Friedrich Engels

Written about September 1, 1860.

From the English.

[New-York Daily Tribune, No. 6056, September 21, 1860, leading article]

With the development of events we are beginning to gain an insight into the plan which Garibaldi had prepared for the liberation of southern Italy, and the more we learn of it, the more we admire the grandeur of its scale. In no other country than Italy, where the national party is so well organised and so completely under the sway of the one man who has drawn his sword with brilliant success for the cause of Italian unity and independence, could such a plan have been devised, or its execution attempted.

This plan was not confined to the liberation of the Kingdom of Naples. Simultaneously, the Papal States were to be attacked, so as to provide employment for Lamoricière’s army and the French in Rome, as well as for the troops of Bombalino (Francis II). By August 15, 6,000 volunteers, who were gradually crossing from Genoa to the Gulf of Oranges (Golfo degli Aranci) on the north-eastern coast of Sardinia, were to be transported to the coast of the Papal States, while at the same time the insurrection was to break out in the various provinces of the Neapolitan mainland, and Garibaldi was to cross the Strait of Messina into Calabria. Some reports of Garibaldi’s sayings concerning the cowardice of the Neapolitans, and the news brought by the last steamer, that he had entered Naples and been received there in triumph, make it probable that an insurrection in the streets of that city formed part of the plan, but was rendered unnecessary by the flight of the King.

The landing in the Papal States was prevented, as already known, partly by Victor Emmanuel’s remonstrances, but mainly by Garibaldi’s conviction that these men were not in a condition to carry out an independent campaign. He therefore brought them to Sicily, left one part in Palermo, and sent the rest in two steamers round the island to Taormina, where we shall soon find them again. Meanwhile, as agreed, the insurrections broke out in the provincial towns, and in a manner which showed how well the revolutionary party was organised and how ripe the country was for revolt. On August 17, Foggia in Apulia rose. The dragoons of the garrison of the town joined the people. General Flores, commanding the district, sent two companies of the 13th Regiment, which on their arrival did the same. Now General Flores himself appeared with his staff, but could do nothing and had to withdraw again. This behaviour plainly shows that Flores himself did not intend to offer any serious opposition to the revolutionary party. Had he been in earnest, he would have sent two battalions instead of two companies, and would have appeared in person at the head of as strong a force as he could muster, instead of coming with a few adjutants and orderlies. In fact, the mere circumstance that the insurgents permitted him to leave the town again is sufficient proof that at least a tacit understanding existed. Another movement broke out in the province of Basilicata. Here the insurgents assembled their forces at Corleto Perticara, a village on the river Lagni (this must be the place called Corleto in the telegrams).

From this mountainous and inaccessible district they marched to Potenza, the chief town of the province, where they arrived on the 17th with 6,000 men. The only resistance they met with was from about 400 gendarmes, who, after a short fight, were dispersed and afterwards came in one by one and surrendered. A provincial government was formed in the name of Garibaldi, and a pro-dictator appointed. It is reported that the royal Intendant (the Governor of the province) accepted this office—a further sign of how hopeless the Bourbon cause is regarded even by its own representatives. Four companies of the 6th Line regiment were sent from Salerno to put down this insurrection; but when they reached Auletta—about 23 miles from Potenza—they refused to march further, and shouted: Viva Garibaldi! Only these movements have become known to us in detail. But we have further intelligence that other towns have joined the insurrection, for instance, Avellino, a town less than 30 miles from Naples, Campobasso in the province of Molise (on the Adriatic), and Celenza in Apulia—for this must be the place called Cilenta in the telegram; it lies half way between Campobasso and Foggia; and now Naples itself is added to the list. While the Neapolitan provincial towns were thus performing, at least, their expected share of the work, Garibaldi was not idle. Hardly returned from his excursion to Sardinia, he made his final preparations for the passage to the mainland. His army now consisted of three divisions, commanded by Türr, Cosenz, and Medici. The two latter, concentrated about Messina and Faro, were ordered to march to the northern coast of Sicily between Milazzo and Faro, as if charged to embark there and land on the coast of Calabria, north of the Strait, somewhere near Palmi or Nicotera. Of Türr’s division, the Brigade Eber lay near Messina, the Brigade Bixio had been sent into the interior, to Bronte, to quell some disturbances. Both were ordered at the same time to Taormina, where, on the evening of the 18th, Brigade Bixio, together with the men brought from Sardinia, embarked on two steamers, the *Torino* and the *Franklin*, and some on transport vessels taken in tow.

About ten days previously, Major Missori, with 300 men, had crossed the Strait and passed safely through the Neapolitan forces to the elevated, broken region of Aspromonte. Here he was joined by other small parties, brought over the Strait by degrees, and by Calabrian insurgents, so that at this time he commanded a body of about 2,000 men. The Neapolitans had sent about 1,800 men after his small band upon landing, but these 1,800 heroes managed never to come into collision with the Garibaldians.

On the 19th, at daybreak, Garibaldi’s expedition (he was himself on board) landed between Melito and Cape Spartivento, at the extreme southern end of Calabria. They met with no resistance. The Neapolitans had been so completely misled by the movements of troops threatening a landing north of the Strait, that they entirely overlooked the country south of it. Thus, besides the 2,000 men collected by Missori, 9,000 more were thrown across the Strait.

After these had united with Garibaldi, he marched on Reggio, which was occupied by four companies of the line and four of chasseurs. This garrison must, however, have received some reinforcements, as it is reported that on the 21st very severe fighting took place in or before Reggio. After Garibaldi had stormed some outworks, the artillery in the fort of Reggio refused to continue firing, and General Viale capitulated. In this engagement Colonel de Flotte (the republican representative for Paris in the French Legislative Assembly of 1851) was killed.

The Neapolitan fleet in the Strait distinguished itself by doing nothing. After Garibaldi had landed, a naval commander telegraphed to Reggio that it was impossible for the ships to offer any resistance, as Garibaldi had with him eight large men-of-war and seven transports! During the crossing of General Cosenz’s division, which must have taken place on the 20th or 21st, at the narrowest part of the Strait, between Scilla and Villa San Giovanni, precisely at the spot where the Neapolitan ships and troops were most strongly concentrated, this fleet, too, offered no resistance. Cosenz’s landing was a signal success. The two brigades of Melendez and Briganti (the Neapolitans call them battalions instead of brigades) and Fort Pezzo (not Pizzo, as some telegrams say; that place lies much farther north, beyond even Monteleone) surrendered to him, as it seems, without a shot. This is said to have happened on the 21st; the same day on which Villa San Giovanni was also occupied, after a short skirmish.

Thus Garibaldi had in three days made himself master of the whole coastline on the Strait, including some fortified points; the few forts still held by Neapolitans were now useless to them.

The two following days seem to have been occupied with the passage of the remaining troops and material—at least we hear of no further fighting until the 24th, when a severe action is reported from a place called Piale in the telegrams, but which we cannot find on the map. It may be the name of a torrent-like mountain stream, whose ravine may have served the Neapolitans as a position of defence. The issue of this encounter is said to have been undecided. After some time the Garibaldians proposed an armistice, which the Neapolitan commandant referred to his commanding general at Monteleone. But before an answer could arrive, the Neapolitan soldiers seem to have come to the conclusion that they had done quite enough for their King, dispersed, and abandoned their batteries.

The main body of the Neapolitans under Bosco seems to have remained quietly at Monteleone, more than thirty miles from the Strait, the whole time. Apparently they were not very eager to fight the attackers. Therefore General Bosco went to Naples to fetch six battalions of chasseurs, who, next to the Guards and the foreign troops, are the most reliable parts of the army. Whether these six battalions have become infected with the spirit of dejection and demoralisation which prevails in the Neapolitan army remains to be seen. It is certain that neither they nor any other troops are capable of preventing Garibaldi from marching victoriously and most probably unopposed into Naples, to find the royal family fled and the city gates open for his triumphal entry.