickness and his appeal to forbearance with the sick man did “at 
least not give offense.” Thus ends Sir H.Seymour’s report on his 
first confidential conversation with the Czar; but, although 
appearing a perfect courtier in this vis-a-vis, he has sufficient good 
sense to warn his Cabinet and to tell them what follows: 

“Any overture of this kind only tends to establish a dilemma. The dilemma 
seems to be this: If Her Majesty’s Government do not come to an understanding 
with Russia as to what is to happen in the event of the sudden downfall of Turkey, 
they will have the less reason for complaining if results displeasing to England 
should be prepared. If, on the contrary, Her Majesty’s Government should enter 
into the consideration of such eventualities, they make themselves in some degree 
consenting parties to a catastrophe which they have so much interest in warding off 
as long as possible.” 

January 11, 1853.— Ed. 

Sir Hamilton winds up his dispatch with the following epigram- 
matic sentence: 

“The sum is probably this, that England has to desire a close concert with 
Russia, with a view to preventing the downfall of Turkey—while Russia would be 

well pleased that the concert should apply to the events by which this downfall is to 
be followed.” 

On the 14th of January, as Sir G.H.Seymour informs Lord 
J. Russell, in his dispatch dated 22d January, 1853, he had another 
confidential interview with the Czar, whom “he found alone.” The 
Autocrat condescended to give the English Embassador a lesson in 
Eastern affairs. The dreams and plans of the Empress Catherine II 
were known, but he did not indulge in them. On the contrary, 
in his opinion there existed, perhaps, only one danger for Russia, 
that of a further extension of his already too vast dominions. 
(Your readers will recollect that I alluded to this in extracting a 
passage from the dispatches of Count Pozzo di Borgo.”’) The status 
quo of Turkey was the most consonant with Russian interests. On 
the one hand, the Turks had lost their spirit of military enterprise, 
and on the other, 

“this country was strong enough, or had hitherto been strong enough, to preserve 
its independence and to ensure respectful treatment from other countries.” 

But in that empire there happened to be several millions of 
Christians he must take care of, hard and “inconvenient” as the 
task might be. To do this he was bound at once by his right, his 
duty and his religion. Then, all of a sudden, the Czar returned to 
his parable of the sick man, the very sick man, whom they must by 
no means allow “to suddenly die on their hands” (de leur 
échapper).” 

“Chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a European war, must attend the 

catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior scheme had been 
sketched.” 

Having, thus, again given notice of the impending death of the 
Ottoman Empire, the summons to England followed in conformity 
with the “eventual engagement’ to discount the heritage in 
common with Russia. “Still, he avoids sketching his own ulterior 
system,” contenting himself by establishing, in a parliamentary 
way, the main point to be kept in view in the event of a partition. 

“I desire to speak to you as a friend and a gentleman. If England and I arrive at 
an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest, it matters little to me; it is 
indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly, that if 
England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will 

not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better on these 
occasions to speak plainly; for my part, I am equally disposed to take the 
engagement not to establish myself there, as proprietor that is to say, for as 
occupier I do not say; it might happen that circumstances, if no previous provision 
were made, if everything should be left to chance, might place me in the position 
of occupying Constantinople.” 

England, therefore, will be forbidden to establish herself at 
Constantinople. The Czar will do so, if not as proprietor, at least 
in the quality of a temporary occupier. The British Embassador 
thanked His Majesty for the frankness of this declaration. Nicholas 
then alluded to his past conversation with the Duke of Wellington, 
of -which the memorandum of 1844 is the record, and, as it were, 
the résumé. Passing to the question of the day—to his claims to the 
Holy Places—the British Embassador expressed his fears: 

“Two consequences that might be anticipated from the appearance of a Russian 
army—the one being the counter-demonstration which might be provoked on the 
part of France; the other, and the more serious, the rising, on the part of the 
Christian population, against the Sultan’s authority, already so much weakened by 
revolts, and by a severe financial crisis. The Emperor assured me that no 
movement of his forces had yet taken place (n’ont pas bougé), and expressed his 
hope that no advance would be required. With regard to a French Expedition to the 
Sultan’s dominions, His Majesty intimated that such a step would bring affairs to an 
immediate crisis; that a sense of honor would compel him to send his forces into 
Turkey without delay or hesitation: that if the result of such an advance should 
prove to be the overthrow of the Great Turk (le Grand Turc), he should regret the 
event, but should feel that he had acted as he was compelled to do.” 

The Czar has now given England the theme she has to work 
out, viz: to sketch an “ulterior system” for superseding the 
Ottoman Empire, and “to enter into a previous concert as to 
everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, 
intended to replace that which now exists.” He encouraged his 
pupil by holding forth the prize he might gain from a successful 
solution of this problem, dismissing him with the paternal advice: 

“A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilization of the Nineteenth 
century, if the void left by the extinction of Mohammedan rule in Europe could be 
filled up without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the 
precautions adopted by the two principal Governments the’ most interested in the 
destinies of Turkey.” 

England being thus summoned, Lord J. Russell appears and 
sends in his answer in a secret and confidential dispatch dated 
Feb. 9, 1853. If Lord John had been fully aware of the Czar’s 
perfidious plan to press England into a false position by the mere 
fact of her entering into secret communications with him, as to the 

future partition of an allied State, he would have acted like the 
Czar, and have contented himself with making a verbal reply to 
Baron Brunnow, instead of dispatching an official State paper to 
St. Petersburg. Before the secret papers were laid before the 
House, The Times had described Lord John’s dispatch as a most 
powerful and “indignant refusal” of the Czar’s proposals.* In its 
yesterday's number it withdraws its own eulogy of Lord John, 
declaring that “the document does not deserve the praise it had 
been led, on imperfect information, to apply to it.” Lord John 
incurred the wrath of The Times in consequence of his declaration, 
in Friday’s sitting of the Commons,‘ that he certainly was not in 
the habit of making communications to that paper, and that he 
had not even read the article alluding to his answer to Sir 
G.H.Seymour until three days after its publication. 

Any one acquainted with the humble and abject tone assumed 
by every English Minister since 1814, Canning not even excepted, 
in their communications with Russia, will be forced to own that 
Lord John’s dispatch is to be regarded as a heroic performance on 
the part of that little earthman. 

The document having the character of an important contribu- 
tion to history, and being proper to illustrate the development of 
negotiations, your readers will be glad to be acquainted with it in 
extenso. . 

“LORD JOHN RUSSELL TO SIR G.H.SEYMOUR 
(“Secret and Confidential) 
“Foreign Office, February 9, 1853 

“Sir: I have received, and laid before the Queen, your secret and confidential 
dispatch of the 22d of January. 

“Her Majesty, upon this as upon former occasions, is happy to acknowledge the 
moderation, the frankness, and the friendly disposition of His Imperial Majesty. 

“Her Majesty has directed me to reply in the same spirit of temperate and 
amicable discussion. 

“The question raised by His Imperial Majesty is a very serious one. It is, 
supposing the contingency of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire to be probable, 
or even imminent, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a 
contingency than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a European 
war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and 
before some ulterior system has been sketched; this is the point, said His Imperial 
Majesty, to which I am desirous that you should call the attention of your 
Government. 

: The Times, No. 21686, March 11, 1854, leader.— Ed. 
The Times, No. 21693, March 20, 1854, leader.— Ed. 
“ March 17, 1854.— Ed. 

“In considering this grave question, the first reflection that occurs to Her 
Majesty’s Government is that no actual crisis has occurred which renders necessary 
a solution of this vast European problem. Disputes have arisen respecting the Holy 
Places, but these are without the sphere of the internal government of Turkey, and 
concern Russia, and France rather than the Sublime Porte. Some disturbance of the 
relations between Austria and the Porte has been caused by the Turkish attack on 
Montenegro; but this again relates rather to dangers affecting the frontier of 
Austria, than the authority and safety of the Sultan; so that there is no sufficient 
cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at hqme, or preserve 
friendly relations with his neighbors. 

“It occurs further to Her Majesty’s Government to remark, that the event which 
is contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time. When William III and 
Louis XIV disposed, by treaty, of the succession of Charles II, of Spain,” they 
were providing for an event which could not be far off. The infirmities of the 
sovereign of Spain, and the certain end of any human life, made the contingency 
in prospect both sure and near. The death of the Spanish king was in no way 
hastened by the treaty of partition. The same thing may be said of the provision 
made in the last century for the disposal of Tuscany ‘~ upon the decease of the last 
prince of the house of Medici.* But the contingency of the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire is of another kind. It may happen twenty, fifty, or a hundred 
years hence. 

“In these circumstances it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings toward the 
Sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to 
dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion. Besides this consideration, 
however, it must be observed, that an agreement made in such a case tends very 
surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to provide. Austria and 
France could not, in fairness, be kept in ignorance of the transaction, nor would 
such concealment be consistent with the end of preventing a European war. 
Indeed, such concealment cannot be intended by His Imperial Majesty. It is to be 
inferred that, as soon as Great Britain and Russia should have agreed on the 
course to be pursued, and have determined to enforce it, they should communicate 
their intentions to the Great Powers of Europe. An agreement thus made and thus 
communicated would not be very long a secret; and while it would alarm and 
alienate the Sultan, the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his enemies 
to increased violence and more obstinate conflict. They would fight with the 
conviction that they must ultimately triumph; while the Sultan’s generals and 
troops would feel that no immediate success could save their cause from final 
overthrow. Thus would be produced and strengthened that very anarchy which 1s 
now feared, and the foresight of the friends of the patient would prove the cause 
of his death. 

“Her Majesty’s Government need scarcelv enlarge on the dangers attendant_on 
the execution of any similar convention. The example of the Succession War~ is 
enough to show how little such agreements are respected when a pressing 
temptation urges their violation. The position of the Emperor of Russia as 
depositary, but not proprietor, of Constantinople, would be exposed to numberless 
hazards, both from the long-cherished ambition of his own nation and the 
jealousies of Europe. The ultimate proprietor, whoever he might be, would hardly 
be satisfied with the inert, supine attitude of the heirs of Mohammed II. A great 

influence on the affairs of Europe seems naturally to belong to the Sovereign of 
Constantinople, holding the gates of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 

“That influence might be used in favor of Russia; it might be used to control 
and curb her power. 

“His Imperial Majesty has justly and wisely said: My country is so vast, so 
happily circumstanced in every way, that it would be unreasonable in me to desire 
more territory or more power than I possess. On the contrary, he observed, our 
great, perhaps our only danger, is that which would arise from an extension given 
to an Empire already too large. A vigorous and ambitious State, replacing the 
Sublime Porte, might, however, render war on the part of Russia a necessity for the 
Emperor or his successors. 

“Thus European conflict would arise from the very means taken to prevent it; 
for neither England nor France, nor probably Austria, would be content to see 
Constantinople permanently in the hands of Russia. 

“On the part of Great Britain, Her Majesty’s Government at once declare that 
they renounce all intention or wish to hold Constantinople. His Imperial Majesty 
may be quite secure upon this head. They are likewise ready to give an assurance 
that they will enter into no agreement to provide for the contingency of the fall of 
Turkey without previous communication with the Emperor of Russia. 

“Upon the whole, then, Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that no 
course of policy can be adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to 
Europe than that which His Imperial Majesty has so long followed, and which will 
render his name more illustrious than that of the most famous sovereigns who have 
sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory. 

“With a view to the success of this policy, it is desirable that the utmost 
forbearance should be manifested toward Turkey; that any demands which the 
Great Powers of Europe may have to make should be made matter of friendly 
negotiation rather than of peremptory demand; that military and naval demonstra- 
tions to coerce the Sultan should as much as possible be avoided; that differences 
with respect to matters affecting Turkey, within the competence of the Sublime 
Porte, should be decided after mutual concert between the Great Powers, and not 
be forced upon the weakness of the Turkish Government. 

“To these cautions Her Majesty’s Government wish to add that, in their view, it 
is essential that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects in 
conformity with the principles of equity and religious freedom which prevail 
generally among the enlightened nations of Europe. The more the Turkish 
Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equa: administration, the less 
will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection 
which His Imperial Majesty has found so burdensome and inconvenient, though no 
doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty. 

“You may read this dispatch to Count Nesselrode, and, if it is desired, you may 
yourself place a copy of it in the hands of the Emperor. In that case you will 
accompany its presentation with those assurances of friendship and confidence on 
the part of Her Majestv the Queen, which the conduct of His Imperial Majesty was 
so sure to inspire. 
“Tam &c. 

“J. Russell” 

I am obliged to postpone the conclusion of this analysis to my 
next letter.* Before concluding, however, I will give you, in 

addition to previous communications, the most recent news I have 
obtained, from a source not otherwise accessible to the public,” 
regarding the attitude and plans of Prussia.* 

When the conflict between Russia on the one hand, and the 
Anglo-French Alliance on the other, already reached a certain 
climax, the Emperor Nicholas dispatched an autograph letter to 
his brother-in-law” at Berlin, in which he stated that though 
England and France might do him some damage at sea he feared 
nothing from them on land, having 600,000 soldiers ready to take 
the field at the end of April. Of these he would place 200,000 at 
the disposition of Frederick William, if the latter engaged himself 
to march on Paris and dethrone Louis Napoleon. The imbecile 
king was so much taken in by this proposition that Manteuffel 
required three days’ discussion to dissuade him from taking the 
pledge. So much for the king. 

As to Herr von Manteuffel himself, the “great character’’* of 
whom the Prussian middle classes are so proud, the whole man 
lies open, as in a nutshell, in his secret instructions sent to Mr. 
Bunsen, his Embassador at London, at the same period as the 
above Russian letter was received, and which came into my 
possession through certainly a different manner than that by 
which Mr. Bunsen possessed himself of my private letters.” The 
contents of these instructions, betraying in the arrogant ambiguity 
of their style at once the schoolmaster and the drill-sergeant, are 
nearly as follows: “Look sharp whence the wind blows. If you 
observe that England is in earnest alliance with France, and 
determined to push on the war, take your stand on the ‘integrity 
and independence’ of Turkey. If you observe her wavering in 
policy and disinclined to war, out with your lance and break it 
cheerfully for the honor and character of the king, my master and 

yours.” 
Is the Autocrat wrong then in treating Prussia as a non-entity? 
Written on March 21, 1854 Reproduced from the New-York