London, June 20. The local war proclaimed by Bonaparte in the 
Constitutionnel*? is a war in the Black Sea, and its purpose is the 
destruction of the alleged Russian supremacy in the Black Sea—a 
supremacy, moreover, that has never stood the test at sea, not 
even against the Turks. What is the state of affairs at the moment? 
The whole coast, from Constantinople to the Danube on one side 
and right round the Circassian shores to Balaklava and Eupatoria, 
has been snatched out of the hands of the Russians. Only Kaffa 
and Sevastopol are still holding out, with the former hard-pressed 
and the latter so situated that it will have to surrender as soon as it 
is seriously threatened. And more. The fleets are carrying out 
mopping-up operations in the inland sea of Azov, their light 
ships penetrate as far as Taganrog and every important place 
is bombarded by them. No part of the coast remains in Russian 
hands except the stretch from Perekop to the Danube, approxi- 
mately '/;; of their possessions on this coast. Supposing Kaffa 
and Sevastopol also fall, and the Crimea is under the control of 
the allies, then what? Russia will not conclude peace, as it has 
already proclaimed. It would be madness. It would be tantamount 
to giving up a battle after the vanguard has been repulsed, at the 
very moment that the main force is entering the battlefield. What 
remains for the allies to do? We are told they can destroy Odessa, 
Kherson, Nikolayev. They can go ahead and land a strong army at 
Odessa, fortifying it. against any number of Russians and then 

acting according to circumstances. In addition, they can send a 
detachment of troops to the Caucasus, wiping out the Russian 
army in Georgia and the other trans-Caucasian possessions (under 
General Muraviev) and cutting off the Russian Empire from its 
south Asian possessions. And if Russia still refuses to make peace? 
Russia cannot make peace as long as the enemy remains on its soil. 
It has not lost through any peace it has concluded in the last 150 
years. Even at Tilsit?’’ it acquired additional territory, and that 
peace was made before a single Frenchman had set foot on 
Russian soil. Having only recently succeeded to the throne, 
Alexander II dare not even attempt something that would have 
been perilous even for Nicholas. He cannot suddenly break with 
the imperial tradition. Supposing the Crimea has been captured 
and garrisoned with 50,000 allied troops; that the Caucasus and all 
the possessions in the south have been cleared of Russians; that an 
allied army is holding the Russians in check at the Kuban and the 
Terek; that Odessa has been taken and turned into a fortified 
camp with an army of 100,000 men; that Nikolayev, Kherson and 
Ismail have been destroyed or occupied by the allies—will the 
allies then limit themselves to maintaining their positions and 
count on wearing out the Russians? Their troops in the Crimea 
and the Caucasus will dwindle from disease faster than they can be 
replaced. Their main army at Odessa would have to be supplied 
by the fleets, as the land produces nothing for hundreds of miles 
around Odessa. Wherever they dared emerge from the camp they 
would be exposed to the harassment of the Russians, particularly 
the Cossacks. To force the latter to stand and fight would be 
impossible. It would always be to their advantage to entice the 
allies into the interior of the country. They would respond to all 
allied advances with a slow retreat. Moreover, large armies cannot 
be kept idle in a fortified camp for long. Disease and the gradual 
breakdown of discipline and morale would compel the allies to 
take a decisive step. It is therefore not feasible to occupy the main 
points of the coast and wait until the Russians find themselves 
constrained to give in. It would also be a military blunder. To 
control a coast it is not sufficient to hold the main points. Only 
possession of the country’s interior guarantees possession of the 
coast. With the allied forces established on the south coast of 
Russia, conditions would arise which would compel them to 
advance into the interior. But this is where the difficulties begin. 
All the way to the borders of the gubernias of Podolia, Kiev, 
Poltava and Kharkov the terrain is mostly uncultivated steppe, 
very poorly watered and yielding nothing but grass, and not even 

that when the heat of the sun has dried it out. Taking Odessa, 
Nikolayev and Kherson as their base of operations, where is the 
object at which the allies are supposed to direct their efforts? 
There appears to be none except Moscow, 700 miles away and 
requiring 500,000 men to march on it. But all this presupposes 
not merely the strict neutrality of Austria but even her moral 
support. And where is it? In 1854 Prussia and Austria declared 
the advance of the Russians across the Balkans to be a casus belli. 
Why not, then, a French advance on Moscow or even Kharkov in 
18562 One must never for a moment forget that any army 
marching from the Black Sea towards the interior of Russia 
exposes its flank to Austria just as much as a Russian army 
advancing from the Danube into Turkey, and therefore, at a given 
distance, renders its lines of communication and its base of 
operations, 1.e. its very existence, dependent on Austria. Should 
the allied armies pursue the Russians on a wild goose chase into 
the interior under these circumstances? It is nonsense, sheer 
nonsense, but it is the inevitable consequence of Bonaparte’s latest 
plan of “local warfare”. On all counts an inexorable dialectic 
drives the “local war” beyond the appointed local boundaries, 
turning it into a “grand” war, but without the prerequisites, 
conditions and_ resources of a grand war. Nevertheless, 
Bonaparte’s latest “plan” remains important. It constitutes an 
admission that other powers must step on to the stage to continue 
the war against Russia, and that the restored Empire finds itself 
condemned to the impotence of waging war on Russia on a local 
scale when it can only be done on a European scale. All the 
grotesque metamorphoses undergone by the “tdées napoléonien- 
nes”* under the restored Empire have been surpassed by the 
transformation of the Napoleonic war against Russia into a “local 
war’. 

In the debate on administrative reform, to be resumed this evening, 
the amendment moved by Bulwer on behalf of the Tories gave the 
government the opportunity of defeating the “administratives” by 
a majority of 7 to 1.?!* What characterised the whole debate was its 
junior civil-servant nature, which it failed to transcend for a 
moment. Details of favouritism and nepotism, investigations as to 
the “best type of examination”, resentment at merit neglected — 
everything was petty and pusillanimous. One seemed to be 
listening to a written complaint from an assistant gamekeeper to a 

government board. Aberdeen, too, had a reform of the bureaucra- 
cy in petto,* Gladstone asserted. Derby too, asserted Disraeli. Not 
less my Ministry, asserted Palmerston.’ So the city gentlemen need 
not swing into action to reform, inform and re-organise our 
Departments. Too kind! 

In their earlier agitation the English bourgeoisie took the ruling 
caste by surprise and drew the masses behind them as a chorus, by 
vastly overstating their real purpose in their programme. This 
time the programme does not even venture to rise to the height of 
the real purpose. One after the other you assure us that you do 
not seek the fall of the aristocracy but simply want to patch up the 
government machine in friendship with us! Very well!* Friendship 
for friendship! We are willing to reform the administration for 
you—within its traditional limits, of course. “Administrative 
reform” is not a matter of conflict between the classes as you 
assert. It is simply a question of the “issue”, of “well-intentioned” 
reforms. As initial evidence of your good intentions we ask you to 
leave the details to us, and it is only a matter of details. We 
ourselves must know best how far we can go without jeopardising 
our class, without administrative reform inadvertently becoming a 
matter of conflict between the classes and forfeiting its philan- 
thropic character. The reforming bourgeoisie are obliged to 
acquiesce in this ironic language of aristocratic bonhomie because 
they themselves speak a fraudulent language to the masses. The 
aristocracy, ministry and opposition, Whigs and Tories were never 
mistaken about the relationship of the Administrative Reformers 
to the masses. They knew that the agitation had failed before it 
had even had a chance to be produced in Parliament. And how 
could they have been mistaken? Although the Reform Association 
admitted selected guests only to its Drury Lane meeting, although 
its audience was sifted twice and thrice, their fear of a popular 
motion, or even simply an unorthodox speech, was so excessive 
that the chairman‘ declared at the opening of the meeting that the 
audience was only there to “listen to the addresses of the speakers 
announced in the programme”, no “resolutions” would be put to 
the vote, therefore “no amendments could be moved”, and ‘no 
addition could be made to the list of set speakers”. Agitation 

Gladstone’s speech was made on June 15, 1855 and the speeches by Disraeli 

like this is definitely not suitable to impress the tough English 
oligarchy and wring concessions from it. 

The report of the Roebuck committee which was read out in the 
Commons the day before yesterday envelops its points in a broad, 
feeble gush of words.* It contains timidly formulated criticism of 
the various departments, such as Ordnance, the Commissariat, the 
Medical Department, etc. It condemns Palmerston for his manage- 
ment of the militia, and the entire coalition ministry for the 
heedless frivolity with which it undertook the Sevastopol expedi- 
tion. As during the examination of witnesses the committee 
scrupulously avoided inquiring into the fundamental reasons for 
the stupendous calamities, it is only natura] that in the report, too, 
it is obliged to keep the balance between quite general criticism of 
the political heads and petty, detailed faulting of the administra- 
tive machinery. On the whole the committee has fulfilled its 
purpose of acting as a safety-valve for the pressure of public 
passions. 

The daily papers have let out a cry of indignation at the 
“dastardly murders” by the Russians at Hango.?!” The fact that 
ships sailing under flags of truce have been misused by the British 
for taking soundings with a plummet and spying out Russian 
positions, e.g. at Sevastopol and Odessa, is, however, admitted by 
The Morning Chronicle.”