Written at the end of January 1861.

From the English.

["The Volunteer Journal, for Lancashire and Cheshire", No. 22, February 2, 1861]

According to the “Almanach de Gotha”, which is considered a great authority on this subject, the war footing of the French army for 1860/1861 has been fixed as follows:

1.  
Infantry: Guard —  
12 Grenadier, 16 Voltigeur, 2 Zouave battalions and 1 Chasseur battalion: in all 31 battalions.  
Line —  
103 regiments of 4 battalions each, in all 412 battalions; 3 regiments of  
Zouaves  
, 2 of the  
Foreign Legion  
, 3 regiments of  
Turcos  
(indigenous Algerian riflemen), each regiment 3 battalions — 24 battalions;  
Chasseurs —  
20 battalions;  
Zephyrs  
or light African (disciplinary) battalions — 3 battalions;  
pompiers  
(fire brigade) of Paris 1 battalion.  

In all 491 battalions; or, in time of war,

515,037 men

2.  
Cavalry: Guard —  
6 regiments or 37 squadrons,  
Line —  
58 regiments or 358 squadrons, in all 395 squadrons.

100,221 men

3.  
Artillery:  
22 regiments — 227 batteries (146 of them are batteries of 6 guns — 876 guns comprise the field artillery)

66,007 men

4.  
Engineers

15,443 men

5.  
Train:  
medical troops, commissariat

24,561 men

6.  
Gendarmerie

24,172 men

7. Staffs, invalides, military schools, etc.

17,324 men

total

762,765 men

This is the war strength. The peace footing is as follows:

Infantry

255,248 men

Cavalry

61,023 men

Artillery

39,023 men

Engineers

7,467 men

Train, etc.

11,489 men

Gendarmerie, invalides, etc.

41,496 men

total

415,746 men

In January 1859, shortly before the Italian war broke out, the “Constitutionnel” published an official status of the French army, which showed a war establishment of 568,000 and a peace establishment of 433,000 men. How, then, was it possible, within two years, to increase the war strength by 200,000 men, while the peace strength has actually been reduced?

Furthermore, the annual contingent of fit young men available to the army amounts to about 160,000. Of these, under Louis-Philippe, between 40,000 and 60,000 were actually taken and found sufficient to maintain the strength of the army despite the losses in Algeria. Subsequently, 80,000 and even 100,000 and more have been enrolled. The Empire, which is peace, consumed twice as much cannon fodder as the constitutional monarchy or the republic had required. The term of service is seven years, but even supposing that recently 100,000 men have been enrolled annually (which is above the average), this would only yield 700,000 men for seven years, and if one deducts the losses incurred during campaigns and from other causes, it would barely amount to 600,000 men. How, then, were the remaining 163,000 found?

The answer to these two questions is contained in the latest ordinances of the French Emperor. Before the Italian war, the regiments, until then composed of three battalions of eight companies each, were formed into four battalions of six companies each; thus, by merely changing the distribution of the 24 companies of a regiment, four battalions came into being instead of three. The strength of a battalion has a maximum; with more than 1,000 men it is too strong to be commanded by the voice of one man, and too unwieldy for rapid manoeuvring. The strength of a company, on the other hand, is far more variable; whether it comprises 100 or 250 men is an arbitrary matter and not a question of necessity. By the establishment of the fourth battalions in the manner indicated, with the same number of officers and sergeants, the regiment was in a position to muster 4,000 instead of 3,000 men, as soon as these were found. During the war, the regiments took the field with the strength of three fighting battalions, the fourth constituted the depot battalion. In this way, with the fourth battalions of the 100 line regiments, ways and means were found to accommodate 100,000 men more than the old cadres could absorb. After the war, the fourth battalions were dissolved, but they have recently been re-established. Three additional infantry regiments (the 101st, 102nd, 103rd), which provide room for a further 17,000 men, have been formed. These new formations explain the increase of 112,000 men, and those 51,000 men, whose whereabouts still remain to be explained, will be the number which the army lacked of its full war strength in January 1859, owing to earlier losses. This shows that there are now cadres in the French infantry which are fully sufficient to organise the enormous number of soldiers mentioned above, without resorting to new formations. But where are the soldiers to be found to fill these new cadres?

The regular enrolments of the last seven years will have left 550,000 to 600,000 men on the muster rolls. The annual contingent available is about 160,000 men. In an annual conscription, at worst barely 50,000 men would be wanting; in case of need, there are the young men who, during the last six years, have been completely exempted from service because they drew favourable numbers in the ballot. Of these, at least up to 300,000 could be made available, but since such people generally assume they are forever exempt from military duty, since they are partly married, partly scattered over the whole country and difficult to find, such a measure would be both unpopular and difficult to carry out.

How, then, does Louis Napoleon close the gap? By introducing a modification of the Prussian reserve system. Of the 160,000 men available each year, a portion, say one half, is taken to fill the vacancies in the standing army. The remainder are enrolled on the reserve list. They are called up and drilled for two months in the first year, and for one month in each of the second and third years. They can be called out, like the active army, for a total of seven years. We have some reason to believe that, if the military doctors were not too strict when examining the soldiers — in wartime, on the contrary, they are often extraordinarily indulgent — the annual contingent of 160,000 fit soldiers could be increased at one stroke to 200,000, but we will leave this out of account for the present. 160,000 men annually would, in seven years, give an army of 1,112,000 men, and, after deducting a round number for losses, there would still be a million soldiers. Thus we see that, by the new reserve system recently introduced, Louis Napoleon’s troops will in a few years outgrow the existing forms of organisation. For this possibility, however, provision has also been made. In future, all four battalions of a regiment are to be fighting battalions. A fifth battalion is now being formed under the name of training battalion, and the soldiers are placed on the reserve list under the pretext of drilling. This new organisation creates room for a further 103,000 men, and raises the number of soldiers who can be absorbed by the existing corps or cadres to 863,000 men.

Not content with this, the French government proposes to raise a further guard regiment and 17 regiments of line infantry. These 18 regiments are 90 more battalions, or 90,000 men.

From what is already known, we are certain that before the end of this year the French army will be so organised that it will be able comfortably to accommodate at least 953,000 men in its battalions, squadrons and batteries. And as to finding the soldiers to fill these establishments, we have seen that up to 700,000 men can be found even this year, without having to resort to those discharged in earlier years. But once the principle of universal liability to service in the active army or the reserve is accepted, it will be easy to apply the same principle to the persons discharged in the last six years (Napoleon did the same time and again in his day), and then there can be no doubt that all the 953,000 men will soon be brought together.

This, then, is the man who unintentionally called forth the Volunteer movement, to which he replies by the quiet and noiseless organisation of an army of a million men, and at the same time lays down twenty armoured frigates, perhaps to escort a part of that army across the Channel.