Speech at the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China
(13th and 31st of October 1968)

The meeting will last approximately seven to ten days. Think about what issues need to be
raised. Specific matters: One domestic, one international. Domestically, we need to
summarise the work done since the last plenary session over two years ago. Two years of
the Cultural Revolution have essentially resulted in two opinions: one is that it was not bad
and was basically correct; the other is that some people say it was not necessarily so. At the
11th Plenary Session, I already mentioned that at the October Work Conference, I had also
made a point: Do not assume that everything approved at the meeting can be implemented.
Raising your hand at the meeting is one thing, but actually raising objections is another
matter. Later, it turned out that some people still did not understand, and some encountered
problems. (13th and 31st October 1968)
There was a comrade named Zhang Dingcheng [1] who also did not discover any traitors,
spies, or counter-revolutionaries. Why didn't he come to the meeting? What was the
reason? You are very familiar with Deng Lao [2].
(Zhou Enlai: He attended the Dalian meeting. Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Xu Haidong, and the
other four people—Xu Haidong and Gao Gang embraced and wept, saying that the Central
Committee had wronged him, and that without his contributions in Shaanbei, the Central
Committee would not have been able to stand firm. This was precisely when Gao Gang was
appointed as Vice Chairman, and his alliance with Gao Gang deserves investigation.)
Tan Qilong [3] from Shandong was a Red Army soldier from a young age. He had no other
issues, only work-related mistakes. Shandong does not understand him, and the issue
cannot be resolved at present. Shandong wants to drag him back for a struggle session, but
we will not allow it.
(Zhou Enlai: He has been dragged back and is now in Jinan.)
Our comrades in Shandong must do persuasion work.
Zhang Tixue [4] from Hubei was a good comrade who made a mistake. He returned to Hubei
and made a good self-criticism, so the masses forgave him. The masses welcomed him. He
wanted to make another self-criticism, but the masses said there was no need. Wang
Renzhong [5] was a traitor and a member of the Kuomintang. Tao Zhu also had problems
with his history.
Hunan’s Wang Yanchun [6]. This man is no good. Deng Xiaoping had not yet discovered any
historical issues with him, only that he had deserted from the Seventh Army. (Zhang Yunyi:
When he was political commissar of the Red Seventh Army, the situation became tense, so

he used the excuse of going to the Central Committee to report on his work, but instead
deserted in Chongyi. Comrade Ye Jizhuang also exposed this incident before his death.)
The main issue was that after arriving in Beijing, he sought to establish an independent
kingdom. He was dissatisfied and claimed he did not seek power, but in reality, he was the
one shaking the goose feather fan21 in Liu Shaoqi's headquarters. However, I occasionally
spoke with him, and during the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Liberation War, he
fought against the enemy. No evidence was found of him having defected to the enemy,
betrayed his country, or surrendered in the past. This individual made significant mistakes,
and he wrote an autobiographical self-criticism that can be shared with everyone [7]. He
requested not to be expelled from the Party and hoped to find some work. When the topic
of work came up, many comrades shook their heads. Even major tasks were difficult to
accomplish, but I suggested that tasks like organizing materials indoors might be feasible!
The Party Committee decided to assign him to the Party School for further study and
education.
Comrades have a lot of experience. We can imagine, should the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution be carried out, or not? Are the achievements the main thing, or are the
shortcomings the main thing? Can the Great Cultural Revolution be carried out to the end?
Let's discuss it. For example, the Zhejiang issue, the ‘Red Terror’ has not yet been resolved,
which is also a work issue.
The Fujian issue is very serious. Han Xianchu [8], isn't it chaos in your area?
(Han Xianchu: The situation is good now.)
I see. Your report is good. Once the work is done, isn't the problem solved? Problems can be
solved, so why can't this one be solved?
We must summarise our experiences. In the past, the Liberation War was relatively
straightforward. Like autumn winds sweeping away fallen leaves, it was completed in three
and a half years. At that time, the enemy was relatively clear. Now, with the Great Cultural
Revolution, there are many difficulties, and the battle is not easy to fight. The Cultural
Revolution is faster than the past. In the past, it took twenty-two years, from 1927 to 1949,
but the Cultural Revolution only took two and a half years.
The problem is that ideological errors are mixed with contradictions between us and our
enemies, making it difficult to understand the situation at a glance.

21 "Shaking a goose feather fan" is an idiom used in Chinese to metaphorically plan and strategize behind the
scenes, derived from the legend of Zhuge Liang of the Three Kingdoms period holding a feather fan to
command the battles.

We can only solve the problem province by province. For example, the three major factions
in Liaoning Province fought for eight months [9], causing chaos throughout the country.
Hasn't the problem been solved? It is still clear.
We must take on more responsibility ourselves to lighten the burden on those below us. The
main issue is ideological, a contradiction within the people. There are also some enemies
within, but they are a minority, and it is a matter of doing a good job.
Xiao Ke has been in battle before. He went to Tiananmen Square for National Day, but he
didn't go this time. I'm not sure what his issue is.
(Zhou Enlai: There's a part of his history that's unclear. He fought in a village in Huan County,
surrendered his weapons to the enemy, and even established a party. This time, the rebels
found out about it.)
Which one is Li Desheng [10]? You handled the Anhui incident well. You did a good job with
Wuhu.
(Li Desheng: It was the Chairman’s approval of the “July 3rd” proclamation that made a
difference. The public opinion was well-managed.)
It's all about creating public opinion. It's like an invention that has been worked on for
decades without understanding how to create public opinion. It's been worked on for
decades, and it's all about creating public opinion. Otherwise, how could the Eighth Route
Army and New Fourth Army have been formed? Without the masses, how could there be a
dictatorship of the proletariat? Without the masses and without an army, who would accept
your party?
The 11th Plenary Session of the Central Committee stated that we should engage in
ideological struggle, not armed struggle, but they wanted armed struggle, not ideological
struggle. Two factions fought each other in a school, each with their own weapons. Two
factions fought each other in a factory, with two centres of power. Two factions also fought
each other in a ministry.
The basic masses are still workers, peasants, and soldiers, and soldiers are also workers and
peasants. Then come the intellectuals. We must strive to unite and educate the majority of
intellectuals. The shortcoming of intellectuals is that they are easily swayed, mainly because
they have not combined with the workers, peasants, and soldiers.
We cannot simply label them as stinking intellectuals, but it is okay to be a little stinky.
Intellectuals are indispensable, but they should not get too big for their boots.
Do not enrol students for two years. Let them all graduate and go work with the workers,
peasants and soldiers. Do not enrol students for two years, and the sky will not fall. Start
afresh in the future and select high school students who have performed well in rural areas
and factories to enrol in school.

Who knew that a military academy would have 210 "momomo" students, and among them
there were indeed "monsters." It’s our own fault for creating so many. No one was in charge
of them. Ye Jianying, weren’t you in charge? The Four Cleans campaign didn’t work, so send
them all to work with the workers and the People’s Liberation Army.
Can this great proletarian cultural revolution be carried through to the end? We say that it
must be carried through to the end, but what does ‘to the end’ mean? That is the question. I
estimate that it will take about three years, until next summer.  To the end means including
the great criticism campaign, the purge of the class ranks, the rectification of the Party,
streamlining the army, and reforming unreasonable rules and regulations.
Look at the state of the factories. How could we have avoided the Great Cultural Revolution?
Take a timber factory in Beijing, for example. It had a thousand or so employees and was run
by two capitalists. Some of the factories had been around for three dynasties, while others
had been around for four. There’s also the Xinhua Printing Factory, which printed currency
during the Beiyang warlord era and printed newspapers and leaflets for the Japanese when
they arrived. It was taken over by the Kuomintang, and when the Communists came, it still
operated smoothly. It operated smoothly, with some third- and fourth-generation cadres,
some of whom were hidden counter-revolutionaries. Our people weren’t capable either, and
their ideological state and mental condition weren’t good. If we don’t clean out the hidden
counter-revolutionaries, whose factory is it really?
As expected, rural areas are better, but there are still issues. Communes and production
teams that have not been properly organised need to be tightened up. Rely on the People's
Liberation Army and the provincial, prefectural and county revolutionary committees. One
province organised a propaganda team of one million people, while the People's Liberation
Army only had a few tens of thousands, 90% of whom were poor peasants and lower-middle
peasants. That was Guangdong. Jiangxi is also not bad. Jiangxi is a medium-sized province
with 22 million people. Some areas have too many people. The provincial government has
only 7,000 staff members, so at least 6,000 need to be reduced. Where will they be reduced
to? Within China, of course. One factory, one rural area, or mainly sent to rural areas.
Factories cannot accommodate so many people.

[1] Zhang Dingcheng, then Prosecutor General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.
[2] Deng Lao, referring to Deng Zihui, had worked with Zhang Dingcheng for a long time in
Central China and the Huaihai Field, and they knew each other well. At that time, he was the
Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference and also the Deputy Director of the State Planning Commission, in charge of
banking.

[3] Tan Qilong, then First Secretary of the Shandong Provincial Committee of the Communist
Party of China.
[4] Zhang Tixue, then Governor of Hubei Province.
[5] Wang Renzhong, former First Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Committee of the
Communist Party of China.
[6] Wang Yanchun, former Standing Committee Member and Second Secretary of the Hunan
Provincial Party Committee, and Acting First Secretary.
[7] Deng Xiaoping's autobiographical self-criticism: In July and August 1968, Deng Xiaoping
wrote a self-criticism letter titled "My Autobiography” and sent it to the Central Committee
and Mao Zedong. The full text is divided into four parts: ’The Red Seventh Army
Period,‘ ’More Than Three Years in the Central Soviet Area ,‘ ’The Daxing Period,‘ and ’The
Beijing Period."
[8] Han Xianchu was then the director of the Fujian Provincial Revolutionary Committee. On
19 August 1968, the Fujian Provincial Revolutionary Committee was established.
[9] The Three Major Factions in Liaoning: At the time, Liaoning was divided into three
factions: the ‘Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Rebellion United Committee’ (abbreviated as
‘Liaoning United Committee’), the ‘Liaoning Proletarian Revolutionary Liaison Station’
(abbreviated as ‘Liaoning Revolutionary Station’), and the ‘August 31st Revolutionary
Rebellion Headquarters’ (abbreviated as ‘August 31st’). After merging, the Liaoning
Revolutionary Committee was successfully established in Liaoning on 10 May 1968, with
Chen Xilian as its main leader.
[10] Li Desheng, then head of the Anhui Provincial Revolutionary Committee, established the
Revolutionary Committee in Anhui on 18 April 1968.