Neue Oder-Zeitung.
No. 249, June 1, 1855.
Mittagblatt

X. London, May 29. (From Parliament.) Gladstone's style of eloquence has never found more complete, more exhaustive expression than in his "Speech" of Thursday evening. Polished smoothness, empty profundity, unction not without a venomous ingredient, velvet paw not without a claw, scholastic distinctions and petty distinctions, quaestiones and quaestioniculae, the entire arsenal of probabilism with its casuistical conscience and its unscrupulous reservations, its unscrupulous motives and its motivated scruples, humble pretension to superiority, virtuous intrigue, simplicity full of clauses, Byzantium and Liverpool. Gladstone's speech revolved less around the question of war or peace between England and Russia, than around the investigation why Gladstone, until recently a member of a war-waging ministry, had now become the Gladstone of the peace party at any price. He analysed, he dissected in all directions the limits of his own conscience, and he demanded, with characteristic modesty, that the British Empire should move within the limits of Gladstone's conscience. His speech therefore had a diplomatic-psychological colouring that, if it brought conscience into diplomacy, brought still more diplomacy into conscience. The war against Russia was originally just, but we have now reached the point where its continuation becomes sinful. Since the beginning of the Oriental troubles, we have gradually ratcheted up our demands. We moved upwards in our conditions, while Russia has descended from the height of its intransigence. At first Russia claimed not only a spiritual but also a temporal protectorate over the Greek Christians of Turkey. It was unwilling to give up any of the old treaties, indeed even to evacuate the Danube provinces only contingently. It refused to attend any congress of the powers at Vienna, and summoned the Turkish envoy to St. Petersburg or to Russian headquarters. This was Russia's language still on February 2, 1854. What a distance from the demands of the Western powers at that time to the 4 points! And as late as August 26, 1854, Russia declared that it would never accept the 4 points except after a long and desperate and disastrous struggle. Again, what a distance from this language of Russia in August 1854 to its language of December 1854, in which it promised to accept the 4 points "without reserve"? These 4 points form the nodal point up to which our demands can ascend and Russia's concessions can descend. What lies beyond these 4 points lies beyond Christian morality. Well! Russia has accepted the first point; it has accepted the second point; it has not rejected the fourth point, because it has not been discussed; there remains, therefore, only the 3rd point, hence only ¼, and not even the whole 3rd point, but only half of the 3rd point, hence only ⅛ of a difference left. For the 3rd point consists of two parts: No. 1, the guarantee of the Turkish territory; No. 2, the reduction of Russian power in the Black Sea. To No. 1, Russia declared itself more or less willing. There remains, therefore, only the second half of the 3rd point. And here, too, Russia does not declare itself opposed to the restriction of its superiority at sea; it only declares itself against our method of putting it into effect. The Western powers have proposed one method; Russia proposes not one but two other methods, thus again taking the lead over the Western powers. As regards the method proposed by the Western powers, it injures the honour of the Russian empire. But one must not injure the honour of an empire without reducing its power. On the other hand, one must not reduce its power, because thereby one injures its honour. Different views on the "method", a ⅛ point of difference, to attach too much weight to the consideration of "methods"—for this another half million people are to be sacrificed? On the contrary, it must be declared that we have achieved the purposes of the war. Shall we therefore continue it for mere prestige, for military glory? Our soldiers have covered themselves with glory. If England has nevertheless fallen into discredit on the Continent, "for God's sake," exclaimed the honourable gentleman, "do not avenge this discredit with human blood, but wipe it out by sending more correct information abroad." And indeed, why not "correct" the newspapers abroad? Further successes on the part of the allied arms, what do they lead to? They compel Russia to a more stubborn resistance. Defeats on the side of the Allies? They stir up the people of London and Paris and compel bolder attack. What, then, would be the result of waging war for war's sake? Originally Prussia, Austria, France and England were united in their demands against Russia. Prussia has already withdrawn. If one goes further, Austria will withdraw as well. England would be isolated upon France. If England continues the war on grounds shared by no other power except France, then "the moral authority of its position would be greatly weakened and undermined." On the other hand, by a peace with Russia, even if he loses the prestige that is of this world, he strengthens his "moral authority", which neither moth nor rust doth corrupt. And moreover, what does one want, if one does not want Russia's method of implementing the second half of the third point? Does one want to dismember the Russian empire? Impossible, without provoking a "war of nationalities". Does Austria want, can France support a war of nationalities? If England undertakes a "war of nationalities", it must undertake it alone; i.e., "it will not undertake it at all". Thus, nothing is possible except to demand nothing that Russia has not conceded.

That was Gladstone's speech, if not in letter, then in spirit. Russia has changed its language; proof that it has yielded in substance. For the honourable Puseyite, language is the only thing. He too has changed his language. He now speaks jeremiads about the war; the whole suffering of humanity touches him. He spoke apologies when he railed against the Committee of Inquiry and found it in order to abandon an English army to all the sufferings of death by starvation and pestilence. Indeed! The army was then sacrificed for peace. The sin begins when it is sacrificed for war. He is, however, successful in his demonstration that the English government was never serious about the war against Russia, successful in the demonstration that neither the present English nor the present French government can or will wage a serious war against Russia; successful in the demonstration that the pretexts for the war are not worth a shot of gunpowder. He forgets only that these "pretexts" belong to him and his former colleagues, but the "war" itself was forced upon them by the English people. The conduct of the war was for them only a pretext to paralyse it and to keep their posts. And from the history and metamorphosis of the false pretexts under which they waged war, he successfully concludes that they can conclude peace under equally false pretexts. On only one point does he find himself in dispute with his old colleagues. He is Out, they are In. A false pretext, good for the ex-minister, is not a false pretext good for the minister, although sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. This terrible confusion of concepts by Gladstone gave Russell the long-awaited signal. He rose and painted Russia black, where Gladstone had painted it white. But Gladstone was "Out" and Russell was "In". After he had blustered out all the well-known commonplaces—true despite their triviality—about Russia's plans of world conquest, he came to the point, to Russell's point. Never, he declared, had so great a national question been so utterly degraded as had been done by Disraeli. And indeed, can one degrade a great national, nay, a world-historical question more deeply than by identifying it with little Johnny, with Johnny Russell? Now, it was indeed not Disraeli's fault that Europe contra Russia at the beginning and at the close of this first war period figured as Russell contra Nesselrode. Strangely did the little man twist himself when he came to the four points. On the one hand, he had to show that his peace conditions stood in a relation to the Russian horrors he had just unfolded. On the other hand, he had to show that, faithful to his voluntary, unprovoked promise to Titoff and Gortschakoff, he had proposed "the conditions best harmonising with Russia's honour". He therefore proved, on the one hand, that Russia as a sea power exists only in name, hence can very well permit a restriction of this merely imaginary power. He proved, on the other hand, that the navy, sunk by Russia itself, is formidable for Turkey, hence for the European balance of power, so that "the second half of the third point" formed a great whole. Many a man is run by his opponent between the two horns of a dilemma. Russell impaled himself firmly on both horns. Of his diplomatic talent he gave new proofs. From Austria's active alliance, nothing is to be expected, because a lost battle would bring the Russians to Vienna. Thus he encourages the one ally. "Our feeling is," he continued, "that it is Russia's intention to take possession of Constantinople and rule there, since Turkey is evidently on the road to decay; and I do not doubt that Russia entertains the same opinion of the intentions of France and England in the break-up of that country." Only he needed to add: "It is deceiving itself, however. Not England and France, but England alone must take possession of Constantinople." Thus did the great diplomat incite Austria to take sides; thus did he betray to Turkey what the opinion of his saviours, his party friends, "evidently" is. He has, however, made one progress as a parliamentary tactician. In July 1854, when he ranted about the capture of the Crimea, he allowed himself to be so dumbfounded by Disraeli that he personally ate his heroic words before the vote in the House. This time he postponed this process of self-devouring—the retraction of his announced world struggle against Russia—until after the vote was completed. A great progress this!

His speech contains two further historical illustrations—his highly comical description of the negotiations with Emperor Nicholas on the Treaty of Kainardji; a sketch of German conditions. Both deserve to be mentioned in extracts. Russell, as the reader will recall, had from the outset conceded Russia's protectorate, based on the Treaty of Kainardji. The English ambassador at Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, proved more difficult, more sceptical. He instituted inquiries with the Russian government, the history of which Russell is so naive as to relate as follows: "Sir Hamilton Seymour requested the late Emperor of Russia to be so good as to show him the part of the treaty on which his claims were founded. His

15 His Imperial Majesty said: 'I will not show you the particular article
of the treaty on which my claim (of the protectorate) is founded. Go to Count Nesselrode, he will do so.' Seymour Hamilton

therefore went with his request to Count Nesselrode. Count Nesselrode
replied that he was not acquainted with the articles of the treaty, and called

20 upon Hamilton to go to Baron Brunnow or to send his government to
him, and the Baron would tell them on which part
of the treaty the Emperor’s claim was founded. I believe that

Baron Brunnow never attempted to show such an article in the treaty.”

25 Of Germany the noble Lord related: “In Germany Russia is
connected by marriage with many of the lesser princes. Many of these
princes, I regret to say it, govern in great fear of
the presumed revolutionary disposition of their subjects. And
they therefore rely on the protection of their armies. But who are these

30 armed forces? Their officers are seduced and corrupted by the Russian court. The Russian court distributes orders, decorations, and
rewards among them, and in certain cases Russia regularly gives

money to pay their debts — so that Germany, which ought to be the seat of

independence, which ought to stand in the van for the protection of Europe against Russian

35 domination, has for years been undermined and cajoled out of its
independence by Russian arts and Russian money.” And in order to transform Germany into a pillar of fire and summon it awake to the “categorical imperative”, the Ought, Russell declared himself at the Vienna Conference the spokesman for

40 “the honour and dignity of Russia”, and had it hear the proud language of the
free and independent Englishman.