Our European correspondence and files of journals received last 
evening by the arrival of the America’s mail, fully confirm the 
reported expulsion of the Russians from their trenches before 
Silistria and their subsequent withdrawal from Wallachia back to 
the line of the Sereth. We learn also that there is no doubt of the 
immediate entrance of the Austrians into the evacuated province 
of Wallachia, under the treaty concluded at Constantinople on the 
14th ult.'*°—an event under the circumstances of no small value 
to the Czar, brought about too, as we learn, under the immediate 
direction of Prince Metternich, who, in fact, again controls the 
foreign policy of the Hapsburgs. 

Besides the curious coincidence of the Russians evacuating and 
of the Austrians occupying Wallachia, the very manner in which 
the siege of Silistria was undertaken, carried on, and _ finally 
abandoned, indicates that agencies were at work altogether distinct 
from mere military considerations. From the official Russian 
report, which comes down to the night of May 28,'*! and which 
differs from the Turkish bulletins only with regard to the 
respective numbers of killed and wounded, it appears that the 
operations were of a strangely precipitate character; that the 
rudest efforts to dismount the outworks were not made until the 
impossibility of taking the place by storm was practically ascer- 
tained, and that the attack was more wild and unscientific than 
any known even in the annals of Russian sieges. As to the 
operations between the 28th of May and the 15th of June, the 
reports which we have received are yet too fragmentary to allow of 
a detailed description; the fact, however, that during the repeated 

desperate assaults, nearly all the commanding officers were 
wounded and disabled —Paskievich, Schilder, whose leg has since 
been amputated, Gorchakoff, Luders and Orloff who was shot 
through the eye, clearly proves that the Russians were under 
orders, not merely to take the place at any cost, but to take it 
within a certain fixed time. Indeed the whole was conducted on 
their part in a manner which reminds us more of the barbarian 
method of carrying the cities of Koordistan by Timur Tamerlane, 
than of the proceedings of regular modern warfare. On the other 
hand, it is evident that the heroic and able defense of Silistria 
created equal surprise with the allied powers and the Ottoman 
Divan. Our readers may remember that about six weeks ago the 
allied commanders met at Varna, that they discovered that the 
Balkan line formed the natural defense of Turkey,* and that now 
many of the British journals not only confess, but glory in the 
avowal, that Silistria was not relieved by a single French or English 
soldier. Lastly, it cannot be denied that Silistria was a point of 
great military importance, that the fate of this fortress decides the 
fate of the campaign, and that with the abandonment of its siege 
and the sudden retreat of the Russians upon the Sereth, the whole 
of the Russian conquests of territory made this year as well as the 
last are lost. 

Still it must be said that our English cotemporaries, many of 
them, greatly exaggerate the extent of the present Muscovite 
reverses. It certainly requires a high degree of credulity to believe 
that the sortie made by the garrison of Silistria on June 13, and 
the succor of 2,000 men they are said to have received from Omer 
Pasha, resulted in the total defeat of the Russians, and forced 
90,000 to 100,000 men to fly before 15,000. The sudden retreat of 
the Russians is, so far as we can judge, quite as mysterious as their 
sudden attack. It is only to be explained by a_ previous 
understanding with Austria, involving the occupation of Wallachia 
by Austrian troops. Under these circumstances, the following 
passage which we find in a letter of The Morning Chronicle's 
Constantinople correspondent, revealing this plot on June 10, as 
early as four days before the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish 
treaty, is of a peculiarly interesting character: 

“The Turks think that diplomacy is playing with them, and that it is their 
intention to allow Silistria to fall into the hands of Russia. These suspicions receive 
confirmation from the news that has been received here of the preparation of a new 
protocol at Vienna, in which the fall of Silistria is, I learn, spoken of as if it were 

accomplished; and, the military honor of Russia being satisfied, Austria would consider 
the time to have arrived for her armed intervention to bring about an arrangement 
by the means of her co-operation— occupying the Danubian Principalities, which would 
be evacuated by the armies of Russia.” 

According to this, if the Russians had taken Silistria in due time, 
all would have been right. But though they did not succeed in 
satisfying the military honor of the Czar, they must, according to 
the compromise with Austria, beat back in a somewhat inglorious 
manner. The Russians receding behind the Sereth, the Austrians 
advance to the Sereth and Danube, and thus place themselves 
between the Muscovites and the Turks and their allies. In this 
position they are arbiters of the quarrel, preventing both parties 
from moving forward. The Russians remain in Moldavia, while the 
Vienna Conference will be more than ever busy itself with 
protocols, and thus the winter will be gained. If the Conferences 
end in nothing—a result which is sure since the Emperor of 
Russia has got the money on his new loan of $37,000,000 from 
Hope & Co. of Amsterdam*—the position of the Russian army 
behind the Danube and the Sereth will be twice as strong as was its 
line between Bucharest and Kustendje. Besides, if we look at the 
relative strength of the Russians before Silistria and in Bulgaria, 
now on their retreat behind the Sereth, and of the allied armies as 
far as they can, thanks to their ingenious arrangements, be thrown 
at all into the balance, it is plainly seen that, with even the best 
intentions, the latter would not be capable of baffling this 
combination of Austria with Russia. 

The Russian forces employed against Turkey and the allies on 
the European shores of the Black Sea amount to thirteen divisions 
of infantry, three of the third, three of the fourth, one of the 
fifth, three of the sixth army corps, and three reserve divisions. 
Besides these, the third, fourth, fifth and sixth divisions of light 
cavalry, and the third, fourth and fifth divisions of artillery. These 
troops, making up nearly one-half of the grand army of 
operations, should amount, according to the official statements, to 
16,000 men per division of infantry, 5,000 per division of cavalry, 
and 160 guns per division of artillery; altogether something like 
250,000 to 260,000 men, inclusive of train and camp followers. 
But, if we measure the strength of a Russian army by what it 
actually was in the Hungarian war,'” we cannot estimate a division 
of Russian infantry at more than 13,000 to 14,000 men, and the 
cavalry and artillery must be reduced in proportion. The actual 

forces, then, which the Russians have successively marched into 
the Principalities would be reduced to about 210,000 men, and 
even from this number must be deducted, on account of loss in 
battle and by sickness, at least 20,000 to 25,000 more. Recollecting 
the ravages made by the marsh-fever in the ranks of the Russian 
army during 1828-29, and comparing the letters of a Russian 
surgeon' in the Vienna Medical Journal,? we cannot consider a 
loss of from eight to ten per cent. upon the total of the army as 
exaggerated. Thus about 180,000 Russians are left as the 
disposable number of their army. 

It is interesting to learn what portion of this force can have been 
employed in the operations against Silistria. A large body of troops 
was required to guard the communications and magazines 
established in the rear of the line of battle. Bucharest and the line 
of the Dobrodja had to be occupied. Detachments were indispens- 
able to cover the flanks, and partly the front of the army; and if 
we deduct 60,000 men for these various duties we obtain a net 
result of 130,000 men available for the siege of Silistria and the 
covering of that operation. This is rather above than below the 
mark. Now the position of Silistria on a large river made it 
unavoidable that the besieging army should divide itself, with a 
view to inclose the fortress from all sides. It further necessitated 
the establishment of strong reserves on the northern bank, in 
order to receive the troops pushed forward from the southern 
bank in case of a defeat. Finally these troops occupying the 
southern or right bank had to divide themselves agaip into a 
double army, the one to carry on the siege and to repel any sallies 
of the besieged, the other to cover the siege and defeat any army 
marching to the relief of the fortress. About 35,000 to 40,000 men 
were required to occupy the left bank and carry on the siege on 
the right. Thus an army of 80,000 Russians would have remained 
available for active field-operations against a relieving army, and 
this was the utmost the Russians could bring to battle on Bulgarian 
ground within from ten to twenty miles of Silistria. 

Now let us see what force the allies have to oppose to the 
180,000 Russian total at this moment. The Turkish army at 
Shumla was stated, some time ago, to be about 80,000 strong, but 
short of everything required for action in the open field, and 1s, 
according to the latest report of Lord Raglan and French staff 
officers, badly officered, altogether 1n a condition which peremp- 
torily forbids offensive operations. It is neither our purpose nor 

within our present means to determine the accuracy of this report. 
Suffice it to say that such is the character of the Turkish main 
army in the official opinion of its allies. Since then the troops from 
Kalafat have been drawn to Rustchuk, where a camp of 40,000 
men is said to be establishing. It would be difficult to conceive the 
policy of thus rendering idle a corps of such strength, which, if it 
had marched upon Bucharest instead of Rustchuk, might have 
compelled the Russians to raise immediately the investment of 
Silistria, but for the conduct of the war being entirely in the hands 
of diplomacy. Setting apart the present garrison at Rustchuk and 
the garrison and reserve at Shumla, it may well be doubted 
whether the Turks can muster 50,000 men in the open field in a 
condition fit for the work before them. An Anglo-French soldier 
being equal, in the estimation of western military authorities, to at 
least two Russians, there would still be required a force of 65,000 
allies to balance the strength of the Russian army of occupation. 
Unless, therefore, they can muster that force at Varna they would 
hardly go to battle, the case of extreme necessity excepted. 

They have however been most careful not to drop at once into 
the field in such force as would leave no further pretext for 
abstaining from active operations. The whole Anglo-French force 
now in Turkey does not amount to more than 80,000 men, besides 
from 15,000 to 20,000 more now on their way thither, including 
almost the entire cavalry and artillery. The amount of transports 
at hand in the Bosphorus is, whether intentionally or not, very 
limited, so that it would take many a journey there and back, if 
they were to be transported to Varna by sea alone. But, 

“according to the latest and most accurate accounts,”—says the correspondent 
we have already quoted—‘there are at present but 12,000 British and French 
troops who have been transported by sea, while the bulk of the French army is 
slowly advancing from Gallipoli toward Constantinople and Adrianople.” 

The roads being notoriously bad and the difficulty of victualling 
‘extreme, an arrangement which allows their famous General—St. 
Arnaud—to be permanently under steam between Varna and 
Constantinople, where we may be sure he does not lose an 
opportunity for turning every intrigue in the Divan to a solid 
advantage for his unfathomable purse. As to the two British 
divisions still at Scutari, we are informed by the same correspon- 
dent that 

“they do not seem ready to start yet, though there is a whole fleet of transports 
and steamers at anchor, waiting to embark them.” 

From all these facts it is sufficiently clear to everybody that the 
allied powers have taken full care not to be in a state to frustrate 
directly the present arrangement between Russia and Austria. For, 
if it were intended to pursue that object, a very simple alternative 
for doing so offers itself either by an Anglo-Swedish alliance in the 
Baltic, which would give a basis of operations for auxiliary troops 
by facilitating an invasion of Finland and a turning on the 
land-side of the fortresses of Sweaborg and Kronstadt; or by a 
combined attack by sea and land on the Crimea and Sevastopol. 
With regard to the first supposition, it is amusing to see how The 
London Times which, not three weeks before, preached the 
necessity of sending the Black Sea squadron to the Baltic, now 
recommends a simple blockade of the harbors of the Baltic and an 
immediate return of the greater portion of the Baltic fleet to the 
Black Sea, where it suddenly advocates the occupation of the 
Crimea.* This is the same journal which affected to regret that 
nothing could be undertaken by Napier before the French fleet 
should have joined him.’ Now that it has done so, it is supposed 
that nothing will be done, after all, and that both the French and 
English fleet had better take another excursion through the 
Kattegat, the Channel, and the straits of Gibraltar sound to the 
Euxine. Reflecting on the time which the juncture of these fleets 
has required, and again on the time which their junction with the 
forces under Admiral Dundas would require, it becomes plain that 
to do nothing either in the Baltic or in the Black Sea is the great 
object of these propositions. 

The only point on which the Russians—apart from their 
unforeseen and unexpected defeat at Silistria—have undergone 
substantial losses and are surrounded with dangers, is the 
Caucasus—though this is not altogether certain. They had aban- 
doned nearly all their fortresses on the eastern shore of the Black 
Sea, not from any fear of the allied fleets, but in order to strength- 
en their Georgian army. On their retreat across the Dariel Pass 
they are stated to have been suddenly attacked by a large force of 
mountaineers, in the van and rear, to have had their advanced 
guard cut to pieces, while their center and rear were compelled to 
retire with severe loss. At the same time the army of Selim Pasha 
advanced from St. Nicholas upon Ussurgheti, whence the Russians 
had frequently molested and menaced the Turks, and now forced 

“The Times, No. 21774, June 22, 1854, leader.— Ed. 
1854. The Times, No. 21751, May 26, 1854.— Ed. 

the Russians to evacuate that fortress, a result by which the 
communications between Selim Pasha and the main Turkish army 
at Kars have been secured. When it is recollected that even this 
army was throughout the winter and spring in the most deplorable 
state of inefficiency, the maneuver of the Russians indicates at 
least that they felt their position in Georgia to be no _ less 
precarious, and that they were sadly in want of reenforcements 
from the coast. If, now, this reported defeat at Dariel be true or 
even partially so, the consequence is that the army of Woronzoff is 
cut off, and must try either to procure a tenable basis at Tiflis with 
a view to hold out until next winter—a matter of no slight 
difficulty—or it must attempt to make its way at any loss through 
the pass. This operation would at all events be preferable to a 
retreat upon the Caspian Sea, the pass leading thither being of 
infinitely greater danger than that of Dariel. On this point, 
however, we shall be better able to speak positively on the receipt 
of more complete and authentic information from that quarter. So 
far we may set down Russia as having certainly gained two 
victories by the recent operations,—one in the loan from Hope 
& Co., and one in the Austrian treaty with the Porte; and as ha- 
ving suffered one defeat—that of Silistria. Whether the former 
will have permanent advantages enough to compensate for 
the disgrace of the latter, the future only can decide.