The Complete Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 51


Zhou: At a mass rally to criticize Chen Yi, several foreign experts from the foreign affairs sector also participated. At that time, it was all very confusing. After the criticism session ended, they tried to take Chen Yi away, but the service staff in the Great Hall of the People wouldn’t let them. The staff said, “Since the Chairman ordered us to protect him, we will protect him.”


Mao: When they were criticizing him, he bowed three times forward and backward. But once he got into the car, he suddenly reversed course again and denied everything, claiming that you had forced him to say those things.


Mao: What exactly happened with Yang Yong?


Ye Jianying (hereafter referred to as Ye): I wasn’t clear about it at the time either.


Mao: Why did they want to arrest Liao Hansheng?


Zhou: Liao Hansheng was associated with He Long. It was all because of He Long. Even then, the Chairman didn’t approve of doing things this way.


Mao: This whole affair involving Yang Yong was backed by Lin Biao. Lin told me about it himself, but later he denied it.


Mao: If you have time, there’s a book by Lu Xun worth reading. In the postscript to “Quasi-Monthly Talks,” there’s an article titled “A Remote Account of a Literary Symposium” written by Cao Juren. Zeng Jinkan wanted to convene a literary symposium and invited Cao Juren, who didn’t attend, yet the newspapers still reported him as the initiator. So Cao asked Long Yusheng how that meeting actually went. Long replied, “We just had some snacks and tea.” To which Cao Juren remarked, “Once you’ve accepted someone’s tea, you’re considered one of their people!” This incident illustrates just how complicated struggles were back then. Now, does accepting someone’s tea really mean you become their person? I don’t think so. Just because you’ve had tea with me today, does that make you my person? Not necessarily. After all, both the Premier and Elder Kang have drunk tea offered by others! If merely drinking someone’s tea makes you their man, does that mean we should abandon the Party and the Central Committee?


After I finished writing “My Own Views,” the next morning the Premier and Elder Kang went to see Lin Biao. After reading it, he said he agreed. At the time, “My Own Views” didn’t have a title. Setting aside certain issues, its central point revolved around the question of the Chairman, so I chose to sidestep that. The claim that the General Staff wanted me to become State President was false; what was real was Lin Biao’s ambition to become Chairman and his desire to succeed me. Of course, there were also some who genuinely hoped I would become President and weren’t aligned with Lin Biao. Some even argued that if I didn’t take the post, the general public wouldn’t accept it. But I pointed out that I hadn’t been State President for over a decade already. As for me personally, I’m happy enough to chat with all of you, but being State President—having to greet foreign dignitaries day in and day out, handling state visits, receiving and presenting diplomatic notes, and all that routine business—is simply a faster route to meeting my maker.


Ye: The Chairman is very busy, and there are still many things left unwritten.


Mao: We can just have a little chat with everyone.


Mao: I’ve read all the fabricated dirt on Ye Jianying that those people collected. They escalated step by step—from initial attacks to calls for his overthrow. Later, when they realized they couldn’t bring him down, they stopped. Not all members of the “Red Guards” belonged to the “May 16th Group.” Among the compiled dossiers, there was a report in a Nationalist newspaper claiming that during the Long March, Ye had surrendered to the enemy in Jiangxi. Yet he had actually followed the Long March. All of you veteran comrades were part of the Long March—how could such a thing possibly be true?


Mao: Traditionally, the Red Army has never engaged in fighting among its own ranks. You (referring to Zhang Guohua) were originally a soldier in Wang Zuo’s unit.


Zhou: Later, he became a bugler.


Mao: Regardless, Wang Zuo did have merits and was even admitted into the Party. However, he was too attached to his mountain stronghold and couldn’t endure hardship. Peng Dehuai had him executed, which was entirely wrong. How could Communist forces turn their guns on fellow Communists? Ji Zhentong of the Fifth Corps also shouldn’t have been killed. It’s always better to kill fewer people. With counter-revolutionaries, rather than executing them outright, we should keep them alive for the benefit of the Party, since they serve as living evidence. So why go and execute someone like Xie Fang?


Zhou: Even Wang Shiwei could have been spared execution.


Mao: Wouldn’t it be much better if they hadn’t been executed? There are still people alive today who arrested and tried Liu Shaoqi under the Nationalist regime, as well as those who arrested and tried Chen Boda. These individuals themselves are living proof.


Remarks on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Report Regarding Plans to See Off the Delegation Attending the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (November 1971)


The level of formality should perhaps be raised slightly. We can discuss it tonight.


[1] According to this report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated November 6, 1971, the Chinese delegation to the 26th UN General Assembly, led by Qiao Guanhua as head of the delegation and Huang Hua as deputy head, was scheduled to depart Beijing on November 9, traveling via Shanghai and Paris en route to New York. First, it was recommended that Ji Pengfei, Li Yaowen, Ma Wenbo, other members of the Party Leadership Group within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and heads of relevant departments, along with leaders from other government bodies involved in diplomatic affairs, see the delegation off upon its departure from Beijing. Second, it was suggested that a deputy director and a member of the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, together with the head of the city’s foreign affairs office, welcome and bid farewell to the delegation upon its arrival in and departure from Shanghai. Third, given the numerous requests from various foreign embassies in China to see the delegation off, it was proposed to inform the ambassadors accredited to China, the Soviet border negotiation team, and the foreign correspondents stationed in Beijing. Fourth, a comprehensive press release was planned to be issued both upon the delegation’s departure from Beijing and during its transit through Shanghai. On November 3, Mao Zedong personally met with all members of the Chinese delegation to the 26th UN General Assembly. On the 9th, Premier Zhou Enlai and Politburo member Ye Jianying, along with other Party and government leaders, went to the airport to see the delegation off.