"Neue Rheinische Zeitung" – Drigalski the Legislator, Citizen and Communist

Drigalski the Legislator, Citizen and Communist

["Neue Rheinische Zeitung" No. 153 of November 26, 1848]

* Cologne, November 24. Düsseldorf has been declared in a state of siege; the Brandenburg-Wrangel Ministry has found worthy representatives in Messrs Spiegel and Drigalski. The first of these gentlemen is a simple district president, but the other combines manifold qualities; he is not only lieutenant general and divisional commander — in which capacity he figures in the rank and quarter list and as “supreme” legislator of the city and the combined municipality of Düsseldorf — he is also a writer and says of himself that he is at once “citizen” and — communist, all with God for King and Fatherland. These two gentlemen, the simple as well as the many-coloured, have found that in Düsseldorf the legal state can be maintained only by extraordinary means; they have therefore felt themselves “compelled,” “for the protection of the legal order,” to declare the whole municipality of Düsseldorf in a state of siege.

We have long known that the Brandenburg government can maintain itself only by extraordinary means; we know that its <in the “N. Rh. Ztg.”: his> state would have come to an end long ago if the country were not in a state of siege. The state of siege is the legal state of the Brandenburg government.

“A state of siege, gentlemen, means a state of war,” declared Minister-President von Pfuel in the session of the Agreement Assembly of September 29. At that time it was a matter of the city and fortress of Cologne, at that time there was talk of an insurrection, the dispositions of the courts could not be carried out, the legal power — the civic militia — could not maintain calm, barricades had been erected; force

could only be met by force. So at least asserted the defenders of the state of siege, at least they still took the trouble to save outward appearances by means of allegedly established facts. Now they make things much easier for themselves; Düsseldorf is not in revolt, the action of the courts has not been disturbed for a single moment, the civic militia has always been ready to comply with the legal requisition, indeed they cannot even invoke the outdated instructions of 1809, to which such great weight was attached at that time; for Düsseldorf is not a fortress. But Düsseldorf has pronounced itself with rare energy in favour of tax refusal — that sufficed for the two Brandenburgers to restore the legal state, i.e., to declare the city outside the law.

We shall not go into the accusations which are intended to serve as a pretext for the proclamation of the state of siege; we commend them as false accusations to the attention of the judicial authority, since nowhere is the legal proof provided to support them, they are calumnies that fall under Articles 367 et seq. of the Penal Code. We wish here merely to enumerate the illegalities which Messrs Spiegel and Drigalski are committing under the pretext of protecting the legal order.

After the two gentlemen have proclaimed the state of siege and “therewith the supreme authority has passed to the military authority,” the “communist and citizen” Drigalski decrees as follows:

1. The legally existing authorities remain in their functions and will be most vigorously supported in the measures they are to take.

That is, the legally existing authorities, in so far as they exist legally, are quashed, but remain in their functions to support Herr v. Drigalski.

“I expect,” Drigalski says to his “fellow citizens,” “that all well-disposed inhabitants will make it easier for me to administer the laws and that the authorities will support me in this with all resoluteness.”

Herr Drigalski not only makes the laws, he also administers them, the legally existing authorities are his satellites. And the “independent” judges of the Düsseldorf regional court and the chief public prosecutor and his office put up with all this quite calmly! They find no violation of the law in the fact that they are suspended from their office, they pay homage to the legislator Drigalski and rejoice that at this price they may continue to draw their

salary. Shame on you, gentlemen, does no blush of shame overcome you, you who under the sabre regime issue warrants of arrest and conduct investigations? Or is the arrest of Herr Lassalle, who, trusting unfortunately all too boldly in his good right and the protection of the judicial authority, did not wish to evade the state of siege, merely an act of private revenge on the part of Herr Drigalski? Has an investigation perhaps already been secretly requested and initiated against this man and his accomplices on the basis of Articles 114, 123, 124?

The second law of Herr Drigalski reads:

“All associations for political and social purposes are dissolved.”

What does Herr Drigalski care about the law of April 6, § 4. If, according to this, “all Prussians are entitled to form associations for purposes that do not conflict with existing laws, without prior police permission,” then this is obviously one of those “achievements” which must be wrested back again as quickly as possible, and hence incompatible with Drigalski’s legislation.

Third and fourth law. Herr v. Drigalski regulates the traffic in streets and public houses. As if Düsseldorf had become Paris, he issues a law against attroupements <gatherings>. He is not only great as a policeman, however, he also shows distinct talent for a night watchman: he orders closing time.

Fifth law. “The civic militia is dissolved subject to its reorganisation and is to hand over its weapons this very day.” This law is complex in its illegalities, we distinguish:

a) The civic militia is dissolved. According to the ordinary laws, particularly the Civic Militia Act of October 17, the civic militia can be dissolved only by royal cabinet orders. Has Herr v. Drigalski perhaps a secret cabinet order up his sleeve? Well, why does he not publish it, as he publishes the declaration of the chief postal director Maurenbrecher. Admittedly, the latter has been given the lie at once by the Düsseldorf civic militia. Herr v. Drigalski has no cabinet order, he acts on his own plenary power and arrogates to himself royal prerogatives, although he is a royal-minded “citizen and communist.”

b) The civic militia is not merely suspended from service. Herr v. Drigalski does not content himself with merely seizing the official authority of the district president. As far as illegality goes, suspension from service alone would already have been quite sufficient. § 4 of the Act of October 17 reads:

“If the civic militia of a community or district refuses to comply with the requisition of the authority or interferes in the functions of the communal, administrative or judicial authorities, the administrative head of the government district may, stating the reasons, provisionally suspend it from service.”

The suspension from service could, therefore, only be pronounced by the district president, but neither by a lieutenant general, nor by a divisional commander, nor by a citizen, nor, finally, by a communist, even if he is a “royal Prussian communist.”

But Herr Drigalski has his good reasons for immediately comporting himself as a majesty without respect for the proper channels. Had he treated the civic militia merely as district president, he could not have disarmed it. But

c) “the civic militia is to hand over its weapons this very day.” Mere suspension from service in no way authorises the seizure of weapons. Otherwise suspended officers would also have to surrender their swords. But Herr Drigalski is right; had the civic militia been allowed to keep its weapons, it would probably not have let him suspend it; it would have fulfilled its purpose, as prescribed by § 1 of the Act.

d) Herr von Drigalski has the weapons handed over to himself. Since he once feels called upon to appear as majesty, he does not even bother about the royal ordinance concerning the implementation of the Act on the Establishment of the Civic Militia. There, § 3 states:

“The weapons supplied by the state to the communities shall in any case remain in the possession of the communities until the above-mentioned time.”

The “town council and municipal council of Düsseldorf raise no objection to this order. Instead of protesting against this illegality and standing up for the rights of the community, they exhort the citizens to “calm, lawful behaviour” towards their new dictator.

Sixth law. “Anyone who is encountered in open and armed resistance against measures of the legal authority or who, by a treasonable act, causes danger or disadvantage to the troops, shall be brought before a court-martial.”

According to the law for the protection of personal liberty, no one may be brought before a judge other than the one designated by law. Special courts and extraordinary commissions are inadmissible. No penalty may be threatened or imposed except in accordance with the law. According to the same law, this provision can never be suspended temporarily or by district, not even in the event of war or insurrection. For according to § 8, only §§ 1 and 6 may then be provisionally repealed, but also only by resolution and under the responsibility of the state ministry. Nevertheless, Herr v. Drigalski decrees a court-martial for civilians. It is no longer surprising that he has arrests carried out, that for this purpose he violates the sanctity of the home; these provisions may at least still be suspended, even if not by Herr v. Drigalski. Incidentally, it does not matter whether one wants to give credence to the assertion of the “Düsseldorfer Zeitung” that Lassalle’s arrest was carried out in a completely informal manner, or to the assurance of the “Kölnische Zeitung,” according to which it took place on the order of the examining magistrate. The “Kölnische Zeitung,” of course, takes the side of the military commander in order to embarrass the examining magistrate. In any case, the arrest is illegal; for in an illegal condition no legal actions can be taken. In a state of war the action of the civil jurisdiction ceases. If the examining magistrate remains in his functions, he steps into the position of a military auditor, his code becomes the articles of war. The Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office has well understood its new position; for if it still considered itself within the jurisdiction prescribed by the Rhenish Code of Criminal Procedure, it would have intervened long ago, if only on the basis of § 9 of the Habeas Corpus Act, which states:

“No prior authorisation of the authorities is necessary in order to prosecute public civil and military officials judicially for the violations of the above provisions committed through the transgression of their official powers.”

It is now a question, in order to become fully acquainted with the strength of our Rhenish institutions, whether the Prosecutor General, Herr Nicolovius, under whose supervision all officers of the judicial police, even the examining magistrates, stand, will approve the conduct of the Düsseldorf public prosecutor’s office.

A deputation which waited upon him yesterday to request him to exert his official authority with regard to the Düsseldorf events, is said to have been told by Herr Nicolovius that he had no article of law upon the basis of which he could intervene. We say, Herr Nicolovius is said to, although this remark has been communicated to us in the most credible way. We cannot, however, believe it, for we should otherwise be obliged to assume that Herr Nicolovius must have completely forgotten the Code pénal, along with all the laws which have been enacted since March of this year.