Friedrich Engels

Movements of the Armies in Turkey

Written about October 21, 1853.

From the English.

["New-York Daily Tribune" No. 3919, November 8, 1853, leading article]

Several important military movements have lately taken place in the Turkish theatre of war, revealing still more clearly the positions and plans of the parties concerned. The Russians—to whom we turn first, because they are the attacking party and are therefore to be regarded as those who take the initiative—have extended their line of operations farther to the west. One brigade after another was set in march toward Widdin on the upper Danube; and it may now be said that the front of the Russian army extends from Kalafat opposite Widdin to Orasch opposite Hirsowa, in a direction that threatens alike the road to Constantinople and that to Serbia and Macedonia. The first movement upon Kalafat sufficed to allow a Russian diversion toward the centres of the Slavonic and Greek population in Turkey to be recognised with certainty. At the same time it has thereby become probable that the plan of campaign provides for defensive actions and mere demonstrations on the direct road to Constantinople, but for energetic offensive operations on the road to Sofia, in Serbia and Macedonia. When these movements were undertaken, however, the Turks had not yet declared war. That has since occurred and appears to have angered the Tsar to such a degree that he is likely to impart to his troops a far more energetic impulse than was previously to be expected. Not only has Prince Paskevich been appointed commander of the Russian troops, but it is also said that he is bringing with him 40,000 men from the army in Poland, which, next to the Guard and the Grenadiers, is considered the best troop in Russian pay. Such reinforcements would establish a superiority of the Russian arms

that would justify offensive operations on the upper as well as on the lower Danube, while at the same time they would have to be regarded as a counterweight to French and British troops which, according to rumour, are possibly to be dispatched in support of Turkey. In any case, these Russian reinforcements can no longer arrive on the Danube in time to undertake operations this year. From Warsaw to Bucharest via Dubno, Chotin and Jassy the distance is about 800 miles, and it passes through a region in which an army cannot advance more than eight to ten miles a day. It would therefore take three months, or until the beginning of January, before these fresh troops could take up their positions; and if we take the season into account, it is even probable that they will require still longer. These troops must therefore remain completely in the background until the opening of the spring campaign.

The Russian troops at present in the Principalities have been estimated at 130,000 to 150,000 men. Assuming they have lost 20,000 to 30,000 men through sickness and desertion, they still possess a numerical superiority over the Turks. For even if we know little more about the actual strength of the Russian troops than what can be gleaned from the number of divisions and brigades that have marched into Turkey and the effective strength they are supposed to have, the number of Turkish troops on the Danube is very well known to us from the reports of the British, French and Piedmontese officers sent there by their respective governments. All these reports agree that, even after the arrival of the Egyptian contingent, the active Turkish army under Omer Pasha numbered no more than 110,000 combatants, and of these only 80,000 regular soldiers. In their rear a reserve army was formed at Adrianople, which is said to consist of 80,000 redifs (trained, recalled soldiers), but about the condition of this reserve we possess no precise information. It is therefore a fact that on the day the first shot is fired the army commanded by Omer Pasha will be numerically weaker than that of his opponent, and that only gross errors on the part of his opponent, or excellent generalship on his part, will preserve him from defeat.

We are equally well informed about the position and the defensive preparations of the Turks. Three lines have been fortified: first, the Danube, to prevent its being crossed by the enemy; second, the line from Varna to Shumla; third, the one a few miles behind the second on the

River Kamchik, where the fort securing the Balkan passes is situated. These fortifications are described by the foreign officers as insurmountable and sufficient to render any enemy assault futile. But with all respect for the significant art of field fortification and for the judgement of the officers making this report, we venture to remark that such opinions must be received with the greatest caution. How many fieldworks have existed that were considered impregnable and were taken at the first assault after a few rounds of case-shot, and who does not know that the most famous fortified position ever constructed, the lines of Torres Vedras, was not strong through its passive power of resistance, but because Wellington had 100,000 men for its defence while Masséna could bring up only 30,000 men for the attack! Isolated, detached field redoubts, e.g. in mountain passes, have often rendered good service, but in modern times a superior army commanded by an able general has never yet been defeated in an ordinary action owing to the passive power of resistance afforded by fieldworks. Furthermore, the manner in which field fortifications are defended is of decisive importance; yet poorly disciplined troops or undisciplined soldiers are of little use behind a breastwork when a hail of case-shot sweeps over them.

But let us cast a glance at the three defensive lines fortified by the Turks. The first is the Danube. Admittedly, the fortification of the Danube line can only mean that such works are erected as to prevent a river crossing by the Russians. The Danube is about 600 miles long from Orsova to its mouth; to fortify such a line effectively and to occupy the fortifications with troops would require six times as many soldiers as are under the command of the Turkish general; and if he had them, he would commit the gravest error by employing them for that purpose. We infer from this that this first line of fortification must be limited to works between Rustchuk and Hirsowa, by which the river crossing can be hampered but not effectively prevented.

The second position—from Shumla to Varna—is exactly the same in which the Turks were utterly defeated in 1829 and in which they can certainly be crushingly defeated again should they accept a decisive battle there. The position appears to possess outstanding defensive qualities and could be artificially strengthened further. The position on the Kamchik, in the rear of Varna and Shumla,

seems to be still stronger and has, besides, the advantage of compelling the enemy to leave troops behind for the blockade of these fortresses. Both, however, have the disadvantage that behind them they have only a narrow pass as the sole line of retreat, whereby all other advantages are cancelled for a weaker army, and it would constitute an unheard-of error to accept battle unless the weaker army were as certain as the British at Waterloo that, at the decisive moment, an allied army would fall upon the flank of the attacking enemy.

We have no means of judging what use Omer Pasha will make of these fortifications. Doubtless he knows very well that his role in the war will essentially be a defensive one; and he is therefore perfectly right to strengthen his defensive position with every means the art of fortification places at his disposal. We do not know whether he intends with these fortifications to deter the Russians from crossing the Danube at those points from which Constantinople is most directly threatened, or whether he is prepared to accept a decisive battle here. He is said to have drawn up his army in such a way that he is ready to fall upon the head of the main body of the Russians wherever they cross the Danube in the direction of Shumla and to beat them before support can be brought up for them. In this case the second fortified line would provide a secure retreat should the operation be frustrated. But in truth, a great defensive battle on any of the three defensive lines would be an error; for either the Russians will concentrate their entire forces for the attack, and then Omer Pasha will scarcely have a chance left, or they will divide their forces, and then he would have to leave the fortified lines in order to fall upon one of the Russian columns. The best use of these fortifications, and the only one that corresponds to the modern requirements of war, would be for him to employ them as temporary bases for offensive operations against individual Russian columns at the moment they cross the Danube; to check the Russian advance through a more or less tenacious defence of each individual line; and, by means of the third line, to hold the most important Balkan passes for as long as that could be done without a pitched engagement. At the same time, it must not be concealed that any army, and especially the Turkish army, would be utterly demoralised by the surrender of these fortresses without a fight; for if it cannot hold its own behind entrenchments and ditches,

how is it to beat the Russians in the open field? That is the way the common soldier always reasons, particularly when he is but little disciplined. If, therefore, these fortresses really possess the importance ascribed to them, we must consider them less dangerous for the Russians than for the Turks themselves.

But have the Russians not also entrenched themselves in Wallachia? Certainly, yet their situation is a different one. They are the attacking party; their fortifications serve only to cover the retreat and hold up the pursuers in the event of a reverse. Moreover, they have four rivers, one behind the other, which touch their line of retreat and accordingly form four defensive lines. These lines are: the Danube, the Argeș, the Buzău and the Siret. That is an ideal possibility to erect precautionary fortifications; those are natural defensive lines which form no obstacle for a European army during a retreat, but which, when reinforced by a few artificial improvements of the terrain, become serious obstacles to pursuit; and, in addition, there is here no intention of accepting a general battle with only a single line of retreat. As far as we can judge, the Russian fortifications decidedly belong to the European system of warfare, whereas in those of the Turks the Asiatic character predominates. The same thoughtless character is the determining factor in the general position of the Turks. They defend Constantinople by placing themselves across the nearest approach road to it, while the Russians appear not to direct their first attack upon this city, but upon the central part of the peninsula, where Turkish rule is especially vulnerable, and from where an army can, nevertheless, take the shortest route to the capital.

But there is one circumstance that we must not forget. The Russian army is, and always has been, slow and cautious in its movements. They will in all probability undertake nothing during the winter. There may be a few skirmishes to gain this or that Danube island for the one or the other party. Yet, unless the Tsar should command quite extraordinary activity – in which case, however, the execution of such an order would very probably be thwarted by the passive pedantry of his generals – there is very little prospect of decisive manoeuvres before the arrival of spring. The Danube could be crossed, but the Balkan cannot be traversed, and between the two the position of the Russians would be extremely perilous.

In the meantime, the Turks have dispatched their fleet to Varna. The Englishman, Admiral Slade, who commands it, seems to be of good courage. Yet this movement, too, is highly risky. In fact, the Russian fleet appears, in everything except its numbers, to be inferior to the Turkish, but as long as the Russians have two ships of the line for every Turkish one, and two Russian cannon for every Turkish cannon, the Turks can venture no operation beyond the range of their coastal batteries. And in such a case the fleet would lie safer and better in the Bosphorus, where the Russians will scarcely attempt to blockade it. Once the Turkish fleet is at Varna, every possibility of movement is taken from it, while at the Bosphorus it preserves its freedom of action and can be employed for expeditions to Trebizond, to the Caucasian coast, or against individual detachments of the Russian fleet.

Thus, for better or worse, we are compelled to assume that the Russians are in every respect superior to the Turks. Whether Omer Pasha, who is indeed a capable soldier, will succeed by throwing his personal qualities into the scale remains to be seen. Old Paskevich, although a slow fellow, is an experienced general and will not easily be outwitted.