During the civil war, three "Left" deviationist line errors were committed. Why were "Left" deviationist line errors committed instead of Right deviationist line errors? Because there was fighting at the time. During the second cooperation with the Communist Party, a Right deviation emerged. Now that there is cooperation, everything must be subordinated to the united front, and everything must go through the united front. Independence and initiative are not wanted, the masses are not to be mobilized, the army is not wanted, and the Party’s leadership is not wanted.

After the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, there were the Chongqing negotiations. When I was in Chongqing, Liu Shaoqi gave a report at the Party School in Yan'an, saying that a "new stage of peace and democracy" had arrived, and as a result, telegrams were even sent to various places.
(Dong Biwu: I never heard about it in Chongqing. [Redacted]: It was conveyed in Zhangjiakou by the Jin-Cha-Ji authorities. Huang Yongsheng: I heard a telegram was sent to the Northeast. Lin Biao: The Northeast also received the telegram. We did not convey it; we sent a telegram saying it was not a "new stage of peace and democracy" but the "beginning of civil war.") Before the negotiations were over, I returned to prepare for war. Later, Premier Zhou and Kang Lao went, drafted an agreement, and signed it. Did this agreement count? In principle, it should have counted, but in reality, it did not.

The Seventh Congress was a congress of unity and also a congress of victory. In just over three years, Chiang Kai-shek was defeated. After entering the cities, we victoriously united many people, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Liu Shaoqi was later found out to be a renegade, traitor, and scab. Deng Xiaoping had no historical problems. Bo Yibo and An Ziwen had connections with the Kuomintang.

The day the People's Republic of China was established marked the beginning of socialism. At that time, we did not announce it; it was only announced after the land reform was completed. In some places, the land reform was not thorough, and peaceful land reform was carried out. At that time, the national bourgeoisie was subjected to utilization, restriction, and transformation.

The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee proposed that the principal contradiction was that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, but this was not constantly emphasized or openly discussed with everyone. As a result, the broad masses did not know that the socialist revolution was aimed at eliminating the bourgeoisie, yet some people talked only about utilization, without mentioning restriction or transformation.

Whether this Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution should be called a Cultural Revolution will be decided by history. It can be called a Cultural Revolution, because from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, no matter what name it is given, it has always been able to touch the superstructure, from the central authorities to government offices, schools, factories, and rural areas...
There are bourgeois intellectuals who still have backers. This work is not yet complete; it will take some time and must be seriously addressed. We must develop models, conduct investigations and research, sum up experiences, and implement policies.
(Lin Biao: Our great leader Chairman Mao personally took charge of several models in Beijing.) I can't manage that many; you have to take charge. In the past, the Beijing Municipal Committee couldn't manage it, but now it can. I only took charge of the models; I can't manage everything all at once. Factories, schools, and government offices all need to develop models. We must tackle them one factory, one commune, one school, one unit at a time.
(Mao asked Huang Yongsheng about the work of purging class ranks.) Our army must be prudent.

April 1969, Mao Zedong at the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
In Nankou, a case investigation group of eight people turned a Party committee secretary into a dog spy. Later, when handed over to the masses for investigation, he turned out not to be a spy but a good person. Those conducting case investigations do not always produce reliable materials. They tend to think the more [evidence] the better, like when we used to march and catch lice—catching too few wasn't satisfying. For those handling cases, adjudicating is not easy, and overturning a case means admitting leadership errors. I do not handle case investigations.

There is a university in Beijing with over nine thousand people; they arrested more than nine hundred—one-tenth. Once people are locked up, it is not easy to release them. To release them, one must give a reason: Why was I arrested? Why am I being released? Some can be pushed down with a nudge, and pulled up with a tug. Some are locked in cowsheds to sweep toilets.
(Asked Zhang Chunqiao) What is [redacted] doing? (Zhang answered...) It's acceptable for intellectuals to sweep toilets.
Wang Ming wrote articles saying we don't want intellectuals. Qin Shi Huang burned books and buried scholars alive, killing over four hundred people. We have not killed; the jet plane-style struggle, wearing tall hats, parading through the streets, and sweeping toilets are temporary phenomena. (Kang Sheng: Soviet newspapers published a photo of Peng Zhen wearing a tall hat.) Wearing tall hats was for attacking local tyrants and evil gentry; I wrote about it in an article. We hadn't done it for decades. This time the Red Guards dug it up and put tall hats on people again. If local tyrants and evil gentry could wear tall hats, why couldn't Peng Zhen wear a tall hat? We oppose wearing tall hats, oppose wearing black placards, oppose the jet plane-style struggle, and oppose arbitrary arrests. If people are arrested, they must be released; it's just a case of something causing suspicion but lacking evidence upon investigation.

In every period, one tendency mainly covers another. We must make comrades thoroughly understand our Party's historical experience to avoid making mistakes. Now there is a tendency to dig a pit only when one is desperate to defecate. Some do dig pits in advance.
When we used to march, upon reaching the campsite we would dig latrines. Now that we live in barracks, having no latrines won't do. If we stay among the common people too long, the masses will find us disagreeable. This time, with our "Three Supports" and "Two Militaries," the relationship between the army and the masses has become harmonious again. When you speak of "Three Supports" and "Two Militaries," foreigners don't understand.
We must guard against formalism of the "Left" that is actually Right in essence; the "Left" is the form, masking the Right essence.
I propose that several veteran comrades be elected in, including Zhu De, Chen Yun, Deng Zihui, Zhang Dingcheng, Xu Xiangqian, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Chen Yi, and Ye Jianying. As for Wang Ming, everyone probably won't elect him. Wang Jiaxiang made mistakes but still did some work.

Speech at the National Congress (III)
(April 13, 1969)
Any news? (Zhou Enlai: There are plans to convey the Chairman's last speech tonight by opening large group meetings.)
What is the point of conveying that? (Zhou Enlai: If the Chairman's words are not conveyed, it will be said we are blocking them.)
No, what matters is whether what I said conforms to the facts.
(Zhou Enlai: It all conforms.) (Kang Sheng: Tell them to review "Study and the Current Situation.")
Four issues, and one document. At a Party congress, I made a report once, discussing the principal contradiction and secondary contradictions. Domestic contradictions were downgraded to secondary contradictions. After finishing the speech, I then discussed the national united front. When sent to Liu Shaoqi and Peng Zhen, they disagreed. I said Chiang Kai-shek was resisting Japan; in the past, they did not resist Japan and did not mobilize the masses.
(Li Xuefeng: At the Soviet Area Party Congress, a student named Yang Cheng kept saying: Resist Japan, resist Japan; Democracy, democracy.) (Kang Sheng: It was at the December meeting.) (Cheng Shiqing: We discovered three unpublished articles by the Chairman, one of which is "Message to the Frontline Officers and Soldiers.") That's probably incorrect. (Cheng Shiqing: It was published in the newspapers.) (Chen Boda: All united, negating struggle. There was also all struggle, negating unity... The "Preface to Rural Surveys" and "On Policy" — two articles — were included.) Is there this "On Policy"? (Chen Boda: Yes.) To summarize our Party's errors over the past decades, tossed back and forth, it was all united, negating struggle; all struggle, negating unity. For example, when Li Weihan went down to Hunan, they approved of locking peasants in jail cells. Like in Xiangxiang, things were relatively better. One was Li Weihan, another Xia Xi. That was a kind of tendency, which coexisted with

(III)
uniting with the Kuomintang while also criticizing and struggling against them. If one wanted to criticize, criticizing the Kuomintang was absolutely not allowed. For instance, in Wuhan at that time, I had already left Wuhan for Changsha, serving as provincial Party secretary.
The General Labor Union, Liu Shaoqi. (Zhou Enlai: Those who stayed behind also included Xiang Zhongfa and Xiang Ying.) The so-called union was a union with the bourgeoisie, referred to as the bourgeoisie along with Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. They became comprador bourgeoisie gradually, not all at once. They were scared stiff by the masses. Within the Party, some were also scared stiff. There was a North China delegation that dared to raise the slogan of democracy; the time was not ripe, so they couldn't come up with that slogan either. After the Nanchang Uprising, when they couldn't hold on in the cities, they ran to the countryside. This was a contradiction masked by the past, one masked by the KMT-CPC cooperation. Actually, it had existed since the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident. (Zhou Enlai: There was a man surnamed Jiang, [something] Xian, and another named Special Agent Ku.) He believed Chiang Kai-shek's words. Chiang Kai-shek had a Principal's Instruction; because I knew this man, he was at the Changsha Normal School and later in Anyuan. Not just in Wuhan, but even Chen Yannian in Guangdong, these comrades were all studying, so this situation was well worth noting. During one period, there was a wave, and that wave was correct, like cooperation. But this wave masked another wave. Independence and initiative, mobilizing the masses—these were no longer mentioned.
The second time was different; the national struggle masked the class struggle. Afterwards, there were always undercurrents. For example, the current anti-revisionism hasn't again led to anti-Soviet sentiment. In the past, China opposed all foreigners without distinguishing good from bad. For decades, until the Communist Party was founded, we only then understood that foreigners should be divided into two groups, one being laboring people. We had little contact with them, so it remained the same old way. Veteran comrades, having worked for decades, probably understand a bit! Comrade Wang Hongwen, you haven't been through several periods.
(Wang Hongwen: There are many things I just don't understand.) So, by the time of the Nanchang Uprising and the "August 7th" Emergency Conference evaluating Chen Duxiu, sometimes there were Right tendencies as well, but the main tendency was "Left."
What I'm talking about is the Jiangxi AB Corps, which put forward several slogans: Down with Mao Zedong, support Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Huang Gonglue. Peng Dehuai was smart and immediately issued a statement, saying it was an enemy provocation. They wanted to capture and kill me. The messenger was named Zhu [redacted]; he hid in the mountains. The current Zeng Shan from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who was then the chairman of the Jiangxi Soviet, did not agree with these slogans and so also