London, May 24. No sooner had Disraeli’s motion presented 
the prospect of a regular battle between the Ins and Outs* in the 
House of Commons than Palmerston sounded the alarm and, a 
few hours before the commencement of the sitting, he asked his 
ministerial retinue along with Peelites, Manchester School and 
so-called Independents to come to his official residence in 
Downing Street.” Two hundred and three M.P.s turned up, 
including Mr. Layard who felt incapable of resisting the ministerial 
siren-call. Palmerston played the diplomat, the penitent, the 
apologist, the appeaser, the wheedler. Smilingly he bore with the 
censorious rebukes of Messrs Bright, Lowe and Layard. He left it 
to Lord Robert Grosvenor and Sir James Graham to mediate with 
the “agitated”. From the moment he saw the malcontents 
clustering about him in his official residence, mingling with his 
faithful followers, he knew he had them in his pocket. They were 
disgruntled but anxious for reconciliation. Thus the result of the 
sitting in the Commons was anticipated; nothing more remained 
but the parliamentary performance of the comedy before the 
public. The crisis was over. We shall be sending a brief account of 
this comedy as soon as the final act has been played out. 

The types of illness peculiar to the spring and summer season in 
the Crimea have been reactivated by the return of warm, humid 
weather. Cholera and ague have again made their appearance in 

No. 22063, May 25, 1855.— Ed. 

the allied camp, not as yet in particularly virulent form but 
sufficiently so to provide a warning for the future. Also in 
evidence is the miasma given off by the mass of. putrefying animal 
matter that is buried only a few inches below ground throughout 
the entire extent of the Chersonese. The morale of the besieging 
army is also in a very unsatisfactory state. After they had undergone 
the hardships and dangers of an unparalleled Winter campaign, the 
soldiers had been kept in something like order and good spirits by 
the return of Spring and by ever-repeated promises of a speedy 
and glorious termination of the siege. But day after day passed 
away without making any progress, while the Russians actually 
advanced out of their lines and constructed redoubts on the 
disputed ground between the two parties. The Zouaves became 
unruly and were consequently led to the slaughter on Mount 
Sapun on February 23. A little more bustling—it can hardly be 
called activity—was then shown on the part of the allied 
commanders; but there was evidently no distinct aim, and no 
definite plan was followed up consistently. 

Again, the spirit of mutiny among the French was kept down by 
the continued sallies of the Russians which kept them occupied 
and by the opening of the second bombardment which was this 
time definitely to end in the grand spectacle of the assault. A 
deplorable fiasco ensued. Then came engineering operations, slow, 
difficult and barren of those results which keep up the spirits of 
soldiers. Soon thev got tired again of nightly trench-fighting, 
where hundreds fell to no visible purpose. Again the assault was 
demanded, and again Canrobert was compelled to make promises 
which he knew he could not fulfil. Then Pélissier saved him from 
a renewal of disorderly scenes by the night attack of the Ist of 
May; it is stated that Peélissier executed it in spite of a 
counter-order from Canrobert arriving the moment the troops 
were put in motion. The success of this affair is said to have 
revived the courage of the soldiers. Meantime the Piedmontese 
reserve arrived; the Chersonese became crowded. The soldiers con- 
sidered that these reinforcements enabled them to go into action 
immediately. Something had to be done. The expedition to Kerch 
was resolved upon, and sailed. But before it had reached the offing 
of that town a dispatch from Paris induced Canrobert to recall it. 
Raglan of course gave in at once. Brown, and Lyons, the 
commanders of the British land and sea forces on this expedition, 
besought their French colleagues to attack the place in spite of the 
countermand; in vain—the expedition had to sail back. Now the 
exasperation of the troops was no longer to be mastered. Even the 

English spoke in unmistakable terms; the French were in a state 
bordering on mutiny. Accordingly there was nothing left for 
Canrobert but to resign the command of an army over which he 
had lost all control and influence. 

Pélissier was the only possible successor, since the soldiers, long 
sick of generals who had shot up in the forcing- house of 
Bonapartism, had been repeatedly calling for a leader of the old African 
school. Pélissier enjoys the confidence of the soldiers but he is 
taking command under difficult circumstances. He must act, and 
act quickly. Since an assault is impossible, there is no other choice 
than to move into the field against the Russians, not, however, in 
the manner we have previously described when the entire army 
would have to march along one single road that had, moreover, 
been heavily barricaded by the Russians, but by distributing the 
army over the numerous small upland paths and tracks mostly 
used only by shepherds and their flocks, which would make 
it possible to outflank the Russian position. One difficulty arises 
here. The French have only sufficient means of transport to supply 
about 30,000 men for a very short distance from the coast. 
The means of transport of the English would be exhausted if they 
had to convey a single division no further than Chorgun on the 
Chernaya. Given this lack of transport it is difficult to see how then 
is the field to be taken, in case of success the north side of Sevasto- 
pol invested, the enemy pursued to Bakshiserai and a junction 
effected with Omer Pasha? Especially since the Russians in accor- 
dance with their custom will take good care to leave nothing but 
ruins behind them, so that a supply of carts, horses, camels, etc., 
can only be obtained after the Allies have completely routed their 
enemy. We shall see how Pélissier will extricate himself from this 
difficulty. 

We have previously drawn attention to a number. of peculiar 
circumstances connected with Pélissier’s appointment.* However 
there is a further aspect to be considered here. When the war 
began, that Bonapartist general par excellence, S[ain]t-Arnaud, was 
entrusted with the supreme command. He did his emperor the 
service of promptly dying. Not one of the Bonapartists of the first 
rank was appointed in his place, neither Magnan, nor Castellane, 
nor Roguet, nor Baraguay d’Hilliers. Recourse was had to 
Canrobert, a man tarred neither so heavily nor so long with the 
Bonapartist brush, but having greater African experience. Now, 
with another change of command, the Bonapartists du lendemain? 

have been passed over in the same way as those de la veille,* and 
the post awarded to a simple African general of no pronounced 
political complexion, but with many years of service and a name in 
the army. Must not this descending line inevitably lead to 
Changarnier, Lamoriciére or Cavaignac, i.e. away from Bonapar- 
tism? 

“Unfitness for peace no less than for war—such is our 
situation!” observed a day or two ago a French statesman for whom 
everything is at stake with the imperial régime. Every action of the 
restored empire, right up to the appointment of Pélissier, proves that 
he was right.