THE WAR ON THE DANUBE”! 

As we have already observed, the retreat of the Turks from 
Oltenitza appears to indicate the conclusion of the first epoch of 
the Turko-Russian war; with it at least a first and distinct series 
of operations, beginning with the passage at Kalafat, seems to be 
concluded, to make room either for the tranquility of winter 
quarters, or for the execution of new plans not yet developed. The 
moment seems opportune for a review of the campaign up to that 
epoch, the more so as the official and non-official reports of the 
only action of consequence fought on the Danube, the Russian 
attack upon the Turkish téte-du-pont?* at Oltenitza, are just come to 
hand. 

On the 28th of October the Turks crossed from Widin to 
Kalafat. They were hardly disturbed in their occupation of this 
point, except by reconnoitering skirmishes; for when the Russians 
were on the point of concentrating an effective force at Krajova 
for the attack on Kalafat, they were disturbed by the news of a 
second and more dangerous advance of the Turks, who, on the 2d 
of November, had crossed the Danube at Oltenitza, whence they 
seriously menaced the Russian communications. Simulated and 
secondary attacks were at the same time made by the Turks on the 
whole line of the Danube from Widin to Oltenitza, but these either 
found the Russians well prepared, or were not undertaken with a 
sufficient force to deceive the enemy and lead him into any 
serious error. 

The corps at Kalafat therefore, remained unmolested and 
gradually received reinforcements, which are said to have swelled 

The War on the Danube 517 

it to something like 24,000 men. But as this corps has neither 
advanced or suffered a repulse, we may for the present leave it 
out of consideration. 

The passage at Oltenitza took place according to Omer Pasha’s 
report’ in the following way. Oltenitza is a village situated near the 
confluence of the Arges River and the Danube. Opposite the 
mouth of the Arges there is an island in the Danube; on the 
southern bank of this river the village and fort of Turtukai are 
situated, on a steep bank rising to some 600 or 700 feet, on the 
top of which elevation the fort of Turtukai is constructed. The 
guns of Turtukai, therefore, form a most effective support to any 
corps crossing the river at this point. On the Ist Nov. the Turks 
crossed over to the island and there threw up solid entrenchments 
during the night. On the 2d they crossed from this island to the 
Wallachian shore, east of the Arges. Two battalions, with 100 
horsemen and two guns passed in boats to the Wallachian side; a 
few gun-shots from Turtukai drove the Russian outposts from a 
lazaretto building situated near the riverside, and this building, 
which was immediately taken possession of by the Turks, proved a 
great advantage to them. It was massively constructed, with 
vaulted chambers, thereby offering, with hardly any additional 
labor, all the advantages of that great desideratum in field 
fortification, a réduit. Consequently the Turks at once began 
throwing up entrenchments from the Arges to the Danube; four 
hundred men were kept constantly employed, galianes and 
fascines having been prepared beforehand. From all the reports 
we receive, we can only conclude that these entrenchments were 
continuous lines, cutting off entirely every communication from 
the Russian positions to the Turkish points of landing. Fortifica- 
tion by continuous entrenched lines has been long since generally 
condemned and found ineffective; but the special destination of 
this entrenchment as a bridge-head, the fact that a capital réduit 
was found ready-made, the want of engineers among the Turks, 
and other circumstances peculiar to the Turkish army, may have 
rendered it, after all, more advisable to employ this antiquated 
system. In the Arges the Turks found a number of boats which 
were at once employed, together with what they had before, in the 
construction of a bridge across the Danube. All these works were 
nearly completed by the morning of Nov. 4. 

At Oltenitza, then, the Turks had a mere bridge-head on the left 
bank of the Danube; the Turkish army had not crossed the river, 

nor has it done so since; but it had a safe débouché on the left 
bank, which might be turned to account the very moment when a 
sufficient force was concentrated at Turtukai. They had the 
means, beside, of taking either the right o1 the left of the Arges; 
and, finally, all their operations in the vicinity of the river were 
protected by ten heavy guns in the fort on the hights of 
Turtukai, whose range, consequent upon this elevated position 
and the narrowness of the river at that point, extended at least 
half a mile beyond the bridge-head. 

The bridge-head was occupied by three battalions of the line 
(2,400 men), two companies of guards (160 men), two of sharp 
shooters (200 men), 100 cavalry and some artillery, who attended 
to the 12 heavy guns placed in the Lazaretto. The right wing of the 
entrenchment was enfiladed and flanked by the guns of Tur- 
tukai, which besides could sweep the whole of the plain in front 
of the center of the bridge-head. The left wing, resting on the 
River Arges, was flanked by the battery on the island, but part of 
this ground was thickly studded with brush-wood, so as to offer 
considerable shelter to the Russians in approaching. 

When on Nov. 4, the Russians attacked the Turkish lines they 
had, according to Omer Pasha, 20 battalions, 4 regiments of 
cavalry and 32 guns, altogether about 24,000 men. It appears they 
formed in the following order: twelve battalions and 14 guns 
opposite the center of the bridge-head; two battalions and two 
guns in the wood to the left (Russian right) on the river Arges, six 
battalions, en échélon, with four guns against the Turkish right, 
toward the Danube, their line being prolongated and outflanked 
by the cavalry. The center first formed a column of attack, after 
the fire of the Russian guns had been kept up for a time; the two 
wings followed; then the artillery, which had first fired at a 
distance of some 1,200 yards from the parapets came up to 
effective grape range (600 to 700 yards), and the columns of 
attack were hurried forward. As may be anticipated, the column of 
the Russian left (nearest the Danube) was shattered by the fire of 
the Turtukai guns; that of the center very soon shared the same 
fate; that of the right (on the Arges) was crushed by the fire 
from the island, and appears to have been far too weak to do 
any good. The attack was once or twice repeated, but without 
the ensemble of the first assault, and then the Russians had enough 
of it. They had marched resolutely up to the brink of the ditch 
(which must not be too literally understood), but the Turkish 

fire proved overwhelming before they came to a hand-to-hand 
fight. 

The War on the Danube 519 

During the fight Omer Pasha sent a battalion of regulars across 
the river to act as reserve. Thus the Turks engaged may be 
estimated at 3,600 infantry, with 44 heavy guns. 

The forces of the Russians are less easily ascertained. While 
Omer Pasha speaks of twenty battalions, two British officers in his 
camp agree in reducing the force actually engaged to some 8,000 
men. These two statements are not exactly contradictory. The 
Russians might have some twenty battalions in order of battle, and 
yet from the nature of the ground, or from contempt of their 
opponents, the actual mass of the attacking columns might not 
exceed eight battalions at a time; and a circumstance which the 
British officers do not mention, but which Omer Pasha reports, 
shows that the Russians had ample reserves. It is this, that every 
fresh attack was headed by a fresh battalion drawn from the 
reserves for the purpose. Besides, the reports of the two “officers 
of her Majesty’s guards” bear in every line the stamp of that 
ignorant and inexperienced self-sufficiency which belongs to subal- 
terns of the privileged corps of all armies. 

Upon the whole, therefore, we think Omer Pasha’s statement 
entitled to credit. There may have been eighteen or twenty 
Russian battalions present during the action, of which ten or 
twelve may successively have been brought to act, although from 
six to eight thousand may be the number of those who at a given 
time advanced simultaneously and ineffectually upon the Turkish 
entrenchments. The loss of the Russians, which must have 
amounted at least to 1,500 or 2,000, also proves what numbers 
they must have brought into the field. They were finally repulsed, 
leaving 500 muskets, plenty of baggage and ammunition, and 800 
killed and wounded in the hands of the Turks, and retreated 
partially in disorder. 

If we look at the tactics of this conflict on either side, we are 
surprised to find a gross blunder committed by the Russians, 
which was deservedly expiated by their signal defeat. They showed 
They had to attack pretty strong lines, with a capital réduit flanked 
by ten heavy guns on the island, commanded by twenty-two guns 
at Turtukai, which also commanded the ground in front of the 
lines; altogether, forty-four, or at least thirty-eight guns, all or 
mostly of heavy metal. Now every officer knows that in attacking a 
field fortification, you have first by your artilléry to silence its guns 
-and the batteries that may support it; then to destroy, as much as 
possible, the parapets, palisades and other defenses; then, by 
approaching your batteries still closer to the attacked works, to 

sweep the parapets with a continued hail-storm of grape-shot, 
until at last you can risk launching your columns of attack upon 
the half-demolished work and its demoralized defenders. In order 
to do all this, you must have a decided superiority in the number 
and caliber of your artillery. But what do we see the Russian 
attempt? To storm a bridge-head, defended by artillery superior 
to their own in number, superior in caliber, and still more 
superior in practice, after a short cannonade from_ twelve 
12-pounders and twenty 6-pounders! This Russian cannonade can 
only be considered as a mere formality, a sort of civility offered to 
the Turks, for it could have no serious purpose; and if, as all 
reports agree, the Russian batteries advanced up to within 650 
yards of the bridge-head, it is a wonder that we do not hear of a 
number of dismounted guns. At the same time we must 
acknowledge the bravery of the Russian troops, who were very 
likely for the first time exposed to fire and that under such 
adverse circumstances, yet advanced to within fifty yards of the 
Turkish lines before they were crushed by the superior fire 
poured in upon them. 

As to the Turks, we cannot say much in favor of their tactics 
either. It was very well that Omer Pasha during the assaults did 
not crowd together more troops in the bridge-head than were 
necessary for its defense. But how is it that he did not concentrate 
a reserve, especially of cavalry, on the Turtukai end of the bridge 
and on the island? that, as soon as the repulse of the Russians 
was becoming manifest, he did not launch his cavalry on the 
beaten foe? and that, after all, he was satisfied with the moral 
effect of the victory and neglected to gather all its fruits, by which 
he might have decided the campaign? We can only find two 
excuses: firstly, that the system of continuous lines in field 
fortification does not easily admit of any vigorous offensive action 
after the repulse of the enemy, as the uninterrupted lines do not 
offer any wide space for sudden and energetic sallies of masses of 
troops; and secondly, that Omer Pasha either distrusted the 
capacity of his troops for fighting in the open field, or that he had 
not troops enough at hand to follow up the victory. 

This leads us to the strategic questions connected with this 
action. If Omer Pasha had had at Oltenitza the troops who were 
lounging without anything to do at Kalafat, would he not have 
acted with more decision? How was it that a corps of 12,000 men, 
with a reserve of equal force, was directed upon Kalafat, to 
menace that point of the Russian position, where of all points it 
must have been most desirable to the Russians to be attacked? 

The War on the Danube 521 

How came it that on the point where the Turks could gain 
decisive advantages these 24,000 men were not present? 

But this is only one point. The Russians, it is now ascertained 
beyond doubt, could not muster more than 50,000 or 55,000 
combatants in Wallachia at the end of October. Taking into 
consideration the want of roads, the intersected nature of the 
country, detachments not to be avoided, the regular wear and tear 
of an active army, the Russians, it is certain, could on no point 
muster more than 30,000 men in a single mass. Forty thousand 
Turks collected upon any given spot of Wallachia were sure to 
beat them, and there is no doubt that the Turks, if they had been 
so minded and taken proper steps in proper time, could have 
collected that body, or even twice as many, with comparative ease. 
But the interference of European diplomacy, irresolution in the 
Divan, vacillation in the Turkish policy towards Servia, and other 
similar considerations, appear to have produced a series of 
half-measures, which placed Omer Pasha in a very singular 
position when hostilities broke out. He knew the weakness of the 
Russians; he himself had a far superior army, eager to go to war; 
but his army was spread upon an extent of country three hundred 
and fifty miles long, and fifty to one hundred miles wide. The 
lameness of his operations in the first half of November was the 
necessary consequence of this. The passage at Kalafat, otherwise a 
mistake, thus became a sort of necessity, Widin being the natural 
point of concentration of some twenty thousand men, who without 
that passage would have been entirely inactive, being too far 
distant from the main army. This passage enabled them at least to 
paralyze a portion of the Russian forces, and to create a moral 
impression in favor of the Turks. 

The passage at Oltenitza—which was intended evidently as the 
main attack by which Bucharest was to be taken, and the Russians 
allured westward by the Kalafat operation, to be cut off from their 
retreat—had no effect whatever, because the necessary forces 
for a march on Bucharest appear not to have been forthcoming. 
The moral effect of the combat at Oltenitza was certainly a 
great gain, but the inactivity after the victory—an _ inactivity 
which lasted nine days, and ended in the voluntary retreat of the 
Turks behind the Danube, in consequence of the rains setting 
in—this inactivity and retreat may not destroy the flush of victory 
on the cheek of the Turkish soldier, but it undermines the repu- 
tation of the Turkish General, most probably more than he 
deserves. But here, if the original fault hes with the Divan, there 
must be some fault with Omer Pasha. To pass twelve days on the 

left bank of the Danube, to possess a bridge and a bridge-head 
strong enough to repel the united force of the Russians, to have 
behind him an army numerous and eager to fight and not to find 
means to carry 30,000 or 40,000 men across—why, all this cannot 
have been done without some negligence on the part of the 
General. The Russians may be thankful for their escape. Never 
did a Russian army get out of a scrape half as bad as this with so 
little material damage. They deserved to be cut to pieces, and they 
are all safe. Whether they will ever be taken at such advantage 
again may well be doubted.