Nixon: General de Gaulle [1] was also.
Mao: De Gaulle is another matter. They also say that West Germany's Christian Democratic Party is also right-wing. I like right-wingers, and I'm happier when these right-wingers are in power.
Nixon: I think what's important is that in America, at least for now, right-wingers like me can do things that left-wingers can only talk about. (Mao Zedong nods)
Kissinger: Mr. President, I feel that those on the left are pro-Soviet, and they don't encourage us to move closer to the People's Republic, and they criticize you for doing so.
Mao: Exactly. Some people are opposing you. A faction in our country also opposed our dealings with you, and as a result, they got on a plane and fled abroad. [2]
Zhou: Perhaps you know about this.
Mao: Of all the intelligence in the world, America's is relatively accurate, followed by Japan. As for the Soviet Union, they just dig up corpses there, but say nothing.
Zhou: In Outer Mongolia.
Nixon: We encountered the same problem recently during the India-Pakistan crisis. The American left criticized me very harshly for not siding with India. There were two reasons for this: one was that they were pro-India, and the other was that they were pro-Soviet. I believe it's important to look at the bigger picture. No country, no matter how powerful, should be allowed to swallow up its neighbors. This cost me politically—I don't regret it, because I did the right thing—and history will prove that I was right to do so.
Mao: A suggestion, just a suggestion, would you mind issuing fewer briefings? (The President points to Dr. Kissinger and Zhou and laughs heartily) If you were to inform others about what we've discussed, the philosophy we've talked about, do you think that would be good?
[1] General de Gaulle, former President of the Fifth French Republic, died on November 9, 1970.
[2] On the night of September 13, 1971, Lin Biao's family fled to the Soviet Union by plane, eventually crashing in Undurkhan, Mongolia. This incident is known as the "September 13th Incident."

Nixon: Chairman can rest assured that everything we have discussed, or everything I have discussed with the Premier, will not be leaked. This is the only way to conduct top-level talks.
Mao: That's good.
Nixon: If possible, I hope to discuss with the Premier, and later with the Chairman, not only the immediate issues: the Taiwan issue, the Vietnam issue, the Korean issue, but also...
Mao: I'm not interested in those issues; those are for him (referring to Premier Zhou) to discuss with you. I think your topic is better—philosophical issues.
Nixon: Most countries in the world approve of my visit; the Soviet Union does not; Japan is skeptical, and has expressed this skepticism; India does not approve. So, we need to study why this is the case and decide our policy, to see how we should develop globally, rather than focusing on immediate issues. Of course, issues like Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan also need to be discussed.
Mao: Yes, I agree.
Nixon: For example, we must ask ourselves, why has the Soviet Union deployed more troops to your border than to its Western European border? What is the future of Japan? We have differences on this, so is it better to let Japan be neutral and completely undefended, or is it better for it to have some relationship with the United States for a period of time? What I'm talking about now falls into the category of philosophy. The problem is that there are no good choices in the field of international relations. One thing is certain: we cannot leave a vacuum, because a vacuum will be filled. For example, the Premier pointed out that he feels the United States is reaching out, and the Soviet Union is reaching out. So the question is, does the People's Republic face a danger from American aggression or from Soviet aggression? This is a difficult question, but we need to discuss it.
Mao: The problem of aggression from the United States, or aggression from China, is relatively small, and can even be said not to be a big problem. There is no problem of our two countries fighting now. You want to withdraw some troops back home, and our troops will not go abroad. Therefore, the state between our two countries is very strange; for the past twenty-two years, we have always failed to reach an agreement. Now, it has been less than ten months since we started playing ping-pong. If we count from when you made the proposal in Warsaw, it has been less than two years. We also have bureaucracy on our side. For example, you wanted to have personnel exchanges and trade, but we stubbornly refused, insisting that if the big problems couldn't be solved, the small problems wouldn't be done. I myself also insisted on this. Later, I saw that you were right, so we started playing ping-pong. The Premier said this also happened after President Nixon took office.
The former President of Pakistan introduced President Nixon to us. At that time, our ambassador to Pakistan disagreed with our dealings with you. He said we should compare whether President Johnson [2] or President Nixon was better. But Yahya [3] said these two people couldn't be compared. He said one was like a bandit—referring to President Johnson. I don't know where he got that impression. We didn't like him much either. From Truman [4] to Johnson, we were not very happy either.
In between, there were eight years of Republican [5] rule, and at that time, you hadn't figured it out either.
[1] Playing ping-pong refers to the incident in 1971 when China invited the US ping-pong team to visit China, also known as "Ping-Pong Diplomacy."
[2] Johnson: On November 22, 1963, US President Kennedy was assassinated, and Johnson, then Vice President, assumed the presidency. He was officially elected US President in 1965 and served until 1969.
[3] Yahya: Yahya Khan, former President of Pakistan. He used his good relations with both China and the United States to secretly relay messages between China and the US, establishing the famous "Yahya Khan Channel" and successfully arranging Kissinger's secret visit to China.
[4] Truman: In 1945, US President Roosevelt died in office, and Truman, then Vice President, assumed the presidency. He was officially elected US President in 1948 and served until 1953. Truman adopted a hostile attitude towards New China. On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out. On June 27, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait to prevent our liberation of Taiwan, and declared that Taiwan's status was undetermined. Soon after, the United States established military bases in Taiwan. In December 1954, the US and Chiang Kai-shek signed the "Mutual Defense Treaty."
[5] From 1953 to 1961, the United States was governed by the Republican Party, with Eisenhower as President and Nixon as Vice President.

Zhou: It was mainly John Foster Dulles' [1] policy.
Mao: He (referring to Zhou Enlai) and Dr. Kissinger discussed this earlier.
Nixon: But they (gesturing towards Zhou Enlai and Dr. Kissinger) shook hands. (Zhou Enlai laughs)
Mao: Do you have anything to say, Doctor?
Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, the world situation also changed dramatically during that period. We learned a lot. We originally thought all socialist and communist countries were all the same. It wasn't until the President took office that we understood the different nature of the Chinese revolution and the revolutionary path of development of other socialist countries.
Nixon: Mr. Chairman, I know that my position on the People's Republic for many years was completely disagreed with by the Chairman and the Premier. We are now coming together because we recognize that a new world situation exists. We recognize that what is important is not a country's internal policy and its philosophy, but its policy towards other countries in the world and its policy towards us. This is why (and I think I can be frank about this) we have differences. The Premier and Dr. Kissinger have discussed these differences.
Mao: Exactly.
Nixon: I also want to say that, looking at the two great powers, the United States and China, we know that China does not threaten the territory of the United States.
[1] Dulles, an American Republican, served as US Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959. In his international activities, he advocated the Cold War and pursued strategies such as "brinkmanship," "massive nuclear retaliation," and "peaceful evolution" against socialist countries. In 1950, he participated in planning the US government's use of the Korean War to militarily occupy Chinese territory, Taiwan. In 1954, he also planned the US government's signing of the "Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty" with the Taiwan authorities, attempting to legitimize the occupation of Taiwan and make Taiwan a long-term US military base. He consistently opposed socialist countries and national liberation movements, insisted on not recognizing China, illegally excluded China's legitimate status in the United Nations, implemented a blockade and embargo against China, and openly engaged in the conspiracy to create "two Chinas."

Mao: Nor does it threaten Japan or South Korea. [1]
Zhou: It threatens no country.
Nixon: We don't threaten others either, and I think you also know that the United States has no territorial claims on China. We know that China doesn't want to rule the States, and we believe you also understand that the United States doesn't want to rule China. At the same time, I believe, though you may not, that both the United States and China are great nations, and neither wants to rule the world. Precisely because our two countries share the same attitude on these major issues, we do not pose a threat to each other. Therefore, although we have differences, we can find common ground to build a world structure, a structure in which we can both develop safely and go our separate ways. This cannot be said for some other countries in the world.
Mao: Do you have other engagements this afternoon? What time is it now?
Zhou: The plenary session starts at 4:30, and it's 3:45 now.
Mao: Is that enough talk for now?
Nixon: Yes. I would like to conclude by saying, Mr. Chairman, we know that you and the Premier took a great risk in inviting us here. This was also a very difficult decision for us. But I have read some of the Chairman's speeches and know that the Chairman is a person who can see an opportunity when it arises, and I also know that you must "seize the day."
Mao: (Pointing to Dr. Kissinger) He is the one who "seizes the day."
Nixon: Personally, you and the Premier don't know me, so you shouldn't trust me. But you will find that I will never say what I cannot do, but I do more than I say. I just want to exchange views frankly with the Chairman and the Premier on this basis.
Mao: Perhaps I, this kind of person, often makes grand pronouncements. It's nothing more than "the whole world unites to overthrow imperialism, revisionism, and reactionaries" and establish socialism.
[1] South Korea, now the Republic of Korea, abbreviated as Korea.

Nixon: (Smiling) Just people like me, and bandits.
Mao: You, personally, may not be among those to be overthrown. Perhaps he (referring to Kissinger) isn't either. If everyone is overthrown, then we'll have no friends.
Nixon: (Laughs) Then there would be no target.
Nixon: We are all familiar with the Chairman's life. You came from a poor family and have now reached the pinnacle of the world's most populous country, a great nation. My background, less known, is also from a poor family, and I have now reached the pinnacle of a great nation. I feel that history has brought us together. The problem is that our philosophies are different, but we are both down-to-earth, both from the people, and we can achieve a breakthrough. This breakthrough will not only benefit China and the United States but will also benefit the entire world in the years to come. That is why I am here.
Mao: Your *Six Crises* [1] is well written.
Nixon: (To Kissinger) He (referring to Mao Zedong) reads too many books.
Mao: Too few. I don't know much about America. I want to ask you to send some teachers, mainly history and geography teachers.
Nixon: Oh, that's great.
Mao: So I told the journalist Snow, who passed away a few days ago, that it's fine if we succeed in our talks, and it's fine if we don't. Why be so rigid? Must we succeed?
Nixon: His death is very sad.
Mao: People will talk. If we don't succeed once, it simply means we took the wrong path. But what if we succeed the second time? (Both stand up)
Nixon: (Shaking Mao Zedong's hand) Together, we can change the world.
Mao: I won't see you off.
[1] Nixon wrote the book *Six Crises* in 1962, recounting his own life experiences, acknowledging his strengths and weaknesses, and speaking of his joys and sorrows.

On February 21, 1972, US President Nixon arrived in China for a visit, and Zhou Enlai greeted him at the airport.

On February 21, 1972, Mao Zedong met with US President Nixon.

On February 21, 1972, Mao Zedong met with US President Nixon.

On February 21, 1972, Mao Zedong met with US President Nixon in his study in Zhongnanhai.
On February 21, 1972, Mao Zedong met with US President Nixon in his study in Zhongnanhai.

"Historic Meeting" (Chinese painting)

February 21, 1972, U.S. President Nixon visited China. The picture shows the cover of *Time* magazine on March 6, 1976.
Supplement:
A Preview of the Primaries