Ever since Sir Charles Napier set sail for the Baltic, with the 
First Lord of the Admiralty’s “full permission to declare war’, the 
more sanguine portion of the British public expect shortly to hear 
of Kronstadt bombarded, the approaches to St. Petersburg forced, 
and who knows? perhaps even the Union Jack hoisted on the 
glittering spire of the Russian Admiralty Palace. 

There is a very correct idea at the bottom of these anti- 
cipations; it is this, that Kronstadt is the decisive point for any 
naval attack against Russia in the Baltic. Take Kronstadt, and St. 
Petersburg is at your feet, the Russian Navy exists no longer, and 
Russia is reduced to what she was before Peter the Great. If 
England has the forces in the Baltic required for such a feat, and 
if these forces should fritter away their strength in attacks against 
minor points, more than might be absolutely necessary, they would 
commit a blunder of the first magnitude, decisive in its effects 
perhaps for two or three campaigns to come. But if we know the 
vital importance of Kronstadt, the Russians know it also, and have 
acted up to their knowledge. That key of Russia has been 
surrounded by double and triple armour, bristling with something 
like a thousand guns. 

It is well known that Kronstadt takes up the south-eastern angle 
of a small island,* about five miles in length, which closes up the 
narrowing portion of the Gulf of Finland, about 16 miles from the 
mouth of the Neva. The water on both sides of the island is 
generally very shallow, having only two channels navigable for 

* Kotlin.— Ed. 

sea-going vessels. The one passing to the north of the island has a 
depth of not less than four fathoms* about two or three miles 
distant from its northern shore, bends round at four miles from 
its eastern extremity, approaching this latter to within 1,400 yards, 
but losing about a fathom in its depth of water. Thus the whole of 
the north-eastern coast of the island is out of cannon range for 
any men-of-war coming round by this channel, except the western 
and eastern extremities only. These alone are therefore fortified, 
the first by the forts Katharine, Alexander and Michael, the second 
by the walls of the town itself and by two batteries erected on the 
sands, about 1,000 yards in advance; the larger one of these 
batteries, however, is reported to be in ruins. Abreast of the north 
shore of the island, between its eastern and western defences, and 
fully a mile from the shore, another battery is constructed on the 
sands, which however is still out of gun-shot range from the 
four-fathom channel. 

This northern passage, then, from its general distance from the 
defences, from the very intricate navigation it offers, and from the 
considerable shallowing of its south-eastern extremity, may be 
considered useless for a serious attack upon Kronstadt. Under 
circumstances where a dispersion of forces is to a certain extent 
not likely to bring on disastrous results, it may serve for sending a 
number of the lighter ships round the island, where, after 
silencing the not very formidable fire of the East Battery, they 
might take up a very convenient station for bombarding the town. 
Kronstadt, containing not only the chief naval magazines and 
dock-yards of Russia in the Baltic, but also plenty of timber in 
private hands, is full of combustible materials, and a few lucky hits 
with shell-guns might create a conflagration destroying in one 
night the naval stores amassed during years. Whether the taking 
up of such a position by a sufficient number of light men-of-war is 
actually possible, a close survey of the state of matters on the spot, 
combined with renewed soundings, must show; whether it is 
advisable, will depend upon the balance of forces; here we can 
only state what may, even at a distance, appear feasible from a 
comparison of the best evidence that can be collected. 

The main line of attack, then, remains the South Channel, 
leading to the Great and Little Roads, otherwise called the 
Narrows. Here the four-fathom channel, several miles wide off the 
north-western point of the island, suddenly contracts to about a 
mile in width at two miles distance from the inner harbour, and 

* 1 fathom=6 feet=1.82 metres.— Ed. 

Plan of Kronstadt drawn by Engels while writing the article 
“The Fortress of Kronstadt” 

The Fortress of Kronstadt 113 

thence forms an extremely acute angle, the apex of which is 
situated in front of the man-of-war harbour. Here a narrow bar, 
passing from the great sand-bank of Oranienbaum to the island, 
cuts the channel off and reduces its extreme depth to 3'/, fathoms. 
The Russians have taken good care to preserve this natural 
fortification for their man-of-war harbour, although a little 
dredging would remove it. This four-fathom channel, then, the 
central passage of which is nowhere less than 4'/y fathoms deep, 
and admits the largest men-of-war, is the line of approach to 
Kronstadt, and the decisive struggle must take place in its apex, 
which, for a mile and a half, is nowhere more than 400 yards 
wide. 

The fortifications which defend this channel are of all sorts, 
from the antediluvian buildings of Peter the Great, to the most 
modern and formidable constructions with two or three tiers of 
guns one above the other. It is remarkable that the most 
important points are defended by fortifications of old and faulty 
construction: this is the weak side of Kronstadt. The old fortifications 
are small bastioned works, with guns firing from behind an open 
parapet, and with few or no casemated guns at all; with 
exceedingly small and narrow bastions, and therefore carrying a 
number of guns exceedingly small in proportion to their extent of 
frontage. It must, besides, be stated that one half of their guns is 
generally directed towards shallow water from which at the very 
utmost a gun-boat attack could be expected. But to such 
fortifications even gun-boats were formidable. 

The modern constructions, on the contrary, are planned upon 
the system which Montalembert first introduced and which since, 
with more or less modification, has been generally adopted, 
especially for coast and harbour defences. Besides Kronstadt, 
Cherbourg and Sevastopol may be quoted as examples of its 
extensive application for this latter purpose. These constructions 
are distinguished by their two or three tiers of guns ranging one 
above the other, the lower tiers of guns standing in casemates, 
small vaulted rooms, as it were, where both guns and men are as 
much protected from the enemy’s fire as it can be done. The 
upper tier of guns alone stands behind a parapet not covered in, 
but from their elevated station which commands the upper decks 
of the largest three-deckers, are well protected against the effects 
of shot. The trial of an attack will show, whether these forts have 
actually been constructed solidly enough to bear the concussion of 
their own and the effect of the enemy’s fire; but if they are, they 
will prove the hardest nuts to crack. 

We may distinguish three lines of fortifications around the 
Kronstadt channel. | 

The first, or outer, line embraces in a semi-circle the mouth of 
the Great Road, or that part of the four-fathom channel which is 
from one mile to half a mile in width. The right, or northern, 
wing of the position is formed by the Peter Fort, an insignificant 
lunette on the island, about 1,400 yards from the deep water 
channel; a mortar battery, also on the island, half a mile to the east, 
which may be considered as almost useless, and the Fort 
Constantine, a strong lunette closed to the rear, built on the sands, 
within 1,000 yards from the edge of deep water, exactly in front 
of the mortar battery. This fort is of modern construction and 
carries 50 guns in two tiers. It serves to defend the outer 
approaches, and may become troublesome to a fleet while 
forming; but if once passed, one half of its guns become useless. 
The centre of the first line is made up by Fort Alexander (not the 
one on the north end of the island, mentioned before); a 
semi-circular building erected in three fathoms water within 
four hundred yards of the deep channel where it narrows to half 
a mile. This fort therefore sweeps the channel from side to side, 
and small as it looks on plans and charts, it carries no less than 
seventy two guns in three tiers. If it be of sufficiently solid 
construction, and with well-ventilated casemates so as to draw off 
the smoke, this tower-like fort will give enough to do to a couple 
of three-deckers. Behind it lies the old Citadel, a lunette the 
insignificance of which is proved by the very existence of the new 
fort, which intercepts the fire of one half of its guns. 

The left or southern wing, finally, is formed by the Risbank 
Fort and Battery, situated south of the entrance to the Great Road. 
This fort, constructed in the last century, has undergone a 
modernizing process, in consequence of which part of its guns are 
disposed in two tiers and their total number is increased to fifty. 
But for all that it occupies a far larger area than the modern forts, 
offering a frontage towards the roads of some 300 yards, which 
frontage, besides, is enfiladed, partially from the deep water 
channel, and entirely by a position which vessels of lighter draft 
may take up in 3'/, to 3 fathoms water within half a mile 
westwards. To obviate this, the Risbank Battery has been built 600 
yards to the rear, but in a position little adapted for that purpose. 
The Risbank Fort lies exactly a mile south from Fort Alexander, 
and both sweep the entrance to the Great Road. with cross fire. 

This first line of defences would not in itself prove very 
formidable, if it were not materially supported by the more distant 

The Fortress of Kronstadt 115 

fire of the second line. The second line protects the whole of the 
Great Road along with the entrance to the Little Road. It consists 
of the two flanking works of Fort Peter the First (old, badly 
constructed, a sort of crown-work situated half a mile east of Fort 
Alexander, and carrying on a frontage of 250 yards only 24 guns), 
Kronslot (bastioned old-fashioned work of five fronts, two of which 
look towards the shallow water and are therefore useless, carrying, 
although 400 yards in its longest diagonal, no more than 36 guns) 
and lastly, the fortified western wall of the Merchant Harbour in the 
centre. This wall, projecting from the island of Kronstadt itself, 
comes down to the very edge of the deep channel with which it 
forms a right angle, and which is here but 300 yards wide. It 
carries 70 guns and 12 mortars, part of which however appear so 
placed as to have little effect upon the shipping, and offers, in 
conjunction with both the main fronts of Peter I Fort and two 
fronts of Kronslot, a most effective cross fire over the inner half 
of the Great Road, where because of the obstacles created by the 
fire of the first line, and the narrowness of the channel, it must be 
extremely difficult for any ships but screw-steamers to take up a 
good position in sufficient force. 

The third line, the direct defence of the Little or Inner Road, is 
formed, on the south side of the channel, by a third (the North 
East) front of Kronslot, and on the north and east side by the 
fortified walls of the Merchant, Middle, and Man-of-war harbours. 
The latter, projecting at an obtuse angle at the eastern end of the 
Middle Harbour, rakes the whole of the Little Road, while the 
south wall of the Merchant and Middle harbours protects it by a 
front fire. Both walls are flanked by several bastions, fortified 
gates and other projections. The width of the deep water channel, 
here, being nowhere greater than 250 yards, the fighting would be 
very murderous, but it is hardly to be doubted that before ships 
could penetrate so far, Kronstadt would have to capitulate. The 
central work of this third line, and the only one which may ever 
have any practical utility, is Fort Menchtkoff, the first bastion, from 
the west, on the Merchant Harbour south wall. This bastion has 
been reconstructed into a tower of imposing proportions, carrying 
44 guns in four tiers above one another one half of which enfilade 
the greater part of the Little and Great roads, the other half 
appearing, from the direction of their embrasures, almost useless. 
Whether the four tiers of guns will not prove too heavy for the 
narrow foundation of the building, remains to be seen. 

We may add that on the land-side Kronstadt is fortified by 
regularly bastioned fronts, requiring a siege in due form to be 

forced; and such a siege in the swampy ground of the little island, 
with only a fleet for base of operations, offers very great diffi- 
culties. If Kronstadt is to be taken, it must be done from the sea. 

It is understood that we could only describe the permanent 
fortifications such as they existed according to the latest surveys 
and military reports. There may have been some alterations 
during the last few years, but it is not probable that they have 
been very important. 

To recapitulate. The fate of any attack against Kronstadt must 
be decided in the Great Road, and here the only fortifications that 
can effectually play against the attacking fleet, are Forts Alexander, 
Peter I, Risbank, two fronts of Kronslot, the western Harbour Wall, 
and Fort Menchikoff. Altogether they may bring 350 
guns at once to bear upon the attack, most of them well protected 
by walls and vaults, and firing through narrow embrasures. 
The other batteries are either directed towards other points of 
attack, or they are insignificant, or they are not within effective 
range. The question is: Can a sufficient naval force be brought 
up this narrow and intricate channel, to face both the northern 
and southern fronts of defence and to silence their fire, while 
that force is itself exposed to a raking fire from the Harbour 
Wall, Fort Menchikoff and Kronslot? Naval men may answer that 
question, unless they prefer to wait till the actual trial has been 
made. From what little we have had occasion to learn of naval 
tactics, we should say that here, if anywhere, is the point where 
the superiority of screw-ships of the line can produce results which 
to sailing-ships and paddle-steamers would appear equally unat- 
tainable. 

The great weakness of Kronstadt, we repeat it, are the forts 
of old construction. They occupy the best positions and the largest 
portion of available space with the least possible effect of fire. If 
Risbank has been improved, Peter I and Kronslot remain 
inefficient. They might be silenced with comparative ease, perhaps 
even occupied, and in that case might be used to bombard the 
town. But from the moment ships have penetrated as far as 
between Alexander and Risbank, they have the town within 
shell-range, and can do immense mischief, unless sufficiently 
occupied by the forts. 

Written at the end of March (not later than Printed from the manuscript 

30), 1854