Karl Marx
On the Oriental Question

-- 4 February 1878.

We take the most decided part for the Turks, for two reasons:
1) because we have studied the Turkish peasant—hence the Turkish mass of the people—and have therefore come to know him as unconditionally one of the ablest and most moral representatives of the peasantry in Europe.

2) Because the defeat of the Russians would have greatly accelerated the social upheaval in Russia, whose elements are present in great numbers, and thereby the transformation throughout Europe.

Things have turned out differently. Why? In consequence of the treachery of England and Austria.

England, I mean the English government, for example, saved the Serbs when they were beaten; under false pretences it induced the Turks to suspend hostilities, in the delusion that the Russians had offered an armistice (through England), the first condition of which was this suspension. This alone made possible the last sudden successes of the Russians. Their army would otherwise have been decimated by hunger and cold: only the opening of the roads to Rumelia, where supplies were to be had (that is, taken) and where, besides, the climate was milder, allowed them to escape from the mousetrap in Bulgaria, which they had overcrowded with soldiers, and to pour their hordes into the south. Disraeli was (still is) paralysed in his own Cabinet by the Russian agent Marquis of Salisbury, the intimate of Ignatieff; the Grand Cophta of Commonplace (High Priest of the Commonplace)—Earl of (Count of) Derby—and the now resigned Earl of Carnarvon.

Austria hindered the Turks from making their victories in Montenegro fruitful, etc.

Finally—and this is a main reason for their eventual defeat—the Turks neglected to make a revolution in Constantinople—so the incarnation (embodiment) of the old seraglio regime—Mahmud Damad—the brother-in-law of the Sultan, the real director of the war, remained absolutely the same, as if the Russian cabinet had been directly directing the war against itself. The systematic paralysing and compromising of the Turkish army by this fellow can be proved down to the smallest detail. Besides, it is common knowledge in Constantinople, and this increases the historical guilt of the Turks. A people that in such moments of supreme crisis does not know how to intervene in a revolutionary manner is lost. The Russian government knew what the Damad was worth to it; it applied more strategy and tactics to keep Midhat Pasha away from Constantinople, and to keep the Damad at the helm, than to take Plevna.

Naturally, in the background of the Russian success stands—Bismarck. He initiated the Three Emperors’ League, by which Austria was kept quiet. Even after the fall of Plevna, Austria had only to put 100,000 men in the field—and the Russians would have had to retire quietly or content themselves with the most modest results. Austria’s abdication gave the Russian party in England the upper hand from the outset, since France (as a consequence of the post-Sedan catastrophe—catastrophe after Sedan—promoted by Mr Gladstone, then prime minister) no longer existed for England as a continental military power.

The consequence is simply the dissolution of Austria, which is inevitable if the Russian peace conditions are accepted and thus Turkey (at least in Europe) will continue to exist only formally. Turkey formed the dike of Austria against Russia and its Slavic following. Thus, at the appropriate moment, they will probably ask for “Bohemia”.

But Prussia as Prussia—hence in its specific opposition to Germany—has still other interests: Prussia as such is its dynasty, it has become what it is on a Russian “deposit”. Defeat of Russia, revolution in Russia—would be the death knell for Prussia.

Otherwise, even Herr von Bismarck, after the great victory over France, after Prussia had become Europe’s first military power, would surely not have again assigned to it the same position towards Russia that it occupied as the fifth wheel on the European state coach in 1815.

Finally, for such great men as Bismarck, Moltke, etc., the personal importance which the now opened sequence of European wars holds out is by no means a matter of indifference.

It is obvious that Prussia will on occasion have to demand “compensation” for the Russian successes made possible by it alone. This is already clear from the conduct of the Russians towards the Romanian government, which saved the same Russians at Plevna before the Muscovite troop reinforcements arrived. As a reward, Charles of Hohenzollern is now to hand back the part of Bessarabia ceded by the Russians after the Crimean War. That this will not be permitted in Berlin without further ado is known in Petersburg, and they are quite ready to give a handsome (nice) compensation.

But the whole story has other sides as well. Turkey and Austria were the last bulwark of the old European states order, which was patched up again in 1815; with their downfall it collapses completely. The crash—which will take place in a series of (“localised” and finally “general”) wars—accelerates the social crisis—and with it the downfall of all these sabre-rattling sham powers (false pseudo-powers).

-- 11 February 1878.

One good thing the Russians have achieved; they have shattered “the great liberal party” of England and made it incapable of governing for a long time, while the Tory party has officially completed the work of killing itself through the traitors Derby and Salisbury (the latter the actual Russian driving wheel in the Cabinet).

The English working class had been gradually demoralised more and more deeply by the period of corruption since 1848, and had finally got to the point where it only formed the tail of the great liberal party, i.e., of its enslavers, the capitalists. Its direction had passed entirely into the hands of the venal trades union leaders and agitators of the craft unions. These fellows bawled and howled to the greater glory of the tsar, the liberator of nations, tagging along behind Gladstone, Bright, Mundella, Morley, the pack of manufacturers, etc., while they did not lift a finger for their own brothers, who were condemned to death by starvation in South Wales by the mine-owners. Wretches! To crown the whole thing worthily, in the last votes of the House of Commons (on 7 and 8 February, when most of the grandees of the “great liberal party”—Forster, Lowe, Harcourt, Goschen, Hartington, and even [on 7 Feb.] the great John Bright himself—abandoned their army and bolted during the vote, so as not to compromise themselves too much by a vote), the only workers’ representatives in the House of Commons, and, horribile dictu, direct representatives of the miners, and themselves miners before entering the House, Burt, and the pathetic Macdonald, voted with the rump of the “great liberal party” which enthused over the tsar!

But the rapid unfolding of the Russian plans has suddenly broken the spell, shattered the “mechanical agitation” (five-pound notes, the mainspring of the mechanism); at this moment it would be “mortally dangerous” for the Mothersheads, Howells, John Hales, Shiptons, Osbornes and the whole pack to make their voices heard in a public workers’ meeting; even their “corner and ticket meetings” (hole-and-corner meetings with entry tickets) are forcibly dissolved and scattered by the mass of the people.

But the heavy-going “Anglo-Saxon” wakes up too late, at least for the next events.

Russian diplomacy is far from sharing the silly “Christian” antipathies against the “Crescent”. Turkey, reduced to Constantinople and a small part of Rumelia in Europe, but with a compact hinterland in Asia Minor, Arabia, etc., is to be chained to Russia by an offensive and defensive alliance.

During the last campaign the 120,000 Poles in the Russian army did great service; now the Turks to go with the Poles—and the two bravest tribes of Europe, who have to avenge their shame on Europe, under the Russian flag—not a bad idea!

In 1829 Prussia acted—but at that time still only the greatest European small state and an avowed protégé of Russia—just as it does now.

The desperate situation in which the Russian army found itself after crossing the Balkans under Diebitsch (July 1829) has been well described by Moltke. It could only be saved by diplomacy.

The second campaign was on the point of turning out just as badly as the first—and then finis Russiae—then it would be all up with Russia. Therefore Nicholas, the Tsar, came to Berlin on 10 June 1829, under the pretext of attending the wedding of Prince William of Prussia (now German Emperor). He asked Frederick William III (“the Victorious”) to induce the Porte to send him plenipotentiaries to open peace negotiations. At that time Diebitsch was not yet across the Balkans, the greater part of his army being held fast before Silistria and around Shumla. Frederick William III, in agreement with Nicholas, officially ordered Baron Müffling to Constantinople as extraordinary envoy; but there he was to act as an agent for Russia. Müffling was a pure Russian, as he himself recounts in “From My Life”; he had drawn up the Russians’ campaign plan in 1827, and he also insisted that Diebitsch, coûte que coûte (cost what it may), must march across the Balkans, while he, in Constantinople, intrigued as a peace mediator; he himself says that the Sultan, terrified by such a march, would “appeal to him as a friend”.

Under the pretext of securing European peace, he succeeded in wheedling France and England; the latter especially, by working through the Russian-friendly English envoy Robert Gordon on his brother, the Earl of Aberdeen, and through him on Wellington—who bitterly regretted it later.

After Diebitsch had crossed the Balkans, the latter had the pleasure that on 25 July (1829) Reshid Pasha invited him by letter to open peace negotiations. On the same day, Müffling had his first interview with Reis Effendi (the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs), whom he intimidated by strong language (à la Prince Reuss); he referred to Gordon, etc. The Sultan, under pressure from the Prussian envoy (supported by the English envoy Gordon and the French envoy Guilleminot, both worked upon by Müffling), accepted the following five peace conditions: 1) Integrity of the Ottoman Empire; 2) maintenance of the earlier treaties between the Porte and Russia; 3) accession of the Porte to the Treaty of London (concluded 6 July 1827) between France, England and Russia, concerning the regulation of Greek affairs; 4) solid guarantees for the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea; 5) further negotiations (discussions) between Turkish and Russian chargés d’affaires on indemnity (compensation) claims and all other pretensions (demands) of the two parties.

On 28 August the two Turkish plenipotentiaries, Sadek Effendi and Abdul Kader Bey, accompanied by Küster (attaché of the Prussian legation in Constantinople), arrived in Adrianople, where the Russian headquarters had been for some 8 days. On 1 September Diebitsch opened the negotiations without waiting for the Russian plenipotentiaries (Alexis Orloff and Pahlen), who had only got as far as Burgas.

But during the negotiations Diebitsch constantly pushed his troops forward towards Constantinople. Brazen and arrogant (despite his rotten position, or rather because of it), he demanded, within a term of 8 days, the Turkish plenipotentiaries’ assent to the following points:

The fortresses of Braila, Giurgevo and Calafat to be razed, the places themselves to be incorporated into Wallachia. Cession to Russia |[62| of Anapa and Poti on the Black Sea and of the Pashalik of Akhaltsikhe; 700,000 “purses” (about 120 million francs) war indemnity, the payment of which to be guaranteed by Silistria and the Danubian Principalities as a pledge in the hands of the Russians. Indemnity of about 15 million francs to the Russian merchants for losses, payable in 3 instalments, after each of which the Russian army would withdraw, first to the foot of the Balkans, then north of this mountain chain, finally across the Danube.

The Porte protested against these conditions, which were so greatly at variance with the Czar’s assurances of moderation. The new Prussian envoy — Royer — (Müffling had vanished on 5 September, after completing his hangman’s work, he the “friend of the Porte” and angel of peace), together with General Guilleminot, whom Müffling had buttered up, and Sir Robert Gordon — supported the Porte’s protests, for this effrontery was contrary to the agreement, went too far even for “the victor wreathed in laurels”. Diebitsch knew that he was militarily in a pickle, made sham concessions: the article concerning the amount of the war indemnity was to be withdrawn from the public peace treaty; the first instalment of the compensation payment to Russian trade was reduced, for, as the Turkish envoys said: “The most ignorant person would know that the Porte could not pay.” Peace was finally concluded on 5 September.

Great sensation in Europe, great indignation in England, Wellington foamed; even Aberdeen, in a dispatch, pointed out the dangers lurking behind every single peace clause, and attempted to bring about a general alliance by which all the great powers (Russia included) would guarantee the peace in the Orient. Austria was willing; but Prussia frustrated the project, saved Russia from the dangers with which a European congress threatened it. (France, where Charles X was preparing the coup d’état, was paving the way for a secret understanding with Russia; a secret treaty was also concluded, according to which France was to receive the Rhine provinces.)

Under these circumstances, Nesselrode had no need to restrain himself; he wrote an insolent and mocking dispatch to the English ministers, i.e., a dispatch addressed to Count Lieven (the Russian envoy) in London.

Prussia did this at that time and has now repeated it on a larger scale. Fine Hohenstaufens — these Hohenzollerns! Bismarck found his statecraft easy in the Austrian and French affair; against Austria he had the protection of Bonaparte and the Italians, and against France he had the whole of Europe. Besides, the goal he was striving for was posed and prepared by the circumstances.

Now that the circumstances are complicated, his genius is at an end.