Friedrich Engels 
The Siege of Sevastopol 

New-York Daily Tribune. 
Nr. 4236, 15. November 1854 

The Siege of Sevastopol. 

Next to the battle of the Alma, the principal achievement ot the Allies in the 
Crimea has been Lord Raglan's famous flank march from the Alma to 
Balaklava, by which he changed the apparent object of the campaign from 
the capture and occupation of Sevastopol to a coup de main against a por- 
tion,—and the weaker portion, too,—of the fortifications, including, of course, 
the destruction of the Russian fleet, dockyards and arsenals, but involving 
the withdrawal of the allied forces as soon as this object should be attained. 
That such must be the case, was plain, from the entire movement in question. 
It was an abandonment of the idea of attacking the northern front of the 
fortress, which is the commanding front, where alone an attack could really 
be decisive; and thus it was a patent confession of incompetence on the part 
of the expedition to accomplish what was laid down in its programme,—the 
complete capture and occupation of the place. Nevertheless, as we said, this 
very march has been glorified as a most brilliant stroke of generalship 
through columns on columns of high-sounding phrases and rhetorical gibber- 
ish; and even the great journals of London, with their correspondents on the 
spot, did not discover the truth till a month afterward, when the Government 
seems to have given them a hint of it. Thus, The London Times of Oct. 28, 
for the first time opening its eyes to the true state of the case, gently indicates 
that the minor object of the campaign may be the only one accomplished, 
and that the forts on the north side of the bay, if they do not voluntarily 
surrender, can hardly be taken. But The Times hopes they will behave 
respectably, and surrender, inasmuch as all dependent fortifications ought 
to give in when once the main body of the place is taken. But the truth is, 
that it is not the North Fort which depends upon the town of Sevastopol, 
but the town of Sevastopol which depends upon the North Fort, and we fear 
the argument of our cotemporary will hardly suffice to take so strong a 
fortress. 

Friedrich Engels 

It is true that since the "glorious march" in question nothinghas been done 
by the Allies of which anybody could boast much, and, therefore, our trans- 
atlantic cotemporaries are not to blame for making the most of it. As for the 
siege itself so far as it has proceeded, itis one ofthose things of which they 
may well think that the less said the better. But as we are bound to nothing 
but impartiality in the premises, we shall not be so delicate. The truth is that 
the war in general being an exceedingly curious war, this siege is one of its 
most curious points. The great feature of the war appears to be a belief that 
field-works are impregnable. First at Oltenitza, the old-fashioned way of 
cannonading was employed for a couple of hours and then the works were 
stormed but without success. At Kalafat the Russians did not even dare to 
make an attack. At Silistria a mere earth-work bore the brunt of the battle, 
and held out, even when almost leveled, against the frantic onslaught of the 
enemy. Now at Sevastopol a simple line of field-works is honored with more 
extensive breaching batteries, and with far heavier artillery, than were ever 
brought to bear against the mostregular fortress. This siege is a striking proof 
of the fact that in the same proportion as the material of warfare has, by 
industrial progress, advanced during the long peace, in the same proportion 
has the art of war degenerated. A Napoleon, on seeing the batteries before 
Sevastopol, bristling with eight and ten-inch guns, would burst out in a fit 
of irresistible laughter. But this is not the whole story by a great deal. 

About the Ist of October, the Allies were in position, but it was not till 
the 8th or 9th that the first ground was broken, and fire was not opened till 
the 17th. The reason of this delay was that the guns could not be brought 
up sooner. There were only four or five miles of ground to go over—all good, 
hard soil, with little undulation, and part of it a passable road. But they had 
no draught cattle. No draught cattle in the Crimea—the richest country for 
cattle in the whole world! Why, there were more bullocks in the valley of 
Baidar, within sight from the hights of the Chernaya, than would have been 
required to drag all the united fleet across the hills. But the valley of Baidar 
was open to the Cossacks, and the allied cavalry, in protecting arazzia, might 
be exposed to these formidable opponents. Besides, the Allies must keep on 
good terms with the inhabitants, and not seize their property. With such 
excuses, our English cotemporaries seek to hide the truth that Raglan and 
Canrobert, while blockading Sevastopol on the south, are themselves block- 
aded by Menchikoff's outposts on the Chernaya. And yet, that they are so, 
is proved by the simple fact that the allied soldiers, up to the latest report, 
were compelled to live upon salt meat, no fresh meat being at hand. 

On the 3d of October five Russian battalions crossed the Chernaya near 
Inkerman, and were allowed to enter the fortress from the south, as "this 
could but be favorable to the Allies." An original mode of making war! The 

The Siege of Sevastopol 

enemy, represented as beaten, demoralized, dejected, sends 3,000 men into 
Sevastopol, under the very nose of the Allies. He must have had a reason 
for doing so. But if he has reasons for sending them, Raglan has his reasons 
for bowing them in. He supposes the place to be overcrowded, though upon 
what grounds, is not clear. Atallevents, beside the four square miles inclosed 
within the Russian lines, there is the whole of the north shore and all the 
country lying behind it, to which any excess of troops may be sent in ten 
minutes. To represent a place as overcrowded, which is blockaded on one 
side only, is certainly the hight of absurdity. 

When the landing was first reported, we said that disease would be the 
worst enemy of the Allies if the campaign should be lengthened. Disease is 
there in its worst forms, coupled, at least as far as the British are concerned, 
with the very worst sort of attendance. Indeed, to such an extent have the 
sick been neglected from this cause, that Lord Raglan has been obliged to 
issue a very peremptory reprimand to the medical staff. But this is not all. 
The doctors are at Constantinople, the medical stores at Varna, and the sick 
at Balaklava. Is not this a splendid illustration of the new military doctrine 
lately held forth by Louis Bonaparte at Boulogne, that every army, to have 
a good position, must be placed in a triangle? The sickness increases with 

the roughness of the season, the regiments dwindle down—a British regiment, 

sent out 1,000 strong, now cannot count more than 600 men under arms—and 
the slowness of operations goes on its even course. The routine of the Horse 
Guards, the fruit of forty years' peaceful schooling, is not to be upset by 
trifles of that sort. Perish the army, but let Sevastopol be taken according 
to Her Majesty's regulations! 

In common sieges the besiegers usually try to place their first batteries 
as near as possible to the enemy's works, and six or seven hundred yards 
is considered a great distance. But in a grand siege like this, particularly if 
against mere field-works, just the reverse should be done, according to 
Raglan. The enemy allows us to come within seven hundred yards, but we 
must never do what the enemy wants us to do. So says Raglan, and opens 
his batteries at 2,500 and 3,000 yards distance—a fact we could not believe 
did the reports leave it possible to doubt. Next he comes down to 1,500 and 
1,200 yards, and then states, as a reason for not opening fire, that breaching 
batteries, to be effective, must be within three or four hundred yards from 
the works to be breached! The distant batteries are to have Lancaster and 
long-range ten-inch guns, since it seems the British artillerists are of opinion 
that these guns are like telescopes, only good at a great distance. Indeed, this 
long-range question, which is perfectly inits place for naval armaments, has 
caused more confusion and humbug than real good when applied to land 
artillery; we have an example of it in these ridiculous batteries. 

Friedrich Engels 

The landward fortifications of Sevastopol, which have provoked all these 
outbursts of genius and perspicacity, are as follows: On the western side 
(attacked by the French) one or two faces of the Quarantine Fort are ex- 
posed. Behind this is a loopholed wall running up toward the head of the 
Quarantine Bay, and ending on a hill, in a round tower which forms a réduit 
for an earth-work constructed around it. Thence a wall of three feet average 
thickness is continued to the upper end of the harbor, thus inclosing Sevas- 
topol on the south-west. This wall is said to be incapable of any defense, 
although it might easily have been made so; itis, therefore, protected by small 
earth-works lying in front of it. From the end of the harbor eastward to the 
Careening Bay (the British front of attack) there are no regular defenses 
whatever, except two towers surrounded and sheltered by lunettes, in a 
similar manner with the one described above. There are besides some earth- 
works of irregular form, the whole forming an entrenched camp of no great 
pretensions, if we are to believe the published plans of Capt. Biddulph, 
sketched on the spot. At all events they show only one line of defenses, 
consisting of works open in the rear; there are no closed redoubts, of which 
as a general thing the Russians are so exceedingly fond. But we cannot 
believe that this is the case; if this was the only line to take, the British ought 
long since to have taken it with the bayonet. There must be a second line 
of redoubts behind it. 

The whole of the Russian works have been armed with heavy guns from 
the fleet—the best use the Russians could make of them. Yet their practice 
with them is despicable. They fire away whole days and nights at the enemy, 
and make one hit for a hundred rounds. Perhaps it was this very bad practice 
which induced Lord Raglan to open his trenches at the safe distance of 
3,000 yards. After three days' bombardment by the allied fleets and armies, 
it is stated that the British, on their side, had made one breach, while the 
French had not yet completed theirs. As soon as this was completed, the 
assault was to take place. That it should take 200 guns of immense caliber 
three or four days to breach such defenses would be incredible, had we not 
very good authority for the respectful distance at which the allied batteries 
had been constructed. So much for the results already achieved; but what- 
ever event may crown the operations, itis certain thatthe siege of Sevastopol 
will stand unparalleled in military history.