Since the desperate and sanguinary day of Inkerman, the 
campaign in the Crimea has been marked by no military event of 
any importance; but, the advent of winter without the capture of 
Sevastopol having given a new character to the enterprise, it 
becomes proper to review the course of events since the landing of 
the Expedition, in order to determine what are the circumstances 
and chances amid which it enters upon the new developments that 
now await it. First, however, we must add a few words to our 
former observations upon the last memorable battle.* With regard 
to this event, extraordinary confusion and want of perspicacity 
characterizes the official reports, all of which we have published.” 
Lord Raglan’s dispatch was evidently written in a great hurry.” 
Confounding that front of his army toward the Chernaya with 
that toward Sevastopol, he calls the same flank of his position 
sometimes the right, sometimes the left, in the same dispatch, so 
that it is impossible to get a clear idea of the events from this 
source. Canrobert’s dispatch* is as diffuse and indefinite as it is 
short, and therefore quite useless; and whoever compares the 
so-called Menchikoff dispatch of the Russian Invalid? with the 

Lord Raglan’s dispatch of November 8, 1854. The Times, No. 21906, 

November 23, 1854.— Ed. 

November 22, 1854.— Ed. 

No. 21906, November 23, 1854.— Ed. 

former reports of Prince Menchikoff, must see at a glance that this 
was not penned by the same man. Nicholas, evidently, has found 
that he has allowed quite enough of the liberty of the press, and 
since telling the truth like a gentleman does not prevent his troops 
from getting beaten, he considers it quite as well to return to the 
old system of lying. By his Imperial will, the ordinary course of 
events is altered after the fact, and a defeated attack from his 
relieving army against the besiegers is changed to a victorious sally 
from within the town. The reason is evident: The sallying force 
necessarily retires into its fortifications so soon as the object of the 
sally is obtained; the retreat thus is explained and made a matter 
of course; while, if the facts were stated as they actually occurred, 
the disgrace of the defeat could not be hidden. 

And well might Nicholas do his best to hide the circumstances of 
this battle from his people. Never since the battle of Narva has 
such ‘disgrace been heaped upon the Russian arms. And, 
considering the tremendous difference between the Russians of 
Narva and the Russians of Inkerman, the undrilled hordes of 
1700, and the well-drilled army of 1854, the day of Narva must, in 
comparison, be considered a bright one in Russian military history. 
Narva was the first grand disaster of a rising nation, whose 
determined spirit learnt how to conquer by defeat itself. Inkerman 
almost appears a certain indication of the decay of that hot-house 
development which Russia has experienced since Peter the Great. 
The artificial growth and the mere effort to keep up, with a 
barbarian material, a splendid show of civilization, appears already 
to have exhausted the nation and inflicted a sort of pulmonary 
consumption upon it. In all the battles of the present century, 
from Austerlitz and Eylau*” down to Silistria, the Russians had 
shown themselves excellent soldiers. Their defeats, wherever 
they occurred, could be explained; they left no stain upon the 
honor of the army, if they did upon the reputation of its generals. 
But now the matter is completely changed. If Balaklava showed 
the superiority of the allied cavalry, if the whole of the siege of 
Sevastopol shows the enormous superiority of the allied artillery 
over the Russian, still the Russian infantry remained in possession 
of its high reputation. Inkerman has settled this point too. Strange to 
say, the Russian infantry has forfeited its renown in a battle, in 
which, perhaps, the individual Russian foot-soldier fought more 
bravely than ever. The sovereign mediocrity which has been the 
chief characteristic of all military operations in this war, both on 
the Russian and the allied side, has never been made more 
apparent. Every movement, and every step taken, has produced a 

result exactly the opposite of what was intended. A coup de main? 
is undertaken, and it turns out to involve a campaign—a winter 
campaign even. A battle is fought, but its gain is only momentary, 
vanishing in less than a week from the hands of the victors. An 
open town is assailed with heavy siege artillery; but, before the 
siege train is brought up, the open town is changed into a fortified 
camp of the first order. A siege is undertaken; and, when at the 
point of being successful, it has to be given up, because a relieving 
army comes up, and is—not victorious, but defeated. A strong 
position taken up against the relieving army becomes, by the very 
shortness of its front, the means in the hands of the relieving 
army to turn the besiegers into the besieged! Thus ten weeks are 
occupied with a series of efforts, combats, trench-works, plans and 
counter-plans; winter sets in, and finds both armies — but especial- 
ly the allies— quite unprepared for the season; and all this with no 
result but a tremendous loss on both sides, leaving a decision of 
the campaign as remote and unlikely as ever. 

The forces which the allies brought into the Crimea, from the 
first invasion to the 5th of November, did not exceed 25,000 
British, 35,000 French, and 10,000 to 15,000 Turks, or from 
70,000 to 75,000 altogether. When the expedition was undertaken, 
no more reenforcements from England or France were expected; 
a few battalions and squadrons were on the road, but they are 
comprised in the above estimate. All the additional forces they 
might have been able to bring up, at a short notice, must have 
been Turks; and, in spite of Chetatea and Silistria, neither the 
allied commanders nor the allied troops have ever shown any 
confidence in them. The 60,000 French and English were, then, 
the actually reliable portion of the expedition, and they alone can 
be counted as really effective. Now, this army was too small for a 
campaign, and too large for a coup de main. It could not be 
embarked with rapidity; the months employed in preparation were 
sufficient to put the Russians on their guard; and, if the presence 
of the Austrians guaranteed the Principalities and Bulgaria from. 
Russian attacks, it also guaranteed Bessarabia and Odessa from any 
serious danger; for, the position of the Austrians being on the 
flank and rear of either line of operations, neither army could 
have marched forward without being at their mercy. Thus, the 
Russians must have been certain that all these preparations were 
directed against Sevastopol; beside which, the ports of Kherson 
and Nikolayev, the dock-yards of the Russian fleet, were the only 

points in any way seriously menaced. Russian preparation in the 
Crimea was, therefore, sure to follow, step by step, the prepara- 
tions of the allies. And so they did, until, at last, the contemplated 
coup de main was converted into a regular campaign, conducted, 
however—as was clear from the way it was commenced — in the’ 
most irregular manner. 

When, at the Alma, the allies had to allow the Russians to 
withdraw in perfect order from the field of battle, although 
attacked by far superior numbers, the first glimpse of the truth 
burst upon them; the original plan was upset, the coup had failed, 
a new set of eventualities had to be provided for. Vacillation 
followed; days were lost; the march to Balaklava was at last 
resolved upon, and the advantages of a strong defensive position 
overruled the chance of soon obtaining possession of the north 
side of Sevastopol which commanded the town, and _ was, 
therefore, the decisive point. At the same time Menchikoff made 
similar mistakes by his hasty march to Sevastopol, and his equally 
hasty counter-march to Bakshiserai. Then followed the siege. 
Nineteen days elapsed before the batteries of the first parallel 
could open their fire, and then the advantages remained pretty 
equally divided. The siege went on with enormous slowness, but 
not very surely for all that. Hard work in the trenches, arduous 
outpost duty acting upon men weakened by a climate to which 
they were not bred, and by a fearful epidemic, thinned the ranks 
of the allies wonderfully. Their commanders had scarcely reck- 
oned upon the common wear and tear of a campaign—they were 
taken quite unawares by such extraordinary losses. And the 
medical and commissariat departments, especially with the British, 
were totally out of order. Within sight lay the rich valley of 
Baidar, full of all the supplies most wanted; yet they could not 
venture into it! They had no hopes of early reenforcements; yet 
the Russians were coming up from all] sides. Then came the affair 
of the 25th October.* The Russians gained the advantage, and one 
third of the allied cavalry was annihilated. Next followed the battle 
of the 5th November,” where the Russians suffered a repulse, but 
at a loss to the allies which they could not for a second time 
afford. Since then, both the Russian relieving army and the allied 
besiegers have been quiet. The siege of Sevastopol, if carried on at 
all, is carried on pro forma. Nobody will pretend that the lazy, 
desultory fire which the allies have kept up since the 5th of 

November can do any harm to the defenses of the place, or even 
prevent the Russians from repairing the damage done up to that 
time. There is no doubt that the siege, if taken up again, will have 
to be done over afresh, with the only difference that, perhaps, the 
attacking batteries are brought some hundred yards nearer the 
place than they were at the first beginning, unless the fire from 
the town, supported by continuous attacks from Inkerman, should 
prove superior to that of the allies, and destroy the more 
advanced batteries. 

Here, then, are the allies, in the beginning of December, in a 
country with cold winters, badly provided with clothing and other 
materials to enable them to get through the bad season in a 
passable manner; weak in spite of all reenforcements, arrived or 
on the way; having lost a vast number of men; entangled in the 
pursuit of objects and in modes of action which they never 
intended nor prepared for, and having gained nothing, absolutely 
nothing, but a consciousness of their individual and _ tactical 
superiority over their opponents. Twenty thousand men, chiefly 
French, must by this time have reenforced them, and more are 
expected; but if we recollect the difficulties and delays which 
accompanied the first allied expedition to Turkey —if we recollect, 
moreover, that almost all the transports used for carrying the first 
army have been kept back, and that new ships must be found for 
the divisions now under orders for the East, we must conclude 
that the army of the Crimea will remain without material increase 
of strength, for some time after the arrival of the 20,000 men 
above alluded to. Thus their strength may now be something like 
55,000 to 60,000 men, one-third of whom come fresh from 
comfortable garrison life, and will have to suffer heavily before 
being inured to the hardships of a winter bivouac under a 
Crimean sky. In truth, these very reenforcements may prove an 
incumbrance, instead of an increase of strength, after the disasters 
encountered by the French and English transports, in the furious 
tempest of November 13. These disasters, however, cannot be said 
to belong to that order of fatal and overwhelming accidents, which 
the best contrived plans are unable to foresee or prevent. The 
storm of November 13th was a seasonable storm, and seasonable 
were the disasters that befell the allied fleets. The very date on 
which the Crimean expedition started, after three months of 
tedious and inexplicable delays, foreboded storms and wrecks, 
with losses of ships, crews, men and supplies. The framers of this 
extraordinary campaign were, moreover, again and again 
forewarned as to the incidents inseparable from Black Sea 

navigation at so advanced a period of the year. They, then, are 
responsible, even for the misfortunes of November 13, which 
threaten the allied forces with the fate of Napoleon’s army during 
the Muscovite campaign. The London Times estimates the total loss 
of men, incurred on the 13th, at the various stations of the 
Crimea, at a thousand, “besides those that have fallen into the 
hands of the Cossacks.” * The same journal also tells us that 

“the Prince, a magnificent new screw steamer, of 2,700 tuns, carried out the 
other day to Balaklava the 46th Regiment, all the winter clothing for the troops 
engaged in the siege, including 40,000 great-coats, flannel suits, under-clothing, 
socks and gloves, beef, pork and other provisions; hospital stores for Scutari; and a 
vast quantity of shot and shell to carry on the siege. These are wholly lost. The 
Resolute, with 900 tuns of gunpowder, also went to the bottom. Thus, it seems, all 
the materials for carrying on the siege and providing against the severity of the 
winter, have been carried off at one fell swoop; and, even if we think to content 
ourselves with merely maintaining our position on the hights before Sevastopol, it 
is evident that we are not in condition to stand our worst foe—the coming 
winter.” 

Though the Crimea is an almost insulated portion of the 
Russian Empire, and though the troops brought up against the 
allies have not been able to dislodge them when only 35,000 
strong, yet nobody will venture to say that these 60,000 allies are 
strong enough to resist all the troops Russia may bring up. The 
Russians have six divisions of infantry and one reserved division in 
the Crimea, or about 100 battalions (besides marines and seamen, 
whom we have not counted on either side). These 100 battalions, 
one-half of which have made a murderous campaign of eighteen 
months on the Danube, cannot muster more than 50,000 to 
60,000 men; including cavalry, field artillery and Cossacks, the 
whole Russian force in the field will exceed that of the allies by 
barely 10,000 to 15,000 men. But if it is true that Luders’s corps, 
or another 49 battalions of about 20,000 to 25,000 men (for they, 
too, have left one-third of their number on the Danube), is on the 
march to Perekop, if some more reserves of the new formations 
are concentrating in the same direction the opportunity may very 
soon present itself to the Russians to strike a grand blow; and as 
superiority, moral, physical, and tactical, only goes a certain way 
when opposed to superior numbers and about equal generalship, 
the result may well be considered doubtful. At the same time, if an 
extraordinarily severe winter should interrupt all operations, the 
allied armies are avowedly not in a condition to stand it. 

* The Times, No. 21916, December 5, 1854, leader.— Ed. 

This view of the state of things in the Crimea only justifies the 
doubt and hesitation with which we have received the announce- 
ment that Austria has joined the western powers.*” Certainly, the 
circumstances we have detailed are not such as would be likely to 
seduce the Cabinet of Vienna out of its wonted indecision, while 
the precarious position of the British Ministry, and the urgent 
necessity of covering this immense failure in the East by the show 
of something considerable gained elsewhere, affords an ample 
reason for exaggerating a small treaty into a grand offensive and 
defensive alliance. We may be quite wrong in this; but our readers 
know the reasons for our opinion,’ and time will show whether 
this vaunted accession of Austria to the allies is a reality, or a trick 
specially designed for use at the meeting of Parliament. 

Written on December 4, 1854 Reproduced from the New-York