Anti-Dühring by Frederick Engels 1877

Prefaces

I — London, June 11 1878

The following work is by no means the fruit of any "inner urge". On the contrary.

When three years ago Herr Dühring, as an adept and at the
same time a reformer of socialism, suddenly issued his challenge to his
age, friends in Germany repeatedly urged on me their desire that I should
subject this new socialist theory to a critical examination in the central
organ of the Social Democratic Party, at that time the Volksstaat.
They thought this absolutely necessary if the occasion for sectarian divisions
and confusions were not once again to arise within the Party, which was
still so young and had but just achieved definite unity. [2]
They were in a better position than I was to judge the situation in Germany,
and I was therefore duty bound to accept their view. Moreover, it became
apparent that the new convert was being welcomed by a section of the socialist
press with a warmth which it is true was only extended to Herr Dühring's
good will, but which at the same time also indicated that in this section
of the Party press there existed the good will, precisely on account of
Herr Dühring's good will, to take also, without examination, Herr
Dühring's doctrine into the bargain. [3]
There were, besides, people who were already preparing to spread this doctrine
in a popularised form among the workers. [4]
And finally Herr Dühring and his little sect were using all the arts
of advertisement and intrigue to force the Volksstaat to take a
definite stand in relation to the new doctrine which had come forward with
such mighty pretensions. [5]

Nevertheless it was a year before I could make up my mind to neglect
other work and get my teeth into this sour apple. It was the kind of apple
that, once bitten into, had to be completely devoured; and it was not only
very sour, but also very large. The new socialist theory was presented
as the ultimate practical fruit of a new philosophical system. It was therefore
necessary to examine it in the context of this system, and in doing so
to examine the system itself; it was necessary to follow Herr Dühring
into that vast territory in which he dealt with all things under the sun
and with some others as well. That was the origin of a series of articles
which appeared in the Leipzig Vorwärts, the successor of the
Volksstaat, from the beginning of 1877 onwards and are here presented
as a connected whole.

It was thus the nature of the object itself which forced the criticism
to go into such detail as is entirely out of proportion to the scientific
content of this object, that is to say, of Dühring's writings. But
there are also two other considerations which may excuse this length of
treatment. On the one hand it gave me, in connection with the very diverse
subjects to be touched on here, the opportunity of setting forth in a positive
form my views on controversial issues which are today of quite general
scientific or practical interest. This has been done in every single chapter,
and although this work cannot in any way aim at presenting another system
as an alternative to Herr Dühring's "system", yet it is to be hoped
that the reader will not fail to observe the connection inherent in the
various views which I have advanced. I have already had proof enough that
in this respect my work has not been entirely fruitless.

On the other hand, the "system-creating" Herr Dühring is
by no means an isolated phenomenon in contemporary Germany. For some time
now in Germany systems of cosmogony, of philosophy of nature in general,
of politics, of economics, etc., have been springing up by the dozen overnight,
like mushrooms. The most insignificant doctor philosophiae and even
a student will not go in for anything less than a complete "system". Just
as in the modern state it is presumed that every citizen is competent to
pass judgment on all the issues on which he is called to vote; and just
as in economics it is assumed that every consumer is a connoisseur of all
the commodities which he has occasion to buy for his maintenance — so
similar assumptions are now to be made in science. Freedom of science is
taken to mean that people write on every subject which they have not studied,
and put this forward as the only strictly scientific method. Herr Dühring,
however, is one of the most characteristic types of this bumptious pseudo-science
which in Germany nowadays is forcing its way to the front everywhere and
is drowning everything with its resounding — sublime nonsense. Sublime
nonsense in poetry, in philosophy, in politics, in economics, in historiography,
sublime nonsense in the lecture room and on the platform, sublime nonsense
everywhere; sublime nonsense which lays claim to a superiority and depth
of thought distinguishing it from the simple, commonplace nonsense of other
nations; sublime nonsense, the most characteristic mass product of Germany's
intellectual industry — cheap but bad — just like other German-made goods,
only that unfortunately it was not exhibited along with them at Philadelphia.
[6] Even German socialism has lately, particularly since Herr Dühring's good example, gone in for a considerable amount of sublime nonsense, producing various
persons who give themselves airs about "science", of which they "really
never learnt a word". [7]
This is an infantile disease which marks, and is inseparable from, the
incipient conversion of the German student to Social Democracy, but which
our workers with their remarkably healthy nature will undoubtedly overcome.

It was not my fault that I had to follow Herr Dühring into
realms where at best I can only claim to be a dilettante. In such cases
I have for the most part limited myself to putting forward the correct,
undisputed facts in opposition to my adversary's false or distorted assertions.
This applies to jurisprudence and in some instances also to natural science.
In other cases it has been a question of general views connected with the
theory of natural science — that is, a field where even the professional
natural scientist is compelled to pass beyond his own speciality and encroach
on neighbouring territory — territory on which he is therefore, as Herr
Virchow has admitted, just as much a "semi-initiate" a as any one of us.
I hope that in respect of minor inexactitudes and clumsiness of expression,
I shall be granted the same indulgence as is shown to one another in this
domain.

Just as I was completing this preface I received a publishers'
notice, composed by Herr Dühring, of a new "authoritative" work of
Herr Dühring's: Neue Grundgesetze zur rationellen Physik und Chemie.
Conscious as I am of the inadequacy of my knowledge of physics and chemistry,
I nevertheless believe that I know my Herr Dühring, and therefore,
without having seen the work itself, think that I am entitled to say in
advance that the laws of physics and chemistry put forward in it will be
worthy to take their place, by their erroneousness or platitudinousness,
among the laws of economics, world schematism, etc., which were discovered
earlier by Herr Dühring and are examined in this book of mine; and
also that the rhigometer, or instrument constructed by Herr Dühring
for measuring extremely low temperatures, will serve as a measure not of
temperatures either high or low, but simply and solely of the ignorant
arrogance of Herr Dühring.

London,

June 11, 1878

On Dialectics.

II — 1885 Preface

I had not expected that a new edition of this book
would have to be published. The subject matter of its criticism is now
practically forgotten; the work itself was not only available to many thousands
of readers in the form of a series of articles published in the Leipzig
Vorwärts in 1877 and 1878, but also appeared in its entirety
as a separate book, of which a large edition was printed. How then can
anyone still be interested in what I had to say about Herr Dühring
years ago?

I think that I owe this in the first place to the fact that this
book, as in general almost all my works that were still current at the
time, was prohibited within the German Empire immediately after the Anti-Socialist
Law [8] was
promulgated. To anyone whose brain has not been ossified by the hereditary
bureaucratic prejudices of the countries of the Holy Alliance, [9]
the effect of this measure must have been self-evident: a doubled and trebled
sale of the prohibited books, and the exposure of the impotence of the
gentlemen in Berlin who issue prohibitions and are unable to enforce them.
Indeed the kindness of the Imperial Government has brought me more new
editions of my minor works than I could really cope with; I have had no
time to make a proper revision of the text, and in most cases have been
obliged simply to allow it to be reprinted as it stood.

But there was also another factor. The "system" of Herr Dühring
which is criticised in this book ranges over a very wide theoretical domain;
and I was compelled to follow him wherever he went and to oppose my conceptions
to his. As a result, my negative criticism became positive, the polemic
was transformed into a more or less connected exposition of the dialectical
method and of the communist world outlook championed by Marx and myself
— an exposition covering a fairly comprehensive range of subjects. After
its first presentation to the world in Marx's Misére de la philosophie
and in the Communist Manifesto, this mode of outlook of ours, having
passed through an incubation period of fully twenty years before the publication
of Capital, has been more and more rapidly extending its influence
among ever widening circles, and now finds recognition and support far
beyond the boundaries of Europe, in every country which contains on the
one hand proletarians and on the other undaunted scientific theoreticians.
It seems therefore that there is a public whose interest in the subject
is great enough for them to take into the bargain the polemic against the
Dühring tenets merely for the sake of the positive conceptions developed
alongside this polemic, in spite of the fact that the latter has now largely
lost its point.

I must note in passing that inasmuch as the mode of outlook expounded
in this book was founded and developed in far greater measure by Marx,
and only to an insignificant degree by myself, it was self-understood between
us that this exposition of mine should not be issued without his knowledge.
I read the whole manuscript to him before it was printed, and the tenth
chapter of the part on economics ("From Kritische Geschichte") was
written by Marx [10]
but unfortunately had to be shortened somewhat by me for purely external
reasons. As a matter of fact, we had always been accustomed to help each
other out in special subjects.

With the exception of one chapter, the present new edition is
an unaltered reprint of the former edition. For one thing, I had no time
for a thoroughgoing revision, although there was much in the presentation
that I should have liked to alter. Besides I am under the obligation to
prepare for the press the manuscripts which Marx has left, and this is
much more important than anything else. Then again, my conscience rebels
against making any alterations. The book is a polemic, and I think that
I owe it to my adversary not to improve anything in my work when he is
unable to improve his. I could only claim the right to make a rejoinder
to Herr Dühring's reply. But I have not read, and will not read, unless
there is some special reason to do so, what Herr Dühring has written
concerning my attack [11];
in point of theory I have :finished with him. Besides, I must observe the
rules of decency in literary warfare all the more strictly in his regard
because of the despicable injustice that has since been done to him by
the University of Berlin. It is true that the University has not gone unpunished.
A university which so abases itself as to deprive Herr Dühring, in
circumstances which are well known, of his academic freedom [12]
must not be surprised to find Herr Schweninger forced on it in circumstances
which are equally well known.

The only chapter in which I have allowed myself some additional
elucidation is the second of Part III, "Theoretical". This chapter deals
simply and solely with the exposition of a pivotal point in the mode of
outlook for which I stand, and my adversary cannot therefore complain if
I attempt to state it in a more popular form and to make it more coherent.
And there was in fact an extraneous reason for doing this. I had revised
three chapters of the book (the first chapter of the Introduction and the
first and second of Part III) for my friend Lafargue with a view to their
translation into French [13]
and publication as a separate pamphlet and after the French edition had
served as the basis for Italian and Polish editions, a German edition was
issued by me under the title: Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der
Utopie zur Wissenschaft. This ran through three editions within a few
months, and also appeared in Russian [14]
and Danish translations. In all these editions it was only the chapter
in question which had been amplified, and it would have been pedantic,
in the new edition of the original work, to have tied myself down to its
original text instead of the later text which had become known internationally.

Whatever else I should have liked to alter relates in the main
to two points. First, to the history of primitive society, the key to which
was provided by Morgan only in 1877. But as I have since then had the opportunity,
in my work: Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigenthums und
des Stoats (Zurich, 1884) to work up the material which in the meantime
had become available to me, a reference to this later work meets the case.
The second point concerns the section dealing with theoretical natural
science. There is much that is clumsy in my exposition and much of it could
be expressed today in a clearer and more definite form. I have not allowed
myself the right to improve this section, and for that very reason am under
an obligation to criticise myself here instead.

Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious
dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist
conception of nature and history. But a knowledge of mathematics and natural
science is essential to a conception of nature which is dialectical and
at the same time materialist. Marx was well versed in mathematics, but
we could keep up with natural science only piecemeal, intermittently and
sporadically. For this reason, when I retired from business and transferred
my home to London, [15]
thus enabling myself to give the necessary time to it, I went through as
complete as possible a "moulting", as Liebig calls it, [16]
in mathematics and the natural sciences, and spent the best part of eight
years on it. I was right in the middle of this "moulting" process when
it happened that I had to occupy myself with Herr Dühring's so-called
natural philosophy. It was therefore only too natural that in dealing with
this subject I was sometimes unable to find the correct technical expression,
and in general moved with considerable clumsiness in the field of theoretical
natural science. On the other hand, my lack of assurance in this field,
which I had not yet overcome, made me cautious, and I cannot be charged
with real blunders in relation to the facts known at that time or with
incorrect presentation of recognised theories. In this connection there
was only one unrecognised genius of a mathematician a who complained in
a letter to Marx [17]
that I had made a wanton attack upon the honour of
.

It goes without saying that my recapitulation of mathematics and
the natural sciences was undertaken in order to convince myself also in
detail — of what in general I was not in doubt — that in nature, amid
the welter of innumerable changes, the same dialectical laws of motion
force their way through as those which in history govern the apparent fortuitousness
of events; the same laws which similarly form the thread running through
the history of the development of human thought and gradually rise to consciousness
in thinking man; the laws which Hegel first developed in all-embracing
but mystic form, and which we made it one of our aims to strip of this
mystic form and to bring clearly before the mind in their complete simplicity
and universality. It goes without saying that the old philosophy of nature
— in spite of its real value and the many fruitful seeds it contained
*1 — was
unable to satisfy us. As is more fully brought out in this book, natural
philosophy, particularly in the Hegelian form, erred because it did not
concede to nature any development in time, any "succession", but only "co-existence".
This was on the one hand grounded in the Hegelian system itself, which
ascribed historical evolution only to the "spirit", but on the other hand
was also due to the whole state of the natural sciences in that period.
In this Hegel fell far behind Kant, whose nebular theory had already indicated
the origin of the solar system,' and whose discovery of the retardation
of the earth's rotation by the tides also had proclaimed the doom of that
system. And finally, to me there could be no question of building the laws
of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them
from it.

But to do this systematically and in each separate department,
is a gigantic task. Not only is the domain to be mastered almost boundless;
natural science in this entire domain is itself undergoing such a mighty
process of being revolutionised that even people who can devote the whole
of their spare time to it can hardly keep pace. Since Karl Marx's death,
however, my time has been requisitioned for more urgent duties, and I have
therefore been compelled to lay aside my work. For the present I must content
myself with the indications given in this book, and must wait to find some
later opportunity to put together and publish the results which I have
arrived at, perhaps in conjunction with the extremely important mathematical
manuscripts left by Marx. [18]

Yet the advance of theoretical natural science may possibly make
my work to a great extent or even altogether superfluous. For the revolution
which is being forced on theoretical natural science by the mere need to
set in order the purely empirical discoveries great masses of which have
been piled up, is of such a kind that it must bring the dialectical character
of natural processes more and more to the consciousness even of those empiricists
who are most opposed to it. The old rigid antagonisms, the sharp, impassable
dividing lines are more and more disappearing. Since even the last "true"
gases have been liquefied, and since it has been proved that a body can
be brought into a condition in which the liquid and the gaseous forms are
indistinguishable, the aggregate states have lost the last relics of their
former absolute character. [19]
With the thesis of the kinetic theory of gases, that in perfect gases at
equal temperatures the squares of the speeds with which the individual
gas molecules move are in inverse ratio to their molecular weights heat
also takes its place directly among the forms of motion which can be immediately
measured as such. Whereas only ten years ago the great basic law of motion,
then recently discovered, was as yet conceived merely as a law of the conservation
of energy, as the mere expression of the indestructibility and uncreatability
of motion, that is, merely in its quantitative aspect, this narrow negative
conception is being more and more supplanted by the positive idea of the
transformation of energy, in which for the first time the qualitative
content of the process comes into its own, and the last vestige of an extramundane
creator is obliterated. That the quantity of motion (so-called energy)
remains unaltered when it is transformed from kinetic energy (so-called
mechanical force) into electricity, heat, potential energy, etc., and vice
versa, no longer needs to be preached as something new; it serves as the
already secured basis for the now much more pregnant investigation into
the very process of transformation, the great basic process, knowledge
of which comprises all knowledge of nature. And since biology has been
pursued in the light of the theory of evolution, one rigid boundary line
of classification after another has been swept away in the domain of organic
nature. The almost unclassifiable intermediate links are growing daily
more numerous, closer investigation throws organisms out of one class into
another, and distinguishing characteristics which almost became articles
of faith are losing their absolute validity; we now have mammals that lay
eggs, and, if the report is confirmed, also birds that walk on all fours.
Years ago Virchow was compelled, following on the discovery of the cell,
to dissolve the unity of the individual animal being into a federation
of cell-states — thus acting more progressively rather than scientifically
and dialectically [20]
— and now the conception of animal (therefore also human) individuality
is becoming far more complex owing to the discovery of the white blood
corpuscles which creep about amoeba-like within the bodies of the higher
animals. It is however precisely the polar antagonisms put forward as irreconcilable
and insoluble, the forcibly fixed lines of demarcation and class distinctions,
which have given modern theoretical natural science its restricted, metaphysical
character. The recognition that these antagonisms and distinctions, though
to be found in nature, are only of relative validity, and that on the other
hand their imagined rigidity and absolute validity have been introduced
into nature only by our reflective minds — this recognition is the kernel
of the dialectical conception of nature. It is possible to arrive at this
recognition because the accumulating facts of natural science compel us
to do so; but one arrives at it more easily if one approaches the dialectical
character of these facts equipped with an understanding of the laws of
dialectical thought. In any case natural science has now advanced so far
that it can no longer escape dialectical generalisation. However it will
make this process easier for itself if it does not lose sight of the fact
that the results in which its experiences are summarised are concepts,
that the art of working with concepts is not inborn and also is not given
with ordinary everyday consciousness, but requires real thought, and that
this thought similarly has a long empirical history, not more and not less
than empirical natural science. Only by learning to assimilate the results
of the development of philosophy during the past two and a half thousand
years will it rid itself on the one hand of any natural philosophy standing
apart from it, outside it and above it, and on the other hand also of its
own limited method of thought, which is its inheritance from English empiricism.

London,

September 23, 1885

III — 1894 Preface

The following new edition is a reprint of the former,
except for a few very unimportant stylistic changes. It is only in one
chapter — the tenth of Part II: "From Kritische Geschichte" that
I have allowed myself to make substantial additions, on the following grounds.

As already stated in the preface to the second edition, this chapter
was in all essentials the work of Marx. I was forced to make considerable
cuts in Marx's manuscript, which in its first wording had been intended
as an article for a journal; and I had to cut precisely those parts of
it in which the critique of Dühring's propositions was overshadowed
by Marx's own revelations from the history of economics. But this is just
the section of the manuscript which is even today of the greatest and most
permanent interest. I consider myself under an obligation to give in as
full and faithful a form as possible the passages in which Marx assigns
to people like Petty, North, Locke and Hume their appropriate place in
the genesis of classical political economy; and even more his explanation
of Quesnay's economic Tableau, which has remained an insoluble riddle
of the sphinx to all modern political economy. On the other hand, wherever
the thread of the argument makes this possible, I have omitted passages
which refer exclusively to Herr Dühring's writings.

For the rest I may well be perfectly satisfied with the degree
to which, since the previous edition of this book was issued, the views
maintained in it have penetrated into the social consciousness of scientific
circles and of the working class in every civilised country of the world.

London

May 23, 1894

F. Engels