Final Issue Neue Rheinische Zeitung May 1849

Hungary

by Frederick Engels

Neue Rheinische Zeitung No. 301
Translated by the Marx-Engels Institute
1994

Cologne, May 18. At a moment when the actual entry of Russian
troops turns the Magyar war into a European war, we are compelled to discontinue
our reports on its further development. We can only once more present for
our readers the course of this grand East European revolutionary war in
a brief survey.

It will be remembered that in the autumn of 1847, even before
the February revolution, the Diet at Pressburg, under the leadership of
Kossuth, adopted a number of revolutionary decisions, such as those providing
for the salability of landed property, the peasants' right to choose their
own domicile, the commutation of feudal services, the emancipation of the
Jews and equal taxation of all classes. On the very day the February revolution
began in Paris (February 22) the Diet permitted Croats and Slavonians when
dealing with their internal affairs to use their own language for official
purposes and finally, by demanding a separate responsible ministry for
Hungary, it made the first step towards a separate Hungary.

The February revolution broke out, and with it collapsed the resistance
of the Viennese government to the demands of the Hungarians. On March 16,
one day after the Viennese revolution, consent was given for the formation
of an independent Hungarian government thereby reducing the association
between Hungary and Austria to a mere personal union.

The now independent Magyar revolution made rapid progress. It
abolished all political privileges, introduced universal suffrage, did
away with all feudal dues, labor services and tithes -- compensations being
payable by the State -- brought about the union with Transylvania and succeeded
in securing the appointment of Kossuth as Minister of Finance and the dismissal
of the rebellious Ban Jellachich.

Meanwhile the Austrian government recovered from the blow. While
the pseudo-responsible ministry at Vienna remained powerless, the camarilla
at the Innsbruck Court grew steadily more powerful. It relied on the imperial
army in Italy, on the national appetite of the Czechs, Croats and Serbs
and on the stubborn narrow-mindedness of the Ruthenian peasants.

The Serbian insurrection, instigated with the help of money and
emissaries from the Court, started in the Banat and Bacska on June 17.
On the 20th Jellachich had an audience with the Emperor at Innsbruck and
was reappointed Ban. Jellachich returned to Croatia, renounced allegiance
to the Hungarian ministry and on August 25 declared war against it.

The treachery of the Hapsburg camarilla was plainly evident. The
Hungarians tried once more to persuade the Emperor to return to constitutional
methods. They sent a deputation of 200 members of the Imperial Diet to
Vienna; the Emperor was evasive. Feeling ran high. The people demanded
guarantees and brought about changes in the government. Traitors, who sat
in the Pest ministry too, were removed, and on September 20 Kossuth was
appointed Prime Minister. But only four days later the Palatine Archduke
Stephan, the representative of the Emperor, escaped to Vienna and on the
26th the Emperor issued the well-known manifesto to the Hungarians in which
he declared that the government was rebellious and dismissed it, appointing
the Magyarophobe Jellachich governor of Hungary and encroaching on the
most important revolutionary gains of Hungary.

The manifesto, not having been countersigned by an Hungarian minister,
was declared null and void by Kossuth.

Meanwhile Jellachich, taking advantage of the disorganization
and treachery prevalent among the nominally Hungarian, but in reality old
imperial, officers and general staff, advanced to Stuhlweissenburg. There
he was defeated by the Hungarian army, despite its treacherous leaders,
and driven back into Austrian territory to the very walls of Vienna. The
Emperor and the old traitor Latour then decided to send reinforcements
to Jellachich and to reconquer Hungary with the aid of German and Slav
troops. But the revolution broke out in Vienna on October 6, and for the
time being put an end to the royal and imperial schemes.

Kossuth immediately marched with a Magyar corps to the assistance
of the Viennese people. At the Leitha he was prevented from moving immediately
on Vienna by the indecision of the Viennese Diet, the treachery of his
own officers and the bad organization of his army, which consisted for
the most part of local militia. He was finally obliged to arrest more than
a hundred officers, send them to Pest and have a number of them shot. Only
after this did he dare to attack. But it was too late-Vienna had already
fallen, and his undisciplined local militia was thrown back at Schwechat
by the regular Austrian troops.

The truce between the imperial troops and the Magyars lasted six
weeks. While both armies did their utmost to strengthen their forces, the
Olmiltz camarilla carried out a coup which it had been preparing for a
long time. It forced the idiot Ferdinand-who had compromised himself by
concessions to the revolution and was now useless-to abdicate, and placed
on the throne Sophia's son, the boy Francis. Joseph, whom it intended to
use as its tool. On the basis of the Hungarian constitution the Pest Diet
rejected this change of sovereigns.

Finally in the middle of December the war started. Hungary by
then was practically surrounded by the imperial army. The offensive was
launched from all sides.

From Austria three army corps, no less than 90,000 strong, under
the supreme command of Field-Marshal Windischgratz advanced southward
from the Danube. Nugent with about 20,000 men marched from Styria along
the left bank of the Drave. Dahlen with 10,000 men marched from Croatia
along the right bank of the Drave to the Banat. Several frontier regiments,
the garrison of Temesvir, the Serbian militia -and the Serbian auxiliary
corps of Knica-nin, totaling 30,000 to 40,000 men commanded by Todorovich
and Rukavina, fought in the Banat itself. Puchner with 20,000-25,000 men
was in Transylvania as was also Malkowski with 10,000-15,000 men, who had
invaded it from Bukovina. Finally Schlick with a corps of 20,000-25,000
men moved from Galicia towards the upper Theiss.

The imperial army thus numbered at least 200,000 regular, battle-hardened
troops, not counting the Slav, Romance and Saxon local militia and National
Guards who took part in the fighting in the south and in Transylvania.

Against this colossal fighting force Hungary could pit an army
of perhaps 80,000-90,000 trained soldiers, including 24,000 men who had
formerly served in the imperial army, and in addition 50,000 to 60,000
poorly organized Honveds and local militia. This army was commanded largely
by traitors similar to the officers Kossuth had had arrested at the Leitha.

But whereas Austria, a country kept down by force, financially
ruined and almost moneyless, could not yield another recruit for the time
being, the Magyars still had great resources at their disposal. The Magyars'
enthusiasm for liberty, reinforced by their national pride, waxed stronger
every day, providing Kossuth with eager fighters in numbers unheard-of
for such a small nation of 5 million. The Hungarian printing press placed
inexhaustible financial resources in the form of banknotes at Kossuth's
disposal and every Magyar accepted these national assignats as if they
were hard silver coin. Rifle and gun production was in full swing. All
the army lacked was weapons, experience and good leaders, and all this
could be procured in a few months. It was only necessary to win time, to
entice the imperial troops into the heart of the country where they would
be worn down by unceasing guerrilla warfare and weakened by having to leave
behind strong garrisons and other detachments.

Hence the plan of the Hungarians to withdraw slowly into the interior,
to train the recruits in continuous skirmishes and as a last resort to
place between themselves and their enemies the Theiss line with its impassable
swamps, which form a natural moat around the Magyar lands.

According to all calculations, the Hungarians should have been
able to hold the area between Pressburg and Pest for two to three months
even against the superior strength of the Austrians. But severe frosts
suddenly set in covering all rivers and swamps with a thick layer of ice
capable of bearing the weight even of heavy guns. This deprived the terrain
of all features favoring defense, and made all fortifications built by
the Magyar army useless and liable to be outflanked. And so it happened
that before twenty days had passed the Hungarian army was thrown back from
Odenburg and Pressburg to Raab, from Raab to Mor, from Mor to Pest, and
even had to leave Pest and withdraw beyond the Theiss at the very beginning
of the campaign.

The other corps fared no better than the main army. In the south
Nugent and Dahlen continued their advance towards Esseg, which was occupied
by the Magyars, and the Serbs gradually approached the Maros line; in Transylvania
Puchner joined Malkowski at Maros-Vasarhely; in the north Schlick descended
from the Carpathians to the Theiss and made junction with Windischgratz
at Miskolcz.

The Austrians seemed to have practically finished with the Magyar
revolution. They had two-thirds of Hungary and three-fourths of Transylvania
in their rear, the Hungarians were attacked in front, on both flanks and
in the rear. A further advance of a few miles would have enabled all the
corps of the Emperor to make junction and draw the ring tighter until Hungary
was crushed in it as in the coils of a boa constrictor.

The thing now -- while the Theiss on the front still formed an
insuperable barrier to the enemy -- was to gain some breathing space.

This was done at two points: in Transylvania by Bem, and in Slovakia
by Gorgey. Both carried out operations which show that they are the most
gifted commanders of our time.

On December 29, Bem arrived at Klausenburg, the only town in Transylvania
still held by the Magyars. Here he quickly concentrated the reinforcements
he had brought and the remnants of the defeated Magyar and Szekler troops,
[169] and marched to Maros-Vasarhely, beat the Austrians and drove Malkowski
first across the Carpathians into Bukovina and from there into Galicia,
where he pushed on towards Stanislav. Then, swiftly turning back into Transylvania
he pursued Puchner to within a few miles of Hermannstadt. After several
skirmishes and a few swift drives in various directions, the whole of Transylvania
was in his hands apart from two towns, Hermannstadt and Kronstadt, and
these too would have been taken if the Russians had not been called in.
The 10,000-strong Russian auxiliary troops tipped the scales and forced
Bem to fall back on Szeklerland. There he organized an uprising of the
Szeklers, and with this achieved, he had the Szekler militia engage Puchner,
who had reached Schassburg, while he bypassed Puchner's positions, moved
straight on Hermannstadt and drove the Russians out, then defeated Puchner
who had followed him, marched on Kronstadt and entered it without firing
a shot.

Transylvania was thus won and the rear of the Magyar army cleared.
The natural defense line formed by the Theiss now found its continuation
in the Carpathian mountain range and the Transylvanian Alps, from the Zips
to the borders of the Banat.

Gorgey at the same time made a similar triumphal march in North-Western
Hungary. He set out with a corps from Pest to Slovakia, for two months
kept in check the corps of Generals Gotz, Csorich and Simunich operating
against him from three directions, and finally, when his position became
untenable against their superior forces, fought his way through the Carpathians
to Eperies and Kaschau. There he appeared in the rear of Schlick and forced
him hurriedly to abandon his position and his whole operational base and
retreat to Windischgratz's main army, while he himself was already marching
down the Hernad to the Theiss to join the main body of the Magyar army.

This army, which was now commanded by Dembinski, had likewise
crossed the Theiss and had repulsed the enemy all along the line. It had
reached Hatvan, six miles from Pest, when a stronger concentration of enemy
forces compelled it to retreat again. After offering vigorous resistance
at Kapolna, Maklar and Poroszlo it recrossed the Theiss just at the moment
when Gorgey reached the Theiss at Tokaj. The meeting of the two corps was
the signal for a new magnificent advance of the Hungarians. Newly trained
recruits arriving from the interior strengthened the Hungarian army in
the field. Polish and German Legions were formed, capable leaders had been
trained or enlisted, and in place of the leaderless, unorganized mass of
December, the imperial troops were suddenly faced by a concentrated, brave,
and numerous army which was well organized and excellently led.

The Magyars crossed the Theiss in three columns. The right wing
(Gorgey) moved northwards, outflanked the Ramberg division, which had been
following it, at Eperies and quickly drove it through Rimaszombat towards
the main imperial army. The latter was defeated by Dembinski at Erlau,
Gyongyos, Godollo and Hatvan, and hastily retreated to Pest. Finally the
left wing (Vetter) dislodged Jellachich from Kecskemet, Szolnok and Czegled,
defeated him at Jaszbereny and compelled him, too, to retreat to the walls
of Pest. There the imperial forces stood along the Danube from Pest to
Waitzen, surrounded in a wide semicircle by the Magyars.

To avoid exposing Pest to bombardment from Ofen, the Hungarians
had recourse to their well-tried tactics of dislodging the Austrians from
their positions by maneuvers rather than by open frontal attacks. Gorgey
captured Waitzen and forced the Austrians to fall back beyond the Gran
and Danube; he defeated Wohlgemuth between the Gran and Neutra, thereby
relieving Komorn, which was besieged by imperial troops. Since its line
of retreat was threatened, the imperial army had to decide on a hurried
withdrawal. Welden, the new commander-in-chief, retreated in the direction
of Raab and Pressburg, and Jellachich was obliged, in order to pacify his
extremely refractory Croats, to hastily retreat with them down the Danube
into Slavonia.

During their retreat, which rather resembled a stampede, Welden
(and especially his rearguard commanded by Schlick) and Jellachich suffered
further considerable reverses. While the latter's hard-pressed corps was
slowly fighting its way through the Tolna and Baranya districts, Welden
was able at Pressburg to concentrate the remnants of his army which were
by no means capable of offering any serious resistance.

Simultaneously with these astonishing victories of the Magyars
over the main Austrian army, Moritz Perczel pressed forward from Szegedin
and Tolna towards Peterwardein, relieved it, occupied Bacska and moved
into the Banat, in order to link up there with Bem who was advancing from
Transylvania. Bem had already taken Arad and besieged Temesvar; Perczel
stood at Werschetz close to the Turkish frontier; the Banat was thus conquered
in a few days. The fortified Transylvanian mountain passes were at the
same time held by the Szeklers, the passes in upper Hungary by the local
militia, and Gorgey with a considerable army stood at the Jablunka Pass
on the Moravian-Galician frontier.

In short, in a few more days the victorious Magyar army, driving
the remnants of the mighty Austrian Legions before it, would have entered
Vienna in triumph and put an end to the Austrian monarchy for all time.

Hungary's separation from Austria had been decided in Debrecen
on April 14; the alliance with Poland, openly proclaimed since the middle
of January, was turned into reality by the 20,000-30,000 Poles who joined
the Hungarian army. The alliance with the German Austrians, which had existed
since the Viennese revolution of October 6 and the battle at Schwechat,
was similarly preserved and sustained by the German Legions within the
Hungarian army, as well as by the fact that the Magyars were faced with
the strategic and political necessity of occupying Vienna and revolutionizing
Austria so as to secure recognition of their declaration of independence.

Thus, the Magyar war very soon lost the national character it
had had in the beginning, and assumed a clearly European character, precisely
as a result of what would seem to be a purely national act, as a result
of the declaration of independence. Only when Hungary proclaimed her separation
from Austria, and thereby the dissolution of the Austrian monarchy, did
the alliance with the Poles for the liberation of both countries, and the
alliance with the Germans for the revolutionization of Eastern Germany
acquire a definite character and a solid basis. If Hungary were independent,
Poland restored, German Austria turned into the revolutionary focus of
Germany, with Lombardy and Italy winning independence -- these plans, if
carried out, would wreck the entire East European political system: Austria
would disappear, Prussia would disintegrate and Russia would be forced
back to the borders of Asia.

The Holy Alliance, therefore, had to make every effort to stem
the impending revolution in Eastern Europe -- the Russian armies rolled
towards the Transylvanian and Galician frontiers; Prussia occupied the
Bohemian-Silesian frontier and allowed the Russians to pass through her
territory towards Prerau, and within a few days the first Russian army
corps stood on Moravian soil.

The Magyars, who clearly understood that in a few weeks they would
have to deal with numerous fresh troops, did not advance on Vienna as quickly
as one expected at the beginning. They could not take Vienna, as they could
not take Pest, by a frontal attack without shelling the city, and this
they were not prepared to do. Again, as at Pest, they were compelled to
resort to outflanking maneuvers, and this required time and the assurance
that their own flanks and rear were secure. But it was here that the Russians
menaced their rear, while if Vienna were seriously endangered strong detachments
of Radetzky's army could be immediately expected from the other direction.

The Hungarians therefore acted very wisely when, instead of advancing
swiftly on Vienna, they confined themselves to steadily forcing the imperial
armies out of Hungary, enveloping them in a wide arc from the foothills
of the Carpathians to the spurs of the Styrian Alps, dispatching a strong
corps towards Jablunka, fortifying and covering the Galician mountain passes,
attacking Ofen and rapidly proceeding with the recruitment of 250,000 men, especially from the reconquered western districts. In this way they
secured their flanks and rear and assembled an army which need no more
fear the Russian contingents than the once colossal imperial army. 200,000
soldiers of this glorious Austrian army had invaded Hungary and barely
50,000 of them had returned; the rest were either killed, wounded, sick,
taken prisoner or had changed sides.

True, the Russians threaten to send even more gigantic armies.
Some speak of 120,000 soldiers, others of 170,000. According to the Triester
Freihafen, the mobile army in the field is expected considerably to surpass
500,000 men. But the Russian love of exaggeration is well known: of the
figures they give only half are on the nominal rolls, and of the numbers
on the nominal roll again less than half are really there. If, after deducting
the number of troops required for the occupation of Poland, the effective
Russian aid amounts to from 60,000 to 70,000 men, the Austrians can be
glad. And the Magyars will be able to deal with that number.

The Magyar war of 1849 has strong points of resemblance with the
Polish war of 1830-31. But the great difference is that the factors which
were against the Poles at that time now act in favor of the Magyars. Lelewel,
as we know, unsuccessfully urged, first, that the mass of the population
be bound to the revolution by emancipating the peasants and the Jews, and
secondly, that all three partitioning powers be involved in the war and
this war turned into a European war, by raising an insurrection throughout
the old Polish territories. The Magyars started at the point which the
Poles only achieved when it was too late. The Hungarians first of all carried
through a social revolution in their country, they abolished feudalism;
their second measure was to involve Poland and Germany in the war, thus
turning it into a European war. It started with the entry of the first
Russian corps into German territory, and will take a decisive turn when
the first French battalion steps onto German territory.

By becoming a European war, the Hungarian war is brought into
reciprocal interaction with all other factors of the European movement.
Its course affects not only Germany, but also France and England. The English
bourgeoisie cannot be expected to let Austria become a Russian province
and it is certain that the French people will not calmly contemplate the
increasing attacks of the counter-revolution on it. Whatever the outcome
of the French elections, the army at any rate has declared for the revolution.
And the army today is the decisive force. If the army wants war -- and
it does want it -- then war it will be.

War will come. Paris is on the threshold of revolution, whether
as a result of the elections or of the army's fraternization with the revolutionary
party at the ballot-box. While in Southern Germany the core of a revolutionary
army is being formed, which prevents Prussia from taking an active part
in the Hungarian campaign, France is on the point of having an active role
in the struggle. A few weeks, perhaps even a few days, will decide everything,
and the French, the Magyar-Polish, and the German revolutionary armies
will celebrate their fraternization on the battle-field before the walls
of Berlin.

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