Though the arrival of the Nashville puts us in possession of no 
decisive news from the seat of war, it puts us in possession of a 
fact of great significance in the present state of affairs. This is that 
now, at the eleventh hour, when the Russian Embassadors?’ at 
Paris and London have left, when the British and French 
Embassadors? at St. Petersburg are recalled, when the naval and 
military strength of France and England is being already 
concentrated for immediate action—at this very last moment, the 
two Western Governments are making fresh proposals to negotiate 
by which they concede almost everything that Russia wants. It will 
be remembered that the main point claimed by Russia was her 
right of settling directly with the Porte, and without the 
interference of the other Powers, a quarrel which, it was 
pretended, concerned Russia and Turkey only. This point has now 
been conceded to Russia. The proposals are contained in the letter 
of Napoleon,© which we copy in another place,’ and are to the 
effect that Russia shall treat with Turkey direct, while the treaty to 
be concluded between the two parties shall be guaranteed by the 
four Powers. This guarantee is a drawback upon the concession, as 
it gives the Western Powers a ready pretext to interfere in any 
future quarrel of the kind. But it does not make matters worse for 
Russia than they are now, when the Emperor Nicholas must see 
that any attempt of his at a dismemberment of Turkey cannot be 

universel, No. 43, February 14, 1854.— Ed. ; 

carried out without the risk of a war with. England and France. 
And then, the actual gain to Russia will depend upon the nature 
of the treaty which is not yet concluded; and Russia, having seen 
in how cowardly a manner the Western Powers now shrink from 
the necessity of war, will but have to keep her armies concen- 
trated, and to continue her system of intimidation in order to gain 
every point during the negotiations. Besides, Russian diplomacy 
need hardly be afraid of a contest with those egregious Embas- 
sadors who manufactured the famous blundering first Vienna 
note.° 

Whether, however, the Czar will accept this proposal, or trust to 
his army, remains to be seen. He cannot afford to go through 
such armaments and dislocations of troops over his vast Empire 
once in every five years. The preparations have been made on 
such a scale that a very great material gain only can repay their 
cost. The Russian population are thoroughly roused to warlike 
enthusiasm. We have seen a copy of a letter from a Russian 
merchant—not one of the many German, English, or French 
traders, who have settled in Moscow—but a real old Muscovite, a 
genuine son of Sviataia Russ,7 who holds some goods on 
consignment for English account, and had been asked whether in 
case of war these goods would run the risk of confiscation. The 
old Russ, quite indignant at the imputation thus cast upon his 
Government, and perfectly well acquainted with the official 
phraseology, according to which Russia is the great champion of 
“order, property, family, and religion,” in contrast to the 
revolutionary and socialist countries of the West, retorts that 

‘Here in Russia, God be praised, the distinction between mine and thine is yet in 
full force, and your property here is as safe as anywhere. I would even advise you 
to send over as much of your property as you can, for it will perhaps be safer here 

than where it is now. As to pour countrymen, you may perhaps have reason. to fear, as to 
your property, not at all.” 

In the meantime, the armaments prepared in England and 
France are upon a most extensive scale. The French ocean 
squadron has been ordered from Brest to Toulon in order to 
transport troops to the Levant. Forty or sixty thousand, according 
to different statements, are to be sent, a large portion of them to 
be drafted from the African army; the expedition will be very 
strong in riflemen, and be commanded either by Baraguay 
d’Hilliers or by St. Arnaud. The British Government will send 

about 18,000 men (22 regiments of 850 each) and at the date of 
our last advices," a portion of them had already embarked for 
Malta, where the general rendezvous is to be. The infantry go in 
steamers, and sailing vessels are employed for the conveyance of 
cavalry. The Baltic fleet, which is to be concentrated off Sheerness, 
in the Thames, by the 6th of March, will consist of fifteen ships of | 
the line, eight frigates, and seventeen smaller vessels. It is the 
largest fleet the British have got together since the last war; and as 
one half of it will consist of paddle or screw steamers, and as the 
rating and weight of metal is at present about 50 per cent. higher 
than fifty years ago, this Baltic fleet may prove to be the strongest 
armament ever turned out by any country. Sir Charles Napier is to 
command it; if there is to be war, he is the man to bring his guns 
to bear at once upon the decisive point. 

On the Danube, the battle of Chetatea has evidently had the 
effect of delaying the Russian attack upon Kalafat. The Russians 
have been convinced by that five days’ struggle that it will be no 
easy matter to take an intrenched camp which can send out such 
sallies. It seems that even the positive command of the Autocrat 
himself is not sufficient, after such a foretaste, to drive his troops 
to a rash attempt. The presence of Gen. Schilder, Chief of the 
Engineers, who was sent from Warsaw on purpose, seems even to 
have had a result contrary to the Imperial order, for instead of 
hurrying on the attack, an inspection of the fortifications from a 
distance was sufficient to convince him that more troops and more 
heavy guns were needed than could at once be brought up. 
Accordingly the Russians have been concentrating whatever forces 
they could around Kalafat, and bringing up their siege guns, of 
which, it seems, they brought seventy-two into Wallachia. The 
London Times estimates their forces at 65,000 men, which is rather 
high, if we consider the strength of the whole Russian army in the 
Principalities.© This army now consists of six divisions of infantry, 
three divisions of cavalry, and about three hundred field-guns, 
besides Cossacks, riflemen, and other special corps, of a total 
nominal strength before the beginning of the war, of 120,000 
men. Assuming their losses, by sickness and on the battle-field, to 
be 30,000 men, there remain about 90,000 combatants. Of these, 
at least 35,000 are required to guard the line of the Danube, to 

garrison the principal towns, and to maintain the communications. 
There would remain, then, at the very outside, 55,000 men for an 
attack upon Kalafat. | 

Now look at the respective positions of the two armies. The 
Russians neglecting the whole line of the Danube, disregarding the 
position of Omer Pasha at Shumla, direct their main body, and 
even their heavy artillery, to a point on their extreme right where 
they are further from Bucharest, their immediate base of 
operations, than the Turks are. Their rear is therefore as much 
exposed as it possibly can be. What is worse still is that, in order to 
get some slight protection for their rear, they are obliged to divide 
their forces, and to appear before Kalafat with a force which by 
no means has that evident superiority which, by insuring success, 
might justify such a maneuver. They leave from thirty to forty per 
cent. of their army scattered behind the main body, and these 
troops are certainly not capable of repelling a resolute attack. 
Thus, neither is the conquest of Kalafat assured, nor the 
communications of the besieging army placed out of the reach of 
danger. The blunder is so evident, so colossal, that nothing short 
of absolute certainty of the fact can make a military man believe 
that it has been committed. 

If Omer Pasha, who still has a superior force disposable, passes 
the Danube at any point between Rustchuk and Hirsova, with say 
seventy thousand men, the Russian army must either be annihi- 
lated to the last man or take refuge in Austria. He has had a full 
month for concentrating such a mass. Why does he not cross a 
river which is now no longer obstructed by floating ice? Why does 
he not even retake his téte-de-pont at Oltenitza, in order to be able 
to move at any moment? That Omer Pasha is ignorant of the 
chances the Russians have given him by their unheard-of blunder 
is impossible. He must, it would seem, be tied by diplomatic action. 
His inactivity must be intended to form an offset against the naval 
promenade of the combined fleets in the Black Sea. The Russian 
army must not be annihilated or driven to take refuge in Austria, 
because then peace would be endangered by fresh complications. 
And in order to suit the intrigues and the sham-action of 
diplomatic jobbers, Omer Pasha must allow the Russians to 
bombard Kalafat, to place their whole army, all their siege artillery 
at his mercy, without his being allowed to profit by the occasion. It 
would indeed seem that if the Russian commander* had not had a 
material, positive guarantee that his flanks and rear would not be 

attacked, he would never have attempted to march upon Kalafat. 
Otherwise, in spite of all stringent instructions, he would deserve 
to be tried at the drum-head and shot. And unless, by the steamer 
now due here, or at furthest within a few days, we hear that Omer 
Pasha has crossed the Danube and marched upon Bucharest, it 
will be scarcely possible to avoid the conclusion that a formal 
agreement of the Western Powers has been made to the effect that 
in order to satisfy the military point of honor of Russia, Kalafat is 
to be sacrificed without the Turks being allowed to defend it by 
the only way it can be effectually defended—by an offensive 
movement lower down the Danube.’ 

Tribune, No. 4019, March 6, 1854 asa