[Rheinische Zeitung No. 191, July 10, 1842, Supplement] 

Up to now we have respected the Kélnische Zeitung, if not as the 
“organ of the Rhenish intelligentsia” at any rate as the Rhenish 
“information sheet” We regarded above all its, “leading political 
articles” as a means, both wise and select, for making politics 
repugnant to the reader, so that he will the more eagerly turn to 
the vitally refreshing realm of the advertisements which reflects 
the pulsating life of industry and is often wittily piquant, so that 
here too the motto would be: per aspera ad astra, through politics to 
the oysters. However, the finely even balance which the Kélnische 
Zeitung had hitherto succeeded in maintaining between politics 
and advertisements has recently been upset by a kind of advertise- 
ments which can be called “advertisements of political industry”. 
In the initial uncertainty as to where this new genus should be 
placed, it happened that an advertisement was transformed into a 
leading article, and the leading article into an advertisement, and 
indeed into one which in the language of the political world is 
called a “denunciation”,© but if paid for is called simply an 
“advertisement”. 

It is a custom in the North that before the meagre meals, the 
guests are given a drink of exquisitely fine spirits. In following this 
custom, we are the more pleased to offer some spirits to our 

* A pun on the German word Intelligenz, which can mean both “intelligentsia” 
and “information”. Ed. 

By rough paths to the stars. A pun based on the similarity of the Latin 
astra— stars, to the German Auster— oyster.— Ed. 

cA pun on the German word Anzeige, which can mean both “advertisement” 
and “denunciation”.— Ed. 

Leading Article in No. 179 of Kélnische Zeitung 185 

Northern guest because in the meal itself, in the very “ailing”? 
article in No. 179 of the Kélnische Zeitung, we find no trace of spirit. 
Therefore we present first of all a scene from Lucian’s Dialogues 
of the Gods, which we give here in a “generally comprehensible” 
translation, because among our readers there is bound to be at least 
one who is no Hellene. 

Lucian’s Dialogues of the Gods 

XXIV. HERMES’ COMPLAINTS 
Hermes. Maia 

Hermes. Is there, dear Mother, in all heaven a god who is more tormented than I 
am? 

Maia. Don’t say such things, my son! 

Hermes. Why shouldn’t I? I, who have such a lot of things to attend to, who have 
to do everything myself, and have to submit to so many servile duties? In the 
morning I have to be among the very first to get up, sweep out the dining-room, 
and put the cushions straight in the council chamber. When everything is in order 
I have to wait on Jupiter and spend the whole day as his messenger, going to and 
fro on his errands. Hardly have I returned, and while still covered with dust, I 
have to serve ambrosia. Worst of all, I am the only one who is allowed no rest even 
at night, for I have to lead the souls of the dead to Pluto and perform the duties of 
attendant while the dead are being judged. For it is not enough that in my daytime 
labours I have to be present at gymnastic exercises, act as herald at meetings of the 
people, and help the people’s orators to memorise their speeches. Nay, torn 
between so many duties, I must also look after all matters concerning the dead. 

Since his expulsion from Olympus, Hermes, by force of habit, 
still performs “servile duties” and.looks after all matters concern- 
ing the dead. 

Whether Hermes himself, or his son, the goat-god Pan, wrote 
the ailing article of No. 179, let the reader decide, bearing in mind 
that the Greek Hermes was the god of eloquence and logic. 

“To spread philosophical and religious views by means of the newspapers, or to 
combat them in the newspapers, we consider equally impermissible.” 

While the old man chattered on in this way, I became well aware 
that he intended to deliver a tedious litany of oracular pronounce- 
ments. However, I curbed my impatience, for ought I not to 
believe this discerning man who is so ingenuous as to express his 
opinion with the utmost candour in his own house, and I went on 
reading. But—lo and behold!—this article, which, it is true, 

* A pun on the German words leitender, which means “leading”, and leidender, 
meaning “ailing” .— Ed. 

cannot be reproached for any philosophical views, at least has 
the tendency to combat philosophical views and spread religious 
views. 

What are we to make of an article which disputes the right to its 
own existence, which prefaces itself with a declaration of its own 
incompetence? The loquacious author will reply to us. He explains 
how his pretentious articles are to be read. He confines himself to 
giving some fragments, the “arrangement and connection” of 
which he leaves to the “perspicacity of the reader” —the most 
convenient method for the kind of advertisements which he makes 
it his business to deal with. We should like to “arrange and 
connect” these fragments, and it is not our fault if the rosary does 
not become a string of pearls. 

The author declares: 

“A party which employs these means” (i. e., spreads philosophical and religious 
views in newspapers and combats such views) “shows thereby, in our opinion, that 

its intentions are not honest, and that it is less concerned with instructing and 
enlightening the people than with achieving other external aims.” 

This being his opinion, the article can have no other intention 
than the achievement of external aims. These “external aims” will 
not fail to show themselves. 

The state, he says, has not only the right but the duty to “put a 
stop to the activities of unbidden chatterers”. The writer is obvi- 
ously referring to opponents of his view, for he has long ago con- 
vinced himself that he is a bidden chatterer. 

It is a question, therefore, of a new intensification of the 
censorship in religious matters, of new police measures against the 
press, which has hardly been able to draw breath as yet. 

“In our opinion, the state is to be reproached, not for excessive severity, but for 
indulgence carried too far.” 

The leader writer, however, has second thoughts. It is danger- 
ous to reproach the state. Therefore he addresses himself to the 
authorities, his accusation against freedom of the press turns into 
an accusation against the censors. He accuses them of exercising 
“too little censorship”. 

“Reprehensible indulgence has hitherto been shown also, not by the state, it is true, 
but by ‘individual authorities’, in that the new philosophical school has been allowed 
to make most disgraceful attacks on Christianity in public papers and other 
publications intended for a readership that is not purely scientific.” 

Once again, however, the author comes to a halt; again he has 
second thoughts. Less than eight days ago he found that the 
freedom of the censorship allowed too little freedom of the press; 

Leading Article in No. 179 of Kélnische Zeitung 187 

now he finds that the compulsion of the censors results in too little 
compulsion of the censorship. 
That again has to be remedied. 

“As long as the censorship exists it is its most urgent duty to excise such 
abhorrent offshoots of a childish presumption as have repeatedly offended our 
eyes in recent days.” 

Weak eyes! Weak eyes! And 

“the weakest eye will be offended by an expression which can be intended only 
for the level of understanding of the broad masses”. 

If the relaxed censorship already allows abhorrent offshoots to 
appear, what would happen with freedom of the press? If our 
eyes are too weak to bear the “presumption” of the censored 
press, how would they be strong enough to bear the “audacity” * 
of a free press? 

“As long as the censorship exists it is its most urgent duty.” And 
when it ceases to exist? The phrase must be interpreted as 
meaning: it is the most urgent duty of the censorship to remain in 
existence as long as possible. 

But again the author has second thoughts. 

“It is not our function to act as public prosecutor, and therefore we refrain from 
any more detailed designation.” 

What heavenly goodness there is in this man! He refrains from 
any more detailed “designation”, and yet it is only by quite 
detailed, quite definite signs that he could prove and show what 
his view aims at. He lets fall only vague, half audible words intend- 
ed to arouse suspicions; it is not his function to be a public prose- 
cutor, his function is to be a hidden prosecutor. 

For the last time the unfortunate man has second thoughts, 
remembering that his function is to write liberal leading articles, 
and that he has to present himself as a “loyal friend of freedom of 
the press”. Hence he quickly takes up his final position: 

“We could not fail to protest against a course which, if it is not the consequence 
of accidental negligence, can have no other purpose than to discredit the freer 

movement of the press in the eyes of the public, to play into the hands of 
opponents who are afraid of failing to achieve their aim in an open way.” 

The censorship—we are told by this defender of freedom of 
the press, who is as bold as he is sharp-witted —if it is not the 

* A pun on the German words Ubermut— presumption, and Mut—au- 
dacity.— Ed. 

English leopard with the inscription: “I sleep, wake me not!’’?, has 
adopted this “disastrous” course in order to discredit the freer 
movement of the press in the eyes of the public. 

Is there any further need to discredit a movement of the press 

which calls the attention of the censorship to “accidental negli- 
gences’, and which expects to obtain its renown in public opinion 
through the “penknife of the censor”? 

This movement can be called “free” insofar as the licence of 
shamelessness is also sometimes called “free”, and is it not the 
shamelessness of stupidity and hypocrisy to claim to be a defender 
of the freer movement of the press while at the same time 
teaching that the press will at once fall into the gutter unless it is 
supported under the arms by two policemen? 

And what need is there of censorship, what need is there of this 
leading article, if the philosophical press discredits itself in the 
eyes of the public? Of course, the author does not want to restrict 
in any way “the freedom of scientific research’. 

“In our day, scientific research is rightly allowed the widest, most unrestricted 
scope.” 

But how our author conceives scientific research can be seen 
from the following utterance: 
-“In this connection a sharp distinction must be drawn between the requirements 

of freedom of scientific research, through which Christianity can only gain, and 
what lies outside the limits of scientific research.” 

Who is to decide on the limits of scientific research if not 
scientific research itself? According to the leading article, limits 
should be prescribed to science. The leading article, therefore, 
knows of an “official reason” which does not learn from scientific 
research, but teaches it, which is a learned providence that 
establishes the length every hair should have to convert a scientist’s 
beard into a beard of world importance. The leading article 
believes in the scientific inspiration of the censorship. 

Before going further into these “silly” explanations of the 
leading article on the subject of “scientific research”, let us sample 
for a moment the “philosophy of religion” of Herr H.,? his “own 
science”! 

“Religion is the basis of the state and the most necessary condition for every 
social association which does not aim merely at achieving some external aim.” 

* Marx wrote these words in English— Ed. 
> Hermes.— Ed. 

Leading Article in No. 179 of Kélnische Zeitung 189 

The proof: “In its crudest form as childish fetishism it nevertheless to some 
extent raises man above his sensuous desires which, if he allowed himself to be 
ruled exclusively by them, could degrade him to the level of an animal and make him 
incapable of fulfilling any higher aim.” 

The author of the leading article calls fetishism the “crudest 
form” of religion. He concedes, therefore, what all “men of 
science” regard as established even without his agreement, that 

“animal worship” is a higher form of religion than fetishism. But 
does not animal worship degrade man below the animal, does it 
not make the animal man’s god? 

And now, indeed, “fetishism”! Truly, the erudition of a penny 
magazine! Fetishism is so far from raising man above his sensuous 
desires that, on the contrary, it is “the religion of sensuous desire’. 
Fantasy arising from desire deceives the fetish-worshipper into 
believing that an “inanimate object” will give up its natural 
character in order to comply with his desires. Hence the crude 
desire of the fetish-worshipper smashes the fetish when it ceases to 
be its most obedient servant. 

“In those nations which attained higher historical significance, the flowering of 
their national life coincides with the highest development of their religious 
consciousness, and the decline of their greatness and their power coincides with the 
decline of their religious culture.” 

To arrive at the truth, the author’s assertion must be directly 
reversed; he has stood history on its head. Among the peoples of 
the ancient world, Greece and Rome are certainly countries of the 
highest “historical culture”. Greece flourished at its best internally 
in the time of Pericles, externally in the time of Alexander. In the 
age of Pericles the Sophists, and Socrates, who could be called the 
embodiment of philosophy, art and rhetoric supplanted religion. 
The age of Alexander was the age of Aristotle, who rejected the 
eternity of the “individual” spirit and the God of positive 
religions. And as for Rome! Read Cicero! The Epicurean, Stoic or 
Sceptic philosophies were the religions of cultured Romans when 
Rome had reached the zenith of its development. That with the 
downfall of the ancient states their religions also disappeared 
requires no further explanation, for the “true religion” of the 
ancients was the cult of “their nationality”, of their “state”. It was 
not the downfall of the old religions that caused the downfall of 
the ancient states, but the downfall of the ancient states that 
caused the downfall of the old religions. And such ignorance as is 
found in this leading article proclaims itself the “legislator of 
scientific research” and writes “decrees” for philosophy. 

“The entire ancient world had to collapse because the progress achieved by the 
peoples in their scientific development was necessarily bound up with a revelation 
of the errors on which their religious views were based.” 

According to the leading article, therefore, the entire ancient 
world collapsed because scientific research revealed the errors of 
the old religions. Would the ancient world not have perished if 
scientific research had kept silent about the errors of religion, if 
the Roman authorities had been recommended by the author of 
the leading article to excise the writings of Lucretius and Lucian? 

For the rest, we shall permit ourselves to enlarge Herr H.'s 
erudition in another communication. 

[Rheinische Zeitung No. 193, July 12, 1842, Supplement] 

At the very time when the downfall of the ancient world was 
approaching, there arose the Alexandrine school, which strove to 
prove by force the “eternal truth” of Greek mythology and its 
complete agreement “with the results of scientific research”. The 
Emperor Julian, too, belonged to this trend, which believed that it 
could make the newly developing spirit of the times disappear by 
keeping its eyes closed so as not to see it. However, let us continue 
with the conclusion arrived at by H.! In the old religions, “the 
feeble notion of the divine was shrouded in the blackest night of 
error”, and therefore could not stand up to scientific research. 
Under Christianity, the opposite is the case, as any thinking 
machine will conclude. At all events, H. says: 

“The greatest results of scientific research have so far only served to confirm 
the truths of the Christian religion.” 

We leave aside the fact that all the philosophies of the past 
without exception have been accused by the theologians of 
abandoning the Christian religion, even those of the pious Male- 
branche and the divinely inspired Jakob Bohme, and that Leib- 
niz was accused of being a “Lowenix” (a believer in nothing) 
by the Brunswick peasants, and of being an atheist by the 
Englishman Clarke and other supporters of Newton. We leave 
aside, too, the fact that, as the most capable and consistent section 
of Protestant theologians has maintained, Christianity cannot be 
reconciled with reason because “secular” and “spiritual” reason 
contradict each other, which Tertullian classically expressed by 
saying: “verum est, quia absurdum est.”* Leaving aside all this, we 
ask: how is the agreement of scientific research with religion to be 

* “It is true because it is absurd” (Carne Christi, H, 5).— Ed. 

Leading Article in No. 179 of Kélnische Zeitung 19] 

proved, except by allowing it to take its own course and so 
compelling it to resolve itself into religion? Any other compulsion 
is at least no proof. 

Of course, if from the outset you recognise as the result of 
scientific research only that which agrees with your own view, it is 
easy to pose as a prophet. But in that case how are your assertions 
superior to those of the Indian Brahmin who proves the holiness 
of the Vedas™ by reserving to himself alone the right to read 
them? 

Yes, says H., it is a question of “scientific research”. But every 
research that contradicts Christianity “stops halfway” or “takes a 
wrong road”. Could there be a more convenient way of arguing? 

Scientific research, once it has “‘made clear’ to itself the content 
of its results, will never conflict with the truths of Christianity”. At 
the same time, however, the state must ensure that this “clarifica- 
tion’’ is impossible, for research must never adapt itself to the level 
of understanding of the broad mass, i. e., it must never become 
popular and clear to itself. Even when it is attacked by unscientific 
investigators in all newspapers of the monarchy, it must be modest 
and remain silent. 

Christianity precludes the possibility of “any new decline”, but 
the police must be on their guard to see that philosophising 
newspaper writers do not bring about such a decline; they must 
guard against this with the utmost strictness. In the struggle with 
truth, error will of itself be recognised as such, without the need 
of any suppression by external force; but the state must facilitate 
this struggle of the truth, not, indeed, by depriving the champions 
of “error” of inner freedom, which it cannot take away from 
them, but by depriving them of the possibility of this freedom, the 
possibility of existence. 

Christianity is sure of its victory, but according to H. it is not so 
sure of it as to spurn the aid of the police. 

If from the outset everything that contradicts your faith is error, 
and has to be treated as error, what distinguishes your claims from 
those of the Mohammedan or of any other religion? Should 
philosophy, in order not to contradict the basic tenets of dogma, 
adopt different principles in each country, in accordance with the 
saying “every country has its own customs”? Should it believe in 
one country that 3xX1=1, in another that women have no souls, 
and in a third that beer is drunk in heaven? Is there no universal 
human nature, as there is a universal nature of plants and stars? 
Philosophy asks what is true, not what is held to be true. It asks 
what is true for all mankind, not what is true for some people. Its 

192 | Karl Marx 

metaphysical truths do not recognise the boundaries of political 
geography; its political truths know too well where the “bounds” 
begin for it to confuse the illusory horizon of a particular world 
or national outlook with the true horizon of the human mind. 
Of all the defenders of Christianity, H. is the weakest. 

The long existence of Christianity is his sole proof in its favour. 
But has not philosophy also existed from Thales down to the 
present day, and indeed does not H. himself assert that it now 
puts forward greater claims and has a higher opinion of its 
importance than ever before? 

Finally, how does H. prove that the state is a “Christian” state, 
that its aim is not a free association of moral human beings, but an 
association of believers, not the realisation of freedom, but the 
realisation of dogma? 

“All our European states have Christianity as their basis.” 

The French state too? The Charter, Article 3, does not say: 
“every Christian” or “only a Christian”, but: 

“tous les Frangais sont également admissibles aux emplois civiles et militaires” bude 

Prussian Law, too, Part II, Section XIII, says: 

“The primary duty of the head of state is to maintain tranquillity and security, 
both internally and externally, and to protect, everyone from violence and 
interference in regard to what belongs to him.” 

According to § 1, the head of state combines in his person all 
the “duties and rights of the state”. It does not say that the 
primary duty of the state is to suppress heretical errors and to 
ensure citizens the bliss of the other world. 

But if some European states are in fact based on Christianity, do 
these states correspond to their concept and is the “pure exist- 
ence” of a condition the right of that condition to exist? 

According to the view of our H., of course, this is the case, for 
he reminds adherents of Young Hegelianism 

“that, according to the laws which are in force in the greater part of the state, a 

marriage without consecration by the church is regarded as concubinage and as such is 
punishable under police regulations”. 

Therefore, if “marriage without consecration by the church” is 
regarded on the Rhine as “marriage” according to the Napoleonic 
Code,” but on the Spree as “concubinage” according to Prussian 
Law, then punishment “under police regulations” ought to be an 

* “All Frenchmen are equally eligible for civil and military posts.”— Ed. 

Leading Article in No. 179 of Kélnische Zeitung 193 

argument for philosophers that what is right in one place is wrong 
in another, that it is not the Napoleonic Code, but Prussian Law 
which has the scientific, moral and rational conception of mar- 
riage. This “philosophy of punishment under police regulations” 
may be convincing in some places, but it is not convincing in 
Prussia. Furthermore, how little the standpoint of “holy” marriage 
coincides with that of Prussian Law can be seen from § 12, Part 
II, Section I, which states: 

. “Nevertheless, a marriage which is permitted by the laws of the land loses none 
of its civil validity because the dispensation of the spiritual authorities has not been 
sought or has been refused.” 

Hence in Prussia, too, marriage is partially emancipated from 
the “spiritual authorities” and its “civil” validity is distinguished 
from its “ecclesiastical” validity. 

That our great Christian philosopher of the state has no “high” 
opinion of the state goes without saying. 

“Since our states are not merely legal associations, but at the same time true 
educational institutions, with the only difference that they extend their care to a wider 
circle than the institutions devoted to the education of youth”, etc., “the whole of 
public education” rests “on the basis of Christianity”. 

The education of our school youth is based just as much on the 
ancient classics and the sciences in general as on the catechism. 

According to H., the state differs from an institution for young 
children not in content, but in magnitude, its “care” is wider. 

The true “public” education carried out by the state lies in the 
rational and public existence of the state; the state itself educates 
its members by making them its members, by converting the aims 
of the individual into general aims, crude instinct into moral in- 
clination, natural independence into spiritual freedom, by the 
individual finding his good in the life of the whole, and the whole 
in the frame of mind of the individual. 

The leading article, on the other hand, makes the state not an 
association of free human beings who educate one another, but a 
crowd of adults who are destined to be educated from above and 
to pass from a “narrow” schoolroom into a “wider” one. 

This theory of education and tutelage is put forward here by a 
friend of freedom of the press, who, out of love for this beauty, 
points out the “negligences of the censorship”, who knows how to 
describe in the appropriate place the “level of understanding of 
the broad masses” (perhaps the “level of understanding of the 
broad masses” has recently begun to appear so doubtful to the Kol- 
nische Zeitung because this mass has ceased to appreciate the 

g* 

superiority of the “unphilosophical newspaper” ?) and who advises 
the learned to keep one view for the stage and another for the 
backstage! 

In the same way that the leading article gives documentary 
evidence of its “inferior’ opinion of the state, so it does now of its 
low opinion of “Christianity.” 

“All the newspaper articles in the world will never be able to convince a people 
which on the whole feels well and happy that it is in an unfortunate condition.” 

We should think so! The Material feeling of well-being and 
happiness is a more reliable bulwark against newspaper articles 
then the blissful and all-conquering trust in faith! H. does not 
sing: “A reliable fortress is our God.” * According to him, the truly 
believing disposition of the “broad masses” is more exposed to the 
rust of doubt than the refined worldly culture of the “few”! 

“Even incitements to revolt” are less feared by H. “in a well- 
ordered state” than in a “well-ordered church”, which, more- 
over, is guided in all truth by the “spirit of God”. A fine believer 
he is! And now for the reason for it! Namely, the masses can under- 
stand political articles but they find philosophical articles incompre- 
hensible! 

Finally, if the hint in che leading article that “the half measures 
adopted recently against Young Hegelianism have had the usual 
consequences of half measures” is put alongside the ingenuous wish 
that the latest efforts of the Hegelings may pass “without altogether 
harmful consequences”, one can understand the words of Cornwall 
in King Lear: 

He cannot flatter, he,— 
An honest mind and plain,— he must speak truth: 
And they will take it, so; if not, he’s plain. 
These kind of knaves I know, which in this plainness 
Harbour more craft, and more corrupter ends, 

Than twenty silly ducking observants, 
That stretch their duties nicely.° 

We believe we would be insulting the readers of the Rheinische 
Zeitung if we imagined that they would be satisfied with the spec- 
tacle, more comic than serious, of a ci-devant liberal, a “young 
man of days gone by”, cut down to his proper size. We should 
like to say a few words on “the heart of the matter’. As long as we 
were occupied with the polemic against the ailing article, it would 
have been wrong to interrupt him in his work of self-destruc- 
tion. 

* First lines of Martin Luther’s choral, Ein Feste Burg.— Ed. 
> w. Shakespeare, King Lear, Act II, Scene 2.— Ed. 

Leading Article in No. 179 of Kolnische Zeitung 195 

[Rheinische Zeitung No. 195, July 14, 1842, Supplement] 

First of all, the question is raised: “Ought philosophy to discuss 
religious matters also in newspaper articles?” 

This question can be answered only by criticising it. 

Philosophy, especially German philosophy, has an urge for 
isolation, for systematic seclusion, for dispassionate self-examination 
which from the start places it in estranged contrast to the quick- 
witted and alive-to-events newspapers, whose only delight is in in- 
formation. Philosophy, taken in its systematic development, is un- 
popular; its secret life within itself seems to the layman a pursuit 
as extravagant as it is unpractical, it is regarded as a professor of 
magic arts, whose incantations sound awe-inspiring because no one 
understands them: 

True to its nature, philosophy has never taken the first step 
towards exchanging the ascetic frock of the priest for the light, 
conventional garb of the newspapers. However, philosophers do 
not spring up like mushrooms out of the ground; they are prod- 
ucts of their time, of their nation, whose most subtle, valuable 
and invisible juices flow in the ideas of philosophy. The same 
spirit that constructs railways with the hands of workers, constructs 
philosophical systems in the brains of philosophers. Philosophy 
does not exist outside the world, any more than the brain exists 
outside man because it is not situated in the stomach. But phi- 
losophy, of course, exists in the world through the brain before 
it stands with its feet on the ground, whereas many other spheres 
of human activity have long had their feet rooted in the ground 
and pluck with their hands the fruits of the world before they have 
any inkling that the “head” also belongs to this world, or that this 
world is the world of the head. 

Since every true philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its 
time, the time must come when philosophy not only internally by 
its content, but also externally through its form, comes into con- 
tact and interaction with the real world of its day. Philosophy 
then ceases to be a particular system in relation to other particu- 
lar systems, it becomes philosophy in general in relation to the 
world, it becomes the philosophy of the contemporary world. The 
external forms which confirm that philosophy has attained this 
significance, that it is the living soul of culture, that philosophy has 
become worldly and the world has become philosophical, have 
been the same in all ages. One can consult any history book and 
find repeated with stereotyped fidelity the simplest rituals which 
unmistakably mark the penetration of philosophy into salons, 
priests’ studies, editorial offices of newspapers and court antecham- 

bers, into the love and the hate of contemporaries. Philosophy 
comes into the world amid the loud cries of its enemies, who 
betray their inner infection by wild shouts for help against the 
fiery ardour of ideas. This cry of its enemies has the same 
significance for philosophy as the first cry of the new-born babe 
has for the anxiously listening ear of the mother: it is the cry 
testifying to the life of its ideas, which have burst the orderly 
hieroglyphic husk of the system and become citizens of the world. 
The Corybantes and Cabiri, whose loud fanfares announce to the 
world the birth of the infant Zeus, attack first of all the religious 
section of the philosophers, partly because the inquisitorial instinct 
is more certain to have an appeal for the sentimental side of the 
public, partly because the public, which includes also the oppo- 
nents of philosophy, can feel the sphere of philosophical ideas 
only by means of its ideal antennae, and the only circle of ideas in 
the value of which the public believes almost as much as in the 
system of material needs is the circle of religious ideas; and finally 
because religion polemises not against a particular system of 
philosophy, but against the philosophy of all particular systems. 

The true philosophy of the present day does not differ from the 
true philosophies of the past by this destiny. On the contrary, this 
destiny is a proof which history owed to its truth. 

For six years German newspapers have been drumming against, 
calumniating, distorting and bowdlerising the religious trend in 
philosophy.” The Augsburg Allgemeine sang bravura arias, almost 
every overture played the leitmotif, to the effect that philosophy 
did not deserve to be discussed by this wise lady, that it was a 
rodomontade of youth, a fashion of blasé coteries. But, in spite of 
all this, it was impossible to get away from philosophy, and the 
drumming was continually renewed, for the Augsburg paper plays 
only one instrument in its anti-philosophical cat’s concert, the 
monotonous kettle-drum. All German newspapers, from the Ber- 
liner politisches Wochenblatt and the Hamburger Correspondent down 
to the obscure local newspapers, down to the Kélnische Zeitung, 
reverberated with the names of Hegel and Schelling, Feuerbach 
and Bauer, the Deutsche Jahrbiicher,”’ etc. Finally, the public became 
eager to see the Leviathan itself, the more so because semi-official 
articles threatened to have a legal syllabus officially prescribed for 
philosophy, and it was precisely then that philosophy made its 
appearance in the newspapers. For a long time philosophy had 
remained silent in the face of the self-satisfied superficiality which 
boasted that by means of a few hackneyed newspaper phrases it 
would blow away like soap-bubbles the long years of study by 

Leading Article in No. 179 of Kolnische Zeitung 197 

genius, the hard-won fruits of self-sacrificing solitude, the results 
of the unseen but slowly exhausting struggles of contemplative 
thought. Philosophy had even protested against the newspapers as an 
unsuitable arena, but finally it had to break its silence; it became a 
newspaper correspondent, and then—unheard-of diversion!— it 
suddenly occurred to the loquacious purveyors of newspapers that 
philosophy was not a fitting pabulum for their readers. They 
could not fail to bring to the notice of the governments that it was 
dishonest to introduce philosophical and, religious questions into 
the sphere of the newspapers not for the enlightenment of the 
public but to achieve external aims. 

What could philosophy say about religion or about itself that 
would be worse than your newspaper hullabaloo had already long 
ago attributed to it in a worse and more frivolous form? It only 
has to repeat what you unphilosophical Capuchins preach about it 
in thousands and thousands of controversial speeches—and the 
worst will have been said. 

But philosophy speaks about religious and philosophical matters 
in a different way than you have spoken about them. You speak 
without having studied them, philosophy speaks after studying 
them; you appeal to the emotions, it appeals to reason; you 
anathematise, it teaches; you promise heaven and earth, it prom- 
ises nothing but the truth; you demand belief in your beliefs, it 
demands not belief in its results but the testing of doubts; you 
frighten, it calms. And, in truth, philosophy has enough knowl- 
edge of the world to realise that its results do not flatter the pleasure- 
seeking and egoism of either the heavenly or the earthly world. 
But the public, which loves truth and knowledge for their own 
sakes, will be well able to measure its judgment and morality 
against the judgment and morality of ignorant, servile, inconsis- 
tent and venal scribblers. 

Of course, there may be some persons who misinterpret 
philosophy owing to the wretchedness of their understanding and 
attitude. But do not you Protestants believe that Catholics misin- 
terpret Christianity, do you not reproach the Christian religion on 
account of the shameful times of the eighth and ninth centuries, 
or St. Bartholomew’s night, or the Inquisition? There is clear 
proof that Protestant theology’s hatred of philosophers arises 
largely from the tolerance shown by philosophy towards each 
particular creed as such. Feuerbach and Strauss have been more 
reproached for regarding Catholic dogmas as Christian than for 
declaring that the dogmas of Christianity are not dogmas of 
reason. 

But if some individuals cannot digest modern philosophy and 
die of philosophical indigestion, that is no more evidence against 
philosophy than the occasional bursting of an engine boiler, with 
consequent injury to passengers, is evidence against the science of 
mechanics. 

The question whether philosophical and religious matters ought 
to be discussed in the newspapers dissolves in its own lack of ideas. 

When such questions begin to interest the public as questions for 
newspapers, they have become questions of the time. Then the 
problem is not whether they should be discussed, but where and 
how they should be discussed, whether in inner circles of the 
families and the salons, in schools and churches, but not by the 
press; by opponents of philosophy, but not by philosophers; in the 
obscure language of private opinion, but not in the clarifying 
language of public reason. Then the question is whether the 
sphere of the press should include what exists as a reality; it is no 
longer a matter of a particular content of the press, but of the 
general question whether the press ought to be a genuine press, 
1.e., a free press. 

The second question we separate entirely from the first: 
“Should the newspapers treat politics philosophically in a so-called 
Christian state?” 

When religion becomes a political factor, a subject-matter of 
politics, it hardly needs to be said that the newspapers not only 
may, but must discuss political questions. It seems obvious that 
philosophy, the wisdom of the world, has a greater right to 
concern itself with the realm of this world, with the state, than has 
the wisdom of the other world, religion. The question here is not 
whether there should be any philosophising about the state, but 
whether this should be done well or badly, philosophically or 
unphilosophically, with or without prejudice, with or without 
consciousness, consistently or inconsistently, quite rationally or 
semi-rationally. If you make religion into a theory of constitutional 
law, then you are making religion itself into a kind of philosophy. 

Was it not Christianity above all that separated church and 
state? 

Read St. Augustine’s De civitate Det, study the Fathers of the 
Church and the spirit of Christianity, and then come back and tell 
us whether the state or the church is the “Christian state”! Or 
does not every moment of your practical life brand your theory as 
a lie? Do you consider it wrong to appeal to the courts if you have 
been cheated? But the apostle writes that it is wrong. If you have 
been struck on one cheek, do you turn the other also, or do you 

Leading Article in No. 179 of Kélnische Zeitung 199 

not rather start an action for assault? But the gospel forbids it. Do 
you not demand rational right in this world, do you not grumble at 
the slightest raising of taxes, are you not beside yourself at the 
least infringement of your personal liberty? But you have been told 
that suffering in this life is not to be compared with the bliss 
of the future, that passive sufferance and blissful hope are the 
cardinal virtues. 

Are not most of your court cases and most of your civil laws 
concerned with property? But you have been told that your 
treasure is not of this world. Or if you plead that you render unto 
Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are 
God’s, then you should regard not only golden Mammon, but at 
least as much free reason, as the ruler of this world, and the 
“action of free reason” is what we call philosophising. 

When it was proposed to form a quasi-religious union of states 
in the shape of the Holy Alliance and to make religion the state 
emblem of Europe, the Pope, with profound intelligence and 
perfect consistency, refused to join it, on the grounds that the 
universal Christian link between peoples is the church and not 
diplomacy, not a secular union of states. 

The truly religious state is the theocratic state; the head of such 
states must be either the God of religion, Jehovah himself, as in 
the Jewish state, or God’s representative, the Dalai Lama, as in 
Tibet, or finally, as Gorres rightly demands in his recent book, all 
the Christian states must subordinate themselves to a church which 
is an “infallible church”. For where, as under Protestantism, there 
is no supreme head of the church, the rule of religion is nothing 
but the religion of rule, the cult of the government’s will. 

Once a state includes several creeds having equal rights, it can 
no longer be a religious state without being a violation of the 
rights of the particular creeds, a church which condemns all 
adherents of a different creed as heretics, which makes every 
morsel of bread depend on one’s faith, and which makes dogma 
the link between individuals and their existence as citizens of the 
state. Ask the Catholic inhabitants of “poor green Erin”,* ask the 
Huguenots before the French revolution; they did not appeal to 
religion, for their religion was not the state religion; they appealed 
to the “Rights of Humanity”, and philosophy interprets the rights 
of humanity and demands that the state should be a state of 
human nature. 

* Treland.— Ed. 

But, according to the assertions of half-hearted, narrow-minded 
rationalism, which is in equal measure unbelieving and theologi- 
cal, the general spirit of Christianity, irrespective of differences 
of creed, should be the spirit of the state! It is the greatest irreligion, 
it is the arrogance of secular reason, to divorce the general spirit 
of religion from actually existing religion. This separation of 
religion from its dogmas and institutions is tantamount to assert- 
ing that the general spirit of the law ought to prevail in the state 
irrespective of particular laws and positive legal institutions. 

If you presume yourself raised so high above religion that you 
are entitled to separate its general spirit from its positive provi- 
sions, how can you reproach the philosophers if they carry out this 
separation completely and not halfway, if they call the general 
spirit of religion the human spirit, and not the Christian spirit? 

Christians live in states with different political constitutions, 
some in a republic, others in an absolute monarchy, and others 
again in a constitutional monarchy. Christianity does not decide 
whether the constitutions are good, for it knows no distinction 
between them. It teaches, as religion is bound to teach: submit to 
authority, for all authority is from God. Therefore, you must judge 
the rightfulness of state constitutions not on the basis of Christian- 
ity, but on the basis of the state’s own nature and essence, not on 
the basis of the nature of Christian society, but on the basis of the 
nature of human society. 

The Byzantine state was the real religious state, for in it dogmas 
were questions of state, but the Byzantine state was the worst of 
states. The states of the ancien régime were the most Christian states 
of all; nevertheless, they were states dependent on the “will of the 
court”. 

There exists a dilemma in the face of which “common” sense is 
powerless. 

Either the Christian state corresponds to the concept of the state 
as the realisation of rational freedom, and then the state only 
needs to be a rational state in order to be a Christian state and it 
suffices to derive the state from the rational character of human 
relations, a task which philosophy accomplishes; or the state of 
rational freedom cannot be derived from Christianity, and then 
you yourself will admit that this derivation is not intended by 
Christianity, since it does not want a bad state, and a state that 
is not the realisation of rational freedom is a bad state. 

You may solve this dilemma in whatever way you like, you will 
have to admit that the state must be built on the basis of free 
reason, and not of religion. Only the crassest ignorance could 

Leading Article in No. 179 of Kolnische Zeitung 201 

assert that this theory, the conversion of the concept of the state 
into an independent concept, is a passing whim of recent 
philosophers. : 

In the political sphere, philosophy has done nothing that 
physics, mathematics, medicine, and every science, have not done 
in their respective spheres. Bacon of Verulam said that theological 
physics was a virgin dedicated to God and barren,’ he emancipated 
physics from theology and it became fertile. Just as you do not ask 
the physician whether he is a believer, you have no reason to ask 
the politician either. Immediately before and after the time of 
Copernicus’ great discovery of the true solar system, the law of 
gravitation of the state was discovered, its own gravity was found 
in the state itself. The various European governments tried, in the 
superficial way of first practical attempts, to apply this result in 
order to establish a system of equilibrium of states. Earlier, 
however, Machiavelli and Campanella, and later Hobbes, Spinoza, 
Hugo Grotius, right down to Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel, began 
to regard the state through human eyes and to deduce its natural 
laws from reason and experience, and not from theology. In so- 
doing, they were as little deterred as Copernicus was by the fact 
that Joshua bade the sun stand still over Gideon and the moon in 
the valley of Ajalon. Recent philosophy has only continued the 
work begun by Heraclitus and Aristotle. You wage a polemic, 
therefore, not against the rational character of recent philosophy, 
but against the ever new philosophy of reason. Of course, the 
ignorance which perhaps only yesterday or the day before yester- 
day discovered for the first time age-old ideas about the state in 
the Rheinische or the Konigsberger Zeitung, regards these ideas of 
history as having suddenly occurred to certain individuals over- 
night, because they are new to it and reached it only overnight; it 
forgets that it itself is assuming the old role of the doctor of the 
Sorbonne who considered it his duty to accuse Montesquieu 
publicly of being so frivolous as to declare that the supreme merit 
of the state was political, not ecclesiastical, virtue. It forgets that it 
is assuming the role of Joachim Lange, who denounced Wolff on 
the ground that his doctrine of predestination would lead to 
desertion by the soldiers and thus the weakening of military 
discipline, and in the long run the collapse of the state. Finally, it 
forgets that Prussian Law was derived from the philosophical 
school of precisely “this Wolff”, and that the French Napoleonic 

* F. Baconi Baronis de Verulamio, De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, Liber I, 
3,.— Ed. 

Code was derived not from the Old Testament, but from the 
school of ideas of Voltaire, Rousseau, Condorcet, Mirabeau, and 
Montesquieu, and from the French revolution. Ignorance is a 
demon, we fear that it will yet be the cause of many a tragedy; the 
greatest Greek poets rightly depicted it as tragic fate in the 
soul-shattering dramas of the royal houses of Mycenae and 
Thebes. 

Whereas the earlier philosophers of constitutional law pro- 
ceeded in their account of the formation of the state from the 
instincts, either of ambition or gregariousness, or even from 
reason, though not social reason, but the reason of the individual, 
the more ideal and profound view of recent philosophy proceeds 
from the idea of the whole. It looks on the state as the great 
organism, in which legal, moral, and political freedom must be 
realised, and in which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of 
the state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human 
reason. Saptenti sat.* 

In conclusion, we turn once more to the Kolnische Zeitung with a 
few philosophical words of farewell. It was very sensible of it to 
take a liberal “of a former day” into its service. One can very 
conveniently be both liberal and reactionary if only one is always 
adroit enough to address oneself to the liberals of the recent past 
who know no other dilemma than that of Vidocq: either “prisoner 
or gaoler”. It was still more sensible for the liberals of the recent 
past to join issue with the liberals of the present time. Without 
parties there is no development, without demarcation there is no 
progress. We hope that the leading article in No. 179 has opened 
a new era for the Kolnische Zeitung, the era of character. 

1842 paper 

Rheinische Zeitung Nos. 191, 193 and 195, 

July 10, 12 and 14, 1842