## Marx's 1845 version

Marx’s original text was first published in 1924, in German and in Russian translation,
English translation was first published in the Lawrence and Wishart edition of The
German Ideology in 1938.

The most widely known version of the Theses is that based on Engels’ edited version,
published as an appendix to his Ludwig Feuerbach in 1888, where he gave it the title
Theses on Feuerbach;

1

The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism — that of Feuerbach included — is
that the Object [der Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the
form of the object [Objekts], or of contemplation [Anschauung], but not as human
sensuous activity, practice [Praxis], not subjectively. Hence it happened that the
active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism — but only
abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such.
Feuerbach wants sensuous objects [Objekte], differentiated from thought-objects, but he
does not conceive human activity itself as objective [gegenständliche] activity. In The
Essence of Christianity [Das Wesen des Christenthums], he therefore regards the
theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice [Praxis] is
conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance [Erscheinungsform][1].
Hence he does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary’, of ‘practical-critical’,
activity.

2

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a
question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the
reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in practice. The
dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a
purely scholastic question.

3

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and
that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed
upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must
himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one
of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of
human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally
understood only as revolutionary practice.

4

Feuerbach starts off from the fact of religious self-estrangement [Selbstentfremdung],
of the duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world, and a secular
[weltliche] one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular
basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still
remains to be done. For the fact that the secular basis lifts off from itself and
establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm can only be explained by the
inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must
itself be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction,
revolutionised. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the
secret of the holy family, the former must itself be annihilated [vernichtet]
theoretically and practically.

5

Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants sensuous contemplation
[Anschauung]; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous
activity.

6

Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man [menschliche Wesen =
‘human nature’]. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single
individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does
not enter upon a criticism of this real essence is hence obliged:

1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment
regarded by itself, and to presuppose an abstract — isolated - human individual.

2. The essence therefore can by him only be regarded as ‘species’, as an inner ‘dumb’
generality which unites many individuals only in a natural way.

7

Feuerbach consequently does not see that the ‘religious sentiment’ is itself a social
product, and that the abstract individual that he analyses belongs in reality to a
particular social form.

8

All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism
find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this
practice.

9

The highest point reached by contemplative [anschauende] materialism, that is,
materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the
contemplation of single individuals and of civil society [bürgerlichen Gesellschaft].

10

The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society or social humanity.

11

Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.

1. “Dirty-Jewish” — according to Marshall Berman, this is an allusion to the Jewish God
of the Old Testament, who had to ‘get his hands dirty’ making the world, tied up with a
symbolic contrast between the Christian God of the Word, and the God of the Deed,
symbolising practical life. See Feuerbach, The Significance of the Creation in Judaism,
Essence of Christianity 1841

## Engels' 1888 edited version

1

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is
that the things [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of
the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not
subjectively. Hence, it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to
materialism, was set forth by idealism – but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism
does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really
distinct from the conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as
objective activity. Hence, in Das Wesen des Christenthums, he therefore regards the
theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived
and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the
significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity.

2

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a
question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the
reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over
the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely
scholastic question.

3

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and
that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing,
forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be
educated. Hence, this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which
is superior to society (in Robert Owen for example).

The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived
and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.

4

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the duplication of
the world into a religious, imaginary world and a real one. His work consists in
resolving the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after
completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact that the
secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as
an independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic
contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself, therefore, first be
understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction,
revolutionized in practice. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to
be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and
transformed in practice.

5

Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, appeals to sensuous contemplation; but
he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.

6

Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of
man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the
ensemble of the social relations.

Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is hence obliged:

To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment [Gemüt]
regarded by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.

The essence of man, therefore, can with him be regarded only as “species”, as an inner,
mute general character which unites the many individuals only in a natural way.

7

Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the “religious sentiment” is itself a social
product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs to a particular form
of society.

8

Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism
find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this
practice.

9

The highest point attained by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does
not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is contemplation of single
individuals and of “civil society.”

10

The standpoint of the old materialism is “civil” society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or associated humanity.

11

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.