MARX TO WILHELM LIEBKNECHT” 

[London,] 4 February 1878 378 

... We are most decidely espousing the Turkish cause and for 2 
reasons: 

1. because we have studied the Turkish peasant—i.e. the mass of 
the Turkish people—and in this way have come to see him as 
indubitably one of the ablest and most moral representatives of the 
peasantry in Europe; 

2. because the defeat of the Russians would have greatly expedited 
social revolution in Russia, of which all the elements are present in 
abundant measure, and hence radical change throughout Europe. 

Things took a different course. Why? In consequence of 
England’s and Austria’s treachery. 

England—I mean the English government—came, for example, 
to the rescue of the Serbs when they had been beaten 116: by 
misrepresenting the facts, she caused the Turks to suspend 
hostilities in the erroneous belief that the Russians had proffered an 
armistice (through England) of which the first condition was the 
aforesaid suspension. It was this alone that enabled the Russians to win 
their final spate of victories.’* Otherwise their armies would have 
been decimated by hunger and cold; only the opening up of the 
way to Rumelia where supplies were to be had (i.e. taken) and 
where, furthermore, the climate was milder, permitted them to 
escape from the mousetrap in Bulgaria, cram-full with soldiers, 
and pour their hordes into the south. Disraeli was (and still is) 
hamstrung in his own cabinet by the Marquis of Salisbury, Russian 
agent and confidant of Ignatiyev, by the Grand Cophta*” oF 
Commonplace— Eart or Derby—and by the Eari or Carnarvon, who 
has since resigned. 

Austria prevented the Turks from enjoying the fruits of their 
victories in Montenegro, etc.*” 

Finally—and this is one of the main reasons for their ultimate 
defeat— the Turks failed to stir up revolution in Constantinople, thus 
allowing that incarnation of the old Seraglio régime — 
Mahmud Damad—brother-in-law to the Sultan,* to remain the 
real power behind the war—exactly the same thing as actually 

a Abdul Hamid II 

entrusting the Russian cabinet with the conduct of the war against 
itself. The systematic paralysing and compromising of the Tur- 
kish army by this laddie can be demonstrated down to the smal- 
lest detail. Come to that, everyone in Constantinople is aware of 
it and this increases the historical guilt of the Turks. A people 
incapable of resolute revolutionary action at moments of intense 
crisis such as this is doomed. The Russian government knew what 
Damad was worth to them; it brought more strategy and tactics to bear 
on keeping Midhat Pasha away from Constantinople and Damad at 
the helm than on the capture of Plevna.° 

The man behind the Russian victory was, of course, Bismarck. 
He was responsible for the Alliance of the Three Emperors'* 
whereby Austria was kept quiet. Even after the fall of Plevna all 
Austria would have had to do was marshal 100,000 men—and the 
Russians would have been compelled quietly to withdraw or to 
content themselves with the paltriest of spoils. From the start, 
Austria’s abdication gave the Russian party in England the upper 
hand, France (as a result of the post-Sedan catastrophe— 
catastrophe after Sedan '!’—engineered by the then premier, Mr 
Gladstone) having ceased to exist in English eyes as a continental 
military power. 

The consequence will simply be the dissolution of Austria, which is 
inevitable if the Russian peace terms be accepted *”’ and this means 
that Turkey (at least in Europe) will continue to exist in name 
only. Turkey was Austria’s barrier against Russia and her retinue of 
Slavs. So presumably at the first appropriate moment there'll be a 
call for ‘Bohemia’. 

But Prussia qua Prussia—i.e. as specifically opposed to Ger- 
many—also has interests of a different kind: Prussia as such is her 
dynasty, she has come to be and is what she is on Russia’s ‘warranty’. 
The defeat of Russia, revolution in Russia, would ring Prussia’s 
death-knell. 

For otherwise, after the great victory over France, after Prussia 
had become the leading military power in Europe, we may 
presume that not even Mr von Bismarck would have assigned her 
the same position vis-a-vis Russia as she had occupied in 1815 as a 
supernumerary on the political stage of Europe. 

Finally, to panjandrums such as Bismarck, Moltke, etc., the 
prospect of personal eminence held out by the succession of 
European wars now beginning ... is by no means a matter of 
indifference. 

It goes without saying that Prussia must, as occasion arises, 
demand ‘compensation’ for the Russian victories which she alone 

made possible. This is already plainly evident from the behaviour 
of the Russians vis-a-vis the Romanian government which had 
gone to the rescue of those same Russians at Plevna before 
Muscovite reinforcements arrived. Karl von Hohenzollern is 
now to demonstrate his gratitude by handing back the part of 
Bessarabia ceded by the Russians after the Crimean War.’ That 
this will not be permitted out of hand by Berlin, Petersburg is 
aware, and is prepared to make HANDsome compensation. 

But there are other aspects to all this. Turkey and Austria were 
the last bulwarks of the old European political order that was 
patched up again in 1815; with their downfall it will suffer total 
collapse. This debacle—which will take the form of a series of 
‘localised’ and ultimately ‘general’) wars—will precipitate the social 
crisis—and with it the decline of all these sabre-rattling sham powrrs.