Friedrich Engels

The War in the East

Written on 16 November 1854.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 4249 of 30 November 1854, leading article]

By the arrival of the "Africa" we received reports of three further days in Europe, which, however, contained nothing further of interest from the theatre of war except a horrifying episode in which a very large number of sick and wounded were burnt alive in a hospital, and accounts of sufferings that cannot be described in words. Of the bloody and indecisive battle of 5 November, of which the "Baltic" brought a brief report, we now have Lord Raglan’s concise dispatch, but not yet the usual lengthy and gripping descriptions by correspondents who were present as participants or spectators. Both in England and in France great uneasiness prevails—much greater than is outwardly visible—at the increased and still growing difficulties of this war; the stubborn refusal of Sevastopol to surrender to the Allies, the rivals in courage and devotion, is regarded as highly fateful. The extracts from the "London Times" in another column of this newspaper show an altered mood and a spirit of anxiety that may be mistaken by some for incipient despair. As sufficient consistent details about the battle of 5 November to allow reflections upon it are lacking, we shall now offer some remarks on the siege operations immediately preceding that date.

On 25 October the monotony of the siege of Sevastopol was for the first time interrupted by a dramatic incident. On that day the Russians attacked the position taken up by the Allies to secure the siege, and as the advantages were this time more evenly distributed on both sides, the result was quite different from that of the battle of the Alma. This encounter was indeed the exact counterpart of the battle of the Alma: it was fought almost exclusively by cavalry, whereas at the Alma no cavalry had been employed; the Russians had not occupied a defensive position but were the attackers, while the advantage of strong positions lay with the Allies. The fight was almost as indecisive as at the Alma, yet this time the Russians retained the advantage.

The Heracleatic Chersonese, the peninsula south of the bay of Sevastopol, borders on the mainland of the Crimea by a chain of heights running from the mouth of the Chornaya, the head of the Sevastopol bay, to the south-west. This chain falls away gradually on its north-western side towards Sevastopol, while to the south-east, towards Balaclava, it is generally high and steep. Since the Allies had occupied the Heracleatic Chersonese, this chain was their natural defensive position against any Russian army that might attempt to put an end to the siege. But Balaclava was unfortunately the "base of operations" of the British, the chief harbour for their fleet, their great supply depot; and Balaclava lay some three miles south-east of this range of hills. It was therefore necessary to include Balaclava within the defensive system. The area around Balaclava consists of a group of very irregular heights stretching from the southern tip of the said chain of heights almost exactly east and west along the coast and, like all hills in the Crimea, falling away gently to the north-west but steep and rugged towards the south-east. In the angle formed by these two ranges lies an undulating plain that gradually rises towards the east until it ends in a steep slope near the valley of the Chornaya.

The most noteworthy feature of this plain is a chain of small hills and slightly raised ground, extending north-west and south-east and connecting what we shall call the Heracleatic chain with the mountains on the south coast. On this elevation, about three miles east and north-east of Balaclava, the Allies had erected their first line of defence, consisting of four redoubts and securing the road from Bakhchisarai and from the upper Chornaya. These redoubts were manned by Turks. A second line of fieldworks was erected directly in front of Balaclava and continued up to the apex of the angle formed by the heights on the coast and the Heracleatic chain; this was fortified by the French division stationed there under General Bosquet. While the second line, defended by British soldiers, marines and sailors, was continued and flanked by the French line of redoubts, the first, the Turkish line, almost two miles in front of it, was not only entirely unsupported but, instead of forming a line at a right angle to the road on which the enemy could come, had, strangely enough, been constructed almost as a prolongation of that road. This made it possible for the Russians to take first one, then the second, the third and finally the fourth redoubt and to gain ground each time, without one redoubt being able to give much support to another.

The Allied position was occupied: the redoubts near Balaclava, or the first line, by the Turks; the heights in the immediate vicinity of Balaclava by the British marines; the valley north of Balaclava by the 93rd Highlanders and some convalescents. Farther north of this lay the camp of the British cavalry, and on the Heracleatic heights that of Bosquet’s vanguard division.

On the morning of the 25th, at 6 o’clock, General Liprandi led the Russians in an attack on this position. He commanded a combined division, namely six infantry regiments (Dnieper, Azov, Ukraine, Odessa, Vladimir, Suzdal, the 6th Rifle Battalion and a battalion of Black Sea Cossacks, in all 25 battalions); three cavalry regiments (the 11th and 12th Hussars and a combined Uhlan regiment, together 24 to 26 squadrons); about two Cossack regiments and 70 guns, 30 of them 12-pounders.

He sent General Gribbe with three battalions of the Dnieper infantry regiment through a ravine to the left, to occupy the village of Kamary, in front of which the first and strongest redoubt lay. General Gribbe occupied the village, and his three battalions seem to have spent the day there very quietly, as they are never mentioned in the subsequent fighting.

The main column, first following the course of the Chornaya and then using a side road, reached the chaussee from Bakhchisarai to Balaclava. Here it came upon the redoubts manned by Turks. As the first redoubt was fairly strong, Liprandi opened artillery fire upon it and then ordered the assault columns forward. A line of skirmishers covered the first, second and third battalions of the Azov regiment, which advanced in company columns; behind their wings, again, stood the fourth battalion of the Azov regiment and a battalion of the Dnieper regiment in dense assault columns. The redoubt was taken after spirited resistance. The fact that the Turks thereupon left 170 dead and wounded behind proves that, despite the venomous assertions of the British press, this redoubt was bravely defended. The second, third and fourth redoubts, however, which had been hurriedly thrown up, were taken by the Russians almost without resistance, and by about 7 o’clock in the morning the first line of defence of the Allies was completely in Russian hands.

The abandonment of these redoubts by the Turks may help to dispel the exaggerated notions of Turkish bravery that have become general since Oltenitza and Silistria, but the British generals and the British press play a very shabby part in suddenly turning against the Turks on this occasion. Blame should not be cast so much upon the Turks as upon the engineers who laid out this line of defence so defectively and failed to complete it in good time, and upon the commanders who exposed the first line to an overwhelming onslaught of the enemy without any support being at hand.

The 93rd Highlanders, deliberate and slow as befits Scotsmen, gradually formed line and advanced upon the heights in the direction of the redoubts only after these had already been taken by the enemy. The fleeing Turks, decimated by the Russian cavalry, eventually formed again on the flanks of the Highlanders. These lay down in front of the positions still held by the Allies, behind the crest of a rise in the ground, to shelter from the Russian fire, and were supported only by the cavalry division on their left. In the meantime, the Russians had formed their line of battle on the heights on which the redoubts lay—on their left flank the Azov regiment, to its right the Ukraine regiment and then the Odessa regiment. These three regiments occupied the space between the redoubts and held the former first line of the Allies. Farther to the right of the Odessa regiment, the undulating plain offered favourable ground for cavalry movements. Thither the two Hussar regiments were ordered, and they found themselves directly facing the British cavalry drawn up some two miles away. The Suzdal and Vladimir regiments, part of the artillery and the Uhlans, who were just coming up, remained in reserve.

When the 93rd Highlanders, reinforced by the convalescent battalion and the Turks, confronted the Russians, the Hussars were thrown against them. But before the Hussars could come up, they were attacked by the British heavy cavalry brigade. The 700 or 800 British heavy dragoons hurled themselves upon the Russians and scattered them in one of the most brilliant and successful charges in history, considering their far smaller numbers. The Russian Hussars, twice as numerous, were flung apart in an instant. The few Russian squadrons that had attacked the 93rd Highlanders were received at a distance of fifteen yards by the infantry with a Scottish volley and fell back as best they could.

If the Turks had run away, the English had so far reaped only glory. The daring of the Highlanders, who received the cavalry in line without first forming squares, the impetuous charge of the heavy cavalry were certainly glorious exploits, especially as they were performed before the arrival of reinforcements. But now the first division (the Duke of Cambridge’s) and the fourth (Cathcart’s) division, as well as Bosquet’s French division and the brigade of Chasseurs d’Afrique (cavalry), came up. The line of battle was formed, and only now could it be said that two armies were engaged. As Bosquet’s French formed on the Heracleatic heights, Liprandi ordered the Vladimir and Suzdal regiments to form the extreme right wing on the heights beyond the cavalry position.

After the firing had almost ceased, because the armies on both sides were out of range, an unexplained misunderstanding caused an attack by the British light cavalry – an attack which had no objective and ended in a defeat. An order to advance arrived, and in a few moments the Earl of Cardigan led his Light Brigade up the valley opposite his position – a valley from whose protecting heights the batteries concentrated their fire on the lower-lying terrain. The whole brigade numbered 700 men at most; when they came within canister range, they were received by the fire of the artillery and of the riflemen posted on the slopes; they attacked the battery at the upper end of the valley, were fired on from a distance of twenty yards, rode down the gunners, dispersed the Russian hussars, who attempted a second, but hesitating, attack, and were just about to retire when the Russian Uhlans took them in flank. These had just closed up and immediately fell upon the blown horses of the British. This time, despite partial successes, the British were forced to withdraw and were completely defeated by the Russians – although, and this must be said, by their great numerical superiority and by a mistake which led them, without an objective, straight into the cross-fire of a strong artillery. Of the 700 attacking soldiers, scarcely 200 returned fit for combat. The Light Cavalry Brigade may be considered destroyed, until it is reformed by replacements.

This catastrophe would have been much greater for the British, and scarcely a man would have returned, had there not been two movements on both

flanks of the attacking light cavalry. On the right, Lord Lucan ordered the Heavy Brigade to make a feint upon the Russian batteries before them. They manoeuvred forward for some minutes, lost about ten men through the Russian fire, and galloped back. When they saw their comrades beaten, however, the French Chasseurs d’Afrique, two of the finest cavalry regiments in the world, dashed forward on the left flank to hew out the British cavalry. They attacked the battery by which the British light cavalry was being taken in flank, and which stood further up on the hill in front of the Vladimir Infantry Regiment; they instantly broke into the gun positions, sabred the gunners, and then, having fulfilled their task, withdrew – which they would have done, had the Vladimir Regiment not immediately advanced against them.

Here another feature of British warfare in this campaign showed itself, to which we have had occasion to point out more than once. First they committed a blunder, and then they shrank from a movement contrary to the rules of tactics, which alone could have prevented the consequences. The French Chasseurs, however, felt at once what had to be done. On their
side,
no flank attack by the Russian cavalry was carried out during the cavalry engagement, because their sudden thrust prevented it; the cautious “Heavies” of Brigadier Scarlett, by contrast, merely attacked as a feint, which naturally was not enough to prevent the Russian Uhlans from falling upon the hussars’ flank. Had they attacked like the French, the Russian Uhlans would very soon have taken to flight. But while the brigade of their comrades was commanded to show great daring, they were commanded to show too great caution, and the result was the shattering of the Light Brigade.

After that, the fighting ceased. The Russians destroyed the two redoubts nearest the Allies and kept the other two strongly occupied. They held the captured ground, and Lord Raglan, not daring to attack them, ordered the reinforcement of the second line of redoubts and confined himself to their defence. The first line was abandoned.

In this engagement, the conduct of the 93rd Highlanders was beyond all praise. To receive cavalry in line, as they did, by merely throwing back one company on their right flank en potence <in hooked position> and holding their fire until the decisive moment in order

then to fire with such deadly precision, is a feat of which only very few troops are capable, and testifies to the highest qualities an infantryman can possess. The Austrians and the British are probably the only troops with whom such an experiment can be ventured with reasonable certainty; perhaps also with some Russian troops, for by their long service they are enabled for such a task, although we cannot recall that they have ever been subjected to this trial and passed it.

This engagement incontestably proved the superiority of the British and French cavalry over the Russian. The three allied brigades had approximately the same strength as the three Russian regiments; and had they been sent into the attack simultaneously instead of successively, and supported by advancing artillery and the whole advancing infantry line, Liprandi and his troops would have been in great danger of being thrown down the steep slope to the Chernaya and suffering the fate that Blücher prepared for the French on the Katzbach.

The strength of the two armies may be calculated approximately as follows: The Russians had 25 battalions, most of which had already been engaged on the Alma and could not be more than 14,000 strong at most; 24 squadrons of cavalry, which had marched almost the whole way from Moscow and Kaluga, certainly not more than 2,400 men; in addition, about 1,000 Cossacks and 70 guns.

The infantry of the Allies consisted of the greater part of the first and fourth British divisions and Bosquet’s French division, as well as an indefinite number of Turks, whom we can only arrive at by calculating the number of Turkish battalions landed. From the outset, ten Turkish battalions took part in the campaign, and according to Lord Raglan’s report of 18 October, six more battalions landed near Balaclava. Since they were neither employed in the siege nor removed far from Balaclava, all these Turks must have been employed there, even if after their retreat from the redoubts they were no longer mentioned in the reports and were considered not worth mentioning. Thus we should come fairly close to the truth if we estimate the British at about 6,500, the French at about 3,500, and the Turks at at least 6,000 men. In addition, about 1,000 British marines and sailors lay in the redoubts around Balaclava. Infantry in all 17,000 men, or, if the Turks do not count, 11,000 men. The two British cavalry brigades comprised about 1,400 men (in the British reports, only the rank and

file are counted), the Chasseurs d’Afrique at least 800 men, in all 2,200 men. The strength of the artillery is unknown, but numerically inferior to the Russians, although far superior in quality.

All in all, we consider the Allies on this occasion to have been at least as strong as the Russians; they had the advantage of strong positions to which they could fall back, and could have won a decisive victory by a bold combined attack of cavalry and infantry – not one like that on the Alma, which had no result, but a victory that would have spared them the trouble of fighting through that murderous battle of 5 November. Now they did not even make good the losses inflicted upon them, and through that strange mixture of temerity and over-caution, of misplaced daring and misplaced timidity, of military madness that disregards the rules of the art of war, and learned disquisitions that let the moment for action pass by – through this singularity of always doing the wrong thing at the wrong moment, which has characterised all the deeds of the Allies, the battle of Balaclava was utterly lost to them.

With regard to the battle of 5 November, we can for the time being only conclude that it initiated that crisis which we assumed would break out between the 5th and the 13th. As we have long since stated, and as the *London Times* now also states – everything is merely a question of supplies and reinforcements.