"Neue Rheinische Zeitung" – The June Revolution (The Course of the Uprising in Paris)

The *Kölnische Zeitung*
on the June Revolution

Contents

German Foreign Policy

Page numbers refer to: Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels – Werke, Volume 5, pp. 145-153

The June Revolution

[The Course of the Uprising in Paris]

[*Neue Rheinische Zeitung* No. 31, 1 July 1848]

** Gradually one arrives at a survey of the June Revolution; the reports become more complete, the facts can be separated from rumours as well as from lies, the character of the uprising emerges ever more clearly. And the more one succeeds in grasping the events of the four June days in their interconnection, the more one is astonished at the colossal dimensions of the uprising, at the heroic courage, the rapidly improvised organisation, the unanimity of the insurgents.

The battle plan of the workers, said to have been drawn up by Kersausie, a friend of Paspails and a former officer, was as follows:

The insurgents advanced in four columns, in a concentric movement, towards the Town Hall.

The first column, whose operational base was the suburbs of Montmartre, La Chapelle and La Villette, advanced southwards from the Poissonnière, Rochechouart, St. Denis and La Villette barriers, occupied the boulevards and approached the Town Hall through the streets Montorgueil, St. Denis and St. Martin.

The second column, whose base was the Faubourgs du Temple and St. Antoine, which are almost entirely inhabited by workers and covered by the Canal Saint-Martin, advanced on the same centre through the streets du Temple and St. Antoine and along the quays of the northern bank of the Seine, as well as through all the parallel streets of the intervening quarters.

The third column, based on the Faubourg St. Marceau, advanced through the street St. Victor and the quays of the southern bank of the Seine towards the Île de la Cité.

The fourth column, supported by the Faubourg St. Jacques and the area of the medical school, advanced through the street Saint Jacques, likewise towards the Cité. From here both columns, united, pressed on across the right bank of the Seine and took the Town Hall in rear and flank.

The plan thus rightly relied on the parts of the city inhabited exclusively by workers, which surround the whole eastern half of Paris in a semicircle and which grow broader the further east one goes. The east of Paris was first to be completely cleared of enemies, and then an advance was to be made on both banks of the Seine against the west and its centres, the Tuileries and the National Assembly.

These columns were to be supported by a host of flying corps operating on their own initiative beside and between them, throwing up barricades, occupying the small streets and maintaining communications.

In the event of a retreat, the operational bases were heavily fortified and skilfully transformed into formidable fortresses – such as the Clos Saint-Lazare, the Faubourg and the Quartier St. Antoine, and the Faubourg St. Jacques.

If this plan had a flaw, it was that it entirely ignored the western half of Paris for the beginning of operations. Here, on both sides of the street St. Honoré, around the Halles and the Palais National, there lie several districts particularly suited to riots, which have very narrow and crooked streets and are predominantly inhabited by workers. It was important to create a fifth focus of insurrection here, thereby cutting off the Town Hall as well as engaging a large mass of troops at this salient bastion. The victory of the uprising depended on penetrating into the centre of Paris as soon as possible, on securing the capture of the Town Hall. We cannot know to what extent it was impossible for Kersausie to organise the insurrection here. It is, however, a fact that no uprising has ever succeeded which did not know how to seize from the outset this centre of Paris, which adjoins the Tuileries. We need only recall the uprising at the funeral of General Lamarque, which likewise advanced as far as the street Montorgueil but was then pushed back again.

The insurgents advanced according to their plan. They immediately began to separate their terrain, the Paris of the workers, from the Paris of the bourgeoisie by two main works: the barricades of the Porte Saint Denis and those of the Cité. They were driven out of the former; the latter they held. The first day, the 23rd, was a mere prelude. The insurgents' plan already emerged clearly (as the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* also rightly grasped from the very beginning, see No. 26, special supplement <See "Details on 23 June">), particularly after the first outpost skirmishes of the morning. The Boulevard St. Martin, which cuts across the line of operations of the first column, became the scene of fierce fighting, which ended here with the victory of "order", partly determined by the local conditions.

The approaches to the Cité were cut off, on the right by a flying corps that established itself in the street Planche-Mibray, on the left by the third and fourth columns, which occupied and fortified the three southern bridges of the Cité. Here, too, a very violent struggle developed. "Order" succeeded in seizing the Pont Saint-Michel and advancing as far as the street St. Jacques. By evening it flattered itself that the revolt was crushed.

If the plan of the insurgents had already clearly emerged, that of "order" was even clearer. Its plan consisted for the time being only of suppressing the insurrection by all means. It announced this intention to the insurgents with cannonballs and case shot.

But the government believed it was dealing with a crude band of ordinary, planless troublemakers. After having cleared the main streets towards evening, it declared that the revolt was vanquished, and only very negligently occupied the conquered districts with troops.

The insurgents knew how to exploit this negligence admirably in order to initiate the great battle after the outpost skirmishes of the 23rd. It is altogether astonishing how rapidly the workers made the operational plan their own, how uniformly they worked hand in hand, how skilfully they knew how to use such intricate terrain. This would be purely inexplicable had the workers not already been fairly well organised on military lines and divided into companies in the National Workshops, so that they needed only to transfer their industrial organisation to their warlike activity in order to form immediately a completely articulated army.

On the morning of the 24th, the lost terrain was not only completely reoccupied, but new ground was also gained. The line of the boulevards up to the Boulevard du Temple remained, to be sure, occupied by the troops, and thus the first column was cut off from the centre; in return, however, the second column advanced from the Quartier St. Antoine until it had almost surrounded the Town Hall. It established its headquarters in the church of St. Gervais, three hundred paces from the Town Hall; it captured the monastery of St. Merry and the surrounding streets; it pushed far beyond the Town Hall and, in conjunction with the columns of the Cité, almost completely isolated it. Only one access remained open: the quays of the right bank. In the south, the Faubourg St. Jacques was again entirely occupied, communications with the Cité were re-established, the Cité reinforced and the crossing to the right bank prepared.

There was certainly no more time to lose; the Town Hall, the revolutionary centre of Paris, was threatened and had to fall if the most resolute measures were not taken.

[*Neue Rheinische Zeitung* No. 32, 2 July 1848]

** The terrified National Assembly appointed Cavaignac dictator, and he, accustomed from Algiers to "energetic" intervention, knew what was to be done.

At once ten battalions advanced along the broad Quai de l'École towards the Town Hall. They cut off the communications of the Cité insurgents with the right bank, secured the Town Hall and even allowed attacks on the barricades surrounding the Town Hall.

The street Planche-Mibray and its continuation, the street Saint Martin, were cleared and kept constantly clear by cavalry. The opposite Pont Notre-Dame, which leads to the Cité, was swept by heavy artillery, and now Cavaignac advanced directly on the Cité in order to proceed "energetically" there. The main post of the insurgents, the "Belle Jardinière" ("Beautiful Gardener", a well-known clothing house), was first battered down by cannonballs, then set on fire by rockets; the Rue de la Cité was likewise conquered by cannonballs; three bridges leading to the left bank were taken by storm and the insurgents on the left bank were decisively driven back. Meanwhile the fourteen battalions stationed on the Place de Grève and the quays relieved the already beleaguered Town Hall, and the church of Saint Gervais was reduced from a headquarters to a lost outpost of the insurgents.

The street St. Jacques was attacked not only from the Cité with artillery, but also taken in the flank from the left bank. General Damesme advanced along the Luxembourg towards the Sorbonne, captured the Latin Quarter and sent his columns against the Panthéon. The Place du Panthéon had been transformed into a formidable fortress. The street St. Jacques had long been taken when "order" still found here an impregnable bastion. Cannon and bayonet attacks had been in vain, until finally fatigue, lack of ammunition and the threat of arson by the bourgeois compelled the 1,500 workers, surrounded on all sides, to surrender. At about the same time, the Place Maubert fell into the hands of "order" after a long, brave resistance, and the insurgents, driven from their strongest positions, were compelled to abandon the whole left bank of the Seine.

Meanwhile, the position of the troops and National Guards on the boulevards of the right bank of the Seine was also used to operate in both directions. Lamoricière, in command here, had the streets of the Faubourgs St. Denis and St. Martin, the Boulevard du Temple and half the street du Temple swept by heavy guns and swift troop attacks. He could boast of having fought to brilliant successes by evening: he had cut off the first column in the Clos Saint-Lazare and half-surrounded it, driven back the second and, by his advance on the boulevards, driven a wedge into it.

How had Cavaignac conquered these advantages?

First, through the enormous superiority of force he could deploy against the insurgents. On the 24th he had at his disposal not only the 20,000 men of the Paris garrison, the 20,000 to 25,000 Mobile Guards and the 60,000 to 80,000 available National Guards, but also the National Guard of the whole environs of Paris and of many a more distant town (20,000 to 30,000 men), and, further, 20,000 to 30,000 troops hurriedly summoned from the surrounding garrisons. On the morning of the 24th, well over 100,000 men were already at his disposal, and by evening this number was further increased by a half. And the insurgents were at most 40,000 to 50,000 strong!

Secondly, by the brutal means which he employed. Hitherto, cannon had been fired in the streets of Paris only once – in Vendémiaire 1795, when Napoleon dispersed the insurgents in the Rue Saint Honoré with grapeshot. But artillery had never yet been used against barricades, against houses, and still less had shells and incendiary rockets been used. The people were not prepared for this; they were defenceless against it, and the only countermeasure, burning, went against their noble feelings. The people had till then had no inkling of such Algerian warfare in the heart of Paris. That is why they fell back, and their initial retreat decided their defeat.

On the 25th, Cavaignac advanced with far larger forces. The insurgents were confined to a single quarter, the faubourgs Saint Antoine and du Temple; besides these, they still held two advanced posts, the Clos St. Lazare and a part of the quarter of St. Antoine as far as the Damiette bridge.

Cavaignac, who had again drawn 20,000 to 30,000 reinforcements, together with considerable artillery parks, first had the isolated outposts of the insurgents attacked, especially the Clos St. Lazare. Here the insurgents were entrenched as in a citadel. After twelve hours of cannonading and shelling, Lamoricière finally succeeded in driving the insurgents from their positions and occupying the Clos; but he only succeeded after making a flank attack possible from the streets of Rochechouart and Poissonnière, and after he had had the barricades shot to pieces by 40 guns on the first day and by even more on the second.

Another part of his column penetrated through the Faubourg Saint Martin into the Faubourg du Temple, but achieved no great success; a third advanced down the boulevards towards the Bastille, but likewise did not get far, since here a series of the most formidable barricades succumbed only after a long resistance to a fierce cannonade. Here the houses were terribly destroyed.

Duvivier’s column, attacking from the Hôtel de Ville, drove the insurgents back further and further under incessant cannon fire. The church of St. Gervais was taken, the Rue Saint Antoine was cleared for a long way from the Hôtel de Ville, and by several columns advancing along the quai and its parallel streets the Damiette bridge was captured, by means of which the insurgents of the quarter of St. Antoine linked up with those of the islands of St. Louis and the Cité. The quarter of Saint Antoine was outflanked, and the only retreat left to the insurgents was into the faubourg, which they carried out amidst fierce fighting with a column advancing over the quais as far as the mouth of the Canal St. Martin and from there along the canal on the Boulevard Bourdon. A few cut-off men were massacred, only a few were taken prisoner.

Through this operation the quarter of St. Antoine and the Place de la Bastille were taken. Towards evening, Lamoricière’s column succeeded in capturing the entire Boulevard Beaumarchais and linking up with Duvivier’s troops on the Place de la Bastille.

The capture of the Damiette bridge enabled Duvivier to expel the insurgents from the island of St. Louis and the former island of Louvier. He did this with a praiseworthy display of Algerian barbarity. In few parts of the town was heavy ordnance employed with such devastating success as precisely on the island of St. Louis. But what did that matter? The insurgents were driven out or massacred, and “order” triumphed amid the blood-stained ruins.

On the left bank of the Seine there was still one post to be captured. The Austerlitz bridge, which east of the Canal St. Martin connects the Faubourg St. Antoine with the left bank of the Seine, was heavily barricaded and on the left bank, where it debouches on the Place Valhubert in front of the Jardin des Plantes, was provided with a strong bridgehead. This bridgehead, the last redoubt of the insurgents on the left bank after the fall of the Panthéon and the Place Maubert, was taken after a stubborn defence.

For the following day, the 26th, the insurgents thus had only their last fortress left, the Faubourg St. Antoine and a part of the Faubourg du Temple. Neither faubourg is very suitable for street fighting; they have fairly broad and almost completely straight streets, which give artillery a magnificent field of play. On the western side they are excellently covered by the Canal St. Martin, but on the northern side they are completely open. Here five or six completely straight and broad streets run right into the heart of the Faubourg Saint Antoine.

The main fortifications were erected on the Place de la Bastille and in the most important street of the whole quarter, the Rue du Faubourg Saint Antoine. Barricades of remarkable strength were raised here, partly built up of large paving-stones, partly put together from beams. They formed an inwardly facing angle, partly in order to weaken the effect of cannon-balls, partly to present a broader defensive front that could open cross-fire. In the houses, the fire-walls were breached, thus connecting a whole row of houses together each time, so that the insurgents, according to the needs of the moment, could open tirailleur fire on the troops or withdraw behind their barricades. The bridges and quais on the canal, as well as the streets parallel to the canal, were also heavily fortified. In short, the two faubourgs still held resembled a complete fortress, in which the troops had to fight for every inch of ground in blood.

On the morning of the 26th the battle was to recommence. But Cavaignac had little inclination to send his troops into this tangle of barricades. He threatened a bombardment. The mortars and howitzers were brought up. Negotiations took place. Meanwhile Cavaignac had the nearest houses undermined – which, to be sure, given the shortness of the time and the canal covering one of the lines of attack, could be done only to a very limited extent – and from the houses already occupied he also had internal communications with the adjoining houses made by opening breaches in the fire-walls.

The negotiations broke down; the battle began again. Cavaignac had General Perrot attack from the Faubourg du Temple, General Lamoricière from the Place de la Bastille. At both points the barricades were heavily cannonaded. Perrot advanced fairly rapidly, took the remainder of the Faubourg du Temple and at some places even penetrated as far as the Faubourg St. Antoine. Lamoricière advanced more slowly. His cannon were resisted by the first barricades, although the first houses of the suburb were set on fire by his shells. He negotiated again. Watch in hand he waited for the minute when he would have the pleasure of shooting the most populous quarter of Paris to pieces. Then at last part of the insurgents capitulated, while the other part, attacked in their flanks, withdrew from the city after a short battle.

That was the end of the June barricade fighting. Outside the city some tirailleur skirmishes still took place, but they were quite insignificant. The fugitive insurgents were scattered in the surrounding area and were picked up singly by the cavalry.

We have given this purely military account of the fight to prove to our readers with what heroic courage, with what unity, with what discipline and with what military skill the Paris workers fought. Forty thousand of them held out for four days against a fourfold superiority of force, and they missed victory by a hair’s breadth. A hair’s breadth, and they would have gained a foothold in the centre of Paris, taken the Hôtel de Ville, installed a provisional government, and doubled their numbers, both from the conquered quarters and from the Mobile Guards, who at that time needed only a push to go over.

German papers assert that this was the decisive battle between the red and the tricolour republic, between workers and bourgeois. We are convinced that this battle decides nothing but the disintegration of the victors within themselves. Besides, the course of the whole affair proves that the workers must be victorious in no long time, even if we consider the matter from a purely military point of view. If 40,000 Paris workers already achieved such tremendous results against a fourfold superiority of numbers, what will the whole mass of the Paris workers achieve when they act unitedly and in combination!

Kersausie has been taken prisoner and in all probability already shot by now. The bourgeois can shoot him, but they cannot rob him of the glory of having been the first to organise street fighting. They can shoot him, but no power on earth will prevent his inventions from being used in all future street fights. They can shoot him, but they cannot prevent his name from living on in history as that of the first barricade commander.