against the “Neue Rheinische Zeitung”

[1] II. Legal.  
ad Art. 222.  
“Lorsqu’un ou plusieurs magistrats de l’ordre administratif ou judiciaire auront reçu dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions ou à l’occasion de cet exercice, quelque outrage par paroles tendant à inculper leur honneur ou leur délicatesse, celui qui les aura ainsi outragés, sera puni d’un emprisonnement d’un mois à deux ans. – Si l’outrage a eu lieu à l’audience d’une cour ou d’une tribunal, l’emprisonnement sera de deux à cinq ans.”  
What is honneur? What is délicatesse?  
The distinction between “insult” and “calumny” is contained in Art. 375, which reads as follows:  
“Quant aux injures ou aux expressions outrageantes qui ne renfermeraient l’imputation d’aucun fait précis, mais celle d’un vice déterminé, si elles ont été proférées dans des lieux ou réunions publics, ou insérées dans des écrits imprimés ou non, qui auraient été répandus et distribués, la peine sera une amende de seize francs à cinq cent francs.” § 376. “Toutes autres injures ou expressions outrageantes qui n’auront pas eu ce double caractère de gravité ou de publicité, ne donneront lieu qu’à des peines de simple police.”  
Calumny, therefore, exists only where I impute to someone a fait précis, an articulated fact which he himself is supposed to have committed. If I call someone a thief, for example, only Art. 375 is applicable. The word thief is no “fait précis”, in no way the imputation of a “fait”, but only an “outrageous expression”, the accusation of a “specified failing”. You stole a pair of silver spoons yesterday at such and such a place, on the other hand, culpa maxima; in place of the fine in § 375, the much heavier punishment of imprisonment and loss of civil rights comes into force. Reason: in the latter case the punishment is more probable, greater loss of honour, etc.

Just as Art. 375 applies to private persons, so Art. 222 applies to officials if the offence against him is committed in his function. Insult against a functioning official is, according to the hierarchical spirit of the Code, punished more severely than against a dangerous person. Art. 222 is, in content and concept, entirely identical with Art. 375. Art. 222 is merely the aggravation of the penalty when the offence of Art. 375 is committed against officials engaged in their functions. Art. 222 does not replace Art. 367, where the crime of “calumny” is committed against functioning officials, but 375. Otherwise, the crime against private persons would be punished more severely than against functioning officials, which contradicts the spirit of the Code.  
Thus: 1) Art. 222 identical with Art. 375.  
2) Art. 222 differs from Art. 367, as 367 differs from 375.

[2] As regards Zweiffel, the only thing that can be incriminated is: “Herr Oberprokurator Zweiffel is said also to have declared that he would put an end to the matter within 8 days, etc.” It therefore does not fit 222 (375), where it would have to read: “Zweiffel is said to have made base and dishonourable remarks”, and then only a “fait précis”, a definite and precisely specified remark.  
Art. 222 is, however, also inapplicable for other reasons.  
a) Zweiffel was not functioning at all.  
The words of Art. 222 “dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions ou à l’occasion de cet exercice” and the words “outrage par paroles” express the same thought and prove in equally compelling fashion that the legislator had in mind in this article only insults which occur directly in connection with an official act, must therefore have been committed orally, and that Art. 222 does not extend to insults committed in writing long after completion of the official act.  
If the insult must have occurred orally “par parole”, it is thereby already given that it is committed during the official act.  
If we demonstrate that the legislator had in mind in Art. 222 only insults which are uttered in the personal presence of the official, it is thereby proved that no such insult falls under Art. 222 which is committed in writing long afterwards and in the absence of the official (written insult presupposes in and of itself the absence of the person insulted; the presence of the person insulted presupposes oral insult.)  
It says in the motives for Art. 222 (exposé by M. le conseiller d’état Berlier, session of 6 February 1810):  
“Il ne sera donc ici question que des seuls outrages qui compromettent la paix publique, c’est-à-dire, de ceux dirigés contre les fonctionnaires ou agents publics, dans l’exercice ou à l’occasion de l’exercice de leurs fonctions; dans ce cas ce n’est plus seulement un particulier, c’est l’ordre public, qui est blessé ... La hiérarchie politique sera dans ce cas prise en considération: celui qui se permet des outrages ou violences envers un officier ministériel, est coupable, sans doute, mais il commet un moindre scandale que lorsqu’il outrage un magistrat.”  
Thus much emerges from this: The legislator regards the insult against which he directs Art. 222 as the lowest act of insubordination against a functioning official, as a defiance and résistance against the acting official, which remains a growling without turning into acts of violence. How else could such an “outrage” [3] II215 otherwise compromise “la paix publique” — “la paix publique” is disturbed only when a riot for the overthrow of the laws is undertaken in some manner, or when insubordination is shown to the official who carries out the law by some official act, either physically or merely by disparaging remarks. If I insult the Oberprokurator in a newspaper today, I do not thereby disturb the paix publique, and the cited motives state expressly: “Il ne sera donc ici question que des seuls outrages, qui compromettent la paix publique.”  
In the same passage it says: “Ainsi qui se permet des outrages ou violences envers un officier”. Outrage and violence are treated here as identical in concept, distinguished only by the degree of severity. But just as violence can only be committed in the personal presence of the functioning official, so outrage, the lowest stage of the same offence, requires the personal presence of the official. Thus, the insult occasions no disturbance of an official act, hence also no disturbance of the paix publique.  
But if the personal presence of the official (the person insulted) is necessary, the insult can only be committed orally, par parole, and cannot be extended to written insults, or only in those cases where written insults are possible during the official act. (e.g. examining magistrate.)  
Hence there is also no lèse-majesté in the Code: If the Code conceives offence against an official only in such a way that the official is insulted in the execution of his function and indeed in his own personal presence, lèse-majesté in this sense was impossible, because the king personally exercises no function but only has it exercised by others, and thus can never be insulted in the sense of Art. 222, in personal appearance and direct function.  
Through the addition: “à l’occasion de cet exercice” the matter seems to take on a different aspect and the requirement of personal presence to disappear. This interpretation is best refuted by § 228, which reads as follows:

[4] Art. 228  
“Tout individu qui, même sans armes, et sans qu’il en soit résulté de blessures, aura frappé un magistrat dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, ou à l’occasion de cet exercice, sera puni d’un emprisonnement de deux à cinq ans. – Si cette voie de fait a eu lieu à l’audience d’une cour ou d’un tribunal, le coupable sera puni de carcan.”  
Thus, personal presence remains necessary because of the à l’occasion, for I cannot beat someone in his absence. “À l’occasion” also does not mean “in reference”, but “on the occasion”. I cannot give “relative”, “referential” blows.  
The “à l’occasion” was added by the legislator only so that the case of Art. 222 and 228 is not limited merely to the duration of the official act, so that the insult can also occur immediately before or immediately afterwards, but must always attach itself directly to the official act and must occur in the personal presence of the official.  
Just as I can beat an official only in his presence, so the case of Article 222, since it contains only the same à l’occasion de cet exercice which is also required by Art. 228 dealing with blows and injuries, can only occur in the personal presence of the official and thus only through words.

ad § 367.  
There is no calumny against the gendarmerie:  
a) Proof of the truth.  
B) because they are not named. “Gendarme” designates no individual, but a collective concept.  
There is no calumny against Zweiffel.  
a) No “faits, qui s’ils existaient”, etc., are imputed to Zweiffel, but mere “mots”; this distinction is justified. “Utterance” not only does not render one legally punishable, but also does not instantly render one “hated and despised by the citizens”.  
demands imputation d’un fait précis.  
b) Zweiffel “is said to have”. An assertion that seeks to gain credence, and not to call itself into question.

[5] With regard to the gendarmes:  
Art. 367 closes with the words:  
“La présente disposition n’est point applicable aux faits dont la loi autorise la publicité, ni à ceux que l’auteur de l’imputation était, par la nature de ses fonctions ou de ses devoirs, obligé de révéler ou de réprimer.”  
Duty of the press.  
There is also:  
§ 372.) “Lorsque les faits imputés seront punissables suivant la loi, et que l’auteur de l’imputation les aura dénoncés, il sera, durant l’instruction sur ces faits, sursis à la poursuite et au jugement du délit de calomnie.”  
ad 369.)