Your readers have followed, step by step, the diplomatic 
movements of the Coalition Cabinet, and they will not be 
surprised at any new attempt, on the part of the Palmerstons and 
the Aberdeens, to back the Czar* under the pretext of protecting 
Turkey and securing the peace of Europe. Even the resurrection 
of a Vienna Conference*” or of a London Congress they are fully 
prepared for. The Metropolitan Stock Exchange was first in- 
formed by The Morning Chronicle,” on Friday last, of England 
having succeeded in inducing Austria and Prussia to support the 
Western Powers in their attempt at a new mediation between the 
belligerent parties. Then came The Morning Post with the news of 
“this attempt” and with the consolatory announcement that 

“in. this attempt the cooperation of Prussia and Austria has been sought and 
obtained, and the four Powers have signed a protocol, engaging them, implicitly, to 
maintain the present territorial distribution of Europe, and inviting the belligerent 
Powers to come to an amicable adjustment of their differences by means of an 
European conference. The first step that will be taken, in consequence of this 
proceeding of the four Powers, will be to ascertain the views of Turkey on the 
bases upon which she will allow negotiations for an arrangement of the Eastern 
dispute to be conducted. This clearly ascertained, the four Powers will then invite 
Russia to state her views in regard to the [...] bases of the proposed arrangement, 
and then both Powers will be requested to send plenipotentiaries to a conference of 
the Great Powers, [...] at some time and place to be hereafter determined upon.... 
The Czar’s dignity might be preserved while the interests of Turkey would be fully 
upheld, in the first place by a treaty between Turkey and Russia of amity and peace and 
of commerce, stipulating for a due protection of the subjects of either state within 
the territories of the other, and, in the second place, by a treaty between the 

5 Of December 2, 1853.— Ed. 

Sultan* and the five Powers, such a treaty as that of the Dardanelles of 1841, in which 
the Sultan should undertake to respect the existing constitutions and privileges of the 
Danubian Principalities and of Servia, and in which he should bind himself as in the 
treaty [of] Kainardji, but this time to Europe, and not to Russia—-specially to protect 
the Christian religion within his dominions.” 

At last came the thunderer of Printing House-square, announc- 
ing in a first edition’ that the alliance between the four Powers 
had been definitively concluded, and that they had laid down 
conditions which Russia and the Porte would, if necessary, “be 
forced to accept.” Instantly the funds rose; but the satisfaction of 
the stockjobbers proved short-lived, as the same Times announced 
in its second edition that the four Powers had indeed drawn up a 
protocol and presented the draft of a collective note, without 
having, however, bound themselves to enforce its acceptance. Down 
went the funds again. At last the “startling news” was reduced to 
the old story of the resurrection of the dead body of the late 
Vienna Conference—it would be preposterous to speak of its 
ghost—and a telegraphic dispatch confirmed the report that 

“the Conference of the four Powers at Vienna had on the 6th forwarded to 
Constantinople another proposal for the arrangement of the pending differences 

founded on a new project, and that negotiations for peace will continue, even 
though hostilities should not be suspended.” 

On the very eve of war the Vienna Conference, that retrospec- 
tive Pythia, had just proposed to Turkey to accept Prince 
Menchikoff’s ultimatum. After the first defeat Russia had under- 
gone, England and France took up Reshid Pasha’s answer to 
Prince Menchikoff’s ultimatum. What phase of the past transac- 
tions they will now have arrived at in their retrograde movement, 
it is impossible to predict. The Augsburger Zeitung states that the 
new propositions of the Conference express the desire of the four 
Powers to “prevent war.”* A startling novelty this! 

Insipid, as all this diplomatic gossip may appear at a moment, 
when the status quo has been supplanted by a status belli, we must 
not forget that the hidden intentions of the British Cabinet 
transpire through these fantastical projects of conferences and 
congresses; that the ministerial papers throw out their feelers to 
ascertain how far the Ministry may venture to go; and that the 

© Of December 6, 1853.— Fd. 

¢ Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 337, December 3, 1853.— Ed. 

unfounded rumors of to-day more than once have foreshadowed 
the events of to-morrow. So much is sure, that if not accepted by 
Austria, the quadruple alliance has been proposed by England with 
a view to enforce upon Turkey the resolutions to be agreed upon 
by the four Powers. If no alliance has been concluded, a 
“protocol” has at least been signed by the four Powers, 
establishing the principles upon which to conduct the transactions. 
It is no less sure that the Vienna Conference, which prevented 
Turkey from moving tll the Russian army had occupied the 
Principalities and reached the frontiers of Bulgaria, has again 
resumed its work and already dispatched a new note to the Sultan. 
That the step from a Vienna Conference to a European Congress, 
at London, is by no means a great one, was proved in 1839 at the 
epoch of Mehemet Ali’s insurrection. The Congress pursuing its 
work of “pacification,” while Russia pursued her war against 
Turkey, would be but a repetition of the London Congress of 
1827-29, resulting in the destruction of the Turkish fleet, at 
Navarino, and the loss of Turkish independence, by the treaty of 
Adrianople. The bases upon which the British Cabinet have 
proposed, and the other Powers agreed to conduct negotiations, 
are clearly indicated by the ministerial papers. Maintenance of the 
“present territorial distribution of Europe.” It would be a great 
mistake to consider this proposition as a simple return to the 
provisions of the peace of Vienna. The extinction of the Kingdom 
of Poland, the possession of the mouths of the Danube by Russia, 
the incorporation of Cracow, the transformation of Hungary into 
an Austrian province—all these “territorial arrangements” have 
never been sanctioned by any European Congress. A sanction, 
then, of the present “territorial distribution of Europe” would be, 
instead of a simple admission of Turkey to the treaty of Vienna, as 
is pretended, rather a sanction of all the violations of that treaty 
by Russia and Austria, since 1830. “A treaty of amity, and peace, 
and commerce between Russia and Turkey’”—such are the 
identical terms in the preamble of the treaties of Kainardji, 
Adrianople and Unkiar-Skelessi. “A treaty as that of the 
Dardanelles of 1841,” says the Palmerstonian paper.* Exactly so. A 
treaty like that which excluded Europe from the Dardanelles and 
transformed the Euxine into a Russian lake. But, says The Times, 
why should .we not stipulate for the free entrance of the 
Dardanelles for men-of-war, and the free navigation of the 
Danube. But read the letter addressed by Lord Palmerston in 

September, 1839, to Mr. Bulwer,** the then Envoy at Paris, and 
we shall find that similar hopes were held out at that epoch. 

“The Sultan, bound to respect the existing constitutions of the 
Principalities and Servia.” But these existing constitutions distrib- 
ute the sovereignty over the provinces between the Czar and the 
Sultan, and they have, till now, never been acknowledged by any 
European Congress. The new Congress then, would add to the de 
facto protectorate of Russia over Turkish provinces, the sanction of 
Europe. The Sultan would then be bound not to the Czar, but to 
Europe, to protect “the Christian religion within his dominions.” 
That is to say, the right of interference between the Sultan and his 
Christian subjects by foreign powers, would become a paragraph 
of European international law, and, in case of any new conflicts 
occurring, Europe would be bound by treaty to back the 
pretentions of Russia, who, as a party to the treaty, would have a 
right to interpret in her sense the protection to be asked for by 
the Christians in the Sultan’s dominions. The new treaty, then, as 
projected by the Coalition Cabinet, and as explained by its own 
organs, is the most comprehensive plan of European surrender to 
Russia ever conceived, and a wholesale sanction of all the changes 
brought about by the counter-revolutions since 1830. There is, 
therefore, no occasion for throwing up caps and being astonished 
at the change of the policy of Austria, a change, as The Morning 
Post feigns to believe, “effected suddenly within the last ten days.” 
As to Bonaparte, whatever his ulterior designs may be, for the 
moment the Parvenu Emperor is content enough to climb up into 
the heaven of the old legitimate powers, with Turkey as his 
ladder. 

The views of the Coalition Cabinet are clearly expressed by The 
Guardian, the ministerial weekly paper: 

“To treat Russia as a beaten enemy and fancy we have her by the throat 
because Russian troops have been foiled at the trenches of Oltenitza and some forts 
captured on the Black Sea, is simply ridiculous; these petty losses would in 
themselves but exasperate her pride and indispose her to treat till she could do so 
on better terms. But sovereigns, like other men, are governed by mixed motives. 
The Czar is a proud and passionate, but he is also a prudent man. He is engaged 
in a quarrel in which he may lose and cannot gain. His policy is that of his 
predecessors, who have throughout gained more by threatening than by waging war, 
and whose steady and undeviating system of encroachment had in it a vein of 
elastic pliability, which enabled them to avoid great disasters and even to turn minor 
reverses to profitable account. The preliminary resolution of the four Powers, that no 
change shall be made or permitted in the territorial arrangements of Europe, 
appears to be based on this rational view of his position and policy. It will 
disappoint those who see in imagination the feet of England on his neck, or who 
suffer themselves to be misled by the chimerical nonsense of the Protectionist 

papers. But the business in hand is not the humiliation of Russia but the pacification 
of Europe” (in a Russian sense of course), “the establishment, as far as possible, of 
that durable peace for which the French Soldier-Envoy* pledges his master’s honor 
to the Sultan. And the coming treaty, we may be sure, [...] will not be a mere 
restoration of the status quo, but will attempt at least to settle on some permanent 
footing the relations of Turkey with Europe and of the Turkish Government with 
its Christian subjects, attempt—for, settle it so durably as we may, any arrangement 
which leaves a Turkish Empire in Europe will always be provisional at bottom. Such a 
provisional arrangement, however, is the thing now practicable and needful.”” 

The ultimate object, then, the powers aim at, is to help the Czar 
“to turn minor reverses to profitable account,” and “to leave no 
Turkish Empire in Europe.” The provisional arrangement will, of 
course, prepare that ultimate consummation as far as “the thing is 
now practicable.” 

Some circumstances, however, have singularly confounded the 
calculations of the Coalition politicians. There is intelligence of 
new victories gained by Turkey on the shores of the Black Sea and 
on the frontiers of Georgia. There is, on the other hand, a 
peremptory assertion representing the whole army in Poland as 
under orders for the Pruth, while we are informed from the 
frontiers of Poland that “in the night from the 23d and 24th ult., 
the brinka, or levy of men for the army, took place, and in places, 
where formerly one or two men were taken, eight or ten have now 
been drawn.” This, at least, proves little confidence on the part of 
the Czar in the pacifying genius of the four Powers. The official 
declaration on the part of Austria, “that no alliance had been 
concluded between the four Courts,” proves on her part that, 
willing as she is to enforce conditions upon Turkey, she dares not 
assume even the appearance of coercing the Czar to submit to 
conditions projected in his own interest. Lastly, the Sultan’s reply 
to the French Ambassador that “‘at present an amicable arrange- 
ment is quite unacceptable without the complete abandonment by 
Russia of the pretensions which she has raised and without the 
immediate evacuation of the Principalities,’ has struck the 
Congress-mongers like a thunderbolt, and the organ of the crafty 
and experienced Palmerston now frankly tells the other fellows of 
the brotherhood the following piece of truth: 

“To the immediate evacuation of the Principalities and the total abandonment 

of all her claims, [...] Russia cannot submit without a loss of [...] dignity and 
influence which it is foolish to suppose a power of her magnitude will endure 

> The Guardian, No. 418, December 7, 1853.— Ed. 

without a desperate struggle. For this present attempt at negotiation we are sorry, 
therefore, that we can only prognosticate failure.”* 

Defeated Russia can accept no negotiations at all. The business 
in hand is, therefore, to turn the balance of war. But how to effect 
this, but by enabling Russia to gain time? The only thing she wants 
is procrastination, time to levy new troops, to distribute them 
throughout the empire—to concentrate them, and to stop the war 
with Turkey till she has done with the mountaineers of Caucasus. 
In this way the chances of Russia may improve, and the attempt at 
negotiation “may be successful when Russia proves victorious 
instead of defeated.” Accordingly, as stated by the Vienna 
Ost-Deutsche Post, and the ministerial Morning Chronicle, England 
has urged on Turkey the propriety of consenting to a three 
months’ armistice.” Lord Redcliffe had a five hours’ interview with 
the Sultan, for the purpose of obtaining from His Highness that 
consent to the suggested armistice which his Ministers had 
refused, and the result was, that an extraordinary council of 
Ministers was convened to take the matter into consideration. The 
Porte definitively refused to accede to the proposed armistice, and 
could not accede to it without openly betraying the Ottoman 
people. 

“In the present state of feeling,” remarks the to-day’s Times, “it will not be easy 
to bring the pretentions of the Porte within the bounds of moderation.” 

The Porte is immoderate enough to understand that it is 
perfectly irreconcilable with the dignity of the Czar to be defeated, 
and that it must therefore grant him a three months’ armistice in 
order to frustrate its own success, and to help him to become 
again victorious and “magnanimous.” All hope of bringing about 
the three months’ armistice has not yet been parted with. 

“Possibly,” says The Times, “an armistice recommended by the four Powers may 
fare better.” 

The good-natured Morning Advertiser is 

“unwilling to assume that these representations are correct,” because “a 
more direct attempt to betray the Ottoman cause into the hands of the Czar, or 
one better adapted to answer that purpose, could not have been devised by the 
most ingenious mind.” © 

a The Morning Post, December 8, 1853.— Ed. 
> The Morning Chronicle, December 7, 1853.— Ed. 
© The Morning Advertiser, December 8, 1853.— Ed. 

The confidence of the radical Morning Advertiser in “the honor 
and the good faith” of Palmerston, and its ignorance of the 
history of England’s diplomatic past, seem equally incommensura- 
ble. This paper being the property of the Licensed Victuallers’ 
Association, I suspect, that those very victuallers themselves write 
from time to time the editorial articles. 

While England is thus occupied at Constantinople and Vienna, 
the outpost of Russia, let us see how on the other hand, the 
Russians manage affairs in England. 

I have already, in a previous letter, informed your readers that 
at this very epoch, when the Coalition feigns to threaten Russia 
in the Black Sea, Russian men-of-war, the two frigates Aurora 
and Navarino,”’ are fitting out in the Queen’s dockyards at 
Portsmouth. On Saturday last* we were informed by The Morning 
Herald and The Daily News, that six sailors had escaped from the 
Russian frigate Aurora, and nearly reached Guildford, when they 
were overtaken by an officer of the Russian frigate Aurora and an 
English inspector of police, brought back to Portsmouth, placed on 
board the Victorious—an English ship occupied by the crew of the 
Aurora, while out-fitting—subjected to cruel, corporeal punish- 
ment and placed in irons. When this became known in London, 
some gentlemen obtained, through the instrumentality of Mr. 
Charles Ronalds, solicitor, a writ of habeas corpus, directed to 
Rear-Admiral Martin, some other English officers of the navy, and 
to the Russian captain, commander of the frigate Aurora, ordering 
them to bring the six sailors before the Lord Chief Justice of 
England. The English dockyard authorities declined to obey the 
writ, the English captain appealing to the Vice-Admiral and the 
Vice-Admiral to the Admiral, and the Admiral feeling himself 
obliged to communicate with the Lord of the Admiralty, the 
famous Sir James Graham, who, ten years before, in the case of 
the Bandieras, placed the British Post Office at the service of 
Metternich.* As to the Russian captain, although the Queen’s” 
writ was served on him on board the English ship the Victorious, 
and though he was fully informed of its nature by an interpreter, 
he threw it contemptuously from the vessel, and when thrust 
through a port-hole, it was thrown out again. “If,” said the 
Russian captain, “it came from Her Majesty in reality, it would be 
sent to his Ambassador or Consul.” The Consul being absent, the 
Vice-Consul refused to interfere. On Dec. 6, fresh writs were 

served on the naval authorities at Portsmouth, commanding them 
in the Queen’s name to produce not only the six men in question 
before the Lord Chief Justice, but the Russian captain also. 
Instead of the writ being complied with, the Admiralty used every 
effort to tow the ship out of the harbor and to get her to sea, and 
the other day, the Aurora, Capt. Isylmetieff, was seen, by daylight, 
sailing for the Pacific, defying the writ of the habeas corpus. In the 
meantime, as we are informed, by yesterday’s Daily News, 

“the Russian corvette, Navarino, is still in dock, undergoing a thorough 
re-caulking and repair. A number of dockyard men are engaged on her.” 

Now mark in what manner this “startling” case has been dealt 
with by the Ministerial Press. 7 

The Morning Chronicle, the Peelite organ, chose to remain silent, 
its own Graham being the most compromised man in the whole 
affair. The Palmerstonian Morning Post was the first to break 
silence, as its Lord could not let escape such an occasion of 
proving his mastership in making pleasant apparently difficult 
cases. The whole case, it stated, was greatly exaggerated and 
overrated. The six deserters, it stated on the authority of the 
Russian captain, who ordered them to be cruelly flogged and 
hulked, 

“these seamen say that they did not desert from their own inclination, but were 
inveigled away by persons who introduced themselves to them in the streets,”* 

these seamen having also contrived against their inclination and 
against the orders of the Russian captain to get ashore at 
Portsmouth, 

“made them intoxicated and then took them away in a carriage, up the 
country,” and then deserted the deserters, “giving them directions how to get to 
London, with the address of some persons, to whom to go to there.” 

The absurd story is invented by the Palmerstonian organ with a 
view to induce the public to believe, that the “deserters gave 
themselves up to the Police,” a lie too gross to be reechoed by The 
Times itself. The whole affair, insinuates The Post, with a great 
show of moral indignation, was got up by some Polish refugees, 
who, probably, intended wounding the feelings of Lord Palmer- 
ston, its magnanimous master. 

Another ministerial organ, The Globe,” states that 

Affair”, The Morning Post, December 6, 1853.—Ed. 
> Of December 7, 1853.—Ed. 

“the plea that a foreigner is only bound to recognize processes coming to him 
from the Minister of his own country is manifestly untenable; otherwise, any 
foreigners in a British seaport could break our law and could be brought under no 
responsibility, except by the intervention of an Ambassador.” 

The Globe arrives therefore at the moderate conclusion that the 
reply of the Russian captain to the clerk who served on him the 
writ of habeas corpus “is not perfectly satisfactory.” But in human 
matters it would be idle to aspire to anything like perfection. 

“If the Russian captain had hanged them” (viz., the six recaptured sailors) “all 
at the yard-arm of his frigate the next morning, he would have been altogether 
[...] beyond the control of the English law,” exclaims The Times.* 

And why this? Because in the treaty of navigation concluded 
between Russia and Great Britain in 1840 (under the direction of 
Lord Palmerston) there is a provision to this effect: 

“The Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and commercial agents [...] of the [...] high 
contracting parties, residing in the dominions of the other, shall receive from the 

local authorities such assistance as can by law be given them, for the recovery of 
deserters from the ships of war or merchant vessels of their respective countries.” 

But, good Times, the question is exactly what assistance the 
English authorities were warranted by law to give the Russian 
captain. As to the Russian authorities themselves, “sending their 
vessels to England to be repaired at this crisis in political affairs,” 
it appears to The Times, “to be an act of great indelicacy and bad 
taste,” and it thinks, “the position, in which the officers of these 
vessels have been placed here, is that of spies.”” But, it says, “the 
British Government could no more forcibly express its contempt 
for such politics” than by admitting the Russian spies into the 
Queen’s own dockyards “even at some public inconvenience,” by 
placing at their disposal British men-of-war, employing the 
dockyard men, paid out of the pockets of the British people, in 
their service and firing parting salutes to them, when they run 
away after having insulted the laws of England. 

Written on December 9, 1853 Reproduced from the New-York 

Tribune, No. 3960, December 26, 1853;