(October 8, 1970)




Chairman Mao: We ourselves are unaware of many matters. We also know very little about your relations with the Soviet Union. Since Comrade Zhou Enlai went there, we have come to understand quite a bit more.

Prime Minister Kim: That’s right. We should have informed you about these issues long ago, but we failed to do so, which led to numerous misunderstandings between us.

Chairman Mao: Some of these problems have accumulated over time. Originally, they were minor matters. Moreover, the reports from certain personnel at our embassies abroad were not always accurate. (Turning to Premier Zhou) Have you identified anyone responsible now?

Premier Zhou: Yes, there’s a man named Wang Peng. At first, I thought Wang Peng was quite “leftist,” only to discover that one of his subordinates, a fellow named Luo Zhenwen, was even more extreme.

Chairman Mao: This individual is very problematic—pure great-power chauvinism.

Premier Zhou: Indeed. It turns out that he was the one pulling the strings, directing everything from behind the scenes.

Chairman Mao: Who was it over there exercising dictatorial control? What’s his name again? (Looking at the Premier)

Premier Zhou: Luo Zhenwen.

Chairman Mao: Luo Zhenwen, not Wang Peng. Why was Wang Peng taking orders from him?

Premier Zhou: Luo claimed that Wang Peng was an old right-opportunist. Even though Wang Peng was already quite “left,” Luo pushed him further to the left.

Chairman Mao: Extremely “left”—too far to the left, a veritable ultra-leftist.

Prime Minister Kim: Of course, those were contributing factors. But from our side, we did indeed harbor illusions about the Soviet Union in the past. On this point, I would like to take this opportunity to offer a self-criticism to Comrade Chairman.

Chairman Mao: Take the matter of joint action, for example. Back then, we failed to reach consensus. Dealing with the Soviet Union has always been quite difficult. We, too, once held illusions about the Soviet Union—during Khrushchev’s early years, we still placed some hope in him. But later, that confidence dissipated.

…

Chairman Mao: We are engaged in revolution. Domestically, we must continue the revolution; internationally, we aspire to overthrow imperialism. This is what Marxism-Leninism teaches—not something we invented. Should capitalism be allowed to endure forever? Surely not! Marx certainly didn’t advocate that. As a victorious party and a victorious nation, we ought to assist revolutionaries around the world in toppling the exploiters everywhere. That is the general principle. However, in practice, priorities must be set. The primary targets are U.S. imperialism and its close lackeys, such as Japanese militarism. There are others as well, including Park Chung-hee, Chiang Kai-shek, Lon Nol, and Nguyen Van Thieu. The Americans particularly favor such figures. It’s rather peculiar: according to their class nature, they align themselves with these elements, much like the Soviet Union does.

Prime Minister Kim: Exactly.

Chairman Mao: In the West, our main focus is West Germany; in the East, Japan. Meanwhile, the United States maintains both antagonistic and collusive relationships with various parties. For instance, regarding Vietnam and Cambodia, they collaborate. In the Middle East, however, their interactions involve both conflict and cooperation.

Prime Minister Kim: It is said that the South Korean representatives who attended the session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union immediately reported back to their government, deeming the matter highly significant. Consequently, they resolved to study more carefully the future of their relations with the Soviet Union. Based on these developments, we have concluded that the Soviet Union has openly colluded with the South Korean puppet regime.

Chairman Mao: Therefore, expecting assistance from the Soviet Union—whether for you or for us—is simply unrealistic. Even the sale of arms for profit makes no sense. Why should it? After all, weapons are instruments of death. War not only claims lives on one side but also results in casualties among one’s own forces; it is, by definition, bloodshed. Yet someone would demand payment for such tools of war. I am unsure how things stood during Lenin’s lifetime, but in the later years of Stalin’s rule, during the Korean War, money was still exchanged for arms.

Prime Minister Kim: Given our country’s small size and limited self-reliance, we previously discussed this issue with General Huang Yongsheng, hoping that you could help us break free from this predicament.

Chairman Mao: Certainly, we should cooperate wherever possible. Our industrial base is only just beginning to recover. During the Cultural Revolution, two years were consumed by armed clashes. Many large military factories had been inherited from the Nationalist regime, and remnants of Nationalist counterrevolutionaries exploited these divisions to incite violence. Some civilian enterprises were similarly affected, with former Nationalist elements continuing to exert influence. I myself spoke with Comrade Pak Sung-chul about this. As a result, production plummeted in 1967 and 1968, only beginning to pick up last year, 1969, and again this year. We also uncovered pockets of counterrevolutionary activity, formed broad united fronts, and ultimately ended the fighting. (Laughter)

Even within China, we were locked in civil war!… The Foreign Ministry itself was split into two factions. For a brief period—in August 1967, specifically July and August—it fell under the sway of an ultra-leftist group, culminating in the burning of the British legation. Just imagine!…

Prime Minister Kim: It was precisely because of these events that we never gained a proper understanding of the Cultural Revolution.

Chairman Mao: We ourselves were caught off guard, completely unprepared. Why would people within your Foreign Ministry or the Central Cultural Revolution Group incite the masses to burn down the British legation? It remains baffling to us.

The Shenyang Military Region was no better. Those months were truly harrowing. We spent eight months holding negotiations in Beijing. Only after purging the disruptive elements did conditions begin to improve; otherwise, the streets of Shenyang would have been in utter chaos.

This was what we referred to as a “full-scale civil war.” While it may sound harsh, foreign observers’ claims that China was in turmoil were not entirely unfounded. There was indeed an element of truth to it, particularly during 1967 and 1968. Who could have anticipated that the Cultural Revolution would unfold in such a manner? We had no plan for it.

Subsequently, we addressed the situation province by province, department by department, and school by school. Everywhere, we encountered remnants of the Nationalist apparatus—from university professors and secondary school teachers to elementary school educators—all of whom remained entrenched. We simply lacked the cadre to replace them. Our own cadres were primarily based in rural areas, while they dominated urban centers. Thus, the victory of 1949 can be likened to autumn winds sweeping away fallen leaves.

Lin Biao: That’s right—autumn winds sweeping away fallen leaves.

Chairman Mao: It was Lin Biao and the other comrades who carried out that campaign, effectively dismantling the visible structures of the Nationalist military. Most of the individuals who had been hiding themselves went into hiding as well and ceased active operations. In many cases, however, we had no choice but to co-opt them temporarily to maintain order. What alternative did we have? Consider the large factories in Northeast China: if we didn’t utilize the old staff, what could we do? Or take universities—if we excluded the professors and teachers, what would remain?

Thus, this can be regarded as a second revolution. Perhaps there will be a third as well. But by then, please ensure that such confusion does not recur—no more accusations of being “counter-revolutionaries”! (Laughter)

We generally refrained from responding to public attacks leveled against us by various parties. We only replied to Italy, France, and the United States. As for other communist parties, especially those in Eastern Europe, although they often hurled fierce criticisms—criticisms they felt compelled to make—we chose not to engage. Take Romania, for example: they used to attack us fiercely. Didn’t you mention that they once described Deng Zhi as a good comrade? Now, however, they have stopped criticizing us. We are currently exploring opportunities to improve relations with certain Eastern European countries, such as Hungary and Poland. The extent of such improvements remains to be seen.

Prime Minister Kim: Certain issues are clearly rooted in class positions. However, due to the specific circumstances of our struggle, we have been unable to mount a resolute challenge against them.

Chairman Mao: Indeed, severing ties with the Soviet Union—whether in terms of military aid or trade—would not serve your interests. I would not advise you to take such a step. The Soviet intervention in China involved the complete withdrawal of all experts, the abrogation of every agreement and contract. Later, when Khrushchev attempted to reverse course and send experts back, we refused outright.

(Remainder omitted)



Thanks to Ayana Sakura for collecting, transcribing, and proofreading.