Friedrich Engels 
The new move in the Crimea 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4402, 29. Mai 1855 

The new move in the Crimea. 

The letter of our Paris correspondent published yesterday gave the out- 
lines of the plan which, according to the best sources of information at 
Paris, the Allies propose to follow in the Summer campaign in the Cri- 
mea; and a scheme substantially the same having been divulged by Gen. 
Canrobert in the camp, we may fairly conclude that in this respect at 
least the truth is now known. It is simply that 25,000 men of the French 
reserves now distributed at Maslak, Gallipoli and Adrianople, are to be 
brought to the Crimea, to be followed by from 30,000 to 40,000 addi- 

tional troops—Piedmontese and French. As soon as the reserves arrive, 10 

and without waiting for the additional reénforcements, the French army 
will proceed to cross the Chernaya, flog the Russians on the field if it can 
penetrate to Sympheropol and then with the coming reénforcements to 
help out the operation, go on to clear the peninsula of Russians, and to 

occupy and fortify Perekop; after which the main army will return and '5 

finish the siege of Sevastopol at leisure. In the mean time the steamers of 
the fleets are to attack Kaffa and Kertch, and if they succeed in reducing 
those places, to occupy them as possible pivots or points of retreat for the 
active army in the field. 

This is certainly the only thing to be done by the Allies if they expect 20 

ever to bring the operations in the Crimea to a satisfactory conclusion. 
But thus to act in the field requires that the balance of forces should be 
considerably in their favor; otherwise they cannot expect to obtain any 
important advantage over the Russian army of observation. How, then, 

does the balance of strength stand at present? 25; 

The French have in the Crimea nine divisions of infantry and one 
brigade of cavalry (Chasseurs d'Afrique). At 7,000 men to a division, this 
gives a force of 63,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. The English have five 

The new move in the Crimea 

divisions of infantry amounting at a very high estimate, to 6,000 men 
each, and a division of say 2,000 horse. Then there are the remains of the 
Turkish force originally sent to the Crimea, which cannot possibly exceed 
6,000 infantry. Add to these the troops which Omer Pasha can withdraw 
5 from Eupatoria, where he must leave at least 15,000 men to garrison the 
extensive works erected there, and we shall increase the number of the 
allied army by say 120,000 infantry and perhaps 3,000 or 4,000 cavalry. 
These troops, as we learn from our correspondent at London, have al- 
ready been transported to the Chersonese and are encamped at Kadikoi, 
10 back of Balaklava, ready for the expected field movements. This is a 
much more judicious disposition than to attempt to effect ajunction by a 
separate inland movement of both the Anglo-French and Turkish armies, 
exposing them to be separately attacked by a superior Russian force. Our 
correspondent states the number of men Omer has brought to Kadikoi at 
15 a higher figure than we have estimated it, but he allots a corresponding 
English force to make up the garrison at Eupatoria, so that on the whole 
his estimates do not vary from ours. With these forces we must take into 
our account 20,000 men of the French army of reserve who may be 
expected to arrive by the time Canrobert intends to take the field, and the 
20 4,000 Piedmontese landed on the 9th of May. The allied strength in the 
Chersonese will then be as follows: 

French Infantry and Artillery .. 83,000 Cavalry 1,500 
English 5 5 30,000 2,000 
Turks g 26,000 4,000 

25 Piedmontese " x 4,000 
Totals............. 143,000 7,500 

Whether the French reserves have any cavalry with them we do not 
know, or ifthey have, whether it will arrive in season for the commence- 
30 ment of operations is uncertain; however, to make as liberal a calculation 
` as possible for the Allies, let us add 2,000 horse to the above figures, 
which would give a total cavalry force of 9,500. 
A part of the plan is to continue to carry on the siege, and for this at 
least as many troops will be required as are now engaged in that ser- 
35 vice—that is to say: 

Four French divisions at 7,000 each............. 28,000 men. 
Three English divisions at 6,000 each.............. 18,000 men. 
Total.......................2.2...2222222222.....46,000 men 

To this number must be added the sailors and the troops intrusted with 
40 guarding Balaklava and the lines of intrenchments to Inkermann, and 

Friedrich Engels 

who at the same time serve as an army of reserve to the besieging corps. 
We put these down at a low estimate at 12,000. Estimating the sailors and 
marines at 4,000, we shall therefore have to deduct 56,000 men from the 
above 143,000, leaving available for field operations 87,000 infantry and 
artillery and 9,500 cavalry, or altogether about 96,500 men. And this, as 
we have said, is a very liberal computation. 

Now, according to a Russian military correspondent of the Augsburg 
Gazette, who has always put down the Russian forces at very low esti- 
mates, the Russians have now in the Crimea, of 

Regular Infantry 93,000 Regular and irregular Cavalry .... 20,000 10 
Sailors, Marines, etc. 8,000 
Chornomorski Cossacks 6,000 
Artillery, Engineers, etc. 13,000 

Total Infantry 120,000 Total Cavalry........................... 20,000 
The distribution of this force may be approximatively stated as follows: 15 

For the defense ofthe south side of Sevastopol, 

(infantry, artillery, etc.) men .... 26,000 
As Garrison to the North Fort and Intrenched Camp .... 24,000 
Total a Aa nee. PR ROR IGS 50,000 

This leaves as available for the field, 70,000 infantry and artillery and 20 
20,000 cavalry. 

In point of infantry the Allies will thus have a striking superiority, 
their number exceeding those of their antagonists by 26,500 men. As to 
the relative strength in artillery we are in the dark; but from the difficulty 
the Allies have always found in procuring horses, and from the large 25 
proportion of guns accompanying every Russian army, it is probable that 
the Russians will be superior to their opponents. In cavalry they will 
certainly have the advantage. Even if from their 20,000 horse we must 
substract 8,000 Cossacks, who would at all events come in for patrolling, 
outpost and orderly duties, they still retain 12,000 cavalry intact from 30; 
detachment service, against 9,500 of the Allies, of which number, on a 
day of battle, no more than 7,000 can be brought forward in line. 

The advance of the Allies toward the interior can hardly be made 
otherwise than on the road toward Mackenzie's farm and the space be- 
tween this road and the head of Sevastopol Bay or Inkermann; because 35 ; 
east of Mackenzie's farm the steep ridge encircling the Baidar Valley \ 
extends south-eastward until it joins the southern ridge of the Crimea 
near Yalta, forming a rocky barrier impassable for cavalry and artillery, 
and practicable for infantry by a few footpaths only. From Yalta there » 
indeed a road crossing the hills, but this can be defended by a very few’ \ 4 

The new move in the Crimea 

troops, and has no doubt been fortified by the Russians long since, as 

well as the footpath passes. Besides, the direction of this road, the dis- 

tance of Yalta from Balaklava, and the chance it offers to the Russians 

to cut off any corps operating on this line, will hardly admit of its being 
5 used by the Allies as their main line of operations. 

The road by Mackenzie's farm to the Alma and Sympheropol is de- 
fended by a double row of intrenchments; first on the ridge overhanging 
the Chernaya, and secondly on the north side of a ravine running down 
from the edge of the rocky range, near Mackenzie's farm, to the head of 

10 Sevastopol Bay. This second and main line of defense, which is not more 
than two English miles in extent, is said to be very strongly intrenched, 
and here the first decisive action will have to be fought—an action de- 
ciding whether the Allies are to continue imprisoned on the Heracleatic 
Chersonese or to gain the interior of the country. This position will cost a 

15 harder struggle to carry than the Alma, for the forces will be more equal- 
ly balanced, unless the Russians commit the mistake of dispersing their 
troops. They can easily concentrate 75,000 men for the defense of these 
intrenchments, and if the Allies attack with from 80,000 to 90,000 men, 
this superiority will in a great measure be made up by the intrenchments, 

20 and by the narrow front on which the Allies must necessarily act. If the 
Russians behave as they should, they must here check the advance of the 
Allies at once and force them back into their stronghold on the Cher- 
sonese. But if the Russians are defeated and the position carried, there 
remains nothing for them but to retire upon the Belbeck and attempt to 

25 hold that line. In this case the garrison of the north side of Sevastopol 
would have to be observed by the Allies, whose army in the field would 
thereby be weakened by some 8,000 or 10,000 men; and if even the Rus- 
sians suffered a second defeat, their superiority in cavalry would secure 
them a safe retreat, although their line of retreat would lie in the prolon- 

30 gation of their left wing—a very unfavorable position unless made up for 
by some countervailing advantage. 

These are a few of the considerations offering themselves on this new 
turn of affairs in the Crimea. They are far from exhausting the subject, to 
which we shall therefore soon return.