The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston by Karl Marx

7

One glance at the map of Europe will show you on the western littoral of the
Black Sea the outlets of the Danube, the only river which, springing up in the
very heart of Europe, may be said to form a natural highway to Asia. Exactly
opposite on the eastern side, to the south of the river Kuban, begins the
mountain-range of the Caucasus, stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian in
a south-easterly direction for some seven hundred miles, and separating Europe
from Asia.

If you hold the outlets of the Danube, you hold the Danube, and with it the
highway to Asia, and a great part of the commerce of Switzerland, Germany,
Hungary, Turkey, and above all, of Moldo-Wallachia. If you hold the Caucasus
too, the Black Sea becomes your property, and to shut up its door, you only
want Constantinople and the Dardanelles. The possession of the Caucasus
mountains makes you at once master of Trebizond, and through their domination
of the Caspian Sea, of the northern seaboard of Persia.

The greedy eyes of Russia embraced at once the outlets of the Danube and the
mountain-range of the Caucasus. There, the business in hand was to conquer
supremacy, here to maintain it. The chain of the Caucasus separates southern
Russia from the luxurious provinces of Georgia, Mingrelia, Imertia, and
Giuriel, wrested by the Muscovite from the Mussulman. Thus the foot of the
monster empire is cut off from its main body. The only military road, deserving
to be called such, winds from Mozdok to Tiflis, through the eyry-pass of
Dariel, fortified by a continuous line of entrenched places, but exposed on
both sides to the never-ceasing attacks from the Caucasian tribes. The union of
these tribes under one military chief might even endanger the bordering country
of the Cossacks. “The thought of the dreadful consequences which a union
of the hostile Circassians[35] under one head would produce in the south of
Russia, fills one with terror,” exclaims Mr. Kapffer, a German who
presided over the scientific commission which, in 1829, accompanied the
expedition of General Etronnel to Elbruz.

At this very moment our attention is directed with equal anxiety to the
banks of the Danube, where Russia has seized the two corn magazines of Europe,
and to the Caucasus, where she is menaced in the possession of Georgia. It was
the Treaty of Adrianople that prepared Russia’s usurpation of
Moldo-Wallachia, and recognised her claims to the Caucasus.

Article IV of that treaty stipulates:

“All the countries situated north and east of the line
of demarcation between the two Empires (Russia and Turkey), towards Georgia,
Imertia, and the Giureil, as well as all the littoral of the Black Sea, from
the mouth of the Kuban, as far as the port of St. Nicholas exclusively, shall
remain under the domination of Russia.”

With regard to the Danube the same treaty stipulates:

“The frontier line will follow the course of the
Danube to the mouth of St. George, leaving all the islands formed by the
different branches in the possession of Russia. The right bank will remain, as
formerly, in the possession of the Ottoman Porte. It is, however, agreed that
the right bank, from the point where the arm of St. George departs from that of
Sulina, shall remain uninhabited to a distance of two hours (six miles) from
the river, and that no kind of structure shall be raised there, and, in like
manner, on the islands which still remain in the possession of the Court of
Russia. With the exception of quarantines, which will be there established, it
will not be permitted to make any other establishment or fortification.”

Both these paragraphs, inasmuch as they secure to Russia an “extension
of territory and exclusive commercial advantages,” openly infringed on
the protocol of April 4, 1846, drawn up by the Duke of Wellington at St.
Petersburg, and on the treaty of July 6, 1827, concluded between Russia and the
other great Powers at London. The English Government, therefore, refused to
recognise the Treaty of Adrianople. The Duke of Wellington protested against
it.—(Lord Dudley Stuart, House of Commons, March 17,
1837.)

Lord Aberdeen protested:

“In a despatch to Lord Heytesbury, dated October 21,
1829, he commented with no small dissatisfaction on many parts of the Treaty of
Adrianople, and especially notices the stipulations respecting the islands of
the Danube. He denies that peace (the Treaty of Adrianople) has respected the
territorial rights of the sovereignty of the Porte, and the condition and the
interests of all maritime states in the Mediterranean.”—(Lord
Mahon, House of Commons, April 20, 1836.)

Earl Grey declared that “the independence of the Porte would be
sacrificed, and the peace of Europe endangered, by this treaty being agreed
to.”—(Earl Grey, House of Lords, February 4,
1834.)

Lord Palmerston himself informs us:

“As far as the extension of the Russian frontier is
concerned in the south of the Caucasus, and the shores of the Black Sea, it is
certainly not consistent with the solemn declaration made by Russia in the face
of Europe, previous to the commencement of the Turkish war.”—(House
of Commons, March 17, 1837.)

The eastern littoral of the Black Sea, by blockading which and cutting off
supplies of arms and gunpowder to the northwestern districts of the Caucasus,
Russia could alone hope to realise her nominal claim to these
countries—this littoral of the Black Sea and the outlets of the Danube
are certainly no places “where an English action could possibly take
place,” as was lamented by the noble lord in the case of Cracow. By what
mysterious contrivance, then, has the Muscovite succeeded in blockading the
Danube, in blocking up the littoral of the Euxine, and in forcing Great Britain
to submit not only to the Treaty of Adrianople, but at the same time to the
violation by Russia herself of that identical treaty?

These questions were put to the noble viscount in the House of Commons on
April 20, 1836, numerous petitions having poured in from the merchants of
London, of Glasgow, and other commercial towns, against the fiscal regulations
of Russia in the Black Sea, and her enactments and restrictions tending to
intercert English commerce on the Danube. There had appeared on February 7,
1836, a Russian ukase, which, by virtue of the Treaty of Adrianople,
established a quarantine on one of the islands formed by the mouths of the
Danube. In order to execute that quarantine, Russia claimed a right of boarding
and search, of levying fees and seizing and marching off to Odessa refractory
ships proceeding on their voyage up the Danube. Before the quarantine was
established, or rather before a custom-house and fort were erected, under the
false pretence of a quarantine, the Russian authorities threw out their
feelers, to ascertain the risk they might run with the British Government. Lord
Durham[36]
acting upon instructions received from England, remonstrated with the Russian
Cabinet for the hindrance which had been given to British trade.

“He was referred to Count Nesselrode,[37] Count
Nesselrode referred him to the Governor of South Russia, and the Governor of
South Russia again referred him to the Consul at Galatz, who communicated with
the British Consul at Ibraila, who was instructed to send down the captains
from whom toll had been exacted, to the Danube, the scene of their injuries, in
order that inquiry might be made on the subject, it being well known that the
captains thus referred to were then in England.”—(House of
Commons, April 20, 1836.)

The formal ukase of February 7, 1836, aroused, however, the general
attention of British commerce.

“Many ships had sailed, and others were going out, to
whose captains strict orders had been given not to submit to the right of
boarding and search which Russia claimed. The fate of these ships must be
inevitable, unless some expression of opinion was made on the part of that
House. Unless that were done, British shipping, to the amount of not less than
5,000 tons, would be seized and marched off to Odessa, until the insolent
commands of Russia were complied with.”—(Mr. Patrick Stewart,
House of Commons, April 20, 1836.)

Russia required the marshy islands of the Danube, by virtue of the clause of
the Treaty of Adrianople, which clause itself was a violation of the treaty she
had previously contracted with England and the other Powers, in 1827. The
bristling the gates of the Danube with fortifications, and these fortifications
with guns, was a violation of the Treaty of Adrianople itself, which expressly
prohibits any fortifications being erected within six miles of the river. The
exaction of tolls, and the obstruction of the navigation, were a violation of
the Treaty of Vienna, declaring that “the navigation of rivers along
their whole course, from the point where each of them becomes navigable to its
mouth, shall be entirely free,” that “ the duties shall in no case
exceed those nowthe amount of the duties shall in no case exceed those now
(1815) paid” and that “shall take place, except with the common
consent of the states no increase shall take place, except with the common
consent of the states bordering on the river.” Thus, then, all the
argument on which Russia could plead not guilty was the Treaty of 1827,
violated by the Treaty of Adrianople, the Treaty of Adrianople violated by
herself, the whole backed up by a violation of the Treaty of Vienna.

It proved quite impossible to wring out of the noble lord any declaration
whether he did or did not recognise the Treaty of Adrianople. As to the
violation of the Treaty of Vienna, he had

“received no official information that anything had
occurred which is not warranted by the treaty. When such a statement is made by
the parties concerned, it shall be dealt with in such manner as the law
advisers of the Crown shall deem consistent with the rights of the subjects of
this country.”—(Lord Palmerston, House of Commons,
April 20, 1836.)

By the Treaty of Adrianople, Art. V, Russia guarantees the
“prosperity” of the Danubian Principalities, and full
“liberty of trade” for them. Now, Mr. Stewart proved that the
Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were objects of deadly jealousy to
Russia, as their trade had taken a sudden development since 1834 as they vied
with Russia’s own staple production, as Galatz was becoming the great
depot of all the grain of the Danube, and driving Odessa out of the market. If,
answered the noble lord,

“my honourable friend had been able to show that
whereas some years ago we had had a large and important commerce with Turkey,
and that that commerce had, by the aggression of other countries, or by the
neglect of the Government of this, dwindled down to an inconsiderable trade,
then there might have been ground to call upon Parliament.”

In lieu of such an occurrence,

“my honourable friend has shown that during the last
few years the trade with Turkey has risen from next to nothing to a very
considerable amount.”

Russia obstructs the Danube navigation, because the trade of the
Principalities is growing important, says Mr. Stewart. But she did not do so
when the trade was next to nothing, retorts Lord Palmerston. You neglect to
oppose the recent encroachments of Russia on the Danube, says Mr. Stewart. We
did not do so at the epoch these encroachments were not yet ventured upon,
replies the noble lord. What “circumstances” have
therefore “occurred against which the Government are not likely
to guard unless driven thereto by the direct interference of this House?”
He prevented the Commons from passing a resolution by assuring them that
“there is no disposition of His Majesty’s Government to submit to
aggression on the part of any Power, be that Power what it may, and be it more
or less strong,” and by warning them that “we should also
cautiously abstain from anything which might be construed by other Powers, and
reasonably so, as being a provocation on our part.” A week after
these debates had taken place in the House of Commons, a British merchant
addressed a letter to the Foreign Office with regard to the Russian ukase.
“I am directed by Viscount Palmerston,” answered the Under
Secretary at the Foreign Office, to

“acquaint you that his lordship has called upon the
law adviser for the Crown for his opinions as to the regulations promulgated by
the Russian ukase of February 7, 1836; but in the meantime Lord Palmerston
directs me to acquaint you, with respect to the latter part of your letter,
that it is the opinion of His Majesty’s Government that no toll is justly
demanded by the Russian authorities, at the mouth of the Danube, and that you
have acted properly in directing your agents to refuse to pay
it.”

The merchant acted according to this letter. He is abandoned to Russia by
the noble lord; a Russian toll is, as Mr. Urquhart states, now exacted in
London and Liverpool by Russian Consuls, on every English ship sailing for the
Turkish ports of the Danube; and “the quarantine still stands on the
island of Leti”.

Russia did not limit her invasion of the Danube to a quarantine established,
to fortifications erected, and to tolls exacted. The only mouth of the Danube
remaining still navigable, the Sulina mouth, was acquired by her through the
Treaty of Adrianople. As long as it was possessed by the Turks, there was kept
a depth of water in the channel of from fourteen to sixteen feet. Since in the
possession of Russia, the water became reduced to eight feet, a depth wholly
inadequate to the conveyance of the vessels employed in the corn trade. Now
Russia is a party to the Treaty of Vienna, and that treaty stipulates, in
Article CXIII, that “each State shall be at the expense of keeping in
good repair the towing paths, and shall maintain the necessary work in order
that no obstructions shall be experienced by the navigation”. For keeping
the channel in a navigable state, Russia found no better means than gradually
reducing the depth of the water, paving it with wrecks, and choking up its bar
with an accumulation of sand and mud. To this systematic and protracted
infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, she added another violation of the Treaty
of Adrianople, which forbids any establishment at the mouth of the Sulina,
except for quarantine and light-house purposes, while at her dictation, a small
Russian fort has there sprung up, living by extortions upon the vessels, the
occasion for which is afforded by the delays and expenses for lighterage,
consequent upon the obstruction of the channel.

“Cum principia negante non est
disputandum—of what use is it to dwell upon abstract principles with
despotic Governments, who are accused of measuring might by power, and of
ruling their conduct by expediency, and not by justice?”(Lord
Palmerston, April 30, 1823)

According to his own maxim, the noble viscount was contented to dwell upon
abstract principles with the despotic Government of Russia; but he went
further. While he assured the House on July 6, 1840, that the freedom of the
Danube navigation was “guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna,” while
he lamented on July 13, 1840, that the occupation of Cracow being a violation
of the Treaty of Vienna, “there were no means of enforcing the opinions
of England, because Cracow was evidently a place where no English action could
possibly take place”; two days later he concluded a Russian treaty,
closing the Dardanelles to England “during times of peace with
Turkey,” and thus depriving England of the only means of
“enforcing” the Treaty of Vienna, and transforming the Euxine into
a place where no English action could possibly take place.

This point once obtained, he contrived to give a sham satisfaction to public
opinion by firing off a whole battery of papers, reminding the “despotic
Government, which measures right by power, and rules its conduct by expediency
and not by justice,” in a sententious and sentimental manner, that
“Russia, when she compelled Turkey to cede to her the outlet of a great
European river, which forms the commercial highway for the mutual intercourse
of many nations, undertook duties and responsibilities to other States which
she should take a pride in making good.” To this dwelling upon abstract
principles, Count Nesselrode kept giving the inevitable answer that “the
subject should be carefully examined,” and expressing from time to time,
“a feeling of soreness on the part of the Imperial Government at the
mistrust manifested as to their intentions.”

Thus, through the management of the noble lord, in 1853, things arrived at
the point where the navigation of the Danube was declared impossible, and corn
was rotting at the mouth of the Sulina, while famine threatened to invade
England, France, and the south of Europe. Thus, Russia was not only adding, as
The Times says, “to her other important possessions that of an
iron gate between the Danube and the Euxine,” she possessed herself of
the key to the Danube, of a bread-screw which she can put on whenever the
policy of Western Europe becomes obnoxious to punishment.