their units and be equipped with uniforms, arms and ammunition? 
Unless everything goes off smoothly during mobilisation, unless 
everything is available at the right time and in the right place, 
there is utter confusion. But how is everything to go off smoothly 
if everything passes through the hands of thieving, corrupt 
Russian tschinowniks? The Russian mobilisation—that will be a 
show fit for the Gods! 

All things considered: for purely military reasons.alone, we can 
allow the Russians to call up as many soldiers and to keep them 
with the colours as long as the Tsar sees fit. Apart from the troops 
who are already under arms he will hardly be able to put many 
more on their feet, and hardly at the right time. The experiment 
with universal military service may cost Russia dear. 

And then, if it comes to war, all along the border from Kovno 
to Kaminiets the Russian army will be in enemy country right 
there on her own soil, amidst Poles and Jews, the Tsarist 
government even having made mortal enemies of the Jews. The 
moment Russia loses a couple of battles the battlefield will be 
pushed back from the Vistula to the Dvina and the Dnieper; in 
the rear of the German army, under its protection, an army of 
Polish allies will be formed; and it will be a just punishment for 
Prussia if it is then compelled to restore a strong Poland to ensure 
its own safety. 

Up to now we have only considered the directly military 
conditions, finding that Russia can be disregarded as far as the 
present issue is concerned. This will become even more evident, 
however, as soon aS we cast a glance at the overall economic 
situation, and particularly the financial position, in Russia. 

VI 

The internal situation in Russia is almost desperate at the 
moment. The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the 
development of large-scale capitalist industry related to it, partly as 
cause, partly as effect, have hurled this, the stablest of all 
countries, this European China, into an economic and _ social 
revolution which is now proceeding inexorably on its way; and its 
progress is, for the time being, overwhelmingly devastating. 

At the time of the emancipation, the nobility rece1ved compensa- 
tion in state loan bonds, which they spent in revelry as fast as 
they could. When this was accomplished, the new railways opened 
up a market for the wood from their forest for them; they had the 
timber cut and sold and once again lived in splendour and 
pleasure as long as the proceeds lasted. The management of the 
estates under the new conditions and with free workers generally 
remained most unsatisfactory; littke wonder that the landowning 
Russian nobility are up to their ears in debt, if not utterly 
bankrupt, and that the produce yielded by their estates is 
decreasing rather than increasing. 

The peasant generally received worse land, and less of it, than 
he had owned until then; he lost the right to common grazing and 
the use of the forest, and hence the basis for rearing livestock. 
Taxes were raised considerably, and now had to be paid by him 
personally in cash, everywhere; on top of this there were the 
instalments—also in cash—to pay off the interest and capital on 
the redemption money advanced by the state (wykup)*. In short, 
the deterioration of his overall economic position was aggravated 
by his suddenly being forcibly removed from a_ subsistence 
farming economy and being placed in a money economy, which is 
alone enough to ruin the peasantry of a country. The result of this 
was the luxuriant development of the exploitation of the peasants 
by the rural money-owners, well-to-do farmers and pot-house 
landlords, mirojedy (literally “community eaters”) and kulaki? 
(usurers). And as if that were not enough, along came modern 
large-scale industry and ruined the subsistence economy of the 
peasants to the very last bit. Not only did its competition 
undermine the domestic industrial production of the peasant for 
his own wants, it also took away the market for his handicrafts 
intended for sale, or placed it, at best, under the sway of the 
capitalist “entrepreneur” or, even worse, his middleman. The 

Russian peasant, with his primeval agriculture and his old 
communistic community system, was thus suddenly brought into 
collision with the most advanced form of modern large-scale 
industry, which had to forcibly acquire a domestic market; a 
situation in which he was irredeemably bound to perish. But the 
peasant comprised almost nine-tenths of the population of Russia, 
and the ruin of the peasant was synonymous with the—at least 
temporary—ruin of Russia.* 

After this process of social upheaval had been going on 
for about twenty years, other results emerged too. The ruthless 
deforestation destroyed the stocks of subsoil water, the rain and 
snow water flowed quickly away along the streams and rivers 
without being absorbed, producing serious floods; but in summer 
the rivers became shallow and the ground dried out. In many of 
the most fertile areas of Russia the level of subsoil water is said to 
have dropped a full metre, so that the roots of the corn crops can 
no longer reach it and wither away. So that not only are the 
human beings ruined, but in many areas so is the land itself for at 
least a generation. 

This hitherto chronic process of ruination was rendered acute 
and thus visible to the whole world by the famine of 1891. And 
for this reason Russia has not managed to escape from famine 
since 1891. That bad year largely ruined the peasants’ last and 
most important means of production—livestock—and drove their 
indebtedness to such heights that it is bound to crush their last 
powers of resistance. 

In a position like this a country could do no more than embark 
on a war of desperation. But even the means for this are lacking. 
In Russia the nobility lives on debts, the peasant now also lives on 
debts, and the state, especially, lives on debts. The amount of 
money owed by the Russian state abroad is known: over four 
thousand million marks. The amount it owes at home is known to 
no one; firstly, because neither the total of the loans raised. nor 
that of the paper-money in circulation is known and, secondly, 
because the value of this paper-money changes every day. But one 
thing is certain: Russia’s credit abroad is exhausted. The four 
thousand million marks of the Russian national debt bonds have 
glutted the Western European money market to bursting point. 

* I set forth all this a year ago in the Neue Zeit 1891/92, No. 19, in the article 
“Socialism in Germany”. 

England got rid of most of her “Russians” long ago, and Germany 
has recently done so. Holland and France have ruined their 
digestion by purchasing them, as was evident from the last Russian 
loan in Paris: only 300 of the 500 million francs could be placed, 
and the Russian minister of finance had to take back 200 million 
from the subscribing and oversubscribing bankers.*”” This consti- 
tutes proof of the fact that there is no prospect whatever of a new 
Russian loan in the immediate future, not even in France. 

This is the position of the country which is said to be 
threatening us with the imminent risk of war and yet is even 
unable to get a war of desperation off the ground unless we are 
stupid enough to toss the money for it into its jaws ourselves. 

The ignorance of the French government and the French 
bourgeois public opinion that controls it is incomprehensible. It is 
not France that needs Russia—rather it is Russia that needs 
France. Without France, the Tsar and his policy would be isolated 
in Europe; powerless he would have to let everything in the West 
and the Balkans take its course. With a litthke common sense France 
could squeeze as much out of Russia as it wanted to. But instead, 
the French authorities are grovelling prostrate before the Tsar. 

Russia’s wheat exports have already been ruined by cheaper 
American competition. This leaves only rye as its chief export 
commodity, and this goes almost exclusively to Germany. The 
moment Germany starts eating white bread instead of black bread, the 
present, official Tsarist-big-bourgeois Russia will go bankrupt. 

vil 

We have now sufficiently criticised our neighbouring, placid 
enemies. But what are things like at home? 

Well, to put it bluntly: a gradual reduction in the term of service 
can only be to the advantage of the army if an end is put once 
and for all to maltreatment of soldiers which has gained ground in 
recent years and become the rule in the army, far more than 
people care to admit. 

This maltreatment is the counterpart of square-bashing and 
parade drill; both have always spread in the Prussian army as soon 
as it becomes a peacetime army for a while, and from the 
Prussians it is passed on to the Saxons, Bavarians, etc. It is a legacy 
from the genuine “Old Prussian” age, when the soldier was either 
an enlisted ragamuffin or the son of a bond peasant, and 
therefore had to put up with every form of ill-treatment and 

degradation from his Junker officer without a murmur. And 
particularly the down-at-heel nobility of starvelings and spongers, 
which is by no means under-represented east of the Elbe, still 
provides its share of the worst tormentors even today, and is only 
equalled in this respect by the snobbish little sons of the 
bourgeoisie eager to play the Junker. 

The browbeating of the soldier has never entirely died out in 
the Prussian army. But it used to be rarer, more lenient and at 
times more humorous. But then, on the one hand, it became 
necessary to teach the soldier more and more, while, on the other 
hand, nobody thought of abolishing the useless debris of 
outmoded tactical drills, which had become meaningless. From this 
time on, the non-commissioned officer increasingly received tacit 
authorisation to adopt any method of training which he deemed 
suitable. Furthermore he was indirectly constrained to employ 
forcible means by the order to drum one thing or another into his 
squad with a satisfactory result in a limited period. On top of all 
this, the soldier’s right of complaint is a downright mockery—no 
wonder the favourite Old Prussian method came into vogue again 
wherever the soldiers put up with it. For I am certain that there is 
much less tormenting of soldiers in the regiments of the West or 
those with a strong admixture of city-dwellers than in those which 
are chiefly made up of country people from east of the Elbe. 

There used to be a means of counterbalancing this, at least in 
practice. With the smooth-bore muzzle-loader it was a simple 
matter to drop a pebble down the barrel onto the blank cartridge 
during manoeuvres, and it was by no means unusual for hated 
superiors to be accidentally shot during manoeuvres. Sometimes it 
went wrong as well: I knew a young man from Cologne who was 
killed in this way in 1849, by a shot that was intended for his 
captain. Now, with the small-bore breech-loader it is no longer 
possible to do this so easily and unobtrusively; for this reason, the 
army suicide statistics indicate to us the barometric level of soldier 
tormenting fairly accurately. But if the live cartridge is put to use 
in ‘serious cases”, there is certainly every reason to wonder 
whether the old practice is again finding its advocates, as is said to 
have happened here and there in recent wars; though of course 
that would not contribute much to victory.*”' 

The reports of English officers are unanimous in praising the 
exceptionally good relations between superiors and soldiers in the 
French army on manoeuvres in Champagne in 1891. Such things 
as so often leak out of the barracks and into the press in our 
country would be quite impossible in this army. Even before the 

Great Revolution the attempt to introduce Prussian flogging with 
rods failed. Even at the worst moment of the Algerian campaigns 
and the Second Empire, no superior would have dared treat the 
French soldiers anything like as badly as the German soldier is 
treated before our very eyes. And today, after the introduction of 
universal compulsory military service, I should like to see the 
French non-commissioned officer who would venture to order the 
soldiers to box each other’s ears or spit in each other’s faces. But 
what scorn the French soldiers must feel for their future 
adversaries when they hear and read what they submit to without 
turning a hair. And every care is taken to ensure that the men in 
French barracks do read and hear all about it. 

In the French army there prevails the spirit and relationship 
between officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers that 
prevailed in Prussia from 1813 to 1815, and twice took our 
soldiers to Paris. In our own country, however, the state of affairs 
is fast approaching that of 1806, when the soldier was hardly even 
considered a human being, and was flogged and tormented, when 
there was an unbridgeable gulf between him and the officer—and 
this state of affairs led the army to Jena*” and into French 
captivity. . 

There is a lot of talk about the decisive value of morale in war. 
Yet what else is done in peacetime but to destroy it almost 
systematically? 

Vill 

So far we have assumed that the proposal for a gradual, equal 
reduction in the term of service with an ultimate transition to the 
militia system has been universally adopted. But the main question 
is: will it be adopted? 

Let us assume that Germany first puts the proposal to Austria, 
Italy and France. Austria will gladly accept a maximum term of 
service of two years and will probably reduce it even further in 
actual practice. In the Austrian army it seems that there is far less 
reticence than in the German army to talk about the fact that the 
short term of service of some troops has been a success. Many 
officers there state quite bluntly that the Landwehr, which only 
serves for a few months, is a better troop than the line; one thing 
in their favour, at any rate, I am assured, is that a Landwehr 
battalion can mobilise in 24 hours, while a battalion of the line 
requires several days. Naturally: in the line they are afraid to 

infringe on the casual old Austrian arrogance; in the Landwehr, 
where all the institutions are newly created, they have, however, 
had the guts not to introduce it. At any rate, both the people and 
the government of Austria are longing for an alleviation of the 
military burden, which is most easily obtainable here by reducing 
the term of service, precisely on account of their own experience. 

Italy will likewise grasp the opportunity with both hands. It is 
succumbing under the pressure of the military budget to such a 
degree that the help must be brought in, and soon. Here, too, 
reduction of the maximum term of service is the shortest and 
easiest way. One may thus say: either the Triple Alliance*” will 
come to grief or it will have to adopt a method that is more or less 
tantamount to our proposal. 

But if Germany, supported by the acceptance of Austria and 
Italy, puts this proposal to the French government, the latter will 
be placed in a very awkward position. If it accepts the proposal, it 
will certainly not be making its relative military position any worse. 
On the contrary, it would have the opportunity of improving this 
relative position. In some respects it is a disadvantage for France 
that universal compulsory military service was only introduced 
there 20 years ago. But this disadvantage entails the advantage 
that everything is still new, that the pigtail of yore has only 
recently been chopped off, that further improvements can easily 
be introduced without coming up against the stubborn resistance 
of ingrained prejudices. All armies are immensely capable of 
development after major defeats. Better utilisation of the term of 
service laid down by treaty vould therefore be far easier to put 
into effect in France than elsewhere. Moreover, since the 
educational system is also in a state of revolutionisation, just like 
the army, it will be possible to put the all-round physical (and 
particularly the military) training of young people into operation 
far more rapidly and more easily there than elsewhere. But this 
would mean a strengthening in the military position of France 
vis-a-vis that of Germany. In spite of all this, it is possible and 
indeed even probable that the chauvinist tendency— French 
chauvinism is just as stupid as the German variety—will be strong 
enough to bring down any government that adopts any such 
thing, particularly if it hails from Germany. So let us assume that 
France refuses. What then? 

Then, by the simple fact of having made this proposal, Germany 
will have gained a tremendous advantage. We should not forget: 
the twenty-seven years of Bismarckian rule have made Germany 
hated in all countries—not without justification. Neither the 

annexation of the North Schleswig Danes, nor the breaking and 
subsequent juggling away of the Prague Peace Treaty article 
relating to it,”* nor the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, nor the 
petty-minded measures against the Prussian Poles, had anything at 
all to do with restoration of the “national unity”. Bismarck has 
managed to give Germany the reputation of being greedy for 
territory; the chauvinist German burgher who threw out the 
German Austrians and yet still desires to hold Germany fraternally 
together above everything “from the Etsch to the Memel’,* but 
would like to unite Holland, Flanders, Switzerland and the 
allegedly “German” Baltic provinces of Russia with the German 
Empire—this German chauvinist has given Bismarck every possi- 
ble assistance, and with such splendid success that not a single 
person in Europe trusts the “honest Germans” any more. 
Wherever you care to go, you will find everywhere sympathy for 
France and distrust of Germany, which is regarded as the cause of 
the present war danger. There would be an end to all this if 
Germany decided to put forward our proposal. It would be acting 
aS a peacemaker in a manner that left no room for doubt. It 
would be declaring its willingness to lead the way in the work of 
disarmament, as rightly befits the country that gave the signal for 
armament. Distrust would turn into trust, aversion into sympathy. 
Not only would the saying that the Triple Alliance is an alliance 
for peace finally become a reality—so would the Triple Alliance 
itself, which at present is a mere pretence. All public opinion in 
Europe and America would take sides with Germany. And that 
would be a moral conquest which would amply outweigh even any 
military disadvantages in our proposal that could possibly be 
thought out. 

France, on the other hand, having turned down the disarma- 
ment proposal, would slip into the same unfavourable position of 
suspicion now occupied by Germany. Now we all see, the 
European philistine would say—and it is he who is the greatest 
great power—now we all see who wants peace and who wants war. 
And if a really warlike government should one day take the helm 
in France, it would be faced with a situation that with a little sense 
would positively prohibit war. No matter how it went about it, it 
would stand before the whole of Europe as the party that had 
precipitated, indeed generated the war. Thus it would not only 
have prejudiced the small countries against it, and England too; it 
would not even be sure of the aid of Russia, not even the 

traditional Russian aid that consists of first getting its allies into 
trouble and then leaving them in the lurch. 

Let us not forget: the next war will be decided by England. The 
Triple Alliance at war with Russia and France, as well as France, 
separated from Russia by enemy territory, are all dependent on 
sea transport for the large grain imports which are indispensable 
to them. England is absolute master of the sea. If it places its navy 
at the disposal of one side, the other will simply be starved into 
submission, its grain supplies being cut off; it will be the starvation 
of Paris on an immensely larger scale, and the side that is 
starved out will have to surrender, as sure as two and two are 
four. 

All right then: at the moment the Liberal tendency has the 
upper hand in England, and the English Liberals have distinct 
French sympathies. Moreover, old Gladstone is personally a 
Russophile. If a European war breaks out, England will remain 
neutral as long as possible; but in the above-mentioned cir- 
cumstances even her “benevolent” neutrality may be of decisive 
help to one of the warring parties. If Germany puts forward our 
proposal and it is rejected by France, Germany will not only have 
overcome all English sympathies opposed to it, and assured itself 
of England’s benevolent neutrality; it will also have made it 
virtually impossible for the English government to join the war on 
the side of Germany’s opponents. 

So, in conclusion: 

Either France accepts the proposal. Then the risk of war arising 
out of ever-increasing armaments will really have been removed, 
the peoples will come to rest and Germany will enjoy the glory for 
having initiated this. 

Or France does not accept. It will then make its own position in 
Europe worse and Germany’s better, to such an extent that 
Germany will no longer need to fear a war at all and will even be 
able to proceed to gradually reduce the term of service and pave 
the way for the militia system off its own bat and free of danger in 
collaboration with its allies, who will only then truly be its allies. 

Will it have the courage to take the step towards deliverance? Or 
will it wait until France, enlightened as to the position of Russia, 
takes the first step and reaps the credit for itself? 

What better can I tell the German workers today than about the 
coming May Day celebration here in England, which, particularly 
this year, will be of special importance.* If Germany now is no 
longer Heinrich Heine’s “pious nursery”,” then England of today 
is no longer the model country of the German academic 
tender-hearts, the country where worthy Trapes Unions and prog- 
ress within the law ensure that the bogus dreams of socialism find 
no soil. That has gone for ever. The working class of England, 
after its glorious struggles and ultimate defeats in the Chartist 
period, has taken a long time to get under way again. But it is 
undoubtedly under way again. Those socialist organisations which 
exist here were until recently no more than simply sects, 
compared with which the old Trapes Unions appeared a great force 
in fact. Hence the protestation of the tame German academics that 
the English workers did not wish to abolish the wage system, but 
only “refine” it. But how are things today? The masses of the 

4 In the manuscript this sentence is preceded by the following paragraph which 
does not occur in the published text (it was either omitted in the fair copy or—in view 
of the changed situation—at the printing stage): “At the moment when I am to 
despatch these lines to the German May Day newspaper a crisis is expected in Berlin in 
connection with the debates on the Military Bill.456 What will happen? If the Bill is 
rejected, then the [Reichstag] will be dissolved and the election campaign will override 
and overshadow the May Day celebrations and with good reason. Now, it is true, one 
can bet five to one that the compromise being longed for will come about and 
the Reichstag will prolong its existence for another two years. But a tiny accident 
can upset everything. What can I then tell the German workers on the occasion of 
their May Day if it is unknown in what circumstances they will be celebrating 
it?’ — Ed. 

workers are awakening more and more to the realisation that their 
salvation lies not so much in wresting higher wages and shorter 
hours in the struggle against individual employers, but above all in 
winning political rights, parliament,* through the working class 
organised into an independent party. This was first demonstrated 
in the general election of 1892. The workers prevailed with three 
of their candidates” in the struggle against both old parties, and in 
addition in over twenty constituencies gave the latter a tough taste 
of their power, hitherto unexerted. This increased enormously the 
self-awareness of the workers. 

In England, even with the present limited suffrage, the workers 
form the absolute majority in at least 150 constituencies. If the 
electoral reform” introduced by the government goes through, 
then in 200. And even today the worker votes are decisive in a 
majority of all constituencies. What the awakening of the workers 
to class consciousness means under such circumstances is obvious. 
The workers only have to want it, and England cannot be 
governed against their will. 

This awakening is also shown in the preparations for this year’s 
May Day. For the first time the negotiations are going smoothly, 
without wrangles and petty jealousy, with unanimous enthusiasm. 
And what is more: the socialists hold the leadership, and for the 
first time the celebrations will have an unquestionably Social- 
Democratic character. 

March 13, 1893 
Frederick Engels