Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): That briefing [1] had the greatest impact; it
was a counter-revolutionary briefing. I don't understand why they did that. They had
something to say, but they didn't disclose it beforehand. They probably thought they had
some sort of guarantee, that it would succeed. But when they were told it wouldn't work,
they panicked again. I think they were afraid.
Mao: The Lushan riot lasted three days, actually a day and a half. Then we stopped and
toured the mountain. It's been a year now. Comrade Lin Biao's speech was not discussed
with me, nor was it shown to me. Lin Biao's two attempts to call and write were both
blocked by them.
The Lushan issue wasn't so good, but without the Lushan Conference, the current situation
wouldn't exist. The Lushan incident isn't over, it's not thorough, and it hasn't been
concluded. A meeting of fewer than 100 people isn't enough. The military should expand the
participation to include army commanders and political commissars, and local comrades at a
similar level should also participate.
(On the issue of Lin Biao and Chen Boda at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central
Committee)
Mao: The Lushan Conference focused on two main issues: the presidency and genius.
Anyone who speaks of "anti-genius" is opposing me. I've circled those adverbs several times.
Mao: We must practice Marxism-Leninism, not revisionism; we must unite, not split, and
avoid forming factions; we must be open and aboveboard, not engage in intrigue and
conspiracy.
Mao: I haven't discussed the line with you. In our past meetings, we only talked about trivial
matters, nothing more than relations with Nanjing. Who knew there would be the Lushan
Conference? I've said before that one major tendency obscures another, but who knew the
three supports and two militaries obscured the main tendency of the Lushan Conference!
Listen to what you hear and analyse it. Don't listen to rumours. Don't just listen to what
others say. You'll be misled and fail to understand the situation. Therefore, we must
investigate and study, and listen to what we hear and analyse it.
(When discussing his attitude toward the terms "genius" and "greatness")
Mao: Three adverbs were mentioned at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central
Committee. It was a time of chaos and war, so they were still needed. Things are different
after the Ninth National Congress. We must unite and strive for greater victory. Now the



temperature must cool down. Pictures are hung everywhere, exposed to the sun and rain.
It's pitiful. And then there's that "great" thing. I have four "great," but you don't have one! A
great mentor is just a teacher. Of course, a mentor is more capable than a teacher. I circled
those three adverbs in the draft Party Constitution for the Ninth National Congress. The
Ninth National Congress Party Constitution has been finalized. Why don't you take a look?
(On the issue of cadres studying Marxism-Leninism)
Chairman Mao: At this Lushan Conference, many people didn't even understand what
materialism and idealism were. They couldn't even make sense of it. You should study the
works of Marx and Lenin. Now study six books. Those with higher education may make
breakthroughs. Study a few more books next year.
(Finally, the topic turned to the military.)
Chairman Mao: When we entered the city, I was in charge of both the fighting and the army.
Since they won the Korean War, I stopped being in charge. I left that to others. Rongzhen
initially managed the army, then Peng Dehuai, and later Lin Biao. But he was in poor health
and couldn't handle much. Luo Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu wouldn't listen to him, and my
help wasn't enough. I'm not familiar with the current generals, and I don't understand them
well. I haven't had many conversations with them individually or in groups. I'm also unclear
about Huang Yongsheng's current ideological state. I didn't manage it before, but now I'm in
charge of the army. I don't believe the army will rebel. The army must be unified and
rectified.
(Speaking about the situation in the Beijing Military Region)
Mao: Besides them, the main perpetrators were the Beijing Military Region, which first
reorganized the 24th Army, then the 31st, 69th, and finally the 38th Army. Some of them
implemented organizational adjustments. When the 21st Army was transferred to Shaanxi,
Hu Wei remarked, "This is great! We're no longer under their command." They were all
happy to leave the Beijing Military Region. They were dissatisfied with the 66th Army, and
their former commander resisted, refusing to allow them to join the Tianjin Municipal
Revolutionary Committee. They couldn't get involved in the Beijing Garrison District because
of Xie Fuzhi, Wu De, and Wu Zhong, who wouldn't listen to their rhetoric.
Mao: Lin must be protected. (At the same time, he criticized Lin's speech.)
Mao: What do you mean by "one sentence is worth ten thousand"? One sentence is worth
ten thousand. How can it be worth ten thousand? What do you mean by "the People's
Liberation Army was founded and led by me, and Lin Biao personally commanded it?" If you
founded it, you can't command it! (Towards the end of the conversation)
Mao: Industry should learn from Daqing, agriculture should learn from Dazhai, and the
people of the whole country should learn from the People's Liberation Army. That's not
enough. We must also add that the PLA should learn from the people of the whole country.




[1] Refers to Briefing No. 6 of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee.