Henry Kissinger: I think the Chairman is doing much better this time than last time.
Mao Zedong: It seems so. In fact, God has invited me. (Turning to Lord) You are so young.
Lord: I am getting old.
Mao: I am the oldest person here.
Zhou: I am the second oldest.
Mao: Back then, some in the British army opposed your country's independence. Field
Marshal Montgomery [2] was one of those who opposed your policies.
Kissinger: Yes.
Mao: He also opposed the policies introduced by Dulles [3]. However, he probably won't
oppose you anymore. Back then, you opposed us, and we opposed you. So we were
enemies. (Laughter)
Kissinger: Former enemies.
Mao: Now our relationship is what we call friendship.
Kissinger: That's how we feel.
Mao: That's exactly what I say.
Kissinger: I told Premier Zhou that we haven't been as frank and open in our talks with other
countries as we are with you.
Mao: Don't tell lies, don't play dirty. We didn't steal your documents. You could have just put
them there and see what happens. We don't use bugs. Those little tricks are useless, and
some big tricks are useless. I spoke to one of your reporters, Edgar Snow [4], and I told him
that your CIA isn't good at big things either.
Kissinger: That's absolutely true. That's our experience.
Mao: Because when you give an order—for example, your president gives an order
requesting information on certain issues—the intelligence agencies pour in with reports. We

1 The US transcript of the February discussion can be found here: Historical Documents - Office of the Historian.
It has some differences with the Chinese.
2 The US transcript has some additional passages relating to the Middle East, India and Hegel. See: Chairman
Mao Zedong and Secretary Henry Kissinger, November 12, 1973



have our own intelligence agency, and the situation is the same. They don't do a good job.
(Zhou Enlai laughs.) For example, they don't understand Lin Biao. (Zhou continues to laugh.)
Similarly, they don't know you want to come to China.
Mao: You're doing a good job, flying everywhere. Are you a swallow or a dove? The
"Vietnam issue" [5] can be considered essentially resolved.
Kissinger: That's our feeling. We now need a transitional period toward peace.
Mao: That's right.
Kissinger: The basic issues have been resolved.
Mao: We need it too. Your president is sitting here and saying this (pointing to Ki's seat). Our
two countries are in need, so here we are, (clasping hands together) hand in hand3.
Kissinger: Yes, we all face the same danger. Sometimes we may use different methods, but
our goal is the same.
Mao: That's good. As long as our goal is the same, we won't harm you, and you won't harm
us. We'll be fighting a bastard together! That's actually how it is. Sometimes we have to
criticize you, and you have to criticize us. Your president calls it the "influence" of
"ideological power," saying, "To hell with the Communist Party! To hell with communism!"
We say, "To hell with imperialism!" Sometimes we have to speak out; we have to.
Kissinger: I believe both sides should remain true to their respective fundamental principles.
If both sides speak the same tune, it will only lead to chaos. I told the Prime Minister that in
Europe, based on your principles, you can speak more firmly than we can.
Mao: We hope you will cooperate with Europe and Japan. We can argue about certain
issues, but fundamentally, we must cooperate.
Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, from our side, while there may be occasional criticism between you
and us, we will still coordinate our actions with you. We will never participate in any attempt
to isolate you. As for Japan and Europe, we agree to cooperate with them on all substantive
issues, but European leadership is currently weak.
Mao: They are not united.
Kissinger: They are not united, and they don't have the foresight you do. When they face
danger, they always try to make it go away without any effort.
Zhou: (To Mao) Help Pompidou, he (referring to Kissinger) agreed.
Kissinger: We are doing our best to do so, and we will strive to do even more when we
return.

3 Mao spoke the phrase “hand in hand” in English.



Mao: Pompidou is now threatened by the Socialist Party and the Communist Party joining
forces to oppose him.
Kissinger: A coalition of the two.
Mao: A coalition of the two. The Soviet Union wants the Communist Party to come to power.
I don't like that Communist Party, just as I don't like your Communist Party. I like you, not
your Communist Party. (Kissinger laughs) You Westerners have always had a policy: at the
beginning of both world wars, you pushed Germany to fight Russia.
Kissinger: However, it is not our policy to push Russia into attacking China. If a war breaks
out in China, it would be just as dangerous to us as a war in Europe.
Mao: That's exactly what I want to say: Are you now pushing West Germany [6] to make
peace with Russia, and then pushing Russia eastward? I suspect there is such a course for
the entire West. Eastward, primarily toward us, but also toward Japan, and partly toward
you, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Kissinger: We do not approve of Germany's policy. We would rather the German opposition
come to power, and the German opposition does not pursue this policy.
Mao: I talked to a foreign friend about this. I suggested creating a horizontal line, a latitude
line, encompassing the United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Europe. This is
a complex approach, driven by the domestic situation.
Mao: What does "mode of action" mean in English?
Shen Ruoyun: Mode of action4.
Kissinger: Regardless of public opinion, we will make a firm decision on our basic objectives.
If hegemonic intentions become active, then the real danger will develop. Wherever such
intentions arise, we will certainly counter them. The President once told the Chairman that
we are doing this for our own benefit, not to show goodwill to anyone else.
Mao: You speak the truth.
Kissinger: That's our position. (Mao Zedong begins to smoke a cigar and tries to offer it to
Kissinger and Lord. Lord says he doesn't smoke.)
Kissinger: We have no plans to significantly reduce the number of American troops stationed
in Europe over the next four years.
(Mao Zedong looks at Zhou Enlai)
Zhou: When you say disarmament, you mean a maximum of 10 to 15 percent.
Kissinger: Absolutely correct.

4 This phrase is spoken in English.



Mao: How many American troops are stationed in Europe? They're mostly missile forces,
right?
Zhou: The nine major forces have between 200,000 and 350,000, including those stationed
in the Mediterranean.
Mao: This probably doesn't include the navy.
Kissinger: Not including the navy. There are about 275,000 in central Europe, but that
doesn't include the Sixth Fleet deployed in the Mediterranean.
Mao: Your forces deployed in Asia and the Pacific are widely dispersed. You have troops in
South Korea—I've heard there are about 300,000.
Kissinger: About 40,000.
Mao: Chiang Kai-shek has about 8,000 to 9,000.
Zhou: In Taiwan, I think.
Mao: I've heard that Japan also has two garrisons: 40,000 in the Ryukyu Islands and 20,000
to 30,000 in mainland Japan. I don't know how many American troops are in the Philippines,
but there are only a little over 10,000 in Vietnam right now.
Kissinger: But they will all be withdrawn soon.
Mao: Yes, I heard you have 40,000 people in Thailand.
Kissinger: That's right. But what you just mentioned is mostly air force troops, so I'm afraid it
can't be measured solely by numbers.
Mao: You also have ground forces, for example, in South Korea [7].
Kissinger: We do have ground forces in South Korea.
Mao: When you pass through Japan, it would be best if you spent more time talking with
them. If you only talk to them for one day, they'll be embarrassed.
Kissinger: Chairman, we hope the focus of this trip will be the talks in Beijing. I will go to
Tokyo later on, separately.
Mao: Very good. Make it clear to them. You know Japan doesn't feel very well about the
Soviet Union either.
Kissinger: They have a mixture of love and hate.
Mao: (Gestures) In a nutshell, this is what Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka told Premier
Zhou: What the Soviets did is like seeing someone about to hang themselves and
immediately pulling the chair out from under their feet.
Kissinger: Yes.



Mao: You could say that, they seized a vast tract of land without firing a single shot. (Zhou
Enlai chuckled softly) They seized the Mongolian People's Republic, half of Xinjiang, and
Manchuria in the Northeast, and they declared it their sphere of influence [8].
Kissinger: They also took away all the local industries.
Mao: Yes. They also took away Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands [9].
Kissinger: Japan is fascinated by the economic development potential in the Soviet Union.
Mao: (Nodding) They hope to get something back from the Soviet Union.
Kissinger: But we will strengthen Japan's relations with the United States, and we also hope
to strengthen relations with China.
Mao: We believe that if Japan strengthens relations with the Soviet Union, it would be better
to strengthen relations with the United States.
Kissinger: It would be very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed close political
relations.
Mao: In reality, this seems impossible.
Zhou: (To Mao Zedong) We have decided to set up liaison offices in the capitals of both
countries to maintain contact between Huang Hua [10] and the White House.
Mao: (To Zhou Enlai) Why is it so important?
Zhou: The liaison office will handle general public communications. Confidential and urgent
matters will not be covered; these will be handled through Ambassador Huang Hua's
channels.
Mao: Huang Hua has a tough life. (Zhou laughs) He did a great job with you, and now he's
back in Shanghai with a sprained back.
Kissinger: We'll find him a doctor when he returns to his post.
Mao: Good. (Zhou laughs) Huang Hua seems safer with you. He fell down as soon as he
returned to Shanghai. Since your president watched the Chinese Acrobatic Troupe, I think
the Vietnam issue is almost resolved. There are also rumours that you're about to fall down,
too. (Laughter) The ladies present are not very happy about this. (Laughter, especially the
ladies) Some say that if Dr. [Doctor] falls down, we'll be out of work.
Mao: The volume of trade between China and the United States is pitifully small, but it's
gradually increasing. You have to understand that China is very poor.
Mao: The Chinese are very xenophobic. You can accommodate many ethnic groups. We
don't have many foreigners in China. How many different ethnic groups do you have? You
have 600,000 Chinese in the United States, but we probably don't even have 60 Americans. I



don't know why, but you should research it. We've never disliked foreigners, including very
few Japanese, and none Indians at all.
Zhou: Very few.
Kissinger: This is because you've had bad luck dealing with foreigners in history.
Mao: There are some reasons for that. I think the main reasons for the past hundred years
were the Eight-Nation Alliance, and then the Japanese occupied China for thirteen years,
taking over most of the territory. Their previous occupation of Chinese territory doesn't
count. They even had to pay compensation for occupying Beijing.
Kissinger: Yes, and there's also extraterritoriality.
Mao: Extraterritoriality, that's a lot! Now we don't want compensation from Japan. It's
impossible to calculate, no one can figure it out, and we can't afford it.
Zhou: Any compensation would increase the burden on the people.
Mao: Only in this way can we eliminate hostility and improve relations between the two
peoples. Resolving hostility between the Chinese and Japanese people is more difficult than
resolving hostility between you and me.
Kissinger: Yes, the American people have no hostility toward the Chinese people. On the
contrary, there is only a question of judgment between us.
Mao: That's right.
Kissinger: We will resolve this issue in the coming years, but a powerful community of
interests will soon begin to operate.
Mao: Is that so?
Kissinger: Between China and the United States.
Mao: What community of interests do you mean? Taiwan?
Kissinger: Other countries with similar interests.
Zhou: Are you referring to the Soviet Union?
Kissinger: I am referring to the Soviet Union.
Zhou: Ms. Shen understands what you mean. Mao: (Looking at translator Shen Ruoyun) This
person has excellent English. (To Zhou Enlai) Who is she?
Zhou: She is Shen Ruoyun.
Mao: We really have too few translators.
Kissinger: However, the translators we've met have all done a very competent job.



Mao: The translators you met and our current translators are only in their twenties or
thirties. If they get older, they won't be able to translate as well as they do now.
Zhou: We should send some people abroad.
Mao: We should send some tall children like this (gesturing with his hand), not too old.
Kissinger: We're planning to set up some personnel exchange programs so you can send
students to the United States.
Mao: If ten out of a hundred students master a foreign language, that would be a great
success. Even if more than ten students don't want to return, like some girls who want to
stay in the United States, that's okay, because you Americans aren't as xenophobic as the
Chinese. In the past, Chinese people going abroad refused to learn the local language.
(Looking at translator Tang Wensheng) Her grandparents refused to learn English. They're
just that stubborn. You know, the Chinese are very stubborn and conservative. Many older
generations of overseas Chinese refuse to speak the local language, but the younger
generation is much better.
Mao: (Gestures and points to his book) If the Soviets dropped bombs and killed Chinese
people over the age of thirty, that would help us solve the problem, because old people like
me can't learn English. We only read Chinese. Most of my books are in Chinese, with only a
few dictionaries in foreign languages. The rest are mostly in Chinese.
Kissinger: Is the Chairman learning English now?
Mao: I've heard rumours that I'm learning English. I don't care about those rumours; they're
all false. I know a few English words, but I don't understand grammar.
Tang: The Chairman invented an English word.
Mao: Yes, I invented an English word—paper tiger.
Kissinger: Paper tiger. Yes, that refers to us. (Laughter)
Mao: If Russia attacks China, I tell you now that we will use guerrilla warfare and protracted
war. We will make them go wherever they want. (Zhou Enlai laughs) If they want to go to the
Yellow River basin, that's good! Very good. (Laughter) If they go further to the Yangtze River
basin, that's not bad either.
Kissinger: But what if they use bombs instead of sending troops? (Laughter)
Mao: What will the dragons do? Perhaps you could form a committee to study this issue.
We'll let them attack fiercely, and they'll lose a lot of resources. They say they're socialists,
and we're socialists too, so a Soviet attack on China would be socialists attacking socialists.
Kissinger: If they attack China, we'll certainly oppose them for our own reasons.



Mao: But your people haven't awakened. Europe and you will both think that diverting the
blame to China would be a good thing.
Kissinger: What Europe is thinking, I can't judge; they won't do anything because they're
essentially irrelevant to the matter. We're concerned that if the Soviets occupy China, it will
affect the security of other countries and isolate us.
Mao: (Laughter) What would happen then? Since you've been so deeply entangled in
Vietnam, you've encountered so many difficulties. Do you think the Soviets would be
comfortable if they were deeply entangled in China?
Kissinger: The Soviet Union?
Tang Wensheng: The Soviet Union.
Mao: Then you could keep the Soviet Union deeply enmeshed in China for six months, a
year, two years, three years, or four years, stabbing the Soviet Union in the back. Then your
slogan would be to seek peace. In the name of peace, you would dismantle the socialist
empire. Perhaps you would help them through trade and offer them every possible
assistance against China.
Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important that we understand each other's
intentions. We will absolutely not join forces to attack China.
Mao: (interrupting Kissinger) No, that's not the case. Your goal is to disintegrate the Soviet
Union.
Kissinger: That's a very dangerous thing. (Laughter)
Mao: (Mao gestures with his hands. The Soviet Union's goal is to occupy both the Eurasian
continent.)
Kissinger: Our goal is to deter a Soviet attack, not to defeat it. We hope to stop it.
(Zhou Enlai checks his watch)
Mao: Things are unpredictable. We prefer this development; it's better for the world.
Kissinger: Which way?
Mao: That means the Soviet Union attacks China and is defeated. We must consider the
worst-case scenario.
Kissinger: That's your inevitable inference.
Mao: In any case, Providence has sent me an invitation.
Kissinger: I truly notice that the Chairman looks better this year than last.



Mao: Yes, I'm feeling better. Please give my regards to President Nixon, and also to Mrs.
Nixon. I'm sorry I won't be able to meet with her and Secretary of State Rogers.
Kissinger: I'll certainly convey that.

Mao: Let's discuss the Taiwan issue now. Our relationship with the United States should be
handled separately from our relationship with Taiwan.
Kissinger: In principle...
Mao: As long as you sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the diplomatic issues between our
two countries can be resolved. This is the same approach we took with Japan. As for our
relationship with Taiwan, it's quite complicated. I don't think it can be resolved peacefully.
They are a bunch of counter-revolutionaries [11], how could they cooperate with us? I say
we should let go of Taiwan for now and deal with it in a hundred years. Don't be too hasty
about worldly affairs. What's there to rush? It's just a small island with a population of a few
million.
Zhou: They have a population of 16 million.
Mao: As for your relationship with us, I think it will take less than a hundred years to resolve.
Kissinger: I believe so. We should be able to do it much faster.
Mao: But this is a matter for you to decide, and we won't rush you. If you feel it's necessary,
we'll cooperate. If you feel it's not possible now, then we can wait a little longer.
Kissinger: For our part, we hope to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic
of China. The difficulty is that we can't immediately sever ties with Taiwan. There are several
reasons, all of which are related to our domestic situation. I told the Premier that we hope
to complete this process before or during 1976. Therefore, we must find some way to
establish diplomatic relations that can also serve as a symbol of strengthening our
relationship, because technically, the liaison office (12) is very useful.
Mao: That's possible.
Kissinger: What's possible?
Mao: You can do it the way you are doing it now, because you still need Taiwan.
Kissinger: It's not a question of whether or not Taiwan is needed, but whether it's actually
feasible.
Mao: It's all the same. (Laughter) We're not in a rush about Hong Kong right now. (Laughter)
We won't even touch Macau. If we really wanted to touch Macau, we would only do so



slightly, because Portugal has had a tight grip on Macau since the Ming Dynasty. (Laughter)
Khrushchev even scolded me, asking why we didn't even want Hong Kong and Macau. [13]
And I also told Japan that we not only agree with their (Japan's) demand (for the Soviet
Union) to return the four northern islands, but also the 1.5 million square kilometres of land
that the Soviet Union historically ceded from China.
Kissinger: Chairman, I think this is the issue regarding diplomatic relations. On the Taiwan
issue, I think we all understand each other's positions. So our current problem is... and the
Liaison Office has performed its intended function. The only question is whether we all
believe, or at least to some extent believe, that we should symbolically demonstrate that
Sino-US relations are normal in all respects. If so, we should find a way to do so, but it's not
absolutely necessary.
Mao: We also have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and India, but they're not very
good, even worse than our relationship with you. So that's not very important; the overall
international situation is what really matters.
Kissinger: I completely agree with the Chairman and agree that we must understand each
other. I believe we have a substantial understanding of each other.
Mao: Our Liaison Office Director has already explained the general principles to you and
mentioned the story of George Washington's resistance to the British.
Kissinger: Yes, he gave me a wonderful speech a few weeks ago, and I've heard it from the
Premier before.
Mao: There's no need to repeat that argument. We now have a contradiction: on the one
hand, we have always supported the Arab countries' movement against Israel's
establishment, but on the other hand, we must welcome the United States' efforts to
prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of the Middle East. Our Ambassador Huang
Zhen has mentioned our support for the Arab world, but he doesn't understand the
importance of preventing the expansion of Soviet influence.
Kissinger: Well, my statement surprised him, and he also reiterated the official UN position.
(Laughter) I understand that you have to publicly adopt certain positions, and these do not
violate our common position. However, in fact, we will further resolve the Middle East issue,
but we also want to show that this is not due to Soviet pressure. Therefore, whenever the
Soviet Union pressures us, we must resist. Besides the merits of the dispute itself, we resist
for the sake of resistance. And then, when we defeat them, we may even move in the same
direction. We are not opposed to the Arab countries' ideas; we are only opposed to using
Soviet pressure to achieve their wishes.
Mao: That's right.
Kissinger: And that's exactly our current strategy.



Mao: The next time you come to China, besides politics, you could also discuss philosophy
with me.
Kissinger: I'd be delighted, Mr. Chairman. Philosophical research is my first love.
 Mao: Perhaps it's harder to study philosophy after becoming Secretary of State.
Kissinger: Yes.
Mao: Khrushchev said we were like fighting cocks. Kissinger: When he visited here in 1959, it
wasn't very successful.
Mao: We broke up in 1958. The rift began when they tried to control China's coast and
Chinese naval ports in 1958. When I discussed this with them and their ambassador, I almost
slammed the table and scolded him. (Laughter) After the Moscow report, Khrushchev came.
At that time, Khrushchev proposed the idea of a joint fleet—a joint naval fleet between the
Soviet Union and China. That's what he said. At that time, he was quite boastful because he
had met then-US President General Eisenhower: he had a bit of the so-called "Camp David
spirit." He boasted to me in Beijing that he knew the US President, and when he mentioned
President Eisenhower, he even used two English words, calling him "my friend." (To
Ambassador Bruce: Do you know about this?)
Bruce, no, I never knew about it.
Mao: There are some news. After that, Khrushchev never came again. But he did go to
Vladivostok. He came from China.
Zhou: He delivered an anti-China speech there.
 Mao: No current Soviet leader has ever been as far east as Vladivostok. Kosygin himself said
he wasn't very clear about Siberian affairs. (The Chinese side checks the time)
Zhou: It's already been two and a half hours.
Mao: I wanted to discuss another issue with you, but it seems we've gone on too long today,
over two and a half hours, and we've taken up time originally reserved for other activities. I
want to discuss my strong suspicion that if the Democrats came to power, they would adopt
isolationism.
Kissinger: This is a very serious issue, Mr. Chairman. I believe that the current intellectuals
and some Democrats might move toward isolationism. However, reality will make them
realize that our current policy is the only option.
Kissinger: This is a very serious issue, Mr. Chairman. I believe that the current intellectuals
and some Democrats might be inclined toward isolationism. However, reality will make them
realize that our current policy is the only option. I don't know yet how much damage will be
done before they realize this, or whether they will continue with the same complex tactics.
But I don't think they will deviate from their current path.



Mao: You and I seem to be of the same ilk. We both seem to be somewhat paranoid.
Kissinger: I have my doubts, and I have my doubts about certain leaders. But I think the
situation demands that we return to the policy we are currently pursuing. However, Mr.
Chairman, this is also why we should, while everyone is still in office and understands the
situation, strive to strengthen relations and not allow other policies to take advantage.
Mao: This can be demonstrated primarily by advocating for the withdrawal of troops from
Europe.
Kissinger: Yes.
Mao: This is a great help to the Soviet Union.
Kissinger: We will not do this during President Nixon's term. There are only two possible
scenarios: withdrawing troops from Europe, and if challenged, we are not willing to resolve
it in a very rough or swift manner.
Mao: When you say "rough," you mean the possibility of war.
Kissinger: If necessary, but...
Mao: I don't like you playing diplomacy with me.
Kissinger: If necessary, but based on our experience, as soon as they know we are going to
go to war, they will let up. Until now, they have been very afraid of us.
Mao: Because I also think it's best not to go to war. I don't like war either, although people
say I'm a warmonger. (Laughter) If you go to war with the Soviet Union, I also think it's not a
good idea. If you do fight, it's best to use only conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons are
only a backup, and should be avoided as much as possible.
Kissinger: We will absolutely not start a war.
Mao: That's good. I heard that your previous approach was intended to buy time.
Kissinger: We do want to buy time, but we also have another position. If the Soviet Union
attacks any of the important areas we just discussed, we must be able to retaliate. We must
take precautions before it happens.
Mao: Absolutely correct. As for the Soviet Union, they bully the weak and fear the strong.

[1] On February 17, 1973, Mao Zedong met with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
Attendees included Premier Zhou Enlai, Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Hairong, translator
Tang Wensheng, translator Shen Ruoyun, and U.S. National Security Council member Liao
De. This is part of the conversation between Mao Zedong and Kissinger.



[2] Montgomery (1887-1976), British Field Marshal. During World War II, he was one of the
Allied Advisors. He later served as Chief of the General Staff of the British Army and Deputy
Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.
[3] Dulles, an American Republican, served as U.S. Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959.
[4] Edgar Snow (1905-1972) was an American progressive writer and journalist. He first
visited China in 1928 and in 1976 visited the revolutionary base in northern Shaanxi, where
he met with Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and the Red
Army. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he visited China in 1960, 1964,
and 1970. He died of illness in Geneva, Switzerland on February 15, 1972.
[5] On 27 January 1973, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the United States, the
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and the Saigon
puppet regime signed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam in
Paris, known as the Paris Agreement on the Vietnam Question. This agreement stipulated
that the US government must withdraw all its troops within 60 days, thus creating
favourable conditions for the Vietnamese people to resolve their own problems. Due to
Kissinger's contribution to this agreement, on October 16, 1973, the five-member Nobel
Peace Prize Committee elected by the Norwegian Parliament announced that Kissinger and
Le Duc Tho (the Vietnamese leader) had won the Nobel Peace Prize.
[6] West Germany, also known as the Federal Republic of Germany. After World War II,
Germany was divided into the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany). On October 3, 1990, the German Democratic
Republic officially joined the Federal Republic of Germany, and the two Germanys were
unified under the name of Germany.
[7] South Korea, now the Republic of Korea, abbreviated as South Korea.
[8] From the 1920s to the 1940s, the Soviet Union took advantage of China's internal
turmoil, leaving it unable to focus on the north, and gradually encroached on Chinese
territory. Taking advantage of the Japanese invasion of China during World War II and the
conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the Soviet Union forced the
Chinese Nationalist Government to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia (the
Mongolian People's Republic) and to obtain a series of privileges in Xinjiang and Northeast
China. Outer Mongolia's independence refers to its separation from China in the early 23rd
century, a monumental historical event that continues to resonate with China to this day,
and is one of the darkest periods in Chinese history.
[9] In February 1945, the Yalta Agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States, and
Britain regarding postwar Japan stipulated that the entire Kuril Islands, including what Japan
called the "Northern Four Islands" of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai, would be
ceded to the Soviet Union.



[10] Huang Hua, then Permanent Representative to the United Nations and its Security
Council.
[11] Refers to the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan
[12] In May 1973, China and the United States established liaison offices in each other's
capitals, establishing diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. Huang Zhen, a veteran
diplomat and former ambassador to France, was appointed director of the liaison office in
the United States, while Bruce, a veteran American diplomat, was appointed director of the
liaison office in China.
[13] In December 1962, Khrushchev, in a speech at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR, asked: Why is the People's Republic of China not interested in reclaiming Macau and
Hong Kong, which had fallen under the control of Portuguese and British imperialism due to
wars of aggression and unequal treaties, but instead harbors hostility toward its border with
India?