(October 10, 1970)
Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao): When your army first retreated northward, the losses were quite heavy, and what remained was not much. At that time, as I recall, I told you that you were now stronger than before.
Kim Il-sung (hereinafter referred to as Kim): That is correct.
Mao: Back then, although we had five armies positioned along the Yalu River, our Politburo kept vacillating, going back and forth, until finally a decision was made. If you didn’t help, what could be done? Not only would you have no say, but we would have none either.
I once spoke with a Chinese journalist who had accompanied your troops into South Korea. I asked him which was more destructive—the U.S. artillery or the air force. He replied that the main killing power still came from the ground forces rather than the air force. I said, “That makes it easier for us,” because we had no air force; all we had were ground troops.
Moreover, it would simply mean entering and then being driven out again by the Americans. After all, hadn’t I already fought one battle there alongside you? Once we were pushed back west of the Yalu, and the Americans occupied the eastern bank, I remained uneasy. We could always go in again. Later, if our two countries joined forces to organize guerrilla operations, we could infiltrate once more and seize the eastern side of the Yalu. But if you stood idly by, there would be no justification for doing so.
[This is part of a conversation during Mao Zedong’s meeting with Kim Il-sung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Unfortunately, at that time we only had five armies, and even those lacked sufficient firepower. Seven armies would have been better. This was the first batch. According to local surveys, about twenty percent of the soldiers and cadres were enthusiastic and eager to fight. After mobilization, another survey revealed that twenty percent were willing to fight, while another twenty percent were unwilling.
Zhou Enlai (hereinafter referred to as Zhou): That was at the very beginning.
Mao: Apart from these forty percent, the remaining sixty consisted of people who would join in whether they fought or not, just following the crowd. I thought that was enough. With sixty percent willing to follow the majority and support the fighting, plus the additional twenty percent who were genuinely eager to engage, that added up to eighty percent—more than sufficient to launch an operation. We also combined internationalism with patriotism under the slogan “Resist America, Aid Korea, Defend Our Homeland.” If we hadn’t included “Defend Our Homeland,” many wouldn’t have agreed. They might have argued, “Why should we fight only for the Koreans and not for ourselves?” So I insisted that it was about defending both our homeland and yours—that we needed to go there to protect and defend.
Kim: Yes. Proposing that slogan at the time was excellent and entirely appropriate.
Mao: How can one defend one’s own home and country without supporting the Korean people in their defense of Korea? This helped the soldiers understand the purpose, especially after our initial victory.
Thus, everything proceeded in a tortuous manner. During that period, China’s indecision discouraged Stalin, who eventually gave up, saying, “Forget it!” Later, wasn’t it the Premier who went [to Moscow]? Didn’t he take with him the view against sending troops?
Zhou: There were two options for him to choose from. If we were to send troops, we needed his air force to support us.
Mao: We only asked for their air support, but they refused.
Zhou: At the outset, Molotov[2] approved it. However, Stalin later telegraphed him:
[L:] Here refers to Zhou Enlai.
[2] Molotov was then the Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in 1950.

The gist was that air support was out of the question; the Soviet air force could only reach the Yalu River.
Mao: The final decision was made only later. A telegram was sent domestically stating that regardless of whether the Soviets provided air support or not, we would proceed. Even so, we should still be grateful to the Soviet Union, as it did help us with weapons and ammunition at half price, and also supplied motor transport units. Therefore, when Asians fought against the Americans, they could at least claim some experience. As for the Soviet Union’s reluctance to enter the war at that time, there were valid reasons. They pointed out that the Second World War had inflicted enormous losses—twenty million men alone. In fact, the figure likely exceeded twenty million, since women were not counted among the conscripts.