The consideration of his own private profit is the sole motive which determines 
the owner of any capital to employ it either in agriculture, in manufactures, or in 
some particular branch of the wholesale or retail trade. The different quantities of 
productive labour which it may put into motion, |JV,2{ and the different values which 
it may add to the annual produce of the land and labour of his country, according 
as it is employed in one or other of those different ways, never enter into his 
thoughts. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 335 [Garnier, t. I], pp. 400-01].) 

The most useful employment of capital for the capitalist is that which, risks 
being equal, yields him the greatest profit. This employment is not always the most 
useful for society; the most useful employment is that which utilises the productive 
powers of nature. (Say, t. I, pp. 130-31.) 

The plans and speculations of the employers of capitals regulate and direct all 
the most important operations of labour, and profit is the end proposed by all those 
plans and projects. But the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with 
the prosperity and fall with the decline of the society. On the contrary, it is 
naturally low in rich and high in poor countries, and it is always highest in the 
countries which are going fastest to ruin. The interest of this class, therefore, has 
not the same connection with the general interest of the society as that of the other 
two.... The particular interest of the dealers in any particular branch of trade or 
manufactures is always in some respects different from, and frequently even in 
sharp opposition to, that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow the 
sellers’ competition is always the interest of the dealer.... This is a class of people 
whose interest is never exactly the same as that of society, a class of people who 
have generally an interest to deceive and to oppress the public. (Adam Smith, op. 
cit., Vol. I, pp. 231-32 [Garnier, t. II, pp. 163-65].) 

4. THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITALS 
AND THE COMPETITION AMONG THE CAPITALISTS 

The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower the capitalists’ profit, 
because of the competition amongst the capitalists. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 
78 [Garnier, t. I, p. 179].) 

If, for example, the capital which is necessary for the grocery trade of a 
particular town “is divided between two different grocers, their competition will 
tend to make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of one only; 
and if it were divided among twenty, {[VI,2| their competition would be just so 
much the greater, and the chance of their combining together, in order to raise 
the price, just so much the less”. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 322 [Garnier, t. 
Il, pp. 372-73].) 

Since we already know that monopoly prices are as high as 
possible, since the interest of the capitalists, even from the point of 
view commonly held by political economists, stands in hostile 
opposition to society, and since a rise of profit operates like 
compound interest on the price of the commodity (Adam Smith, 
op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 87-88 (Garnier, t. I, pp. 199-201)), it follows 
that the sole defence against the capitalists is competition, which 
according to the evidence of political economy acts beneficently by 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 251 

both raising wages and lowering the prices of commodities to the 
advantage of the consuming public. 

But competition is only possible if capital multiplies, and is held 
in many hands. The formation of many capital investments is only 
possible as a result of multilateral accumulation, since capital 
comes into being only by accumulation; and multilateral accumula- 
tion necessarily turns into unilateral accumulation. Competition 
among capitalists increases the accumulation of capital. Accumula- 
tion, where private property prevails, is the concentration of capital 
in the hands of a few, it is in general an inevitable consequence if 
capital is left to follow its natural course, and it is precisely 
through competition that the way is cleared for this natural 
disposition of capital. 

We have been told that the profit on capital is in proportion to 
the size of the capital. A large capital therefore accumulates more 
quickly than a small capital in proportion to its size, even if we 
disregard for the time being deliberate competition. IVIIl 

|{ VIII, 2| Accordingly, the accumulation of large capital pro- 
ceeds much more rapidly than that of smaller capital, quite 
irrespective of competition. But let us follow this process further. 

With the increase of capital the profit on capital diminishes, 
because of competition. The first to suffer, therefore, is the small 
capitalist. 

The increase of capitals and a large number of capital invest- 
ments presuppose, further,’ a condition of advancing wealth in the 

country. 

“In a country which had acquired its full complement of riches [...] the ordinary 
rate of clear profit would be very small, so the usual [market] rate of interest which 
could be afforded out of it would be so low as to render it impossible for any but 
the very wealthiest people to live upon the interest of their money. All people of 
[...] middling fortunes would be obliged to superintend themselves the employment 
of their own stocks. It would be necessary that almost every man should be a man 
of business, or engage in some sort of trade.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 86 
{Garnier, t. I, pp. 196-97].)> 

This is the situation most dear to the heart of political economy. 

“The proportion between capital and revenue, therefore, seems everywhere to 
regulate the proportion between industry and idleness; wherever capital predomi- 
nates, industry prevails; wherever revenue, idleness.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, 
p- 301 [Garnier, t. II, p. 325].) 

What about the employment of capital, then, in this condition of 
increased competition? 

* “Further” ‘is not clearly decipherable in the manuscript.— Ed. 
After this paragraph Marx crossed out the sentence: “The less capitals are 
loaned at interest and the more they are thrown into manufacturing business or 
commerce, the stronger grows the competition between the capitalists.” — Ed. 

“As stock increases, the quantity of stock to be lent at interest grows gradually 
greater and greater. As the quantity of stock to be lent at interest increases, the 
interest ... diminishes...” (i). because the market price of things commonly 
diminishes as their quantity increases. ... and (ii) because with the increase of capitals 
in any country, “it becomes gradually more and more difficult to find within the country 
a profitable method of employing any new capital. There arises in consequence a 
competition between different capitals, the owner of one endeavouring to get 
possession of that employment which is occupied by another. But upon most 
occasions he can hope to jostle that other out of this employment by no other 
means but by dealing upon more reasonable terms. He must not only sell what he 
deals in somewhat cheaper, but in order to get it to sell, he must sometimes, too, 
buy it dearer. The demand for productive labour, by the increase of the funds 
which are destined for maintaining it, grows every day greater and greater. 
Labourers easily find employment, {IX, 2}but the owners of capitals find it difficult 
to get labourers to employ. Their competition raises the wages of labour and sinks 
the profits of stock.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 316 (Garnier, t. II, pp. 
358-59].) 

Thus the small capitalist has the choice: (1) either to consume 
his capital, since he can no longer live on the interest—and thus 
cease to be a capitalist; or (2) to set up a business himself, sell his 
commodity cheaper, buy dearer than the wealthier capitalist, and 
pay higher wages—thus ruining himself, the market price being 
already very low as a result of the intense competition presup- 
posed. If, however, the big capitalist wants to squeeze out the 
smaller capitalist, he has all the advantages over him which the 
capitalist has as a capitalist over the worker. The larger size of his 
capital compensates him for the smaller profits, and he can even 
bear temporary losses until the smaller capitalist is ruined and he 
finds himself freed from this competition. In this way, he 
accumulates the small capitalist’s profits. 

Furthermore: the big capitalist always buys cheaper than the 
small one, because he buys bigger quantities. He can therefore 
well afford to sell cheaper. 

But if a fall in the rate of interest turns the middle capitalists 
from rentiers into businessmen, the increase in business capital 
and the resulting smaller profit produce conversely a fall in the 
rate of interest. 

“When the profits which can be made by the use of a capital are [...] diminished 
[...] the price which can be paid for the use of it [...] must necessarily be diminished 
with them.” (Adam Smith, loc. cit., Vol. I, p. 316 [Garnier, t. II, p. 359).) 

“As riches, improvement, and population have increased, interest has declined”, 
and consequently the profits of capitalists, “after these [profits] are diminished, 
stock may not only continue to increase, but to increase much faster than before. 
[...] A great stock though with small profits, generally increases faster than a small 
stock with great profits. Money, says the proverb, makes money.” (op. cit., Vol. I,p. 
83 (Garnier, t. I, p. 189].) 

When, therefore, this large capital is opposed by small capitals 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 253 

with small profits, as it is under the presupposed condition of 
intense competition, it crushes them completely. 

The necessary result of this competition is a general deteriora- 
tion of commodities, adulteration, fake production and universal 
poisoning, evident in large towns. 

X,2| An important circumstance in the competition of large and 
small capital is, furthermore, the relation between fixed capital and 
circulating capital.* 

Circulating capital is a capital which is “employed in raising” provisions, 
“manufacturing, or purchasing goods, and selling them again. [...] The capital 
employed in this manner yields no revenue or profit to its employer, while it either 
remains in his possession, or continues in the same shape. [...] His capital is 
continually going from him in one shape, and returning to him in another, and it 
is only by means of such circulation, or successive exchanges” and transformations 
“that it can yield him any profit”. Fixed capital consists of capital invested “in the 
improvement of land, in the purchase of useful machines and instruments of trade, 
or in such-like things”. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 243-44 [Garnier, t. II, pp. 
197-98].) 

“Every saving in the expense of supporting the fixed capital is an improvement 
of the net revenue of the society. The whole capital of the undertaker of every 
work is necessarily divided between his fixed and his circulating capital. While his 
whole capital remains the same, the smaller the one part, the greater must 
necessarily be the other. It is the circulating capital which furnishes the materials 
and wages of labour, and puts industry into motion. Every saving, therefore, in the 
expense of maintaining the fixed capital, which does not diminish the productive 
powers of labour, must increase the fund which puts industry into motion.” (Adam 
Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 257 (Garnier, t. II, p. 226].) 

It is clear from the outset that the relation of fixed capital and 
circulating capital is much more favourable to the big capitalist 
than to the smaller capitalist. The extra fixed capital required by a 
very big banker as against a very small one is insignificant. Their 
fixed capital amounts to nothing more than the office. The 
equipment of the bigger landowner does not increase in propor- 
tion to the size of his estate. Similarly, the credit which a big 
capitalist enjoys compared with a smaller one means for him all 
the greater saving in fixed capital—that is, in the amount of ready 
money he must always have at hand. Finally, it is obvious that 
where industrial labour has reached a high level, and where 
therefore almost all manual labour has become factory labour, the 
entire capital of a small capitalist does not suffice to provide him 
even with the necessary fixed capital. Qn sait que les travaux de la 
grande culture n’occupent habituellement qu’un petit nombre de: bras.” 

It is generally true that the accumulation of large capital is also 

* Marx uses the French terms capital fixe and capital circulant.—Ed. 
> As is well known, large-scale cultivation usually provides employment only for a 
small number of hands.—Ed. 

accompanied by a proportional concentration and simplification of 
fixed capital, as compared to the smaller capitalists. The big 
capitalist introduces for himself some kind |[XI, 2| of organisation 
of the instruments of labour. 

“Similarly, in the sphere of industry every manufactory and mill is already a 
comprehensive combination of a large material fortune with numerous and varied 
intellectual capacities and technical skills serving the common purpose of production... 
Where legislation preserves landed property in large units, the surplus of a growing 
population flocks into trades, and it is therefore as in Great Britain in the field of 
industry, principally, that proletarians aggregate in great numbers. Where, however, 
the law permits the continuous division of the land, the number of small, 
debt-encumbered proprietors increases, as in France; and the continuing process of 
fragmentation throws them into the class of the needy and the discontented. When 
eventually this fragmentation and indebtedness reaches a higher degree still, big 
landed property once more swallows up small property, just as large-scale industry 
destroys small industry. And as larger estates are formed again, large numbers of 
propertyless workers not required for the cultivation of the soil are again driven into 
industry.” (Schulz, Bewegung der Production, pp. 58, 59.) 

“Commodities of the same kind change in character as a result of changes in 
the method of production, and especially as a result of the use of machinery. Only 
by the exclusion of human power has it become possible to spin from a pound of 
cotton worth 8 shillings and 8 pence 350 hanks of a total length of 167 English 
ae (i.e., 836 German miles), and of a commercial value of 25 guineas.” (op. cit., 
p- 62.) 

“On the average the prices of cotton-goods have decreased in England during 
the past 45 years by eleven-twelfths, and according to Marshall’s calculations the 
same amount of manufactured goods for which 16 shillings was still paid in 1814 is 
now supplied at 1 shilling and 10 pence. The greater cheapness of industrial 
products expands both consumption at home and the market abroad, and because 
of this the number of workers in cotton has not only not fallen in Great Britain 
after the introduction of machines but has risen from forty thousand to one and a 
half million. |[XII, 2{ As to the earnings of industrial entrepreneurs and workers; 
the growing competition between the factory owners has resulted in their profits 
necessarily falling relative to the amount of products supplied by them. In the 
years 1820-33 the Manchester manufacturer’s gross profit on a piece of calico fell 
from four shillings 1'/, pence to one shilling 9 pence. But to make up for this loss, 
the volume of manufacture has been correspondingly increased. The consequence 
of this is that separate branches of industry experience over-production to some 
extent, that frequent bankruptcies occur causing property to fluctuate and vacillate 
unstably within the class of capitalists and masters of labour, thus throwing into the 
proletariat some of those who have been ruined economically; and that, frequently 
and suddenly, close-downs or cuts in employment become necessary, the painful 
effects of which are always bitterly felt by the class of wage-labourers.” (op. cit., p. 
63.) 

“To hire out one’s labour is to begin one’s enslavement. To hire out the ma- 
terials of labour is to establish one’s freedom.... Labour is man; the materials, on the 
other hand, contain nothing human.”* (Pecqueur, Théorie sociale, etc., pp. 411-12.) 

4 “Louer son-travail, c'est commencer son éesclavage; louer la matiére du travail, 
c’est constituer sa liberté.... Le travail est homme, la matiére au contraire n’est rien de 
lrhomme.”—Ed. 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 255 

“The material element, which is quite incapable of creating wealth without the 
other element, labour, acquires the magical virtue of being fertile for them [who 
own this material element] as if by their own action they had placed there this 

indispensable element.” * (op. cit.) 

“Supposing that the daily labour of a worker brings him on the average 400 
francs a year and that this sum suffices for every adult to live some sort of crude life, 
then any proprietor receiving 2,000 francs in interest or rent, from a farm, a house, 
etc., compels indirectly five men to work for him; an income of 100,000 francs 
represents the labour of 250 men, and that of 1,000,000 francs the labour of 2,500 
individuals” (hence, 300 million [Louis Philippe] therefore the labour of 750,000 
workers).” (op. cit., pp. 412-13.) 

“The human law has given owners the right to use and to abuse—that is to say, 
the right to do what they will with the materials of labour.... They are in no way 
obliged by law to provide work for the propertyless when required and at all times, 
or to pay them always an adequate wage, etc.”° (loc. cit., p. 413.) “Complete 
freedom concerning the nature, the quantity, the quality and the expediency of 
production; concerning the use and the disposal of wealth; and full command over 
the materials of all labour. Everyone is free to exchange what belongs to him as he 
thinks fit, without considering anything other than his own interest as an 
individual.” (op. cit., p. 413.) 

“Competition is merely the expression of the freedom to exchange, which itself 
is the immediate and logical consequence of the individual’s right to use and abuse 
all the instruments of production. The right to use and abuse, freedom of 
exchange, and arbitrary competition—these three economic moments, which form 
one unit, entail the following consequences; each produces what he wishes, as he 
wishes, when he wishes, where he wishes, produces well or produces badly, 
produces too much or not enough, too soon or too late, at too high a price or too 
low a price; none knows whether he will sell, to whom he will sell, how he will sell, 
when he will sell, where he will sell. And it is the same with regard to purchases. 
XII, 2l| The producer is ignorant of needs and resources, of demand and 
supply. He sells when he wishes, when he can, where he wishes, to whom he 
wishes, at the price he wishes. And he buys in the same way. In all this he is ever 
the plaything of chance, the slave of the law of the strongest, of the least harassed, 
of the richest... Whilst at one place there is scarcity, at another there is glut and 
waste. Whilst one producer sells a lot or at a very high price, and at an enormous 

4 «[’élément matiére, qui ne peut rien pour la création de la richesse sans l'autre 
élément travail, recoit la vertu magique d’étre fécond pour eux comme sills y avaient 
mis de leur propre fait cet indispensable élément.” —Ed. 

“En supposant que le travail quotidien d’un ouvrier lui rapporte en moyenne 
400 fr. par an, et que cette somme suffise 4 chaque adulte pour vivre d’une vie 
grossiére, tout propriétaire de 2000 fr. de rente, de fermage, de loyer, etc., force 
donc indirectement 5 hommes 4 travailler pour lui: 100000 fr. de rente représentent 
le travail de 250 hommes, et 1000000 le travail de 2500 individus.”—Ed. 

© “Les propriétaires ont recu de la loi des hommes le droit d’user et d’abuser, 
c.-a-d. de faire ce qu’ils veulent de la matiére de tout travail ... ils sont nullement 
obligés par !a loi de fourhir 4 propos et toujours du travail aux non-propriétaires, ni 
de leur payer un salaire toujours suffisant etc.”——-Ed. 

4 “T iberté entiére quant 4 la nature, 4 la quantité, 4 la qualité, a ’opportunité 
de la production, 4 usage, 4 la consommation des richesses, 4 la disposition de la 
matiére de tout travail. Chacun est libre d’échanger sa chose comme il l’entend, sans 
autre considération que son propre intérét d’individu.”—Ed. 

profit, the other sells nothing or sells at a loss.... The supply does not know the 
demand, and the demand does not know the supply. You produce, trusting to a 
taste, a fashion, which prevails amongst the consuming public. But by the time you 
are ready to deliver the commodity, the whim has already passed and has settled on 
some other kind of product.... The inevitable consequences: bankruptcies occurring 
constantly and universally; miscalculations, sudden ruin and unexpected fortunes, 
commercial crises, stoppages, periodic gluts or shortages; instability and depreciation 
of wages and profits, the loss or enormous waste of wealth, time and effort in the 
arena of fierce competition.” * (op. cit., pp. 414-16.) 

Ricardo in his book? (rent of land‘): Nations are merely produc- 
tion-shops; man is a machine for consuming and producing; 
human life is a kind of capital; economic laws blindly rule the 
world. For Ricardo men are nothing, the product everything. In 
the 26th chapter of the French translation it says: 

“To an individual with a capital of £20,000 whose profits were £2,000 per 
annum, it would be a matter quite indifferent whether his capital would employ a 
hundred or a thousand men.... Is not the real interest of the nation similar? 
Provided its net real income, its rent and profits be the same, it is of no importance 
whether the nation consists of ten or twelve millions of inhabitants.”% [t. II, 

* “La concurrence n’exprime pas autre chose que I’échange facultatif, qui lui- 
méme est la conséquence prochaine et logique du droit individuel d’user et d’abuser 
des instruments de toute production. Ces trois moments économiques, lesquels 
n’en font qu'un: le droit d’user et d’abuser, la liberté d’échanges et la concurence 
arbitraire, entrainent les conséquences suivantes: chacun produit ce qu'il veut, comme 
il veut, quand il veut, o il veut; produit bien ou produit mal, trop ou pas assez, trop 
tét ou trop tard, trop cher ou a trop bas prix; chacun ignore s’il vendra, 4 qui il vendra, 
comment il vendra, quand il vendra, ow il vendra: et il en est de méme quant aux 
achats. Le producteur ignore les besoins et les ressources, les demandes et les offres. 
vend quand il veut, quand il peut, ou il veut, 4 qui il veut, au prix qu'il veut. Et il achéte 
de méme. En tout cela, i] est toujours le jouet du hasard, l’esclave de la loi du plus fort, 
du moins pressé, du plus riche... Tandis que sur un point il y a disette d’une richesse, 
sur autre il y a trop-plein et gaspillage. Tandis qu'un producteur vend beaucoup ou 
trés cher, et 4 bénéfice énorme, l'autre ne vend rien ou vend 4 perte... L’offre ignore la 
demande, et la demande ignore l’offre. Vous produisez sur la foi d’un gout, d’une 
mode qui se manifeste dans le public des consommateurs; mais déja, lorsque vous étes 
préts 4 livrer la marchandise, la fantaisie a passé et s'est fixée sur un autre genre de 
produit ... conséquences infaillibles la permanence et luniversalisation des ban- 
queroutes, les mécomptes, les ruines subites et les fortunes improvisées; les crises 
commerciales, les chémages, les encombrements ou les disettes périodiques; 
Vinstabilité et l’avilissement des salaires et des profits, la déperdition ou le gaspillage 
énorme de richesses, de temps et d’efforts dans l'aréne d’une concurrence 
acharnée.”— Ed. 

> On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation.—Ed. 

© These words are in English in the manuscript.— Ed. 

4 «JI serait tout-a-fait indifférent pour une personne qui sur un capital de 20000 
fr. ferait 2000 fr. par an de profit, que son capital employat cent hommes ou mille... 
Liintérét réel d’une nation n’est-il pas le méme? pourvu que son revenu net et réel, et 
que ses fermages et ses profits soient les mémes, qu’importe qu'elle se compose de dix 
ou de douze millions d’individus?”— Ed. 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 . 257 

pp. 194, 195.] “In fact, says M. Sismondi ({Nouveaux principes d’économie politique,] t. 
II, p. 331), nothing remains to be desired but that the King, living quite alone on 
the island, should by continuously turning a crank cause automatons to do all the 
work of England.” #6 

“The master who buys the worker’s labour at such a low price that it scarcely 
suffices for the worker’s most pressing needs is responsible neither for the 
inadequacy of the wage nor for the excessive duration of the labour: he himself has 
to submit to the law which he imposes.... Poverty is not so much caused by men as 
by the power of things.” > (Buret, op. cit., p. 82.) 

“The inhabitants of many different parts of Great Britain have not capital 
sufficient to improve and cultivate all their lands. The wool of the southern‘ 
counties of Scotland is, a great part of it, after a long land carriage through very 
bad roads, manufactured in Yorkshire, for want of capital to manufacture it at 
home. There are many litte manufacturing towns in Great Britain, of which the 
inhabitants have not capital sufficient to transport the produce of their own 
industry to those distant markets where there is demand and consumption for it. If 
there are any merchants among them, |{XIV,2| they are properly only the agents of 
wealthier merchants who reside in some of the greater commercial cities.” (Adam 
Smith, Wealth of Nations, Vol. I, pp. 326-27 [Garnier, t. II, p. 382].) 

“The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be increased in 
its value by no other means but by increasing either the number of its productive 
labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers who had before been employed.... 
In either case an additional capital is almost always required.” ¢ (Adam Smith, op. 
cit., Vol. I, pp. 306-07 [Garnier, t. II, p. 338).) 

“As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the 
division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in proportion only 
as stock is previously more and more accumulated. The quantity of materials which 
the same number of people can work up, increases in a great proportion as labour 
comes to be more and more subdivided; and as the operations of each workman 
are gradually reduced to a greater degree of simplicity, a variety of new machines 
come to be invented for facilitating and abridging those operations. As the division 
of labour advances, therefore, in order to give constant employment to an equal 
number of workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater stock of materials 
and tools than what would have been necessary in a ruder state of things, must be 
accumulated beforehand. But the number of workmen in every branch of business 
generally increases with the division of labour in that branch, or rather it is the 
increase of their number which enables them to class and subdivide themselves in 
this manner.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 241-42 (Garnier, t. H, pp. 193-94].) 

“As the accumulation of stock is previously necessary for carrying on this great 

* “En vérité, dit M. de Sismondi, il ne reste plus qu’a désirer que le roi, demeuré 
tout seul dans l’ile, en tournant constamment une manivelle, fasse accomplir, par des 
automates, tout l’ouvrage de ]’Angleterre.”—Fd. 

b “Le maitre, qui achéte le travail de louvrier 4 un prix si bas, qu’il suffit 4 peine 
aux besoins les plus pressants, n’est responsable ni de I’insuffisance des salaires, ni de 
la trop longue durée du travail: il subit lui-méme la loi qu'il impose ... ce n'est pas tant 
des hommes que vient Ja misére. que de la puissance des choses.”—Ed. 

© In the manuscript: “eastern” —Ed. 

“Pour augmenter la valeur du produit annuel de la terre et du travail, il n’y a pas 
d'autres moyens que d'augmenter, quant au nombre, les ouvriers productifs, ou 
d’augmenter, quant 4 la puissance, la faculté productive des ouvriers précédemment 
employés... Dans lun et dans l'autre cas il faut presque toujours un surcroit de 
capital.” —Ed. 

improvement in the productive powers of labour, so that accumulation naturally 
leads to this improvement. The person who employs his stock in maintaining 
labour, necessarily wishes to employ it in such a manner as to produce as great a 
quantity of work as possible. He endeavours, therefore, both to make among his 
workmen the most proper distribution of employment, and to furnish them with 
the best machines [...]. His abilities in both these respects ||XV, 2| are generally in 
proportion to the extent of his stock, or to the number of people whom it can 
employ. The quantity of industry, therefore, not only increases in every country 
with the increase of the stock which employs it, but, in consequence of that increase, 
the same quantity of industry produces a much greater quantity of work.” (Adam 
Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 242 [Garnier, t. Il, pp. 194-95}. 

Hence over-production. 

“More comprehensive combinations of productive forces ... in industry and 
trade by uniting more numerous and more diverse human and natural powers in 
larger-scale enterprises. Already here and there, closer association of the chief 
branches of production. Thus, big manufacturers will try to acquire also large 
estates in order to become independent of others for at least a part of the raw 
materials required for their industry; or they will go into trade in conjunction with 
their industrial enterprises, not only to sell their own manufactures, but also to 
purchase other kinds of products and to sell these to their workers. In England, 
where a single factory owner sometimes employs ten to twelve thousand workers ... 
it is already not uncommon to find such combinations of various branches of 
production controlled by one brain, such smaller states or provinces within the state. 
Thus, the mine owners in the Birmingham area have recently taken over the whole 
process of iron production, which was previously distributed among various 
entrepreneurs and owners, (See “Der bergmannische Distrikt bei Birmingham”, 
Deutsche Vierteljahrs-Schrift No. 3, 1838.) Finally in the large joint-stock enterprises 
which have become so numerous, we see far-reaching combinations of the financial 
resources of many participants with the scientific and technica] knowledge and skills 
of others to whom the carrying-out of the work is handed over. The capitalists are 
thereby enabled to apply their savings in more diverse ways and perhaps even to 
employ them simultaneously in agriculture, industry and commerce. As a conse- 
quence their interest becomes more Comprehensive: DOV US| and the contradictions 
between agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests are reduced and disap- 
pear. But this increased possibility of applying capital profitably in the most diverse 
ways cannot but intensify the antagonism between the propertied and the 
non-propertied classes.” (Schulz, op. cit., pp. 40-41.) 

The enormous profit which the landlords of houses make out of 
poverty. House rent stands in inverse proportion to industrial 
poverty. 

So. does the interest obtained from the vices of the ruined 
proletarians. (Prostitution, drunkenness, pawnbroking.) 

The accumulation of capital increases and the competition 
between capitalists decreases, when capital and landed property 
are united in the same hand, also when capital is enabled by its 
size to combine different branches of production. 

Indifference towards men. Smith’s twenty lottery-tickets.” 

Say’s net and gross revenue. {XVIII 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 259 

RENT OF LAND 

{1, 3] Landlords’ right has its origin in robbery. (Say, t. I, p. 136, note.) The 
landlords, like all other men, Jove to reap where they never sowed, and demand a 
rent even for the natural produce of the earth. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 44 
(Garnier, t. I, p. 99].) 

“The rent of land, it may be thought, is frequently no more than a reasonable 
profit or interest for the stock laid out by the landlord upon its improvement. This, 
no doubt, may be partly the case upon some occasions.... The landlord demands” 
(1) “a rent even for unimproved land, and the supposed interest or profit upon the 
expense of improvement is generally an addition to this original rent.” (2) “Those 
improvements, besides, are not always made by the stock of the landlord, but 
sometimes by that of the tenant. When the lease comes to be renewed, however, 
the landlord commonly demands the same augmentation of rent as if they had 
been all made by his own.” (3) “He sometimes demands rent for what is altogether 
incapable of human improvement.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 131 (Garnier, 
t. I, pp. 300-01].) 

Smith cites as an instance of the last case kelp,’ 

“a species of seaweed, which, when burnt, yields an alkaline salt, useful for making 
glass, soap, etc. It grows in several parts of Great Britain, particularly in Scotland, 
upon such rocks only as lie within the high-water mark, which are twice every day 
covered with the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never augmented by 
human industry. The landlord, however, whose estate is bounded by a kelp shore of 
this kind, demands a rent for it as much as for his corn fields. The sea in the 
neighbourhood of the Islands of Shetland” is more than commonly abundant in fish, 
which make a great part of the subsistence of their inhabitants. {II, 3] But in order to 
profit by the produce of the water they must have a habitation upon the neighbouring 
land. The rent of the landlord is in proportion, not to what the farmer can make by 
the land, but to what he can make both by the land and by the water.” (Adam Smith, 
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 131 (Garnier, t. I, pp. 301-02].) 

“This rent may be considered as the produce of those powers of nature, the use 
of which the landlord lends to the farmer. It is greater or smaller according to the 
supposed extent of those powers, or in other words, according to the supposed 
natural or improved fertility of the land. It is the work of nature which remains 
after deducting or compensating everything which can be regarded as the work of 
man.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 324-25 (Garnier, t. I], pp. 377-78}.) 

“The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the 
land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord 
may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to 
take; but to what the farmer can afford to give.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., p. 131 
{Garnier, t. I, p. 302].) 

Of the three original classes, that of the landlords is the one “whose revenue 
costs them neither labour nor care, but comes to them, as it were, of its own 
accord, and independent of any plan or project‘ of their own”. (Adam Smith, op. 
cit., Vol. I, p. 230 (Garnier, t. II, p. 161).) 

* Adam Smith uses the general term “kelp”. Marx writes “Salzkraut (Seekrapp, 
Salicorne)” which indicates species of saltwort (Salsola) or glasswort (Salicornia).— Ed. 
In the manuscript: “Scotland” — Ed. 
“In the manuscript Finsicht (understanding) instead of Absicht (purpose, 
intention, project).— Ed. 

We have already learnt that the size of the rent depends on the 
degree of fertility of the land. 
Another factor in its determination is situation. 

“The rent of land not only varies with its fertility, whatever be its produce, but with 
its situation, whatever be its fertility.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 133 [Garnier, t. 
I, p. 306].) 

“The produce of land, mines, and fisheries, when their natural fertility is equal, 
is in proportion to the extent and proper |[III,3| application of the capitals 
employed about them. When the capitals are equal and equally well applied, it is in 
proportion to their natural fertility.” (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 249 [Garnier, t. I], p. 210).) 

These propositions of Smith are important, because, given equal 
costs of production and capital of equal size, they reduce the rent 
of land to the greater or lesser fertility of the soil. Thereby 
showing clearly the perversion of concepts in political economy, 
which turns the fertility of the land into an attribute of the 
landlord. 

Now, however, let us consider the rent of land as it is formed in 
real life. 

The rent of land is established as a result of the struggle between 
tenant and landlord. We find that the hostile antagonism of 
interests, the struggle, the war is recognised throughout political 
economy as the basis of social organisation. 

Let us see now what the relations are between landlord and 
tenant. 

“In adjusting the terms of the lease, the landlord endeavours to leave him no 
greater share of the produce than what is sufficient to keep up the stock from 
which he furnishes the seed, pays the labour, and purchases and maintains the 
cattle and other instruments of husbandry, together with the ordinary profits of 
farming stock in the neighbourhood. This is evidently the smallest share with which 
the tenant can content himself without being a loser, and the landlord seldom 
means to leave him any more. Whatever part of the produce, or, what is the same 
thing, whatever part of its price is over and above this share, he naturally 
endeavours to reserve to himself as the rent of his land, which is evidently the 
highest the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the land. ||IV,3| 
{...] This portion, however, may still be considered as the natural rent of land, or 
the rent for which it is naturally meant that land should for the most part be let.” 
(Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 130-31 (Garnier, t. I, pp. 299-300}.) 

“The landlords,” says Say, “operate a certain kind of monopoly against the 
tenants. The demand for their commodity, site and soil, can go on expanding 
indefinitely; but there is only a given, limited amount of their commodity.... The 
bargain struck between landlord and tenant is always advantageous to the former 
in the greatest possible degree.... Besides the advantage he derives from the nature 
of the case, he derives a further advantage from his position, his larger fortune 
and greater credit and standing. But the first by itself suffices to enable him and 
him alone to profit from the favourable circumstances of the land. The opening of 
a canal, or a road; the increase of population and of the prosperity of a district, 
always raises the rent.... Indeed, the tenant himself may improve the ground at his 
own expense; but he only derives the profit from this capital for the duration of 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 261 

his lease, with the expiry of which it remains with the proprietor of the land; 
henceforth it is the latter who reaps the interest thereon, without having made the 
outlay, for there is now a proportionate increase in the rent.” (Say, t. II, pp. 
142-43.) 

“Rent, considered as the price paid for the use of land, is naturally the highest 
which the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the land.” (Adam 
Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 130 [Garnier, t. I, p. 299].) 

“The rent of an estate above ground commonly amounts to what is supposed to 
be a third of the gross produce; and it is generally a rent certain and independent 
of the occasional variations |[V,3| in the crop.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 153 
[Garnier, t. I, p. 351].) This rent “is seldom less than a fourth ... of the whole 
produce”. (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 325 [Garnier, t. II, p. 378].) 

Rent cannot be paid on all commodities. For instance, in many 
districts* no rent is paid for stones. 

“Such parts only of the produce of land can commonly be brought to market of 
which the ordinary price is sufficient to replace the stock which must be employed 
in bringing them thither, together with its ordinary profits. If the ordinary price is 
more than this, the surplus part of it will naturally go to the rent of the land. If it 
is not more, though the commodity may be brought to market, it can afford no 
rent to the landlord. Whether the price is or is not more depends upon the 
demand.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 132 [Garnier, t. I, pp. 302-03].) 

“Rent, it is to be observed, therefore, enters into the composition of the price of 
commodities in a different way from wages and profit. High or low wages and profit are 
the causes of high or low price; high or low rent is the effect of it” (Adam Smith, 
loc. cit., Vol. I, p. 132 [Garnier, t. I, pp. 303-04].) 

Food belongs to the products which always yield a rent. 

As men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in proportion to the means 
of their subsistence, food is always, more or less, in demand. It can always purchase 
or command a greater or smaller |{VI,3l quantity of labour, and somebody can 
always be found who is willing to do something in order to obtain it. The quantity 
of labour, indeed, which it can purchase is not always equal to what it could 
maintain, if managed in the most economical manner, on account of the high 
wages which are sometimes given to labour. But it can always purchase such a 
quantity of labour as it can maintain, according to the rate at which the sort of 
labour is commonly maintained in the neighbourhood. 

“But land, in almost any situation, produces a greater quantity of food than 
what is sufficient to maintain all the labour necessary for bringing it” to market 
[....] The surplus, too, is always more than sufficient to replace the stock which 
employed that labour, together with its profits. Something, therefore, always 
remains for a rent to the landlord.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 132-33 
(Garnier, t. I, pp. 305-06].) 

“Food is in this manner not only the original source of rent, but every other 
part of the produce of land which afterwards affords rent derives that part of its 
value from the improvement of the powers of labour in producing food by means 
of the improvement and cultivation of land.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 150 
(Garnier, t. I, p. 345).) 

“Human food seems to be the only produce of land which always and 

* In the manuscript Gegenstdnden (objects) instead of Gegen (districts).— Ed. 
b “Te” refers to food, the manuscript however has Arbeit (labour).— Ed. 

necessarily affords some rent to the landlord.” (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 147 (Garnier, t. I, 
p. 337}.) 
“Countries are populous not in proportion to the number of people whom their 
produce can clothe and lodge, but in proportion to that of those whom it can 
‘ feed.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 149 [Garnier, t. I, p. 342].) 
“After food, clothing and lodging are the two great wants of mankind.” They 
usually yield a rent, but not inevitably. (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 147 [Garnier, t. I, pp. 
337-38].) | VIII 

Il VIII, Let us now see how the landlord exploits everything 
from which society benefits. 

(1) The rent of land increases with population. (Adam Smith, 
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 146 [Garnier, t. I, p. 335].) 

(2) We have already learnt from Say how the rent of land 
increases with railways, etc., with the improvement, safety, and 
multiplication of the means of communication. 

(3) “Every improvement in the circumstances of the society tends either directly 
or indirectly to raise the real rent of land, to increase the real wealth of the 
landlord, his power of purchasing the labour, or the produce of the labour of 
other people. 

“The extension of improvement and cultivation tends to raise it directly. The 
landlord’s share of the produce necessarily increases with the increase of the 
produce. 

“That rise in the real price of those parts of the rude produce of land [...] the 
rise in the price of cattle, for example, tends too to raise the rent of land directly, 
and in a still greater proportion. The real value of the Jandlord’s share, his real 
command of the labour of other people, not only rises with the real value of the 
produce, but the proportion of his share to the whole produce rises with it. That 
produce, after the rise in its real price, requires no more labour to collect it than 
before. A smaller proportion of it will, therefore, be sufficient to replace, with the 
ordinary profit, the stock which employs that labour. A greater proportion of it 
must, consequently, belong to the landlord.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 
228-29 [Garnier, t. II, pp. 157-59].) 

1X,3] The greater demand for raw produce, and therefore the 
rise in value, may in part result from the increase of population 
and from the increase of their needs. But every new invention, 
every new application in manufacture of a previously unused or 
little-used raw material, augments rent. Thus, for example, there 
was a tremendous rise in the rent of coal mines with the advent of 
the railways, steamships, etc. 

Besides this advantage which the landlord derives from man- 
ufacture, discoveries, and labour, there is yet another, as we shall 
presently see. 

(4) “All those improvements in the productive powers of labour, which tend 
directly to reduce the real price of manufactures, tend indirectly to raise the real 
rent of land. The landlord exchanges that part of his rude produce, which is over 
and above his own consumption, or what comes to the same thing, the price of that 
part of it, for manufactured produce. Whatever reduces the real price of the latter, 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 263 

raises that of the former. An equal quantity of the former becomes thereby 
equivalent to a greater quantity of the latter; and the landlord is enabled to 
purchase a greater quantity of the conveniencies, ornaments, or luxuries, which he 
has occasion for.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 229 [Garnier, t. I, p. 159].) 

But it is silly to conclude, as Smith does, that since the landlord 
exploits every benefit which comes to society I|X,3| the interest of 
the landlord is always identical with that of society. (op. cit., Vol. I, 
p- 230 (Garnier, t. II, p. 161].) In the economic system, under the 
tule of private property, the interest which an individual has in 
society is in precisely inverse proportion to the interest society has 
in him—just as the interest of the usurer in the spendthrift is by 
no means identical with the interest of the spendthrift. 

We shall mention only in passing the landlord’s obsession with 
monopoly directed against the landed property of foreign coun- 
tries, from which the Corn Laws,” for instance, originate. Likewise, 
we shall here pass over medieval serfdom, the slavery in the col- 
onies, and the miserable condition of the country folk, the day- 
labourers, in Great Britain. Let us confine ourselves to the propo- 
sitions of political economy itself. 

(1) The landlord being interested in the welfare of society 
means, according to the principles of political economy, that he is 
interested in the growth of its population and manufacture, in the 
expansion of its needs—in short, in the increase of wealth; and this 
increase of wealth is, as we have already seen, identical with the 
increase of poverty and slavery. The relation between increasing 
house rent and increasing poverty is an example of the landlord’s 
interest in society, for the ground rent, the interest obtained from 
the land on which the house stands, goes up with the rent of the 
house. 

(2) According to the political economists themselves, the land- 
lord’s interest is inimically opposed to the interest of the tenant 
farmer—and thus already to a significant section of society. 

I(X1,31(3) As the landlord can demand all the more rent from 
the tenant farmer the less wages the farmer pays, and as the 
farmer forces down wages all the lower the more rent the landlord 
demands, it follows that the interest of the landlord is just as 
hostile to that of the farm workers as is that of the manufacturers 
to their workers. He likewise forces down wages to the minimum. 

(4) Since a real reduction in the price of manufactured products 
raises the rent of land, the landowner has a direct interest in 
lowering the wages of industrial workers, in competition amongst 
the capitalists, in over-production, in all the misery associated with 
industrial production. 

(5) While, thus, the landlord’s interest, far from being identical 
with the interest of society, stands inimically opposed to the 
interest of tenant farmers, farm labourers, factory workers and 
capitalists, on the other hand, the interest of one landlord is not 
even identical with that of another, on account of the competition 
which we will now consider. - 

In general the relationship of large and small landed property is 
like that of big and small capital. But in addition, there are special 
circumstances which lead inevitably to the accumulation of large 
landed property and to the absorption of small property by it. 

\| XII,31 (1) Nowhere does the relative number of workers and 
implements decrease more with increases in the size of the stock 
than in landed property. Likewise, the possibility of all-round 
exploitation, of economising production costs, and of effective 
division of labour, increases nowhere more with the size of the 
stock than in landed property. However small a field may be, it 
requires for its working a certain irreducible minimum of imple- 
ments (plough, saw, etc.), whilst the size of a piece of landed 
property can be reduced far below this minimum. 

(2) Big landed property accumulates to itself the interest on the 
capital which the tenant farmer has employed to improve the land. 
Small landed property has to employ its own capital, and therefore 
does not get this profit at all. 

(3) While every social improvement benefits the big estate, it 
harms small property, because it increases its need for ready cash. 

(4) Two important laws concerning this competition remain to 
be considered: 

(a) The rent of the cultivated* land, of which the produce is human food, 
regulates the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land. (Adam Smith, op. 
cit., Vol. I, p. 144 [Garnier, t. I, p. 331].) 

Ultimately, only the big estate can produce such food as cattle, 
etc. Therefore it regulates the rent of other land and can force it 
down to a minimum. 

The smali landed proprietor working on his own land stands 
then to the big landowner in the same relation as an artisan 
possessing his own tool to the factory owner. Small property in 
land has become a mere instrument of labour. }|XVI,1|”° Rent 
entirely disappears for the small proprietor; there remains to him 
at the most the interest on his capital, and his wages. For rent can 
be driven down by competition till it is nothing more than the 
interest on capital not invested by the proprietor. 

(B) In addition, we have already learnt that with equal fertility 

4 The manuscript has “produced” instead of “cultivated” — Ed. 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 265 

and equally efficient exploitation of lands, mines and fisheries, the 
produce is proportionate to the size of the capital. Hence the 
victory of the big landowner. Similarly, where equal capitals are 
employed the product is proportionate to the fertility. Hence, 
where capitals are equal, victory goes to the proprietor of the 
more fertile soil. 

(Y) “A mine of any kind may be said to be either fertile or barren, according as 
the quantity of mineral which can be brought from it by a certain quantity of 
labour is greater or less than what can be brought by an equal quantity from the 
greater part of other mines of the same kind.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 151 
(Garnier, t. I, pp. 345-46].) 

“The most fertile coal-mine, too, regulates the price of coals* at all the other 
mines in its neighbourhood. Both the proprietor and the undertaker of the work 
find, the one that he can get a greater rent, the other that he can get a greater 
profit, by somewhat underselling all their neighbours. Their neighbours are soon 
obliged to sell at the same price, though they cannot so well afford it, and though it 
always diminishes, and sometimes takes away altogether both their rent and their 
profit. Some works are abandoned altogether; others can afford no rent, and can 
be wrought only by the proprietor.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 152-53 
(Garnier, t. I, p. 350).) 

“After the discovery of the mines of Peru, the silver mines of Europe were, the 
greater part of them, abandoned.... This was the case, too, with the mines of Cuba 
and St. Domingo, and even with the ancient mines of Peru, after the discovery of 
those of Potosi.” (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 154 (Garnier, t. I, p. 353}.) 

What Smith here says of mines applies more or less to landed 
property generally: 

(6) “The ordinary market price of land, it is to be observed, depends 
everywhere upon the ordinary market rate of interest.... If the rent of land should 
fall short of the interest of money by a greater difference, nobody would buy land, 
which would soon reduce its ordinary price. On the contrary, if the advantages 
should much more than compensate the difference, everybody would buy land, 
which again would soon raise its ordinary price.” (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 320 [Garnier, t. 
Il, pp. 367-68}.) 

From this relation of rent of land to interest on money it follows 

that rent must fall more and more, so that eventually only the 
wealthiest people can live on rent. Hence the evergreater competi- 
tion between landowners who do not lease their land to tenants. 
Ruin of some of these; further accumulation of large landed 
property. 
- |{XVII,2] This competition has the further consequence that a 
large part of landed property falls into the hands of the capitalists 
and that capitalists thus become simultaneously landowners, just as 
the smaller landowners are on the whole already nothing more 
than capitalists. Similarly, a section of large landowners become at 
the same time industrialists. 

* The manuscript has “mine” instead of “coals” — Ed. 

The final consequence is thus the abolition of the distinction 
between capitalist and landowner, so that there remain altogether 
only two classes of the population—the working class and the class 
of capitalists. This huckstering with landed property, the transfor- 
mation of landed property into a commodity, constitutes the final 
overthrow of the old and the final establishment of the money 
aristocracy. " 

(1) We will not join in the sentimental tears wept over this by 
romanticism. Romanticism always confuses the shamefulness of 
huckstering the land with the perfectly rational consequence, inevita- 
ble and desirable within the realm of private property, of the 
huckstering of private property in land. In the first place, feudal 
landed property is already by its very nature huckstered 
land—the earth which is estranged from man and hence con- 
fronts him in the shape of a few great lords. 

The domination of the land as an alien power over men is 
already inherent in feudal landed property. The serf is the 
adjunct of the land. Likewise, the lord of an entailed estate, the 
first-born son, belongs to the land. It inherits him. Indeed, the 
dominion of private property begins with property in land—that 
is its basis. But in feudal landed property the lord at least appears 
as the king of the estate. Similarly, there still exists the semblance 
of a more intimate connection between the proprietor and the 
land than that of mere material wealth. The estate is individualised 
with its lord: it has his rank, is baronial or ducal with him, has his 
privileges, his jurisdiction, his political position, etc. It appears as 
the inorganic body of its lord. Hence the proverb nulle terre sans 
maitre, which expresses the fusion of nobility and landed property. 
Similarly, the rule of landed property does not appear directly as 
the rule of mere capital. For those belonging to it, the estate is 
more like their fatherland. It is a constricted sort of nationality. 

II XVIII,21 In the same way, feudal landed property gives its 
name to its lord, as does a kingdom to its king. His family history, 
the history of his house, etc.—all this individualises the estate for 
him and makes it literally his house, personifies it. Similarly those 
working on the estate have not the position of day-labourers; but 
they are in part themselves his property, as are serfs; and in part 
they are bound to him by ties of respect, allegiance, and duty. His 
relation to them is therefore directly political, and has likewise a 
human, intimate side. Customs, character, etc., vary from one 
estate to another and seem to be one with the land to which they 
belong; whereas later, it is only his purse and not his character, his 
individuality, which connects a man with an estate. Finally, the 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 267 

feudal lord does not try to extract the utmost advantage from his 
land. Rather, he consumes what is there and calmly leaves the 
worry of producing to the serfs and the tenants. Such is nobility's 
relationship to landed property, which casts a romantic glory on its 
lords. 

It is necessary that this appearance be abolished—that landed 
property, the root of private property, be dragged completely into 
the movement of private property and that it become a commodi- 
ty; that the rule of the proprietor appear as the undisguised rule 
of private property, of capital, freed of all political tincture; that 
the relationship between proprietor and worker be reduced to the 
economic relationship of exploiter and exploited; that all [...]* 
personal relationship between the proprietor and his property 
cease, property becoming merely objective, material wealth; that the 
marriage of convenience should take the place of the marriage of 
honour with the land; and that the land should likewise sink to the 
status of a commercial value, like man. It is essential that that 
which is the root of landed property—filthy self-interest—make 
its appearance, too, in its cynical form. It is essential that the 
immovable monopoly turn into the mobile and restless monopoly, 
into competition; and that the idle enjoyment of the products of 
other people’s blood and sweat turn into a bustling commerce in 
the same commodity. Lastly, it is essential that in this competition 
landed property, in the form of capital, manifest its dominion over 
both the working class and the proprietors themselves who are 
either being ruined or raised by the laws governing the movement 
of capital. The medieval proverb nulle terre sans seigneur is thereby 
replaced by that other proverb, l’argent n’a pas de maitre, wherein is 
expressed the complete domination of dead matter over man. 

I[XIX,2| (2) Concerning the argument of division or non-division 
of landed property, the following is to be observed. 

The division of landed property negates the large-scale monopoly of 
property in land—abolishes it; but only by generalising this 
monopoly. It does not abolish the source of monopoly, private 
property. It attacks the existing form, but not the essence, of 
monopoly. The consequence is that it falls victim to the laws of 
private property. For the division of landed property corresponds 
to the. movement of competition in the sphere of industry. In 
addition to the economic disadvantages of such a dividing-up of 
the instruments of labour, and the dispersal of labour (to be 
clearly distinguished from the division of labour: in separated 

* A word in the manuscript cannot be deciphered. — Ed. 

10* 

268 Kar] Marx 

labour the work is not shared out amongst many, but each carries 
on the same work by himself, it is a multiplication of the same 
work), this division [of land], like that competition [in industry], 
necessarily turns again into accumulation. 

Therefore, where the division of landed property takes place, 
there remains nothing for it but to return to monopoly in a still 
more malignant form, or to negate, to abolish the division of 
landed property itself. To do that, however, is not to return to 
feudal ownership, but to abolish private property in the soil 
altogether. The first abolition of monopoly is always its generalisa- 
tion, the broadening of its existence. The abolition of monopoly, 
once it has come to exist in its utmost breadth and inclusiveness, is 
its total annihilation. Association, applied to land, shares the 
economic advantage of large-scale landed property, and first? 
brings to realisation the original tendency inherent in [land] 
division, namely, equality. In the same way association also 
re-establishes, now on a rational basis, no longer mediated by 
serfdom, overlordship and the silly mysticism of property, the 
intimate ties of man with the earth, since the earth ceases to be an 
object of huckstering, and through free labour and free enjoy- 
ment becomes once more a true personal property of man. A 
great advantage of the division of landed property is that the 
masses, which can no longer resign themselves to servitude, perish 
through property in a different way than in industry. 

As for large landed property, its defenders have always, sophis- 
tically, identified the economic advantages offered by large-scale 
agriculture with large-scale landed property, as if it were not 
precisely as a result of the abolition of property that this 
advantage, for one thing, would receive its lIXX,2| greatest possible 
extension, and, for another, only then would be of social benefit. 
In the same way, they have attacked the huckstering spirit of small 
landed property, as if large landed property did not contain 
huckstering latent within it, even in its feudal form—not to speak 
of the modern English form, which combines the landlord’s 
feudalism with the tenant farmer’s huckstering and industry. 

Just as large landed property can return the reproach of 
monopoly levelled against it by partitioned land, since partitioned 
land is also based on the monopoly of private property, so can 
partitioned landed property likewise return to large landed prop- 
erty the reproach of partition, since partition also prevails there, 
though in a rigid and frozen form. Indeed, private property rests 

* In the manuscript the word “first” (erst) cannot be clearly deciphered.— Ed. 

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 269 

altogether on partitioning. Moreover, just as division of the land 
leads back to large landed property as a form of capital wealth, so 
must feudal landed property necessarily lead to partitioning or at 
least fall into the hands of the capitalists, turn and twist as it may. 

For large landed property, as in England, drives the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the population into the arms of industry and 
reduces its own workers to utter wretchedness. Thus, it engenders 
and enlarges the power of its enemy, capital, industry, by throwing 
poor people and an entire activity of the country on to the other 
side. It makes the majority of the people of the country industrial 
and thus opponents of large landed property. Where industry has 
attained to great power, as in England at the present time, it 
progressively forces from large landed property its monopoly 
against foreign countries? and throws it into competition with 
landed property abroad. For under the sway of industry landed 
property could keep its feudal grandeur secure only by means of 
monopolies against foreign countries, thereby protecting itself 
against the general laws of trade, which are incompatible with its 
feudal character. Once thrown into competition, landed property 
obeys the laws of competition, like every other commodity sub- 
jected to competition. It begins thus to fluctuate, to decrease and 
to increase, to fly from one hand to another; and no law can keep 
it any longer in a few predestined hands. ||XXI,2| The immediate 
consequence is the splitting up of the land amongst many hands, 
and in any case subjection to the power of industrial capitals. 

Finally, large landed property which has been forcibly preserved 
in this way and which has begotten by its side a tremendous 
industry leads to crisis even more quickly than the partitioning of 
land, in comparison with which the power of industry remains 
constantly of second rank. 

Large landed property, as we see in England, has already cast 
off its feudal character and adopted an industrial character insofar 
as it is aiming to make as much money as possible. To the owner it 
yields the utmost possible rent, to the tenant farmer the utmost 
possible profit on his capital. The workers on the land, in 
consequence, have already been reduced to the minimum, and the 
class of tenant farmers already represents within landed property 
the power of industry and capital. As a result of foreign competi- 
tion, rent in most cases can no longer form an independent 
income. A large number of landowners are forced to displace 

* Originally it was “against the monopoly of foreign countries”, then Marx 
crossed out “the monopoly of” — Ed. 

tenant farmers, some of whom in this way [...]* sink into the prole- 
tariat. On the other hand, many tenant farmers will take over 
landed property; for the big proprietors, who with their comfortable 
incomes have mostly given themselves over to extravagance and for 
the most part are not competent to conduct large-scale agriculture, 
often possess neither the capital nor the ability for the exploitation 
of the land. Hence a section of this class, too, is completely ruined. 
Eventually wages, which have already been reduced to a mini- 
mum, must be reduced yet further, to meet the new competition. 
This then necessarily leads to revolution. 

Landed property had to develop in each of these two ways so as 
to experience in both its necessary downfall, just as industry both 
in the form of monopoly and in that of competition had to ruin 
itself so as to learn to believe in man. |XX]!