London, 6 April 1854 
(You know the address) 

Dear Lassalle, 

Your letter of 7 March safely received. I should like to make a 
few comments, firstly on your military, and secondly on your 
diplomatic, views. 

ad I. To my comment” regarding Enos and Rodosto, you 
reply—agreeing in this with the English ministerial papers—that 

8 

4 K. Marx, ‘Lord Palmerston’. 

Constantinople must be protected.’ If the two fleets in the Black 
Sea and the Army of the Danube cannot protect it, then neither 
can 100,000 French and English. I do not, of course, deny that, if 
they are to be launched against Sevastopol or Odessa, they are 
closer to hand at Rodosto than in Malta or Toulon. 

The notion that a move into Serbia would place the Austrians 
‘in the rear of the Turkish Army of the Danube’ does not seem to 
me quite correct. The Austrians must make their crossing at 
Belgrade or not very far below it, or else enter Wallachia via 
Mehadia along the left bank of the Danube. In the first case they 
would find themselves in the extension of the Turkish left wing, in 
the second to the front of it. That this would mean the immediate 
sacrifice of Kalafat and Vidin, with the exception of the garrison 
which would remain there, is evident—but not that this Turkish left 
wing would be lost and its remnants compelled to fall back on the 
Shumla line. Au contraive,” the correct tactics for the Austrians would 
be to march immediately on Sofia via Nissa, hence the correct tactics 
for the Turks would be to withdraw from Vidin, likewise to Sofia. 
Not having so far to go, they would be there before the Austrians and 
could either make a stand in the Balkans or withdraw towards 
Adrianople. 

Should the Austrians allow themselves to be enticed into 
marching on Vidin, the Turks would still make for Sofia. This 
division of Omer Pasha’s principal corps would not involve the 
fragmentation of his forces, since the new enemy would necessitate 
a new Adrianople-Sofia-Belgrade-Vidin operational line. Thus the 
Turkish left wing would become an independent army. 

Should the strategy you postulate be adopted in spite of all this, 
no amount of falling back on the Shumla line would avail, for the 
latter, having already been outflanked as a result of the sacrifice of 
the highway from Belgrade to Constantinople, would have to be 
abandoned all the more precipitately in order to assemble all 
available reserves at Adrianople and advance against the first enemy 
to pass through the Balkans. 

ad 2. Ad vocem Palmerston. Your view of Palmerston is the one 
prevailing on the Continent and among the liberal majority of the 
English public.“ As for myself, I am of the unalterable opinion 
that Palmerston— en passant Princess Lieven paid his debts for him 
in 1827, Prince Lieven got him into the Foreign Office in 1830 and 
Canning, on his deathbed, told people to beware of him—is a 

a See also this volume, p. 419 - > On the contrary - © as for 

Russian agent. I came to this conclusion after the most conscienti- 
ous and painstaking scrutiny of the whole of his career and, 
indeed, of the ‘Blue Books’, the ‘Parliamentary Debates’ and the 
pronouncements of his own diplomatic agents.”” Though far from 
amusing and very time-consuming to boot, the work has proved 
rewarding in so far as it provides the key to the secret diplomatic 
history of the past 30 years.—(En passant. Some of my Tribune 
articles on Palmerston have again been reprinted in London as 
separate pamphlets in 50,000 copies.**’) 

Palmerston is no genius, a genius would not lend himself to 
such a role. But he is a most talented man and a consummate 
tactician. His artistry does not lie in serving Russia, but rather in 
contriving to maintain the role of a ‘rruLy ENnciisu minister’ while so 
engaged. The only difference between him and Aberdeen is that 
Aberdeen serves Russia because he doesn’t understand her, while 
Palmerston serves her although he does. Hence the first is Russia’s 
avowed partisan, the second her secret agent, the first gratis, the 
second in return for fees received. Even if he himself now wished 
to do so, he could not turn against Russia because he is at her 
mercy and must live in constant fear of being immolated in 
Petersburg. This is the man who in 1829 condemned Aberdeen’s 
policy as not pro-Russian enough,” who was told by Robert Peel in 
the House of Commons?” that he didn’t know whose representative 
he was, who sacrificed the Poles in 1831, who imposed the Treaty 
of Unkiar-Skelessi on the Porte in 1833,°' who abandoned the 
Caucasus and the Danube estuary to Russia in 1836, who 
engineered the treaties of 1840 and 1841** and a new Holy 
Alliance against France, who conducted the Afghan War in the 
Russian interest,’ who, in 1831, 1836 and 1840, paved the way 
for the incorporation of Cracow, only to protest against it in 1846, 
etc.°” No matter what he engaged in, he worked against his 
country’s commercial interests on the pretext of protecting them. 
E.g., in the matter of Neapolitan sulphur.*’? He frustrated 
advantageous trade agreements which were about to be ratified 
with France. This is the man who delivered up Italy and 
Hungary.”'* Had he merely worked against revolutionary peoples, 
it would have been understandable. But in questions involving 
exclusively British interests, he invariably contrived in the most 

2 Palmerston, [Speech in the House of Commons on 1 June 1829,] G. H. Francis, 
Opinions and Policy of the Right Viscount Palmerston, London, 1852, pp. 123- 
26. - > Probably Robert Peel’s Speech in the House of Commons on 16 February 
1830, ibid., p. 138. 

subtle manner to betray these to Russia. Incidentally, people here 
are beginning to understand him. Looking forward to hearing 
from you soon, 

Your 
K. M.