Friedrich Engels 
The Russian defeat at Kars 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4568, 10. Dezember 1855 

The Russian defeat at Kars. 

We have at last received a complete collection of documents upon the 
battle of Kars. On the Turkish side we have, beside Gen. William's re- 
port, the letters of several newspaper correspondents at either Kars or 
Erzeroum, but what they add to the official account is of so confused and 5 
contradictory a nature that it must count for next to nothing. The Rus- 
sian side is represented by a few letters from officers more intent on 
describing the obstinate character of the fight than in giving accurate 
details of position, which those actually engaged must have very soon 
lost all faculty and opportunity of observing, and by General Muravieff s io 
report, filling thirteen columns in the Invalide Russe. This was rather 
difficult to procure in extenso, as neither the British nor the French press 
have deigned to give more than extracts from it; some German papers, 
however, have it in full, and thus we are able to compare the two official 
accounts with each other. 15 
The total absence of accurate maps and plans of the ground renders it, 
of course, impossible to pass a decided opinion upon most of the tactical 
details of the engagement. There are wanting, besides, other details ne- 
cessary to form a correctjudgment upon many of its episodes. But what 
we have is sufficient to give a pretty clear idea of the scene and of the 20 
main features of the action; and, to the honor of the Turks be it said, 
their defense does not lose its glorious character under close examination. 
The town of Kars is situated on the right, or south-eastern bank of the 
Kars-chai, in a bend of that river. To the south-east of it, on the same 
bank of the river, is a plain; but on the northern side (on the left bank) a 25 
range of hights approaches the river closely, and is continued on the 
other side of the ravine through which the river runs below the town, by 
another range, the Karadagh. These hights completely command the 

The Russian defeat at Kars 

town, and from here the Russians, in 1828, pushed their trenches against 
it. But these same hights, too, form an admirable position for defense. 
Encircling the whole of the bend of the river before mentioned, they 
stretch out on the western side and above Kars, as far as another of its 
bends, by which a good portion of the southern front of defense becomes 
inaccessible. From this upper bend of the river begins the north-western 
front of defense, called by Gen. Williams the Tahmas-front. It is guarded 
by three large works called, from the bend upward, or from left to right: 
1. Tahmas Tabia (redoubt). 2. Yuksh Tabia. 3. Rennison Lines. The for- 
10 mer two are closed redoubts, the third is a large irregular work, open at 
the gorge. All these works flank each other and are more or less connect- 
ed by detached parapets thrown up further back in the intervals. They 
are fully 2% miles from Kars. Next to the Rennison Lines comes the 
largest and most important work on this side, Fort Lake, a sort of cita- 
is del, erected on the most commanding point of the whole range, and 
capable of holding several battalions. From Fort Lake to where, lower 
down, the river breaks through the range of hills, runs the north-eastern 
front of defense; here four small lunettes, open at the gorge, had been 
constructed, and were called the English works (Ingliz Tabias). They, too, 
20 had lines of parapets behind their intervals. Gen. Williams, finding that 
these constructions were on too small a scale to offer serious resistance, 
caused a closed work of larger dimensions to be thrown up in their rear, 
which was called Williams's Tabia. On the other side of the river, on the 
nearest point of the Karadagh, were built two works, Arab and Kara- 
25 dagh Tabias, either of which could take in flank an assault on the nearest 
of the English works. Finally, on the south-eastern side of the town, the 
plain was closed by a triple range of intrenchments the most important of 
which were Hafiz Pasha Tabia on the eastern or left, and Kanly Tabia on 
the western or right flank; the latter near the point where the line again 

Wn 

30 joins the river above Kars. Thus, the whole line of defense was divided by 
the river into two great divisions, from Tahmas to the English works on 
the left, from Karadagh to Kanly Tabia on the right bank. 

After menacing this south-eastern front for some time, the Russians 
had gone south-west toward the village of Kanly, where they encamped. 

35 Toward the middle of September they prepared for passing with the main 
body to the left bank of the river, and attacking the north-western or 
Tahmas front with the 18th and 21st divisions of infantry, while the 13th 
division was concentrated at the village of Chakmak, north-east of the 
town, for the attack of the English front. Thus, the whole of the lines 

40 west of the river were to be assailed at once. 

Friedrich Engels 

To judge from the state of the ground, this portion of the lines was 
naturally by far the strongest, but its artificial defenses appear to have 
been rather neglected in the beginning. It seems that Gen. Williams for a 
long while thought Fort Lake sufficient to cover the town on this side, 
although the artillery of that work could not be expected to commanda 5 
range of hills extending three miles to the right and as much to the left. 
He admits himself that the three works of the Tahmas front, with their 
connecting breastworks, were only constructed when the movement of 
the Russians toward Kanly took place, viz: in July. These works at first 
were mere lunettes open at the gorge, but the Russians delaying their 10 
attack, the Tahmas and Yuksh works were changed into closed redoubts. 
As to the time the English Tabias were constructed, Gen. Williams does 
not give us any information; but he gives us distinctly to understand that 
the only really important work ofthat group, the Williams Tabia, serving 
as a citadel and réduit to the four outlying lunettes, was thrown up but a 15 
few days before the actual attack. It appears, besides, from his report 
that many works of lesser extent were constructed during the last days 
wherever they might seem likely to strengthen a weak portion of the line. 
Thus, it cannot be said that Williams and his engineer, Lieut. Col. Lake, 
were in a hurry to complete the defenses of the town, and considering the 20 
narrow escape they have had even now, we can scarcely doubt that the 
Russians would have taken Kars, had they not idled away four months, 
or had they even assaulted it in August or the first days of September 
with the same forces they had on the 29th of September. 

That the intrenchments were not devised and constructed upon one 25 
single fixed plan, is clear from what we have just now stated. What unity 
can there be in a system of intrenchments to which, day after day, new 
works are added, the necessity of which was not acknowledged the day 
before? The descriptions we read show us indeed as incongruous an ac- 
cumulation of field-works as one can possibly imagine. The defenses of 30 
most important points is at first neglected, then by and by overdone; 
batteries, redans, lunettes, redoubts, epaulements, are thrown up right 
and left, on the periphery of a circle measuring some ten miles round. 
Lake, the engineer, was sure to find no end of fresh sites for new works, 
and Williams, the artilleryman, appears to have been just the man to 35 
construct batteries wherever a gun might enfilade any possible approach 
of the enemy. The number of troops disposable for the defense of these 
complicated and extensive works does not seem to have ever entered into 
their calculations; and when the day of the action came, Gen. Williams 
had, as a matter of course, to confess that his lines were "undermanned". 40 
If he had not forgotten his quality of chief of the staff and virtual com- 

The Russian defeat at Kars 

mander-in-chief in his other quality of artillerist, he would not have had 
to complain of this circumstance. 

The system of fieldworks which formed the main line of defense appears 

to have been that of lunettes or redoubts, behind the intervals of which 

5 epaulements for infantry, and in some places for artillery, too, formed a 

sort of curtains, so as to establish a species of loosely connected, bastioned 

fronts, with openings large enough to admit of columns sallying forth 

from the lines to attack the enemy at a favorable moment. This rather 

old-fashioned method would not enter into the head of any engineer who 

10 had to construct an intrenched camp for a European army; redoubts, 
closed at the gorge, would be considered sufficient, and epaulements 
would be thrown up for no other purpose than to shelter the reserves from 
artillery fire. But here these epaulements were to be defended as part and 
parcel of the system; their fire in fact had to support the redoubts. The 

15 consequence was a great squandering of combatants in the beginning of 
the action, which must have contributed its part to the "undermanning" of 
the whole of the lines, and which must have weakened the reserves to a 
considerable degree. But Gen. Williams had a very good reason for adop- 
ting this unusual method at Kars. He had a good many Lazian and Kur- 

20 dish mountaineers, Bashi-Bazouks, beside about one thousand volunteers 
from the town—all troops completely useless in the open field, and not 
reliable enough to be trusted with the defense even of an important in- 
trenched post; but for a tenacious defense of parapets, they were very 
useful, particularly if those parapets were not directly exposed to the first 

25 onset of the enemy. Consequently, it was for these irregulars that Williams 
threw up his long lines; and in this case we believe he was perfectly right, 
though he might evidently have managed a great deal better in the laying 
out of these works. What we consider, however, unpardonable is the throw- 
ing up of so many small redans or fléches in front of his redoubts, by 

30 which he was obliged still more to weaken his really disposable reserve 
force. He appears to feel his mistake, for he says as little about them as he 
possibly can, and if it were not for the Russian report, we should to this 
day be ignorant even of the existence of these fléches in front of the Tah- 
mas redoubts, which the Russians took on the first onset. 

35 On the 29th Sept., before daybreak, Muravieff launched four columns 
against the Tahmas front. General Maidel, with the 21st division, attack- 
ed the Tahmas redoubt with one column, while the other attempted to 
pass between that work and the river flowing to its left, (Russian right). 
At the same time General Kovalevski, with the 18th division, attacked 

40 Yuksh Tabia with one column, and the Rennison lines with another. The 
Russians are acknowledged on all hands to have advanced with the 

Friedrich Engels 

greatest steadiness and bravery. They penetrated without difficulty into 
the outlying fléches of the Turks, and attempted the salient angles of the 
redoubts. But here they met with a desperate resistance. General Kmety 
(Ismail Pasha,) commanding the Tahmas front, had taken his measures 
so well, and inspired his soldiers with such confidence—he was in the 5 
Yuksh redoubt himself-—that whenever the head of a Russian column 
had penetrated into the ditches, or even the works themselves, it was 
immediately cut up. Each of the Russian columns advanced in three 
successive bodies; the second or main body was to secure the advantages 
gained by its advanced guard, while the third or reserve was to bring the 10 
final decision, and to guard against any unforeseen accidents. But when 
the main body arrived, the advanced guard was generally in disorder, and 
this disorder was soon communicated to all the fresh troops coming up. 
At the Rennison lines, the Russians had to run the gauntlet of the cross- 
fire of Fort Lake to the right, and of a couple of batteries to the left rear 15 
of the Rennison lines, beside being crushed by the telling front fire of a 
battalion of rifles in the works before them. Here General Kovalevski, all 
his staff, and most of the chiefs of regiments and battalions, fell, and the 
column was broken before it reached the ditch of the work. 

The attack degenerated, as usual, into a desultory fusilade and can- 20 
nonade, during which the Russian commanders sought to restore order 
and to attempt fresh maneuvers. But too many troops had been engaged 
at once by them. To bring them into fire was easy enough, to withdraw or 
even control them was more than could be done. Indeed, this obstinate 
firing, interrupted now and then by weak attempts at a renewed charge, 25 
filled up the long space of six hours succeeding to the first hour of actual 
decisive fighting, and this explains the tremendous disproportion between 
the losses of the Turks who fought under cover and of the Russians who 
exposed themselves recklessly to the enemy's shots. 

In the midst of this struggle the extreme right column of the Russians 30 
appears to the rear of Tahmas Tabia on the plateau. It has brought a 
battery along with it, which opens on Tahmas Tabia, enfilading two of its 
faces and taking in rear the third. The moment is decisive. If that column 
gains ground, the epaulements, attacked in the rear, must be abandoned, 
the redoubts exposed to fire from all sides must soon fall. But help is at 35 
hand. Three battalions, two from the general reserve and one from Fort 
Lake, arrive at the same time; the road being along the hill-side toward 
the river, hides them from the sight of the Russians until they are well on 
their flank; a rush and the enemy is routed. 

That was the second decisive moment, and nobody was more eager to 40 
seize it than Gen. Kmety. With true military instinct he rushed at the 

The Russian defeat at Kars 

head of his men out of Yuksh Tabia on the battalions directly opposed to 
him; the garrisons of the adjoining redoubts follow his example, and the 
two whole Russian divisions, already broken by repeated repulses and 
heavy fire, are driven headlong down the hill by a few Turkish battalions. 
5 That was the master-stroke of the battle, and its honor is exclusively due 
to Kmety. After that there was no more serious fighting on that side of 
Kars; the firing went on for some time longer, but the battle was over to 
all intents and purposes. 
At the same time Gen. Bazin had attacked, from Chakmak, the north- 
10 eastern front, the English Tabias, with the greater part of the thirteenth 
division. His troops found these little fléches garrisoned by a few com- 
panies of irregulars, only, and took possession of them at the first onset. 
The irregulars, reénforced by those from behind the connecting epaule- 
ments and by a number of towns-people, fell into a similar desultory 
15 fusilade as the Russians did on the Tahmas front; but the commanders 
succeeded in throwing the greater part of them into Fort Williams, where 
they could offer a more effective resistance, while the guns of Fort Lake 
from the left, and Arab Tabia and Karadagh Tabia from the right, 
poured shot and canister among the Russians. Next arrived two batta- 
20 lions from Karadagh, which took the lead in a fresh charge against the 
Russians. They were driven out of the small English Tabias, all of which, 
open to the rear, were unfit for defense in that direction; and herewith the 
battle ended on that side also. 
The way in which General Williams directed the defense deserves all 
25 praise. He had certainly not 20,000 men in Kars, all included; he was 
obliged to guard the southern front with a certain number of troops, and 
he was attacked by more than 30,000 Russians. Yet in the most decisive 
moment the advance of but five battalions of reserves was sufficient to 
restore the superiority to his troops on the whole field of battle. But the 
30 hero of the day was certainly Kmety. He not only had to make the 
immediate tactical arrangements on the heavily attacked front—and they 
were very good—but also to decide the action by seizing the proper 
moment for a blow in return. We have seen how well he knew to seize the 
moment. The Russians had still a numerous body in reserve; Muravieff 
35 had sent General Brummer with a portion of it to the battle-field to 
renew, if there was a chance, the assault, or else to draw off the troops 
engaged if there was none. When Brummer arrived he found the Russian 
columns flying downhill in disorder before Kmety's vigorous charge; but 
for that circumstance he very likely would have attempted a fresh attack, 
40 which might have had at least some partial results. The Turks had no 
reserves left in spite of the desperate bravery which animated them, an- 

Friedrich Engels 

other attack by fresh troops might have driven them out of the three 
redoubts of the Tahmas front, and from that position the Russians could 
have shelled the town and the Turkish magazines. It was Kmety alone 
whose well-timed offensive movement at once cut off all chance for such 
an attempt; accordingly, Brummer drew off the troops engaged and 5 
abandoned the field. That Kmety could undertake such a movement with 
troops who had stood five or six hours fighting against superior num- 
bers, is more than anybody would have expected from the army-corps of 
Arabistan, from which these troops were taken; for the Turkish defense 
of fortified lines was hitherto known for its almost exclusively defensive 10 
character only. 

The Russian attack was intended for a surprise, and in consequence 
was undertaken with large masses at once; but as the surprise failed 
completely, the assailants found themselves under the disadvantage of 
having too many oftheir troops engaged at once on ground offering little 15 
or no shelter. The Turkish fire thinned their ranks most effectively; and, 
as usual in such cases, that desultory firing was resorted to by their 
troops which always follows repulsed charges, and which renders it all 
but impossible to re-form the men for a fresh assault. At the same time, it 
would appear that the second and third detachments of the Russian col- 20 
umns on the Tahmas front were far too soon, and, with no definite 
object, entangled into the disorderly fusilade; so that after the first as- 
sault, no second general attack could be organized. The unfitness of the 
Russians for light-infantry service is here again manifest. In every other 
army, after the first repulse was once rendered irreparable, a line of 25 
skirmishers would have been thrown out against the enemy's works, un- 
der shelter of which the remaining troops would have re-formed; but here 
the Russian columns, turned into disorderly heaps of men clubbing te- 
naciously together, unwilling to retreat, yet unfit for movements in ad- 
vance, appear to have remained patiently within close range of the Turks, 30 
allowing themselves to be shot down by wholesale. Thus alone can the 
enormous loss of the Russians be explained. It was just as at Inkermann 
and the Chernaya; bravery enough, but of the stupidest sort known to 
history. 

Muravieff appears to have lost his senses entirely, indeed he is said to 35 
have subsequently gone crazy. Either he should have brought up his 
reserves sooner and renewed the assault with them, or else he should have 
broken off the fight after the second hour, on the Tahmas side at least. As 
it is, he showed himself to be the worthy counterpart of his colleagues in 
the Crimea, who are distinguished for nothing so much as for the reckless 40 
obstinacy with which they sacrifice their soldiers.