Afterwards, he joined forces with those people like Liu Renjing and Peng Shuzhi[1] to organize the "Leftist Opposition of Leninists," and eighty-one people issued a declaration to split our Party. They did not succeed and ended up running off to Trotsky’s faction.

Next came Qu Qiubai’s line error. They got hold of a pamphlet in Hunan that contained my statement, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." They flew into a rage, saying how could political power grow out of the barrel of a gun? Consequently, they removed me from my position as alternate member of the Political Bureau.[2] Later, Qu Qiubai was captured by the Kuomintang, wrote *Superfluous Words*, and surrendered and betrayed the Party.

After the Party’s Sixth National Congress in 1928, Li Lisan became arrogant. From June to September 1930, he pushed the Lisan line for over three months. He advocated attacking large cities and winning first victory in one or several provinces. I disapproved of what he was doing. By the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Li Lisan had fallen.

From 1930 to 1931, Luo Zhanglong[1] turned rightist, set up a separate Central Committee, and engaged in splitting, but he did not succeed either.

The Wang Ming line lasted the longest. He had already formed a faction in Moscow, organizing the "Twenty-eight and a half Bolsheviks." Relying on the power of the Third International, they seized power in the whole Party for four years. Wang Ming convened the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in Shanghai and issued a pamphlet entitled *Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Party*, criticizing Li Lisan for not being sufficiently "Left." He would not be happy until all base areas were ruined, and in the end they were basically all ruined. From 1931 to 1934, during those four years, I had no say at all in the Central Committee. At the Zunyi Conference in January 1935, Wang Ming’s line error was corrected, and Wang Ming fell.

On the Long March, after the First and Fourth Front Armies joined forces, Zhang Guotao engaged in splitting and set up a separate Central Committee, but he did not succeed. Before the Long March, the Red Army had 300,000 troops; by the time we reached northern Shaanxi, only 25,000 remained. The Central Soviet Area had 80,000, but only 8,000 arrived in northern Shaanxi. Zhang Guotao engaged in splitting and was unwilling to go to northern Shaanxi. At that time, not going to northern Shaanxi meant no way out—that was a question of political line. Our line was correct then. If we had not gone to northern Shaanxi, how could we have reached northern China, eastern China, central China, and northeastern China? How could we have established so many base areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan? After arriving in northern Shaanxi, Zhang Guotao fled.

After nationwide victory, Gao Gang and Rao Shushi[2] formed an anti-Party alliance and tried to seize power, but they did not succeed.

At the 1959 Lushan Conference, Peng Dehuai colluded with foreign forces and tried to seize power. Huang Kecheng, Zhang Wentian, and Zhou Xiaozhou also jumped out to oppose the Party. They organized a military club, yet they did not talk about military matters, going on about how "the people’s communes were established too early" and "the gains do not make up for the losses," and so on. Peng Dehuai even wrote a letter, openly throwing down the gauntlet, trying to seize power, but he did not succeed.

That gang of Liu Shaoqi was also trying to split the Party, and they did not get their way either.

Then there was the struggle at the 1970 Lushan Conference.[1]

At the 1970 Lushan Conference, they launched a surprise attack and carried out underground activities. Why did they not dare to come out into the open? That shows they had a guilty conscience. They first engaged in concealment, and then launched a surprise attack. Among the five Standing Committee members, three were kept in the dark, and so were the majority of the Political Bureau comrades, except for those few senior generals. Those generals, including Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo,[2] as well as Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan,[3] did not breathe a word, and then they staged a sudden onslaught. They started making trouble not in just a day and a half, but from August 23 and 24 to noon on August 25—two and a half days in total. There had to be some purpose behind their doing this! When Peng Dehuai organized a military club, he at least issued a written challenge. They were even worse than Peng Dehuai, which shows how low their style was.

In my view, their surprise attack and underground activities were planned, organized, and based on a program. The program was to install a state chairman, to promote "genius," to oppose the line of the Ninth Party Congress, and to overturn the three items on the agenda of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee.[4] Someone was in an impatient hurry to become state chairman, to split the Party, and to seize power hastily. The question of genius is a theoretical problem; they promoted the idealist theory of innate knowledge. They said that opposing genius meant opposing me. I am no genius. I studied the books of Confucius for six years, then studied capitalist books for seven years, and only began to study Marxism-Leninism in 1918. How can I be a genius? Those adverbs[5] —I put circles around them several times, didn’t I? The "Ninth Congress" Party Constitution has already stipulated things, why didn’t they open it up and take a look? I wrote *My Humble Opinion* only after talking with some people and doing a bit of investigation and research; it was specifically aimed at criticizing the theory of genius. I am not saying one should never speak of genius—genius means being somewhat smarter, that’s all. Genius does not rely on one person or a few people; genius relies on a Party, and the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. Genius relies on the mass line and collective wisdom.

Comrade Lin Biao’s speech[6] —he did not consult with me beforehand, nor did he show it to me. If they had something to say, why didn’t they bring it out beforehand? Probably they thought they had some assurance, as if success were within their grasp. But when they realized it wouldn’t work, they panicked. At first they displayed such courage, as if they would blow up Lushan and stop the earth’s rotation. Yet days later, they hurriedly withdrew the records.[7] If they were in the right, why withdraw? That shows their emptiness and panic.

The struggle with Peng Dehuai at the 1959 Lushan Conference was a struggle between two headquarters. The struggle with Liu Shaoqi was also a struggle between two headquarters. This Lushan Conference again was a struggle between two headquarters.

This struggle at Lushan was different from the previous nine. In all the previous nine cases, conclusions had been drawn. This time, to protect Vice-Chairman Lin, no personal conclusion was made, although he certainly must bear some responsibility. What should be done with these people? It is still the policy of education, that is, "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient." Lin must still be protected. No matter who makes mistakes, it is never good to disregard unity or disregard the line, is it? After returning to Beijing, I shall talk to them again. If they do not come to me, I will go find them. Some may be saved, some may not; it depends on practice. There are two possible futures: one is that they may change, the other that they may not. Those who commit major errors of principle, errors in line and orientation, especially the ringleaders—it is difficult for them to change. In history, did Chen Duxiu change? Did Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Luo Zhanglong, Wang Ming, Zhang Guotao, Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Peng Dehuai, or Liu Shaoqi change? They did not.

I talked with Comrade Lin Biao, and some of what he said was inappropriate. For instance, he said it takes several hundred years for the whole world, and several thousand years for China, to produce a single genius. That does not conform to the facts! Marx and Engels were contemporaries, and less than a hundred years passed before Lenin and Stalin appeared—how could one say it takes several hundred years to produce one? In China there were Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, Hong Xiuquan and Sun Yat-sen—how could one say it takes several thousand years? What "peak," what "one sentence is worth ten thousand sentences"—you’ve overstated it. One sentence is just one sentence; how can it be worth ten thousand sentences? Not establishing the post of state chairman, and my not serving as state chairman—I have said it six times. Even if each time counts as one sentence, that makes 60,000 sentences, but they refuse to listen. Not even half a sentence counts; it equals zero. It was Chen Boda’s words that, for them, one sentence was worth ten thousand. What about "greatly establish and specially establish"? Ostensibly it means establishing me, but I don’t know whom it really establishes; frankly speaking, it is establishing himself. And then there’s that saying: the People’s Liberation Army was created and is led by me, but under Lin’s personal command. So the person who creates it cannot command it? Besides, the creator is not I alone.

On questions of line and principle, I never let go. On major matters of principle, I do not yield. After the Lushan Conference, I took three measures: one was to throw stones, another was to mix in sand, and another was to dig at the foot of the wall. I criticized the material Chen Boda concocted that fooled quite a few people; I approved and released the report of the Thirty-eighth Army and the report of the Jinan Military Region on combating arrogance and overcoming complacency; and there was the Military Commission, which held such a long symposium yet did not criticize Chen at all—I added a critical note to one document. My method is to take hold of these stones, add critical notes, and let everyone discuss them—this is throwing stones.

Head. When the soil is too compacted, it lacks breathability; mixing in some sand makes it breathable. The Military Commission’s administrative group hasn’t incorporated enough people yet; it still needs more additions—this is like mixing in sand. Reorganizing the Beijing Military Region, that’s called undermining the foundation.

What’s your view on the Lushan Conference? For instance, North China Group Briefing No. 6¹—was it revolutionary, semi-revolutionary, or counter-revolutionary? Personally, I think it was a counter-revolutionary briefing. All 99 of you² attended the talks, the Premier delivered a concluding speech, and the self-criticisms of five top officers³ were issued, along with those of the two senior officers Li Xuefeng and Zheng Weishan. Everyone thought the problem was resolved. Actually, this Lushan matter isn’t over yet; it hasn’t been resolved. They want to cover it up, even keeping it from officers at the level of department head in the General Staff’s Second Department. How can that work?

What I’m saying is just my personal opinion, shared with you to sound things out. Don’t draw conclusions now; conclusions must come from the Central Committee.

Be prudent. First, the military must be prudent; second, the localities must also be prudent. Don’t be arrogant—once arrogance sets in, mistakes follow. The military must be unified; the military must be rectified. I don’t believe our army would rebel, and I don’t believe you, Huang Yongsheng, could command the PLA to rebel! Beneath the army are divisions and

1 Refers to Briefing No. 6 of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth CPC Central Committee, i.e., North China Group Briefing No. 2. This briefing published the discussions on Lin Biao’s speech during the afternoon of August 24, 1970, by the North China Group of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth CPC Central Committee. In his speech to the group, Chen Boda expounded on the "Excerpts from Engels, Lenin, and Chairman Mao on Proclaiming Genius," which had been reviewed and approved by Lin Biao. The briefing claimed Lin’s speech was “very important, very good,” “representing the heartfelt wishes of the whole Party and the people nationwide,” and that everyone wholeheartedly endorsed the proposals to “add to the Constitution, in Article 2, that Chairman Mao is the state chairman and Vice Chairman Lin is the vice chairman of the state” and to “restore the state chairman chapter in the Constitution.” On the afternoon of August 25, Mao Zedong chaired an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau with the participation of team leaders and decided that the plenum’s group sessions should immediately stop discussing Lin Biao’s speech, that North China Group Briefing No. 2 should be retracted, and that Chen Boda be ordered to make a self-criticism.

2 Refers to the 99 responsible persons from the central leadership, localities, and the military who attended the Criticize Chen Boda and Rectify Work Style Report Meeting convened by the CPC Central Committee from April 15 to 29, 1971. The 143 people then attending the Military Commission symposium also participated in the meeting.

3 Refers to the five individuals Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo.

regiments, plus headquarters, political, and logistics organs. If you try to move the army to do bad things, will they listen to you?

You must involve yourselves in military affairs; you can’t just be civil officials—you also need to be military officers. Grasping army work is really just about studying the line, correcting unhealthy tendencies, and avoiding mountain-stronghold mentality and factionalism. Unity must be emphasized. The military has always upheld a style of swift and resolute action, which I support. But when addressing ideological issues, swift action won’t work; you must present facts and reason things out.

The document on the Three Supports and Two Militaries¹ written by the Guangzhou Military Region, I approved and consented to it. In the Central Committee’s comments, I added the three characters "study it seriously" to draw everyone’s attention. Local Party committees have already been established, and they should exercise unified leadership. If decisions already made by the local Party committee are still brought up for discussion in the military Party committee, isn’t that putting things upside down?

In the past, our military training included a curriculum of standardized instruction. From individual soldier drills to battalion drills, it took about five or six months. Now, it’s only civil work and no military work; our army has turned into a cultural army.

"One Good Leads to Three Goods"—that "one good" you promote might lead things in the right direction, or it might not. Then there are those activist representative conferences: just how effective they really are is worth studying. Some are held well, but many are held poorly, mainly because of line issues. If the line is wrong, then the activist representative conference cannot be held well.

Learn from Daqing in industry, learn from Dazhai in agriculture, and the whole nation learn from the People’s Liberation Army—this isn’t complete; we must also add that the PLA should learn from the whole nation.

Study Lenin’s essay² commemorating the 25th anniversary of Eugène Pottier’s³ death, and learn to sing The Internationale and The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention. Not only sing them, but also explain them, and act accordingly.

1 Refers to the "Summary of the Guangzhou Military Region’s Symposium on Political and Ideological Work for the Three Supports and Two Militaries," issued and distributed by the CPC Central Committee on August 20, 1971.

2 Eugène Pottier, a French proletarian poet, Paris Commune activist, and author of the lyrics of The Internationale. He died in November 1887.

3 Refers to Lenin’s essay "Eugène Pottier," written in January 1913.

The lyrics of The Internationale and Lenin’s article are entirely from the standpoint and viewpoint of Marxism. What is said there is that the slaves rise up to struggle for truth—there has never been any savior, nor do they rely on gods or emperors; they depend entirely on themselves for their own salvation. It is we, the laboring masses, who created the human world. At the Lushan Conference, I wrote a 700-character document¹ in which I raised the question of whether heroes create history or slaves create history. The Internationale calls for us to unite, for tomorrow, and that communism will surely be realized. The study of Marxism stresses unity, not splitting! We’ve sung The Internationale for fifty years, yet within our Party, some have split ten times. I think another ten, twenty, or thirty splits are still possible—do you believe it? Even if you don’t, I do anyway. Will struggle cease once communism is realized? I don’t believe it. Even under communism, there will still be struggles—it’s just struggles between the new and the old, between what’s correct and what’s incorrect. Tens of thousands of years from now, what is incorrect will still be untenable and won’t hold its ground.

Among The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, the lyrics "remember every point clearly" and "the people throughout the country support and welcome us." Now, it seems a few points are no longer clearly remembered—especially the first of the three main rules and the first and fifth of the eight points for attention; these have become unclear. If everyone could remember them clearly and act accordingly, how wonderful that would be. The first of the three main rules is: obey command in all actions and march in step to achieve victory. Without marching in step, there can be no victory. Then there are the first and fifth of the eight points: Be amiable with the people, with soldiers, and with subordinates; don’t be arrogant; resolutely overcome warlord-style behavior. This is the key point. Without a key point, there is no policy. I hope to use The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention to educate soldiers, cadres, the masses, Party members, and the people.

At the Lushan Conference, it was said that people should study Marxist-Leninist books. I hope you all will read more books in the future. How can senior cadres manage if they don’t even understand what materialism is or what idealism is? Marxist-Leninist books can be difficult to understand—what should be done? You can ask a teacher for help. You are all secretaries, but you must also be students. I now act as a student every single day, reading two volumes of reference materials daily, which is why I’ve gained some international knowledge.

1 Refers to "A Few of My Opinions."

I’ve always disapproved of one’s own wife serving as the office director of one’s work unit. At Lin Biao’s place, Ye Qun served as office director; the four of them¹ had to go through her when requesting instructions from Lin Biao. Work must rely on one’s own hands—personally reviewing documents, personally giving approvals. Don’t rely on secretaries; don’t give secretaries so much power. My secretaries only handle receiving and dispatching: I select the documents myself, read them myself, and draft the ones needing handling myself, so as to avoid mistakes.

The Cultural Revolution exposed Liu Shaoqi and Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang²—this has been a great gain. There have been some losses. Some good cadres still can’t stand back up. The majority of our cadres are good; those who are bad are always a very small minority. Those purged amount to no more than one percent, and even adding those sidelined, it’s less than three percent. Those who are bad should be given appropriate criticism; those who are good should be commended—but not excessively flattered. Propelling a person in his twenties as a "super genius"³ brings no benefit. At this Lushan Conference, some comrades were deceived

1 Refers to the four individuals Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo.

2 Peng refers to Peng Zhen, formerly a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, first secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, and mayor of Beijing. Luo refers to Luo Ruiqing, formerly secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, vice premier of the State Council and concurrently vice minister of National Defense, and chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army. Lu refers to Lu Dingyi, formerly alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, head of the Central Publicity Department, vice premier of the State Council and concurrently minister of Culture. Yang refers to Yang Shangkun, formerly alternate secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee. During the "Cultural Revolution," they were wrongly branded as the so-called "Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun Anti-Party Clique." On February 17, 1978, the CPC Central Committee issued a document fully rehabilitating Peng Zhen, pointing out that the various charges and all false accusations made against him during the "Cultural Revolution" were to be overturned. On May 20, 1980, the CPC Central Committee issued a "Notice on Rehabilitating Comrade Luo Ruiqing," deciding to revoke the May 16, 1966 "Central Committee’s Endorsement and Transmittal of the Central Work Group’s Report on Comrade Luo Ruiqing’s Mistakes," completely clearing his name. On June 8, 1979, the CPC Central Committee endorsed and transmitted the Central Organization Department’s "Report on the Reexamination of Comrade Lu Dingyi’s Case," clearing his name. In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee reviewed and corrected the erroneous conclusions previously made about Yang Shangkun, affirming his contributions to the Party and the people.

3 Refers to Lin Biao’s son, Lin Liguo.

and misled. The problem doesn’t lie with you; the problem lies in Beijing. Having mistakes is not serious; our Party has a rule—admit the mistake and make a self-criticism, and correction is allowed.

We must focus on ideological and political education on the line. The policy remains: learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure the sickness to save the patient, unite, and strive for even greater victories.

Reference Image
In August and September 1971, Mao Zedong toured the south and held multiple conversations with Party, government, and military leaders along the way, pointing out that Lin Biao had ambitions. The image shows a summary of Mao Zedong’s conversations with local leaders during his inspection tour.

Appendix I: