Friedrich Engels 
Garibaldi in Calabria 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 6058, 24. September 1860 

Garibaldi in Calabria 

We are now in possession of detailed information respecting the conquest 
of Lower Calabria by Garibaldi, and the entire dispersion ofthe Neapolitan 
corps charged with its defense. In this part of his triumphal career, Garibaldi 
had shown himself to be not only a brave leader and clever strategist, but 
also a scientific general. The attack, by main force, of a chain of coast-forts 
is an undertaking which requires not only mihtary talent, but also mihtary 
science ; and it is gratifying to find that our hero, who never passed a military 
examination in his life, and can scarcely be said ever to have belonged to 

a regular army, was as much at home on this kind of battle-field as on any 
other. 

The toe of the Italian boot is formed by the mountain chain of Aspromonte, 
which ends in the peak of Monte Alto, about 4,500 feet high. From this peak, 
the waters flow toward the coastinanumber of deep ravines, extending from 

Monte Alto as from a center, like the radii of a semicircle, the periphery of 
which is formed by the coast. These ravines, with the beds of their respective 
mountain torrents dried up in this season, are called fiumare, and form as 
many positions for a retreating army. They may indeed be turned by the 
Monte Alto, especially as there are bridle paths and footpaths mnning along 

the crest of each spur and of the main chain of Aspromonte itself; but the 
complete absence of water on the high land would make it rather a difficult 
maneuver to do so in Summer with a large force. The spurs of the hill run 
down to the coast, where they descend toward the sea in steep and irregularly 
broken rocks. The forts guarding the straits between Reggio and Scilla are 

constructed partly on the beach, but more generally on low, projecting rocks 
close to the shore. The consequence is that they are all of them commanded 
and looked into by the more elevated rocks close to the rest, and although 
the commanding points may be inaccessible to artillery, and mostly out of 

Friedrich Engels 

the range of old Brown Bess, so as to be considered of no consequence when 
the forts were erected, their importance has become decisive since the 
introduction of the modern rifle; they are mostly within its range, and thus 
they now do command the forts in reality. Under these circumstances, a 
forcible attack on these forts, despising the rules of regular sieges, was 
perfectly justified. What Garibaldi had to do was, evidently, to send acolumn 
along the high road which skirts the shore under the fire of the forts, for a 
feigned front attack on the Neapolitan troops; and to take another column 
over the hills as high up the fiumare as might be rendered necessary by the 
nature of the ground, or by the extent of front offered by any Neapolitan 
defensive position, thus turning both troops and fort, and having the ad- 
vantage of the commanding position in every engagement. 

Accordingly, on the 21st August, Garibaldi sent Bixio, with part of his 
troops, along the coast toward Reggio, whilst he himself, with a small de- 
tachment and the troops of Missori, which had rejoined him, went by the 
higher ground. The Neapolitans, eight companies, or about 1,200 men, occu- 
pied a fiumara just outside Reggio. Bixio, being the first to attack, sent one 
column to the extreme left on the sandy beach, while he himself advanced 
on the road. The Neapolitans very soon gave way; but their left wing, in the 
hills, held out against the few men of Garibaldi's advanced guard until 
Missori's men came up and drove them in. Then they retreated to the fort, 
which is situated in the middle of the town, and to a small battery on the 
beach. The latter was taken by a very gallant rush of three of Bixio's com- 
panies, who went in through an embrasure. The large fort was cannonaded 
by Bixio, who found two Neapolitan heavy guns, with ammunition, in this 
battery ; but this would not have compelled it to surrender, had not Garibaldi's 
sharpshooters taken up the commanding hights, from which they could see 
and pick off the gunners in the batteries. This told; the artillerymen forsook 
the platforms, and ran into the casemates; the fort surrendered, the men 
partly joining Garibaldi, but mostly going home. While this was going on at 
Reggio, the attention of the Neapolitan steamers being engaged by this fight, 
by the destruction of the stranded steamer Torino, and by a sham embar- 
cation of Medici's men in Messina, Cosenz succeeded in getting 1,500 men, 
in 60 boats, out of the Faro Lagore, and landing them on the north-west 
coast, between Scilla and Bagnara. 

On the 23d, a small engagement took place near Salice, a little beyond 
Reggio: fifty Garibaldians, English and French, commanded by Col. De 
Flotte, defeated four times their number of Neapolitans. De Flotte fell on 
this occasion. On the same day, Gen. Briganti, who commanded a brigade 
in Lower Calabria under Viale, had an interview with Garibaldi as to the 
conditions of his passing over into the Italian camp; this interview, however, 

Garibaldi in Calabria 

had no other result but to show that the Neapolitans were completely de- 
moralized. From this moment, there was no longer any question as to victory, 
but only as to surrender. Briganti and Melendez, the chief of the second 
movable brigade of Lower Calabria, had taken up a position close to the 
coast, between Villa San Giovanni and Scilla, extending their left toward the 
hills near Fiumara-di-Muro. Their united forces might be computed at some 
3,600 men. 
Garibaldi, placing himself in communication with Cosenz, who had landed 
in the rear of this body, drew a complete net round them and then quietly 
awaited their surrender, which took place the 24th, toward evening. He kept 
their arms, and permitted the men to go home if they liked, which most of 
them did. The fort of Punte-di-Pezzo surrendered also, and the posts of the 
Alla Fiumare, Torre del Cavallo, and Scilla followed the example, dis- 
couraged as much by the rifle-shots from the commanding hights as by the 
general defection of the other forts and the troops in the field. Thus not only 
was the perfect command of both sides of the straits secured, but the whole 
of Lower Calabria conquered, and the troops sent to its defense taken 
prisoners and dismissed to their homes in less than five days. 
This series of defeats broke every capability of further resistance in the 

Neapolitan army. The officers of the remaining battalions of Viale, at 
Monteleone, came to the conclusion to defend their position for an hour, to 
save appearances, and then to lay down their arms. The insurrection in the 
other provinces made rapid progress; whole regiments refused to march 
against the insurgents, and desertions took place in bodies, even among the 
troops guarding Naples. And thus the road to Naples was finally opened to 
the hero of Italy.