(November 12, 1973)

Chairman: That expansionism is a pitiful thing. You must not be afraid of it.

Kissinger: We are not afraid of them. From time to time, we need to take strong measures against them, like the ones we took two weeks ago.

Chairman: That’s right.

The Egyptians—at that time, we had not yet persuaded them. One vice president, Shafei, did not trust you and said you were partial to Israel. I said, not so. Jews are not a monolithic bloc, just as Marx and Engels cooperated but did not cooperate with any capitalists.

Kissinger: The current issue in the Middle East is to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a dominant position.

Chairman: It cannot dominate. Its ambition is great, but its capability is insufficient. Look, when you scared them in Cuba, they just bolted.

Kissinger: Twice. The second time we did not announce it.

Chairman: The second time was recently.

Kissinger: Yes, that was recently. Recently they attempted to build a submarine base there, but when we moved our naval vessels there, they ran away.

Chairman: I am very suspicious of that country. It wants to draw closer to us. Through Castro’s delegation, whose leader was named Rodriguez, leading six Latin American communist party delegations, it spoke on behalf of the Soviet Union to make peace. Before that, Ceaușescu of Romania came to intercede, saying we should stop this ideological struggle.

Kissinger: I remember that visit of his.

Premier: Not the later one—even earlier.

Chairman: That was quite a long time ago.

Premier: It was during his first visit.

Kissinger: Oh.

Chairman: The third time, Kosygin came himself.

Premier: In 1965.

Chairman: I then declared to him that we would struggle against it for ten thousand years! That is ten thousand years—ten thousand years of struggle. I declared to him that neither of our two families is socialist. We were branded by you as dogmatists, which is anti-Marxist. We also give you a title: revisionist. So neither of our two families is Marxist. That time I made a concession to Kosygin. I said, ten thousand years—out of consideration for you coming to see me in person, I reduce it by one thousand years. See how generous I am—a concession of one thousand years at once, one thousand years! (All laugh.) Then came Bodnăraș, who interceded through him, twice speaking on behalf of the Soviet Union through Romania. This time I again conceded one thousand years. (All laugh.) My time keeps getting less and less! The fifth time, Ceaușescu came again and raised this issue once more. I said, no way, I can concede no more! (All laugh.)

Kissinger: We know every Soviet position. We have had opportunities to discuss these issues with you. But I agree with the Chairman’s view—it mainly depends on how the account is reckoned.

Chairman: It has to deal with so many fronts—the Pacific, Japan, China, South Asia, several countries. It has only one million troops in total, not even enough for defense, let alone for offense. To attack, unless you let it in, cede the Middle East and Europe to it, only then would it feel at ease. Only then could it shift its forces eastward, adding at least one million more, or even more.

Kissinger: That won’t happen. I agree with this view—that if Europe, Japan, and the United States stand together, and we work together in the Middle East, in the regions Chairman Mao discussed last time, we can greatly reduce the danger of an attack on China.

Chairman: We also pin down a portion of their forces, which benefits you, Europe, and the Middle East. For example, in Outer Mongolia, it has stationed troops. Under Khrushchev, there were no troops stationed in Outer Mongolia. The Zhenbao Island incident occurred after Khrushchev.

Premier: It was already after Brezhnev came to power.

Kissinger: In 1969. Therefore, what is important is that during this period, Western Europe, China, and the United States need to coordinate their actions.

Chairman: Mm.

Kissinger: Because then they won’t dare to attack.

Chairman: Japan’s attitude is also good.

Kissinger: Very good.

Chairman: Most of Europe’s attitude is not bad either.

Kissinger: Their attitude surpasses their courage.

Chairman: Mainly the small countries like Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

Kissinger: Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Scandinavian countries. Germany, if it develops further, will be like that too.

Chairman: I see Germany as still Western; it won’t go with the Soviet Union. Northern Europe—Norway is very afraid of the Soviet Union. Sweden is somewhat wavering. Holland leans slightly toward the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: That’s due to its geographic position, not out of conviction.

Chairman: That’s right. And they were very brave in the war. They are a country of a thousand lakes. They fought extremely bitterly back then, had a piece taken by the Soviet Union, and later pulled back again—also a country not to be trifled with. The border between Leningrad and Finland is too close.

Chairman: Mm.

Let’s talk about the Taiwan issue. We must separate the issue of relations between the United States and us from the issue of our relations with Taiwan. As long as you sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it may be possible for our two countries to resolve the issue of diplomatic relations, that is, like Japan. As for our relations with Taiwan, that is complicated. I do not believe in peaceful transition. Do you (pointing to Foreign Minister Ji) believe in it?

Kissinger: Are you asking me? Oh, you’re asking him (pointing to Foreign Minister Ji).

Chairman: You (pointing to Foreign Minister Ji) are in charge of foreign affairs after all.

A bunch of counterrevolutionaries—how can we possibly cooperate with them?! I say, it’s fine without Taiwan; we can wait another hundred years.

Kissinger (laughs): Oh.

Chairman: Don’t look at things in the world so rigidly. Why be so impatient? Taiwan is just an island, with something over ten million people.

Premier: Now it’s sixteen million.

Chairman: As for your relations with us, I think it won’t take a hundred years.

Kissinger: I fully believe that—it will be much faster.

Chairman: But it’s up to you; we won’t press. If you have a need, go ahead; if it’s not yet possible, then postpone it.

Kissinger: From our perspective, we want to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic. Our difficulty lies in the fact that we cannot immediately sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan—this is partly related to our domestic situation. But I have already told the Premier that we hope to complete this process during 1976. So the question is to find a formula that would allow us to establish diplomatic relations, to symbolize the strengthening of our ties, or we might just wait a while, because from a technical standpoint, the work of the liaison office is functional.

Chairman: That’s fine—it’s fine just like this. You still need Taiwan for now.

Kissinger: It’s not a matter of need, but of realistic possibility.

Chairman: Ai, same thing! (All laugh.)

We’re not in a hurry over Hong Kong—we don’t even touch Macau. If we wanted to touch them, we’d only need to touch them very lightly. That’s a foothold the Portuguese established back in the Ming dynasty. Khrushchev cursed us, saying why we didn’t even want Hong Kong and Macau. I told the Japanese that I not only support Japan’s claim to the four northern islands—the Soviet Union also historically carved away one and a half million square kilometers from China.

Kissinger: My view on the issue of establishing diplomatic relations is this: on the Taiwan question, I believe we have a clear understanding between us; we abide by that understanding, and the liaison office is doing useful work.

Chairman: Mm.

Kissinger: So the only question is when either side, or both, considers it beneficial to symbolize that relations between us in all respects have become normal. In that case, we would find some formula to make it possible, but it is not imperative to do so.

Chairman: We established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and with India too—and those aren’t so good. Not as good as our relations with you, which are even better. So this issue is not a very important one. The overall international issues are the important ones.

Kissinger: I fully agree with what the Chairman said. We need mutual understanding on this issue. I believe that both sides understand each other on the substantive issues.

Chairman: But our director lectures you with grand principles—all that stuff about Washington opposing Britain.

Kissinger (laughs): He gave me a big speech a few weeks ago.

Chairman (nodding): Ai.

Kissinger: But those words the Premier has already said to me in the past.

Chairman: That kind of talk can be reduced. We now have a contradiction: on the one hand, we must support the Arab countries in opposing Israel; on the other, we must welcome the United States to check the Soviet Union, so that the Soviet Union cannot control the Middle East. Our Ambassador Huang Zhen spoke about supporting the Arab side, but didn’t understand the importance of opposing Soviet control of the Middle East.

Chairman: I believe the Soviet Union has enormous difficulty in pulling Europe to its side. It has this ambition, but enormous difficulty.

Kissinger: I think it is very difficult to seize Europe militarily. If they attempt it, they will certainly fight a war with us. The greatest danger lies in the Soviet Union taking military action in places like this: in areas where they can quickly dispatch ground forces, as they did in Czechoslovakia; or launching sudden airstrikes against regions they think we cannot take action on.

Chairman: Just like what they did to Czechoslovakia. That Soviet Union is outrageous! In dealing with Czechoslovakia, they used a ruse, disguised as a traveling plane, controlled their airport, and then transported troops. Pretending to be a passenger plane, it was actually troops. One plane could control their airport, and afterward they kept coming, leaving Czechoslovakia with no way out.

Kissinger: Yes, indeed.

Premier: That very night.

Chairman: So my view is that the Soviet Union has enormous ambitions—it wants to dominate both Europe and Asia, even northern Africa—but it lacks the power and faces enormous difficulty.

Kissinger: As long as the countries they threaten can maintain their unity, that’s good.

Chairman: They took advantage of the opportunity when you had both feet stuck in Southeast Asia. You can’t blame your president; blame the Johnson administration.

Kissinger: When? Take advantage to do what?

Chairman: That is, in Czechoslovakia.

Premier: And India.

Chairman: I don’t pay much attention to those things—those minor matters, like so-called non-aggression treaties with Egypt, with Iraq, with India. I don’t believe in that sort of thing at all! So when they wanted to make a non-aggression treaty with us, we wouldn’t do it.

Kissinger: I have taken note of this issue.

Chairman: Some people here make comments, saying you missed an opportunity—when Egypt expelled Soviet military personnel, you should have given Egypt a hand. (Kissinger blushes.) But then I thought, at that time you were in difficulty; both your feet were stuck in the pit of Southeast Asia and you couldn’t pull them out.

Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, you are quite right. At that time there were two problems: first, our general election; second, we were still entangled in Vietnam, and we couldn’t handle two issues at the same time.

Chairman: That’s correct.

Acknowledgment: Sakura Ayana for collection, transcription, and proofreading