From 1818 Dost Mohammed Khan of the Barukzye tribe 
(Douranee tribe, as also the Populzyes, then the dynasty of the 
Suddozyes, but ousted by Dost Mohammed) ruled in Kabul after 
many civil wars. In Peshawar and Kandahar brothers of Dost 
Mohammed also ruled. The one in Peshawar, Azim Khan, 
attacked the Sikhs but Runjeet Singh defeated him and seized 
Peshawar from him so that it further became a tributary of the 
Sikhs. 

Herat alone remained under an ancient Suddozye dynasty. This 
was attacked by Mohamed Shah of Persia with Russian advice and 
aid. Agitation among the English. Fear of a Russian invasion of 
India, for Persia had been completely played into the hands of the 
Russians by English policy. 

Even earlier, in 1835, Lord Auckland, Governor-General [of 
India], sent Alexander Burnes to Kabul as ambassador, under the 
pretext of a trade mission. The Persians wanted to have Dost 
Mohammed also on their side, but Dost was for the English 
alliance. But when it came to particulars the English demanded 
everything and would promise nothing in return. The Pole 
Vitkievicz intervened, promised everything and demanded little, 
and Burnes finally had to leave, whereupon Vitkievicz and the 
Persians momentarily gained the upper hand (garbled “blue 
books” *°). 

The Indian Governor, in Simla at the time, under the influence 
not of the Indian Council, but of W. H. Macnaghten, secretary to 

the Government, Henry Torrens and J. Colvin, his private 
secretaries. Macnaghten and Colvin very ambitious, particularly 
the former. In its Russophobia this conclave decided to restore 
Shah Soojah, who had been ousted back in 1809 and was living on 
pension in Loodhianah, to the throne of Afghanistan and to 
conclude an alliance with the Sikhs to this end. This was done. 
The army gathered. Runjeet Singh was ready. Shah Soojah began 
to organise a recruited army under English officers. 

Meanwhile small expedition to Karrak (near Bushire) in the 
Persian Gulf was enough at the very last moment, September 4-9, 
1838, when Herat had almost fallen, to push the Persians back. 
They retired, and now au fond no more fear of Russian power in 
Afghanistan. But the English had advanced too far, and so the 
expedition was undertaken, although only with a few troops. 

October 1, 1838 proclamation containing the Governor- 
General’s declaration of war—scarcely public, when the news of 
the relief of Herat arrived. 

The army which actually marched: 2 brigades Bengal army, 
13th Queen’s Infantry Regiment, 16th, 31st, 35th, 37th, 42nd, 
48th native infantry under Sir W. Cotton, 16th Lancers and 
Indian irregular cavalry, 9,500 men in all. 

One brigade Bombay army, 4th Dragoons, 2nd and 17th 
Queen’s regiments, a native infantry regiment and some artillery 
via the Indus. 

Shah Soojah’s army: 2 cavalry, 4 infantry regiments, 1 mounted 
battery —6,000 men under Major-General Simpson (Crimea?’). 

The Bengal troops and Shah Soojah’s troops marched through 
Sindh, on which a levy was imposed for the benefit of Runjeet 
Singh and Shah Soojah, to Shikarpur, where they were to meet 
the Bombay troops. Sir J. Keane commander-in-chief.’—The 
Sikhs, with Shah Soojah’s son Timur Khan, through the Khyber 
Pass towards Kabul. Having marched off from Lahore in 
mid-December, by February 20 Cotton in Shikarpur, where the 
Shah’s army was already. The English Bengal army 9,500 men, 
3,800 camp-followers,” 30,000 pack-camels. 

Macnaghten’s political agents and emissaries with Shah Soojah.‘ 
Burnes among them. 

Many camels already lost in Shikarpur. 

Beginning of March through the Bolan Pass. To Dadur 146 
miles, 16 marches. The camels were dropping for want of forage. 
Food supplies ditto. The Baluchistan robbers on flank and at rear. 
Particularly from Dadur to Quetta, 60 miles through the pass. In 
Quetta on March 26. Here the cavalry was due to stop, but 
nothing to eat. Burnes set out to Mehrab Khan of Khelat, who 
promised everything, but said that the land was poor. 

On March 7 the Shah’s troops marched from Shikarpur. The 
Bombay brigade also followed, and Sir J. Keane, who arrived with 
it in Quetta on April 6. Nothing for it but forthwith to Kandahar. 
Left on April 7, over the Kodjuk Pass. Kohun-dil-Khan and his 
brothers fled, and the army entered Kandahar on April 25. 

The army paid for everything and nationalised very liberally. In 
the process Macnaghten squandered a lot of money on bribery* 
but to no avail. No enthusiasm for Shah Soojah.° 

June 27 from Kandahar for Kabul via Ghuznee, which was the 
impregnable fortress of Afghanistan, and was reached on July 21. 
Through treachery it came to Keane’s knowledge that one gate, 
the Kabul, was not walled up on the inside. He had left his siege 
guns in Kandahar, and had only light field guns. This news alone 
made capture possible. While mock assaults on the impregnable 
façade and a bombardment deceived the garrison, the gate was 
blown up with sacks of gunpowder and stormed by the 13th 
Regiment (under Dennie and Sale). After fierce resistance the 
fortress fell. 

Dost Mohammed moved to Maidan, a very strong position, and 
then even closer to the English. But his army broke up, and Dost 
Mohammed fled to Bokhara, where the Khan had him seized. 

The Sikhs did nothing, but as Dost Mohammed did not support 
the Afridis, they allowed Timur Khan through with a very few 
motley* troops (under Capt. Wade). Arrived in Kabul on 
September 3. 

On August 6 Shah Soojah and the English had entered Kabul. 
On September 18 the Bombay brigade marched back. On October 
3 three companies of infantry, the 16th Lancers, 3rd Bengal 
Cavalry, 4th Local Horse and one battery of artillery of the 
Bengal division were also repulsed. Distribution of the rest: Kabul: 
13th Queen’s Infantry, 35th Native Infantry, 3 cannon light foot. 

Jellalabad: 48th Native Infantry, some cavalrymen and sappers. 

Ghuznee: 16th Native Infantry, 1 squadron irregular cavalry 
and what was available of Shah Soojah’s troops. 

Kandahar: 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, | squadron irregular 
cavalry, | battery and some of Shah Soojah’s troops available (Nott 
in command). 

What had become of the 31st and 37th Native Infantry non 
liquet.*, Bameean particularly through the Shah’s good Gurkha 
Regiment *'! and one battery mounted artillery (!! taken in hand)!). 

The Afghans furious at the invasion by the Kafirs, Shah Soojah 
hated or indifferent. English intervention in government and 
administration makes things even worse. The Douranees around 
Kandahar had reckoned on Shah Soojah giving them back their 
former preponderance and rights of plunder suppressed by Dost 
Mohammed. This was not permitted by the English. The 
Douranees furious about this. The Afridis in the Khyber Pass 
irritated instead of being paid. In Khelat, Mehrab Khan was 
attacked at Macnaghten’s instigation for being a traitor (!), and 
Khelat stormed by Willshire, who seemed to have remained in the 
area with the 2nd and 17th Queen’s and 31st Native Infantry 
together with cavalry and artillery. Mehrab Khan fell and part of 
the country annexed by Shah Soojah. 

Rewards now showered from England. 

In winter Macnaghten checked the revenue.” Very bad. Almost 
everything had to be met by English subsidies. The Russian 
expedition to Khiva now known, and its strength greatly exagger- 
ated because of the success in Afghanistan.*'? Runjeet Singh died 
in Punjab, having already been fatally il! when the [English] 
expedition set out, and his sons and grandsons intrigued against 
each other and against the English. In Herat, Yar Mohamed, Shah 
Kamran’s vizier, let the English pay him, and intrigued against 
them in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan itself the Douranees not 
pacified, and Khelat in open rebellion. In Bokhara, Stoddart, 
English envoy, arrested, maltreated and forced to embrace Islam. 
In the northern mountains on the other side of the Hindu Kush 
near Khulum the supporters of Dost Mohammed among the 
Uzbek tribes in unrest (hitherto they had been dubious vassals of 
Afghanistan). 

Admittedly, the Russian expedition was a failure, as Macnaghten 
ascertained in July, but it was now also established that Nao Nehal 

Singh, heir apparent and actual ruler of the Sikhs, was in direct 
correspondence and intrigues with the enemies of Shah [Soojah], 
that he had given asylum to Ghilzye refugees, etc., and was at the 
same time preparing the betrayal by Yar Shah, who was on 
intimate terms with the Persians and made himself out to be the 
most obedient servant of the Shah in Shah.* 

Auckland had returned to Calcutta, where Sir Jasper Nicolls was 
commander-in-chief and at the same time a member of the 
Council. The latter proved that the armed forces in India were 
already extremely weak. Macnaghten continued to demand that 
Herat should be conquered and Peshawar taken from the Sikhs, 
but now of course in vain. He wanted to macadamise the Punjab 
to enable troops to march through and to create a direct link with 
India, and continued to demand money and reinforcements, the 
latter, however, always being denied him. Macnaghten blamed all 
bad luck on Herat and the Sikhs; in Afghanistan, he claimed, all 
was in vain since Shah Soojah was very popular! 

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan constant insurrections. The Ghilzyes 
rose again in spring 1840. Captain Anderson, Bengal artillery, 
defeated them May 16 on the Turnuk river, and Macnaghten 
promised them a subsidy of £3,000 p.a., yet still they persisted in 
unrest. 

In Khelat the Baluchis rose and recaptured Khelat. 

By now all the Englishmen in Afghanistan convinced of the 
untenability of the position, only Macnaghten obstinately main- 
tained all was well. 

In August Conolly sent to Khokand and Khiva. 

In the Hindu Kush Azim Khan, Dost Mohammed’s son, and 
shortly afterwards Jubbar Khan, Dost Mohammed’s brother, came 
with Dost Mohammed’s. family, respectively surrendering and 
submitting to the English in Bameean. At the same time various 
engagements with the Uzbeks in the mountains between Bameean 
and Kamurd, with varying success. Finally Dost Mohammed 
escaped from Bokhara and went to Khulum, where he gathered an 
army. Bajgah, a weak outpost in the mountains beyond Kamurd, 
had to be evacuated August 30 by the Gurkha Regiment of Shah 
Soojah. A newly formed Afghan regiment went over to Dost 
Mohammed 2-3 days later. Kabul was ready to break away, the Sikhs 
were intriguing these directly against the English and giving 
financial support to Dost Mohammed. 

On September 14 Brig. Dennie arrived in Bameean with the 
35th Native Infantry. On the 18th he attacked Dost Mohammed’s 
Uzbeks, etc., who were debouching from the mountains on 
Bameean, and utterly routed them. The wullee (chief) of Khulum 
pledged not to give Dost Mohammed asylum and concluded 
peace. 

But Dost Mohammed reappeared in Kohistan (in the eastern 
Hindu Kush). At the end of September Sale marched towards the 
Ghorebund Pass against him. On September 29 a number of 
fortifications in the pass captured (near Tootundurrah), on 
October 3 Joolgah (a fortified village) stormed but repulsed. Dost 
Mohammed was everywhere and nowhere, it was often said 40-50 
miles from Kabul, where the Balahissar were being armed. At 
length Dost Mohammed turned up with a fair-sized army in 
Nijrow (where?). Sale marched against him, encountered him at 
Purwandurrah and pursued him with his cavalry (Natives*) as he 
retreated. The latter, attacked by Dost Mohammed’s horsemen, 
fled immediately (November 2) and were pursued as far as 
Kamurd. Thereupon Sale broke off the engagement. 

After this victory, however, Dost Mohammed rode to Kabul and 
surrendered to Macnaghten. 

In October-November unrest in Zemindawer (north-west’ of 
Kandahar) among the Parsewan inhabitants because of the 
collection of taxes due from the time of Dost Mohammed, and the 
cavalry escort of Shah Soojah’s army defeated by these inhabitants: 

End of December 1840 Nott sent troops from Kandahar against 
them, and on January 3, 1841 the Zemindawer Douranees beaten. 
(This insurrection directly instigated by Yar Mohamed in Herat,” 
who promised to come.) Todd (envoy in Herat) now left his post, 
as nothing more could be done with Yar Mohamed, who was 
openly admitting his treachery and just demanding more money— 
but Auckland disavowed Todd and dismissed him! 

The Douranees continued in unrest, and the Ghilzyes also rose 
again. The English decided to fortify Khelat in Ghilzye once 
again; the Ghilzyes refused to suffer this and banded together. 
Nott sent 400 men of the 38th Native Infantry. On May 19 the 
Ghilzyes were defeated at Assiai-Ilmee but this failed to bring 
calm. 

Aktur Khan of Zemindawer with 3,000 men defeated outside 
Ghiresk by Woodburn with chiefly Afghan troops (5th Afghan 

Infantry, 2 guns, and a few Afghan cavalrymen, who absconded) 
(in July). 

Aktur Khan and another Douranee chief, Akrum Khan, back 
into the field. Defeated on August 17. This pacified the 
Douranees for some time. 

On August 5 Chambers also defeated the Ghilzyes with Indian 
cavalry, and Macnaghten was triumphant. 

“All quiet from Dan to Beersheba.” * 

The English in Kabul encamped outside the town, the camp 
miserably fortified, untenable, dominated everywhere. Elphin- 
stone, an old, sick general, had been in command since early 1841, 
when Cotton resigned. The ramparts could be surmounted on 
horseback! All around: gardens, houses and defile paths. The 
stores were kept separately in a fort, and between it and the camp 
lay an empty fort with a walled garden, which seemed to be made 
for a hostile party” to cut off the communications. All this through 
the fault of the politicals‘ who would not permit the occupation of 
the Bala Hissar. 

The English officers and soldiers had intrigued a good deal with 
the women of Kabul, and the men of Kabul could get no redress.* 
Widespread fury of the Mohammedans, who finally decided to 
seek revenge. This at the heart of the fury against the invaders.‘ 

Macnaghten saw everything, as he wrote September 20, 1841, in 
“couleur de rose’.' Meanwhile in September another minor insur- 
rection suppressed in Kohistan. 

The Indian finances ruined by the Afghan war. Every year 
£1'/, million went to Afghanistan, and Nicolls maintained that 
either the Punjab had to be conquered or the force in Afghanistan 
to be brought up to 25,000. A new Indian loan issued. 9,000 
Indian troops encamped between Karachi and Quetta, 16,000 
infantry and Shah troops in Afghanistan itself. Now a ministerial 
crisis in England, prospects of a Tory administration opposed to 
all trans-Indus expeditions. (Macnaghten so blind that when the 
loan was issued he asked if it was intended for the Chinese 

war!*)—The 44th Queen’s Regiment under Shelton sent to Kabul 
in the spring. 

Macnaghten appointed Governor of Bombay. Before departing 
he saw the necessity of restricting expenditure. Firstly by curtailing 
the subsidies to the chieftains of the Ghilzyes, Kohistanees, 
Momunds, Kaubulees, Kuzzilbashes. This decided it. The summon- 
ing of the chieftains to Kabul resulted immediately in a conspiracy, 
and they decided that the Ghilzyes in the mountains to the south of 
Jellalabad should rise first. This they did. 

Macnaghten, however, decided, as all was quiet, to send some of 
the troops to India. One regiment in Kabul and one in Kandahar 
were sufficient succour” [to Shah Soojah’s troops]. So he set out, on 
his return joining up with troops who were to take punitive measures 
on the way. 

On October 9 the 35th Regiment Native Infantry, a cavalry 
squadron and two guns set out.... At Bootkhak the camp attacked. 
On the 10th Sale followed [Monteith] with the 13th Infantry 
Regiment and on October 13 arrived at the pass of Khurd-Kabul. 
Heavy fighting, but the English pushed through and Sale returned 
to Bootkhak. Monteith with the 35th Native Infantry was attacked 
every night in the mountains and robbed of all his camels. 
Admittedly peace concluded with the chieftains and promised to 
continue paying the old subsidies, but no go.‘ The tribes went on 
fighting and the chieftains laughed up their sleeves. From Tezeen 
to Gundamuck continual fighting, and it flared up again on the 
other side of the Jugdulluck. There the outlet from the defile was 
captured. 

Sale was in Gundamuck. Macnaghten still considered it unim- 
portant. 

The conspiracy of the chieftains in Kabul was known to Burnes 
and Macnaghten (the latter had not yet left) but nothing was done. 
On the evening of November | a meeting of the conspirators, 
decision to start an insurrection in the town in the morning, 
beginning with an attack on the residence of Burnes, who lived in 
the town. 

November 2 Burnes’ house destroyed and he and his guards 

murdered. The English did nothing. Ordre, contre-ordre, désordre.’ 
Elphinstone weak. Shah Soojah wanted no troops in the Bala 
Hissar! and they gave in to him! 

November 3. Not until 3 p.m. three companies and 2 guns sent 
against the town! Repulsed, of course.” 

The fortified camp of the English (bastioned stockade con- 
tinued ‘“!) much too big for the few troops there, moreover 
dominated. Food supplies in a fort 400 yards removed from the 
S.W. corner of the camp!! Between the two lay an old earth fort 
with walled gardens, which was not occupied, and Macnaghten 
forbade its occupation!! This place (Mohamed Sheriff’s Fort) 
immediately occupied by the Afghans, the camp fired upon and the 
commissariat fort attacked (only 80 men inside!). 

November 4 three rei? companies sent to the commissariat fort 
forced to turn back. Likewise a cavalry expedition sent to fetch (!) 
the garrison out of the commissariat fort. In the night the garrison 
evacuated the commissariat fort, which was immediately plun- 
dered. All the medical stores, beer, wine, etc., were lost together 
with the food supplies. A more distant fort where corn had been 
stored had already been evacuated the night of the 3rd on account 
of the weakness of the garrison and water shortage. 

The Kohistan Regiment of Shah Soojah in Kardurrah rebelled 
and killed their officers. 

November 5 Elphinstone already talking of bribing the enemy 
and of negotiations! 

November 6 Mohamed Sheriff’s Fort finally captured and 
destroyed. Otherwise nothing happened. Some corn purchased in 
the surrounding villages. Elphinstone writes to Macnaghten: 

“Our case is not yet desperate [...] but it goes very fast.” © 

Mohun Lal, Burnes’ moonshee, sent as negotiator to the 
mountain tribes, in order to bribe the chieftains. But also secretly 
to pay rewards for the heads of the most furious (10,000 rupees a 

. f 
piece’). 

Elphinstone quite ill, at a loss, undecided, depending on 
whoever spoke last, ordre, contre-ordre, désordre. 

November 9 Brig. Shelton, who was in the Bala Hissar with the 
Shah’s troops, called to the camp as second in command* and as 
ad latus’ of Elphinstone, but the two constantly at loggerheads. 

Sale’s brigade was now to return from Gundamuck, to relieve 
them. 

November 10 the Afghans en masse on: the dominating foothills, 
fired into the camp. At Macnaghten’s insistence, 1,000 men were 
to attack. No sooner were they assembled than counter-order from 
Elphinstone. Eventually sent however. A small fort captured, but 
the troops in the open field fled from the Afghan horsemen 
(Europeans! and natives‘). However, the enemy finally repulsed. 

November 13 the Afghans again on the mountain, bombarding 
the camp from the heights of Beh-meru with 2 guns. Macnaghten 
wanted to attack, Shelton did not, overruled, and 16 companies, 
2'/y squadrons, 2 guns sent out, among them Shelton himself. The 
Afghan horsemen charged again and again through the English 
infantry, repulsing them and being repulsed themselves by the 
cavalry. The infantry then followed and took the heights and the 2 
guns. Last success of the English. 

November 15 Pottinger arrived from Kohistan wounded: the 
Shah’s Gurkha Regiment annihilated by the mountain tribes. 

November 17 news that Sale was marching towards Jellalabad. 
Last hope gone west. Now only a choice between occupation of the 
Bala Hissar, retreat or capitulation. Shelton succeeded in asserting 
his view that the Bala Hissar should not be occupied (his reasons 
childish), which alone would have made wintering possible. 

November 23 second engagement at Beh-meru. The English 
marched out, totally defeated, lost 2 guns. The artillery alone 
fought well, the infantry, Europeans and Sepoys, cowardly. 
Chased back in disorder over the plain into the camp by the 
Afghans. 

Now they could no longer (in Elphinstone’s opinion) enter the 
Bala Hissar without sacrificing some of the 700 wounded and sick 
and almost all the stores,“ ammunition and food. On half rations 
for the past few days! Therefore negotiations. The Afghan 
chieftains demand (November 24) unconditional surrender. Re- 
jected. 

Mahomed Akbar Khan, Dost Mohammed’s son, arrived in Kabul 
and became chief of the Afghans. He immediately took steps to 
cut off all the supplies* of the English, and succeeded. 

Abdullah Khan and Meer Musjedee, the two chieftains on 
whose heads the English had placed a reward, eliminated before 
the end of November. The first was wounded at Beh-meru by a 
dubious shot (second engagement) and was then allegedly given 
poison; the second probably poisoned or suffocated. The rewards 
claimed, but the English refused payment. 

December 1-8 shortages in camp. Horses dying. March on 
Jellalabad declared impossible. Likewise a capitulation, which, it 
was said, could provide no protection against the tribes in the 
mountains. Macnaghten now wants [to move to] the Bala Hissar. 
December 5 the Afghans burnt the English bridge over the Kabul, 
‘/4 mile from the camp, without the English attempting to prevent 
them. December 6 Mohamed Sheriff’s Fort evacuated. (5,000 men 
still fit for duty.>) [The garrison of the fort consisting] of 100 men 
[were put to flight by] 20 Afghans who had climbed up the walls 
of the fort!! 

The generals pressed for capitulation or retreat, which was 
admittedly almost impossible. Macnaghten hesitated. On the 10th 
news that the relief force from Kandahar, for which they had 
been hoping, could not get through. On the 11th everything eaten 
up down to the last scrap. The soldiers had become so cowardly 
that they were no longer fit for fighting. 

December 11 capitulation. The whole of Afghanistan to be 
evacuated. The British troops in Kabul to go to Peshawar. Shah 
Soojah to accompany them or remain, as he chooses. Dost 
Mohammed returns. 4 British officers as hostages. Nevertheless, 
peace and friendship between Afghanistan and England (even a 
clause inserted stating that the Afghans were not to enter into any 
alliance without the consent of the English). The treaty accepted in 
the main by word of mouth. 

During the entire period of the English defensive and sluggish 
offensive the Afghans distinguished by their use of long-range 
long flintlocks (jezails). They were always out of range of the poor 
smoothbore muskets of the English. 

December 13 the Bala Hissar evacuated by the English. 

December 16 the forts round the camp (small Afghan fortifica- 
tions) evacuated in return for deliveries of supplies, which proved 

to be very scanty.* The Afghans suspicious, sent nothing and 
scoffed at the treaty. 

December 18 snow. December 19 dispatch of Macnaghten’s 
order that Ghuznee, Kandahar, Jellalabad should be evacuated. 
The chieftains disunited and = suspicious. On December 22 
Mahomed Akbar Khan had the proposal put to them that they 
should associate with the English, leave Shah Soojah on the 
throne, make him, Mahomed Akbar Khan, vizier and immediately 
defeat the other Afghan tribes, and let the English remain until 
the spring, when they should retire peacefully. Macnaghten 
walked into the trap, arrived on the 23rd to conclude the 
matter—and was murdered. The generals sat back and let this 
happen! | 

January 1 [1842] the treaty at last. The English to march, as 
soon as they have cattle, accompanied by Afghan chieftains. The 
troops in Jellalabad to march even earlier. Those in Ghuznee via 
Kabul, those in Kandahar direct [to India]. 6 British officers as 
hostages. The Afghans to conclude no alliance without the consent 
of the English, but may, in return, claim English help too (if this 
not ratified, the Afghans to do as they like). All guns except 6 
horse-drawn and three small mule-drawn (mountain) guns to 
remain, likewise all remaining similar weapons, ammunition and 
stores.* 

In addition all the cash? (19 lakhs) remains, and bills of 
exchange for 14 lakhs signed for individual chieftains, to whom 
Macnaghten was alleged to have promised this. _ . 

Immediate warning from all parties that they would be attacked 
during the march. But que faire’? At first Pottinger refused to 
conclude this treaty, since reinforcements were on the way from 
India and there was great dissension among the chieftains, nor did 
the treaty offer any guarantee of a safe withdrawal. But a council 
of war (December 25) ordered it.