[The Pall Mall Gazette, No. 1806, November 26, 1870] 

Yesterday we called attention to the fact that since the surrender 
at Sedan the prospects of France had much improved,” and that 
even the fall of Metz, and the setting free thereby of some 150,000 
German soldiers, does not now look the crushing disaster it 
appeared to be at first. If we recur to the same subject to-day, it is 
in order to prove still more, by a few military details, the 
correctness of this view. 

The positions of the German armies on the 24th of November, 
as far as they can be made out, were as follows: — 

Investing Paris: The Third Army (2nd, 5th, 6th, and 2nd 
Bavarian corps, the 21st, the Wurttemberg, and Landwehr Guard 
divisions) and the Fourth Army (4th, 12th, and Guards corps); in 
all seventeen divisions. 

Army of Observation, protecting this investment: To the north, 
the First Army (lst and 8th corps); to the west and south-west, 
Duke of Mecklenburg’s army (17th and 22nd divisions, and Ist 
Bavarian Corps); to the south, the Second Army (3rd, 9th, and 
10th corps, and a division of landwehr, a detachment of which was 
so severely handled at Chatillon by Ricciotti Garibaldi)'™; in all 
fifteen divisions. 

On special duty, in the south-east of France, the 14th Corps 
(Werder’s, consisting of two divisions and a half), and 15th Corps; 
in Metz and about Thionville, the 7th Corps; on the line of 
communication, at least a division and a half of landwehr; in all 
eight divisions at least. 

4 Written on November 26, 1870.— Ed. 

Of these forty divisions of infantry, the first seventeen are at 
present fully engaged before Paris; the last eight show by their 
immobility that they have as much work cut out for them as they 
can manage. There remain disposable for the field the fifteen 
divisions composing the three armies of observation, and repres- 
enting with cavalry and artillery a total force of some 200,000 
combatants at most. 

Now, before the 9th of November, there appeared to be no 
serious obstacle to prevent this mass of men from overrunning the 
greater part of central and even southern France. But since then 
things have changed considerably. And it is not so much the fact 
of von der Tann having been beaten and compelled to retreat, or 
that of D’Aurelle having shown his ability to handle his troops 
well, which has inspired us with a greater respect for the Army of 
the Loire than we confess we had up to that day; it is chiefly the 
energetic measures which Moltke took to meet its expected march 
on Paris which have made that army appear in quite a different 
light. Not only did he find it necessary to hold in readiness against 
it, even at the risk of raising de facto the investment of Paris, the 
greater portion of the blockading forces on the south side of the 
town, but he also changed at once the direction of march of the 
two armies arriving from Metz, so as to draw them closer to Paris, 
and to have the whole of the German forces concentrated around 
that city; and we now hear that, moreover, steps were taken to 
surround the siege park with defensive works. Whatever other 
people may think, Moltke evidently does not consider the Army of 
the Loire an armed rabble, but a real, serious, redoubtable army. 

The previous uncertainty as to the character of that army 
resulted to a great extent from the reports of the English 
correspondents at Tours.* There appears to be not one military 
man among them capable of distinguishing the characteristics by 
which an army differs trom a mob of armed men. The reports 
varied from day to day regarding discipline, proficiency in drill, 
numbers, armament, equipment, artillery, transport—in short, 
regarding everything essential to form an opinion. We all know 
the immense difficulties under which the new army had to be 
formed: the want of officers, of arms, of horses, of all kinds of 
matériel, and especially the want of time. The reports which came 
to hand, principally dwelt upon these difficulties; and thus, the 

Army of the Loire was generally underrated by people whose 
sympathies do not run away with their judgment. 

Now the same correspondents are unanimous in its praise.’ It is 
said to be better officered and better disciplined than the armies 
which succumbed at Sedan and in Metz. This is no doubt the case 
to a certain extent. There is evidently a far better spirit pervading 
it than ever was to be found in the Bonapartist armies; a 
determination to do the best for the country, to co-operate, to 
obey orders on that account. Then this army has learned again 
one very important thing which Louis Napoleon’s army had quite 
forgotten—light infantry duty, the art of protecting flanks and 
rear from surprise, of feeling for the enemy, surprising his 
detachments, procuring information and prisoners. The Times’ 
correspondent with the Duke of Mecklenburg gives proofs of 
that.” It is now the Prussians who cannot learn the whereabouts of 
their enemy, and have to grope in the dark; formerly it was quite 
the reverse. An army which has learned that has learned a great 
deal. Stull, we must not forget that the Army of the Loire as well as 
its sister Armies of the West and North has still to prove its mettle 
in a general engagement and against something like equal 
numbers. But, upon the whole, it promises well, and there are 
circumstances which make it probable that even a great defeat will 
not affect it as seriously as such an event does most young armies. 

The fact is that the brutalities and cruelties of the Prussians, 
instead of stamping out popular resistance, have redoubled its 
energies; so much so that the Prussians seem to have found out 
their mistake, and these burnings of villages and massacres of 
peasants are now scarcely ever heard of. But this treatment has 
had its effect, and every day the guerilla warfare takes larger 
dimensions. When we read in The Times the reports about 
Mecklenburg’s advance towards Le Mans, with no enemy in sight,‘ 
no regular force offering resistance in the field, but cavalry and 
francs-tireurs hovering about the flanks, no news as to the 
whereabouts of the French troops, and the Prussian troops kept 
close together in pretty large bodies, we cannot help being 
reminded of the marches of Napoleon’s marshals in Spain, or of 
Bazaine’s troops in Mexico. And, that spirit of popular resistance 
once roused, even armies of 200,000 men do not go very far 

a “Tours, Nov. 19”, The Times, No. 26917, November 25, 1870.— Ed. 

Nov. 18”, The Times, No. 26917, November 25, 1870.— Ed. 

¢ “Tours, Nov. 24”, The Times, No. 26917, November 25, 1870.— Ed. 

towards the occupation of a hostile country. They soon arrive at 
the point beyond which their detachments become weaker than 
what the defence can oppose to them; and it depends entirely 
upon the energy of popular resistance how soon that line shall be 
reached. Thus even a defeated army soon finds a safe place from 
the pursuit of an enemy if only the people of the country arise; 
and this may turn out to be the case now in France. And if the 
population in the districts occupied by the enemy should rise, or 
merely his lines of communication be repeatedly broken, the limit 
beyond which the invasion becomes powerless will be still more 
contracted. We should not wonder, for instance, if Mecklenburg’s 
advance, unless powerfully supported by Prince Frederick Charles, 
turned out to have been pushed too far even now. 

For the present everything of course hinges upon Paris. If Paris 
hold out another month—and the reports on the state of 
provisions inside do not at all exclude that chance—France may 
possibly have an army in the field large enough, with the aid of 
popular resistance, to raise the investment by a successful attack 
upon the Prussian communications. The machinery for organizing 
armies appears to be working pretty well in France by this time. 
There are more men than are wanted; thanks to the resources of 
modern industry and the rapidity of modern communications, 
arms are forthcoming in unexpectedly large quantities; 400,000 
rifles have arrived from America alone'”; artillery is manufac- 
tured in France with a rapidity hitherto quite unknown. Even 
officers are found, or trained, somehow. Altogether, the efforts 
which France has made since Sedan to reorganize her national 
defence are unexampled in history, and require but one element 
for almost certain success—time. If Paris holds out but one month 
more, that will go much towards it. And if Paris should not be 
provisioned for that length of time, Trochu may attempt to break 
through the investing lines with such of his troops as may be fit 
for the work; and it would be bold to say, now, that he cannot 
possibly succeed in it. If he should succeed, Paris would still 
absorb a garrison of at least three Prussian army corps to keep it 
quiet, so that Trochu might have set free more Frenchmen than 
the surrender of Paris would set free Germans. And, whatever the 
fortress of Paris can do if defended by Frenchmen, it is evident 
that it could never be successfully held by a German force against 
French besiegers. There would be as many men required to keep 
the people down within as to man the ramparts to keep off the 
attack from without. Thus the fall of Paris may, but does not of 
necessity, imply the fall of France. 

It is a bad time just now for speculating on the probability of 
this or that event in the war. We have an approximative 
knowledge of one fact only—the strength of the Prussian armies. 
Of another, the strength, numerical and intrinsic, of the French 
forces, we know but little. And, moreover, there are now moral 
factors at work which are beyond all calculation, and of which we 
can only say that they are all of them favourable to France and 
unfavourable to Germany. But this much appears certain, that the 
contending forces are more equally balanced just now than they 
ever have been since Sedan, and that a comparatively weak 
reinforcement of trained troops to the French might restore the 
balance altogether.