Notification of the Content of Chairman Mao’s Conversation with Mr. Heath
(May 25, 1974)
(1)
I. Chairman Mao asked Mr. Heath whether President Nixon could survive the Watergate affair [2]. Mr. Heath believed that Nixon might manage to stay in office. Chairman Mao remarked, “We don’t understand this Watergate business—why has it caused such a huge uproar? It’s unnecessary and rather pointless. They’re just making a big issue out of it.” Mr. Heath then inquired whether the Watergate scandal had made it more difficult for China to establish relations with the United States and to pursue its policies toward both the U.S. and President Nixon. Chairman Mao replied that this was not the case. Mr. Heath went on to ask how Sino-U.S. relations would develop going forward, noting that after President Nixon’s visit to China [3] bilateral ties seemed to have stalled. Chairman Mao responded, “That’s no great concern; overall, things are still quite good. Could you perhaps advise President Nixon and give him a helping hand to help him get through the Watergate crisis?”

Turning to the 1954 Geneva Conference [4], Chairman Mao added, “The Americans simply stretch their reach too far. Look: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Iran, Turkey, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and even Europe. The Americans have been denouncing us for over twenty years.” Mr. Heath joked, “China should be wary of American imperialism!” To which Chairman Mao retorted, “But we are actually more at ease about the Americans.”

II. Chairman Mao asked Mr. Heath when the European Security Conference [5] would finally succeed. When Mr. Heath suggested that it would be easier to answer when the conference would come to an end, Chairman Mao agreed, saying, “Yes, we are in complete accord. Once that conference collapses, true reconciliation between the United States and the Soviet Union will never materialize.”

As Mr. Heath spoke of the Soviet Union’s strong resolve and robust organizational capacity to bolster its power, Chairman Mao countered by asking whether the Soviet Union faced no difficulties of its own. He said, “I believe they are already overwhelmed. They cannot simultaneously contend with Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, China, and the Pacific. I think they will ultimately lose out.” When Mr. Heath again emphasized the strength of the Soviet military and asked whether Chairman Mao considered the Soviet Union to pose no threat to China, Chairman Mao replied, “We are prepared for them. But if they do come, they will collapse! They have only so few troops—yet you Europeans seem so afraid of them.” He continued, “A certain segment of Western public opinion constantly seeks to channel Russian aggression toward China. Your elder statesman Chamberlain [6], along with Daladier [7], were precisely those who encouraged Germany to move eastward.”

Mr. Heath then asked whether the Sino-Soviet differences stemmed primarily from ideological differences or from the Soviet Union’s exercise of power politics. Chairman Mao answered that the disputes concerned border issues arising from ideological factors. He pointed out that the Sino-Soviet quarrels could be traced back to 1954, since as early as 1955 Khrushchev [8] had approached Adenauer [9] to warn him that “China is becoming very powerful.” Mr. Heath noted that Adenauer consistently believed the Soviet Union intended to take control of Europe. Chairman Mao commented, “Europe, Asia, and Africa—yet the Soviet Union lacked the strength to achieve its aims. It lost Egypt. Here, the impact was even smaller. There were some repercussions as well; Lin Biao [10], for instance, was one of their agents.”

Mr. Heath observed that although the Soviet Union had signed a treaty with Mrs. Gandhi [11], they still exerted little influence in India. Chairman Mao concurred, adding, “Our Foreign Minister, Mr. Home, urged us to maintain good relations with India, essentially aiming to draw India away from Soviet influence.”

When Mr. Heath stressed the importance of a strong Europe as a means of putting pressure on Russia, Chairman Mao replied, “We are delighted to see Europe growing stronger.” He further stated, “In our view, Europe and Asia—including Japan—should avoid major conflicts. Minor disagreements are acceptable, but they must not escalate into all-out wars.” Upon being asked whether he felt more at ease about Japan, Chairman Mao nodded affirmatively.

Mr. Heath next inquired whether Chairman Mao trusted Japan’s peaceful intentions. Chairman Mao replied, “For the foreseeable future, it is hard to say for sure. However, we are not worried about you Europeans.”

III. Chairman Mao remarked, “It was thanks to Mr. Heath that Britain was able to normalize diplomatic relations with China, which is why I address you as ‘Prime Minister.’” Referring to the fact that he had not arranged an honor guard review at the airport for Mr. Heath because he was no longer serving as prime minister, Chairman Mao added, “I think it should have been done. I wasn’t afraid of offending Wilson [12]. (Addressing Heath) I voted for you!”

When Mr. Heath mentioned the possibility of Britain providing technical assistance to China, Chairman Mao expressed his gratitude, saying, “We would be very pleased if you could assist us.” Mr. Heath reiterated his willingness to help, and Chairman Mao responded, “Good, very good.”

Chairman Mao concluded by telling Mr. Heath, “You still have the Hong Kong issue [13] remaining. We are not discussing it at present. Hong Kong was ceded; Kowloon was leased, with twenty-four years yet to run. What happens then will be for you younger comrades here to decide.”

Printed according to documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Notes

--- Notes

[1] On May 25, 1974, Mao Zedong met with Edward Heath, leader of the British Conservative Party and former Prime Minister. On May 31, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a “Notification Regarding the Content of Chairman Mao’s Conversation with Mr. Heath.” On June 10, the CPC Central Committee circulated a notice endorsed by Mao Zedong stating: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ ‘Notification Regarding the Content of Chairman Mao’s Conversation with Mr. Heath’ is hereby forwarded to you. All units are requested to transmit it to members of the standing committees of provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committees, as well as to members of the standing committees of party organizations in military units at or above corps level and to officials responsible for foreign affairs.”
[2] Richard Nixon was then the President of the United States. On June 17, 1972, individuals affiliated with Nixon’s re-election campaign broke into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate Office Building in Washington, D.C., to install eavesdropping devices. The scandal came to light shortly after Nixon’s reelection. In July 1974, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee passed articles of impeachment against Nixon based on the evidence gathered. In August of the same year, Nixon was forced to resign.
[3] In February 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon paid his first official visit to China and, together with Chinese leaders, issued the Shanghai Communiqué, marking the beginning of the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations.
[4] Refers to the International Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland, from April 26 to July 21, 1954, to discuss the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the restoration of peace in Indochina. China, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France participated in deliberations on both issues. Representatives of North and South Korea, along with twelve other nations that had intervened in the Korean War besides the U.S., the U.K., and France, took part in discussions on the Korean question. Meanwhile, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and the puppet regime of South Vietnam engaged in talks concerning Indochina. No agreement was reached on the Korean issue; however, regarding the restoration of peace in Indochina, separate agreements were concluded on the cessation of hostilities among the three Indochinese countries, together with the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, collectively known as the Geneva Accords, thereby achieving a ceasefire in Indochina.
[5] Refers to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, commonly called the CSCE. It was attended by thirty-one European countries, as well as the United States, Turkey, Cyprus, and Canada. On December 14, 1964, the Soviet Union, through its Foreign Minister speaking at the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, proposed convening the CSCE. Preparatory meetings were held in Helsinki, Finland, from late November 1972 to early June 1973. The formal conference commenced in July 1973 and proceeded in three stages: first, a meeting of foreign ministers; then, a meeting of experts; and finally, a summit, concluding in August 1975. Following the conference, a “Final Act” was signed, comprising four sections (also referred to as “four baskets”): security issues in Europe; cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological, and environmental fields; exchanges of people, ideas, and culture; and matters pertaining to future meetings. The content of the document was vague and non-binding. A follow-up conference of the CSCE was convened in Belgrade on October 14, 1977.
[6] Refers to Neville Chamberlain, leader of the British Conservative Party and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1937 to 1940. In September 1938, representing the British government, he signed the Munich Agreement with the heads of state of France, Germany, and Italy, adopting a policy of appeasement toward German and Italian fascist aggression. Shortly after the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Chamberlain resigned from office.
[7] Refers to Édouard Daladier, who served as Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense of France from 1938 to 1940. During this period, he pursued a policy of appeasement toward German and Italian fascist aggression. In September 1938, he represented the French government in signing the Munich Agreement. After Germany occupied France in 1940, he was imprisoned and later released in 1945.
[8] Nikita Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1955.
[9] Konrad Adenauer was Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955.
[10] Lin Biao, see note [1] on page 269 of this volume.
[11] Namely, Indira Gandhi, who served as Prime Minister of India from 1966 to 1977.
[12] Refers to James Harold Wilson, leader of the British Labour Party, who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1964 to 1976.
[13] The Hong Kong issue is a historical legacy. Hong Kong—including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New Territories—has long been Chinese territory. In 1840, Britain launched the Opium War and compelled the Qing government to sign the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, permanently ceding Hong Kong Island. In 1856, during the Second Opium War, the Anglo-French forces again pressured the Qing government to sign the Convention of Peking, resulting in the permanent cession of the tip of the Kowloon Peninsula. In 1898, taking advantage of the international powers’ division of spheres of influence in China, Britain forced the Qing government to sign the Additional Clauses to the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong’s Boundaries, forcibly leasing a large area of the Kowloon Peninsula and more than two hundred nearby islands (later collectively known as the “New Territories”) for a term of ninety-nine years, expiring on June 30, 1997. The Chinese people have consistently opposed these three unequal treaties. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government has maintained a consistent position: Hong Kong is Chinese territory; China does not recognize the three unequal treaties imposed by imperialism and advocates resolving the issue through negotiations at an appropriate time, while temporarily preserving the status quo until a solution is reached. Following the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC, Deng Xiaoping proposed the concept of “one country, two systems” to resolve the issues of Taiwan and Hong Kong. As 1997 drew nearer, the British side repeatedly tested China’s stance and attitude toward resolving the Hong Kong problem. Under these circumstances, the time had come to address the Hong Kong issue. The governments of China and the United Kingdom began negotiations on the matter. The talks proceeded in two phases: the first phase ran from September 1982, when British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited China, to June 1983, during which the two sides mainly discussed principles and procedural matters. The second phase spanned from July 1983 to September 1984, when delegations from both governments held twenty-two rounds of substantive talks. On September 18, 1984, the two sides reached agreement on all outstanding issues and preliminarily signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration and its three annexes on September 26. Thus, the two-year-long negotiations between the Chinese and British governments on the Hong Kong issue concluded successfully. On December 19, 1984, the heads of state of China and the United Kingdom formally signed the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong in Beijing. On May 27, 1985, the two governments exchanged instruments of ratification in Beijing, bringing the Sino-British Joint Declaration into effect. On July 1, 1997, the People’s Republic of China officially resumed its sovereignty over Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was proclaimed.