London, 22 October 1885 

Dear Sir, 

I have received your esteemed note of the 15th, *** though the seal 
was badly damaged; this I enclose herewith to the greater glory of Mr 
Stephan. +55 

Since 1848 I, too, have frequently maintained that Russian tsar- 
dom is the last refuge and chief military reserve of European reaction. 
However there have been many changes in Russia over the past 20 years. 
The so-called emancipation of the peasants has created a thoroughly 
revolutionary situation in that it has placed the peasants in a situa- 
tion in which they can neither live nor die. The rapid development of 
large-scale industry and its means of communication, the banks, etc., 
have merely aggravated this situation. Russia is faced with its own 
1789. The Nihilists, 35° on the one hand, and a financial crisis on the 
other are symptomatic of this situation. Prior to the last loan, things 
had got to such a pitch that the Russian government was unable to 
raise money even in Berlin unless the loan was guaranteed by a repre- 
sentative assembly. Even Mendelssohn imposed this condition. At 
this point, when tsardom was in dire straits, Bismarck stepped in and 
authorised a loan, admittedly of a paltry 15 million pounds, a drop in 
the ocean, but enough to provide a few years’ respite.? By doing so, 
Bismarck subjugated Russia, which even today cannot get money 
without him, but by the same token he also put off the Russian revo- 
lution and that certainly did not suit his book either. It is the 
first time Bismarck has done something that has not indirectly and 
contrary to his will turned out to our advantage and if he carries 
on in the same way we may no longer have any use for him. 

So whether the Russians are to get any more money depends pri- 
marily on Bismarck and, if he consents, the financial philistines of 
Germany will be only too delighted to fall into the trap set for them. 
The fact that they will lose their money in the process concerns me 
not at all; on the contrary, it will serve them right, nor will the so- 
called German national capital suffer much in the process, since the 
portion we are interested in consists of ironworks, factories and other 
instruments of production, which can hardly be loaned to the Rus- 
sians. The so-called money capital that is being lent is to a great ex- 
tent bogus capital, lines of credit, and this is of little consequence. 
What would be of far greater consequence would be to make it diffi- 
cult, if not impossible, for the Russians to obtain credit, but on this 
score your typical German punter has more faith in Bismarck than in 
us. At the moment it’s quite impossible for me to spend time on an at- 
tempt to reduce the question of Russian state credits to the size it de- 
serves; a work of that kind, however timely and worthwhile, would ne- 
vertheless call for a study of Russian conditions from Russian sources. 
As regards the actual financial side, a table showing the Russian 

national debt for the past few years together with lists of stock market 
prices would suffice, but in the case of economic conditions within the 
country itself a great deal of study would be necessary if one was to 
form an accurate opinion. One of the main works is a survey carried 
out by the Russian War Ministry under the title Boenno- 
cmamucmuuecki cbopuuxe IV. Poccia,* St Petersburg, 1871. 

Also: 

A. Cxpe6uykilt, Kpecmeancxoe 0020 66 yapcmeosanie Haunepamopa 
Anexcandpa IT,” Bonn, 1862-68, 4 volumes, about 5,000 pages in all. 

Also the c6OopHukn cTaTucTu4ueckux’ cBbazbuiii © of the individual 
gouvernements," in particular Moscow and Tver, and Aucons, Chasnu- 
mensuan cmamucmuxa Pocciu u sanadxo-eeponeuckuxe 2ocydapcmes,* St Pe- 
tersburg, 1880, several volumes. 

The Russian budgets aren’t worth the paper they are written on. 
Sheer lies and invention, more so even than those presented in Prussia 
prior to 1848. 

As to an evaluation of the armies now reorganised along Prussian 
lines, this is a sheer impossibility. We do know, however, that Austria 
and, to an even greater extent, Russia, lack the large educated class 
which alone can supply an adequate number of officers suitable for 
employment in armies of this size, and that, according to the account 
of their own General Kuropatkin,‘ the Russians’ conduct of opera- 
tions in 1878 in Turkey was inferior to that of the Prussians in 
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Liebknecht’s letter returned herewith. *°7” 

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Your obedient servant, 
F, Engels