Gradually one begins to get an overall view of the June Revolution; the reports in No. 31, July 1, 1848, of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* are filling out, the facts can be sifted from the rumours and the lies, the character of the insurrection emerges ever more clearly. And the more one succeeds in grasping the events of the four June days in their interconnection, the more one is astonished at the colossal dimensions of the uprising, at the heroic courage, the rapidly improvised organisation, the unanimity of the insurgents. The workers’ battle plan, which is said to have been drawn up by Kersausie, a friend of Raspail and a former officer, was as follows:

The insurgents advanced in four columns in a concentric movement on the Hôtel de Ville. The first column, whose base of operations was the suburbs of Montmartre, La Chapelle and La Villette, advanced southwards from the barriers Poissonnière, Rochechouart, St. Denis and La Villette, occupied the Boulevards and approached the Hôtel de Ville through the streets Montorgueil, St. Denis and St. Martin. The second column, whose base was the faubourgs du Temple and St. Antoine, inhabited almost entirely by workers and covered by the Canal St. Martin, advanced on the same centre through the streets du Temple and St. Antoine and along the quays of the northern bank of the Seine, as well as along all the parallel streets of the intervening quarters. The third column, with the faubourg St. Marceau, advanced through the street St. Victor and the quays of the southern bank of the Seine towards the island of the Cité. The fourth column, based on the faubourg St. Jacques and the district of the medical school, advanced through the street Saint Jacques likewise towards the Cité. From here the two columns, united, penetrated across the right bank of the Seine and took the Hôtel de Ville in the rear and in the flank. The plan was therefore rightly founded on the exclusively worker-inhabited parts of the city, which encircle the whole eastern half of Paris in a semicircle and become broader the further east one goes. Eastern Paris was first to be cleared of all enemies, and then the intention was to advance along both banks of the Seine on the West and its centres, the Tuileries and the National Assembly.

These columns were to be supported by a host of flying corps which operated on their own initiative beside and between them, threw up barricades, occupied the small streets and maintained communications. In case of a retreat, the bases of operations were strongly fortified and transformed into formidable fortresses with professional skill. Thus the Clos St. Lazare, thus the faubourg and the quarter St. Antoine, and the faubourg St. Jacques.

If this plan had a defect, it was that it entirely ignored the western half of Paris at the beginning of operations. Here, on both sides of the street St. Honoré, around the Halles and the Palais National, lie several districts admirably suited to emeutes, which have very narrow and crooked streets and are inhabited predominantly by workers. It was important to organise a fifth centre of the insurrection here, and thereby both to cut off the Hôtel de Ville and to keep a large body of troops busy in this projecting bulwark. The victory of the uprising depended on pressing forward into the centre of Paris as quickly as possible, on ensuring the capture of the Hôtel de Ville. We cannot know to what extent it was impossible for Kersausie to organise the insurrection here. But it is a fact that an uprising has never yet succeeded which did not from the very outset know how to seize this centre of Paris, which borders on the Tuileries. We need only recall the uprising at the funeral of General Lamarque, which likewise advanced as far as the street Montorgueil, but was then pushed back again.

The insurgents advanced according to their plan. They began by dividing their terrain, the Paris of the workers from the Paris of the bourgeoisie, by two main works: by the barricades of the Porte Saint Denis and those of the Cité. They were driven out of the former; they held the latter. The first day, the 23rd, was a mere prelude. The plan of the insurgents already stood out clearly (as the *Neue Rh. Ztg.* also understood it quite correctly from the very outset, see No. 26, Supplement), especially after the first outpost skirmishes of the morning. The Boulevard St. Martin, which crosses the line of operations of the first column, became the scene of violent fighting, which ended here with the victory of “order”, partly conditioned by the locality. The approaches to the Cité were cut off; on the right by a flying corps which established itself in the street Planche-Mibray, on the left by the third and fourth columns, which occupied and fortified the three southern bridges of the Cité. Here likewise a very violent struggle developed. “Order” succeeded in seizing the Pont St. Michel and advancing as far as the street St. Jacques. By evening, it flattered itself, the emeute was suppressed.

While the plan of the insurgents had already become clearly apparent, that of “order” was more so. Its plan for the moment was simply to suppress the insurrection by all means. It announced this intention to the insurgents with cannonballs and case shot.

But the government believed it was dealing with a crude band of ordinary emeutiers acting without a plan. After having cleared the main streets by evening, it announced that the emeute was defeated and occupied the conquered parts of the city only with the greatest negligence of troops.

The insurgents knew how to exploit this negligence splendidly, to initiate the great battle after the outpost skirmishes of the 23rd. It is altogether amazing how quickly the workers appropriated the plan of operations, how uniformly they worked hand in hand, how skilfully they knew how to make use of the highly complicated terrain. This would be entirely inexplicable if the workers had not already been fairly militarily organised in the national workshops and divided into companies, so that they only needed to transfer their industrial organisation to their warlike activity in order immediately to form a fully articulated army.

On the morning of the 24th the lost terrain was not only entirely reoccupied, but new ground was added. The line of the Boulevards up to the Boulevard du Temple remained occupied by the troops to be sure, and the first column was thereby cut off from the centre; but in compensation the second column advanced from the quarter St. Antoine until it had almost encircled the Hôtel de Ville. It established its headquarters in the church of St. Gervais, 300 paces from the Hôtel de Ville, it captured the monastery of St. Méry and the surrounding streets; it pushed far beyond the Hôtel de Ville and, in conjunction with the columns of the Cité, cut it off almost entirely. Only one approach remained open: the quays of the right bank. In the south the faubourg St. Jacques was again wholly occupied, communications with the Cité were restored, the Cité reinforced and the crossing to the right bank prepared.

There was certainly no more time to be lost; the Hôtel de Ville, the revolutionary centre of Paris, was threatened and had to fall if the most decisive measures were not taken.

(To be concluded.)

*Neue Rheinische Zeitung.* No. 32, July 2, 1848

(Conclusion.)

The terrified National Assembly appointed Cavaignac dictator, and he, accustomed from Algiers to “energetic” intervention, knew what was to be done.

Ten battalions immediately advanced along the broad Quai de l’Ecole towards the Hôtel de Ville. They cut the insurgents of the Cité off from the right bank, made the Hôtel de Ville secure, and even permitted attacks on the barricades surrounding the Hôtel de Ville. The street Planche-Mibray and its continuation, the street Saint Martin, were cleared and kept clear continually by cavalry. The opposite bridge, Notre Dame, which leads to the Cité, was swept by heavy artillery, and now Cavaignac advanced directly on the Cité in order to proceed “energetically”. The main post of the insurgents, the belle Jardinière, was first shattered by cannonballs, then set on fire by rockets; the Rue de la Cité was likewise conquered by cannonballs; three bridges leading to the left bank were taken by storm, and the insurgents on the left bank decisively pushed back. In the meantime the 14 battalions stationed on the Place de Grève and the quays relieved the already besieged Hôtel de Ville and the church of Saint Gervais was reduced from a headquarters to a lost outpost of the insurgents.

The street St. Jacques was attacked not only from the Cité with artillery, but also taken in flank from the left bank. General Damesme advanced along the Luxembourg towards the Sorbonne, conquered the Latin Quarter and sent his columns against the Panthéon. The Place du Panthéon had been transformed into a formidable fortress. The street St. Jacques had long since been taken when “order” still found an impregnable bulwark here. Cannon and bayonet attacks had been in vain when at last exhaustion, lack of ammunition and the threat of arson by the bourgeoisie compelled the 1,500 workers, surrounded on all sides, to surrender. About the same time the Place Maubert fell, after long, courageous resistance, into the hands of “order”, and the insurgents, driven out of their strongest positions, were forced to abandon the whole left bank of the Seine.

In the meantime the position of the troops and National Guards on the Boulevards of the right bank of the Seine was also used to take effect on both sides. Lamoricière, in command here, had the streets of the faubourgs St. Denis and St. Martin, the Boulevard du Temple and half the Temple Street swept by heavy artillery and by rapid troop attacks. He could boast of having won brilliant successes by evening: he had cut off the first column in the Clos St. Lazare and half encircled it, pushed back the second column and, by his advance on the Boulevards, driven a wedge into it.

By what means had Cavaignac won these advantages? Firstly, by the enormous superior force which he was able to deploy against the insurgents. On the 24th he had at his disposal not only the 20,000 men of the garrison of Paris, the 20 to 25,000 men of the Mobile Guard and the 60–80,000 men of the available National Guard, but also the National Guard of the whole environs of Paris and of many a more distant town (20 to 30,000 men), and furthermore 20 to 30,000 troops hastily summoned from the surrounding garrisons. On the morning of the 24th he already had far more than 100,000 men at his disposal, a number which increased by half again by evening. And the insurgents were at most 40 to 50,000 strong!

Secondly, by the brutal means he employed. Hitherto cannon had been fired only once in the streets of Paris – in Vendémiaire 1795, when Napoleon dispersed the insurgents in the Rue Saint Honoré with case shot. But against barricades, against houses, artillery had never yet been used, and still less shells and incendiary rockets. The people were not yet prepared for this; they were defenceless against it, and the only counter-measure, burning, was repugnant to their noble sensibilities. The people had until now had no inkling of such a warfare, transplanted from Algiers into the midst of Paris. Hence they drew back, and their first retreat decided their defeat.

On the 25th Cavaignac advanced with still far greater forces.

The insurgents were confined to a single quarter, the Faubourgs Saint Antoine and du Temple; besides these, they still held two advanced posts, the Clos St. Lazare and a part of the St. Antoine quarter as far as the Damiette bridge. Cavaignac, who had again drawn up 20,000 to 30,000 reinforcements together with considerable artillery parks, first had the insurgents’ isolated outposts attacked, especially the Clos St. Lazare. Here the insurgents were entrenched as in a citadel. After twelve hours of cannonading and grenade-throwing, Lamoricière finally succeeded in driving the insurgents from their positions and in occupying the Clos; however, he succeeded only after he had made a flank attack possible from the streets Rochechouart and Poissonnière, and after he had had the barricades shot to pieces with 40 guns on the first day, and with even more on the second. Another part of his column penetrated through the Faubourg Saint Martin into the Faubourg du Temple, but achieved no great success; a third advanced down the boulevards towards the Bastille, but likewise did not get far, since here a series of the most formidable barricades succumbed only after a long resistance to a fierce cannonade. Here the houses were dreadfully destroyed.

The column of Duvivier, which attacked from the Hôtel de Ville, drove the insurgents constantly further back under uninterrupted cannon fire. The church of St. Gervais was taken, the street Saint Antoine was cleared far from the Hôtel de Ville, and through several columns advancing along the Quai and its parallel streets, the Damiette bridge was taken, by means of which the insurgents of the St. Antoine quarter linked up with those of the islands of St. Louis and Cité. The Saint Antoine quarter was flanked, and the insurgents were left only with the retreat into the Faubourg, which they accomplished under fierce engagements with a column advancing over the Quais to the mouth of the Canal St. Martin and from there along the canal on the Boulevard Bourdon. A few isolated ones were massacred, only a few were brought in as prisoners. Through this operation the St. Antoine quarter and the Place de la Bastille were conquered.

Towards evening, Lamoricière’s column succeeded in completely conquering the Boulevard Beaumarchais and in effecting its junction with Duvivier’s troops on the Place de la Bastille. The capture of the Damiette bridge allowed Duvivier to drive the insurgents from the island of St. Louis and the former island of Louviers. He did this with a commendable expenditure of Algerian barbarity. In few parts of the city was heavy artillery applied with such devastating success as precisely on the island of St. Louis. But what of it? The insurgents were driven out or massacred, and “order” triumphed amid the blood-spattered ruins.

On the left bank of the Seine, one more post had to be conquered. The Austerlitz bridge, which, east of the Canal St. Martin, links the Faubourg St. Antoine with the left bank of the Seine, was heavily barricaded and, on the left bank, where it debouches onto the Place Walhubert, in front of the Jardin des Plantes, provided with a strong bridgehead. This bridgehead, after the fall of the Panthéon and the Place Maubert the last redoubt of the insurgents on the left bank, was taken after an obstinate defence.

For the next day, the 26th, the insurgents were left, therefore, with only their last fortress, the Faubourg St. Antoine and a part of the Faubourg du Temple. Both faubourgs are not well suited to street fighting; they have fairly broad and almost entirely straight streets, which offer artillery an excellent field of play. On the western side they are excellently covered by the Canal St. Martin, but on the northern side they are completely open. Here five or six quite straight and broad streets run down straight into the heart of the Faubourg Saint Antoine.

The main fortifications had been set up on the Place de la Bastille and in the most important street of the entire quarter, the Rue du Faubourg Saint Antoine. Barricades of remarkable strength were erected here, some built of large paving stones, some framed together from beams. They formed an angle facing inward, partly to weaken the effect of the cannonballs, partly to present a larger defensive front opening a cross-fire. In the houses, the party-walls were broken through, and thus a whole row was in each case placed in communication with one another, so that the insurgents could, according to the need of the moment, open a skirmishing fire on the troops or withdraw behind their barricades. The bridges and quays on the canal, as well as the parallel streets of the canal, were likewise strongly fortified. In short, the two faubourgs still occupied resembled a complete fortress, in which the troops had to fight for every inch of ground in blood.

On the morning of the 26th, the struggle was to begin anew. Cavaignac, however, had little inclination to send his troops into this tangle of barricades. He threatened a bombardment. The mortars and howitzers were brought up. Negotiations were conducted. Meanwhile, Cavaignac had the nearest houses mined—which, of course, could be done only on a very limited scale owing to the shortness of time and to the canal covering one of the lines of attack—and from the houses already occupied likewise had internal communications established with the adjoining houses by openings in the party-walls. The negotiations broke down; the struggle began again. Cavaignac had General Perrot attack from the Faubourg du Temple, General Lamoricière from the Place de la Bastille. At both points heavy cannonading was directed against the barricades. Perrot advanced fairly rapidly, took the remainder of the Faubourg du Temple, and at several points even got as far as the Faubourg St. Antoine. Lamoricière moved forward more slowly. The first barricades withstood his cannon, although the first houses of the faubourg were set on fire by his grenades. He negotiated once more. Watch in hand, he waits for the minute when he will have the pleasure of shooting to pieces the most populous quarter of Paris. Then at length one part of the insurgents capitulated, while the other, attacked in its flanks, withdraws from the city after a short struggle.

That was the end of the barricade fighting of June. Outside the city, skirmishing engagements still occurred, but they were of no significance whatsoever. The fugitive insurgents were dispersed in the surrounding area and are being individually captured by cavalry.

We have given this purely military account of the struggle in order to prove to our readers with what heroic bravery, with what unanimity, with what discipline, and with what military skill the Paris workers fought. Forty thousand of them fought for four days against a fourfold superior force, and only a hair’s breadth was wanting for them to be victorious. Only a hair’s breadth, and they gained a foothold in the centre of Paris, they took the Hôtel de Ville, they set up a provisional government, and they doubled their numbers, both from the conquered quarters of the city and from the Mobile Guards, who at that time needed only a shove to go over.

German papers maintain that this was the decisive battle between the red and the tricolour republic, between workers and bourgeois. We are convinced that this battle decides nothing but the disintegration of the victors within themselves. For the rest, the course of the whole affair proves that the workers must triumph in no very long time, even if we consider the matter purely from a military standpoint. If 40,000 Paris workers could already achieve something so formidable against four times their number, what will the entire mass of the Paris workers bring about once they act in concert and in conjunction!

Kersausie has been captured and at this moment probably already shot. The bourgeois can shoot him, but they cannot rob him of the fame of having been the first to organise street fighting. They can shoot him, but no power on earth will prevent his inventions from being used in all future street battles. They can shoot him, but they cannot prevent his name from enduring in history as that of the first barricade commander.