(October 1, 1970)

(Recorded after the event, not reviewed by the person himself)

Time: 9:20 PM to 10:10 PM, October 1, 1970

Place: Lounge on the Tiananmen Rostrum

Participants: Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng

Interpreter and Recorder: Huang Li

Chairman Mao (hereinafter referred to as Chairman): There is a matter I want to discuss with you. We are considering improving state relations with the Ne Win government of Burma and exchanging ambassadors, and would like to hear your opinion. Ne Win and U Nu, both factions are anti-communist and anti-people. U Nu once requested to establish relations with us, but we ignored him. Ne Win recently sent an overseas Chinese merchant, requesting to restore diplomatic relations with us. This overseas Chinese is named Chen...

Zhou Enlai (hereinafter referred to as Zhou): His name is Chen Guohe. We have not had official contact with him.

Chairman: Even if we restore state relations with the Ne Win government, it will not affect your fighting.

Zhou: Now, we have arranged for you to be on the rostrum, and the Ne Win government has not lodged a protest. In the past, they would have.

Chairman: You should fight well again, take down a large area of northeastern Burma, take down Lashio, with a population of one or two hundred thousand, that would be good. Then you will have the right to speak. Now, why does Ne Win come to us? It is because you have been fighting them in northeastern Burma.

Your comrades who were in China and couldn't go back in the past have all gone back this time, taking advantage of Ne Win's anti-China opportunity.

How is Comrade Luo Xian's situation? Is he one of Burma's ethnic minorities?

Thakin Ba Thein Tin (hereinafter referred to as Ba): He is of the Kachin ethnic group, the same as the Jingpo ethnic group within China's borders.

If Chairman Mao believes the current timing is suitable for restoring relations between China and Burma, and it does not affect our revolutionary struggle, we also agree to the restoration of Sino-Burmese relations. Of course, once Sino-Burmese relations improve, some ideological confusion will arise among our comrades at the lower levels within the party. But it doesn't matter, we can do the work.

Chairman: Restoring relations between the two countries means restoring diplomatic relations. Ne Win's request to improve relations with us is for the purpose of gaining some economic benefits. We help them with some economic construction, and in the future when Burma is liberated, won't it be yours?!

We have established diplomatic relations with more than forty countries, basically relying on the people of these countries, not on their governments. The Soviet Union relies on the governments of these countries, not on their people. This is a matter of line.

Ba: As long as it is beneficial to China's foreign relations. We agree to the restoration of relations between the two countries. After China and Burma restore relations, ideological confusion will arise among our comrades at the lower levels internally. In 1949 (should be 1950—translator's note) when China and Burma first established diplomatic relations, ideological confusion also arose among our comrades at the lower levels within the party. But we must do the work, it can be resolved.

Chairman: Where is your Chairman now?

Ba: In the Bago mountains.

Chairman: Your Central Committee is fighting in the Bago mountains, not fighting as well as in your northeastern region, mainly because the masses have not been well mobilized. Your line is correct, taking the armed line is correct, it is the right way.

Our diplomatic line is to rely on the people. Our improving relations with the Ne Win government is transitional; Ne Win is a transitional figure.

I told the Indian chargé d'affaires that the Indian people are a great people. I asked him to convey my greetings to their President and Prime Minister. This chargé d'affaires went back and reported it. The Indian government is unreliable; it is both pro-American and pro-Soviet. Now, to strike a balance, it is requesting to restore diplomatic relations with us and exchange ambassadors. After restoring state relations, it will demand that we not support India's Marxist-Leninist leftist party, and will demand that we stop aiding the armed struggles of India's Mizo and Naga ethnic minorities.

Towards the imperialist countries of Europe, we generally do not curse them or curse them less. We must win them over, such as Britain, France, West Germany, etc. This is advantageous for us; they are the second intermediate force.

The first intermediate force is the Third World, that is, the regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The monopoly capitalists of all countries are afraid of the people; Ne Win is also afraid of the people.

You have not fought some battles well. Don't listen to everything the Chinese say; you must act according to your own actual situation.

Zhou: The visiting group had disagreements with your northeastern military region. A meeting was held, and we criticized the visiting group.

Chairman: You have the right to criticize the Chinese. There are no national boundaries for Marxist-Leninists. If Chinese comrades are wrong, they are wrong; if you are wrong, you are wrong.

Burmese Foreign Minister Hla Han told reporters in Bangkok that it was not the Chinese fighting the Burmese government in northeastern Burma, but the Communist Party of Burma.

Ba: Hla Han also said that relations between the Burmese government and the Chinese government have greatly improved.

Zhou: They sent Chen Guohe, but we had no official contact with him at all. We go through normal diplomatic channels. They have already proposed a candidate for ambassador and requested that we also send an ambassador.

Chairman: Ne Win is in difficulty now, mainly economic difficulties, rice production has decreased. However, the situation in Burma is still better than in India. In Yan'an, an American journalist told me that Burma has hope, India has no hope. In a country like India, when a famine occurs, two or three million people die.

Zhou: India has taken in the Tibetan rebel bandit Dalai and his group, interfering in our internal affairs, so when we support the struggles of the Mizo and Naga, it has nothing to say.

Chairman: Living in Beijing, can you know the situation inside Burma?

Ba: By reading Burmese newspapers, one can know some of the situation. We have a Central Committee member in Burma's Shan State, and we have radio contact with him; he also reports some situations. But unfortunately, this Central Committee member was sacrificed in a battle in early September this year. The whereabouts of the radio are still unknown.

Chairman: You must raise your vigilance; the enemy will send people to infiltrate our ranks. Wasn't your former Chairman, Comrade Thakin Than Tun, killed by an enemy agent!

Ba: If it is beneficial to China and does not affect the revolutionary struggle in Burma, we agree to China and Burma restoring diplomatic relations.

Chairman: Let's give it a try and see how it goes. After there is progress, I will keep you informed. Ne Win is different from India. Ne Win is suspicious of both the United States and the Soviet Union. On his right, he fears U Nu; on his left, he fears you.

If Ne Win comes to China, would you want to see him?

Ba: I can see him.

Chairman: Fighting is fighting, diplomacy is diplomacy.

Ba: Please rest assured, Chairman Mao, we will definitely strive to fight well.

Chairman: You must gradually eliminate the enemy. If you can fight your way to the Bago mountains, that would be good. How many years have you been fighting in the northeastern region of Burma?

Ba: Not yet 3 years. We went out in 1968, then '69, '70, not yet 3 years. We have already wiped out several enemy battalions. We defeated the enemy's main force, the 99th Division, and now they have transferred in the 77th Division.

Chairman: To fight well, you must first get a clear picture of the situation. What you can eat, eat it; what you can't, don't. Fighting is not difficult, it can be summarized in two sentences: You fight your way, I fight my way; if we can win, we fight, if we can't, we leave. When you fight me, it's nothing more than wanting to eliminate me. When I fight you, if I can win, I fight; if I can't, I leave. We must concentrate a superior force, concentrate the majority to fight the minority, not fight equal numbers. For example, five against five is hard to fight; five against one can be fought, and can be won.

Ba: However, to apply this military thought of Chairman Mao to actual struggle is very difficult, it is not easy.

Chairman: Alright! Let's stop here.

(During the conversation, Sihanouk and his wife came to bid farewell to Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao introduced Sihanouk to Ba Thein Tin.)

Thanks to Sakura Ayane for collecting, transcribing, and proofreading.