(Not reviewed by Chairman Mao)

(November 17, 1968)

[Phạm Văn Đồng (March 1, 1906 – April 29, 2000), a senior leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party, was a trusted aide to Ho Chi Minh and assisted Ho in establishing the Indochinese Communist Party. After Ho Chi Minh's passing in 1969, he formed a three-person ruling council with Lê Duẩn and Trường Chinh to lead Vietnam, serving as Prime Minister of North Vietnam from 1955 to 1976. After Vietnam's reunification, he continued as Prime Minister of the Vietnamese government until his retirement in 1987.]

Time: November 17, 1968, 8:15 a.m. to 10:15 a.m.

Location: Room 118, Great Hall of the People

Attendees:

Vietnamese side: Thập Cúc, Lê Thanh Nghi, Lê Đức Anh, Lý Ban, Ngô Minh Loan, Nguyễn Văn Quảng

Chinese side: Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Huang Yongsheng, Wen Yucheng

Interpreter: Liang Feng

Recorder: Ji Chaozhu

Chairman Mao: You've been here four days?

Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng: Yes. How is Chairman Mao's health?

Chairman Mao: Not so good, about to ascend to heaven, going to have a meeting with God. (All laugh)

Is Chairman Hồ's health a bit better? Better than when he was in Beijing?

Phạm Văn Đồng: Better.

Chairman Mao: That's good.

Phạm Văn Đồng: His treatment in Beijing was very fundamental, so after he returned, he has been doing well and has maintained it.

Chairman Mao: The climate in Beijing may not suit his health.

Phạm Văn Đồng: It's possible.

Chairman Mao: I think places like Guangzhou and Hangzhou might be better for him.

Phạm Văn Đồng: Our Chairman Hồ and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party have asked me to convey the highest respect to Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin.

Chairman Mao: Thank you.

Phạm Văn Đồng: Among those paying a visit to Chairman Mao today are two comrades who have just come from the South, Comrade Thập Cúc and Comrade Lê Đức Anh.

Chairman Mao: (Facing Lê Đức Anh) Is this your first time here?

Lê Đức Anh: I came in 1962, but today is the first time I've met Chairman Mao.

Chairman Mao: Look at my bureaucratism. You came and I didn't see you. They'll probably want to dismiss me because of my bureaucratic attitude. We're about to hold a Party Congress, and I might be dismissed. (All laugh) That might be a good thing. But now I can only be an idler, just sweeping the floor, doing things like that. (All laugh) Because there hasn't been much fighting lately, so you want to negotiate with the United States, and the United States wants to negotiate with you, too. Its affairs are rather difficult—I'm referring to the Americans. They mainly have these three issues—America, Europe, and Asia. They've placed heavy forces in Asia for so many years, and things are now unbalanced. The American capitalists investing in Europe are dissatisfied in this regard. At the same time, the United States has historically always let other countries fight first, only joining halfway through. Even after World War II, they first fought the Korean War, then the Vietnam War, taking the lead alone, with very few other countries participating. Whether they call it a special war or a limited war, the United States is going all out. Now it can't attend to other countries. For example, Europe is crying out, saying there are fewer men, that experienced soldiers and commanders have been pulled out, and good equipment has been pulled out. Whether it's Japan, Korea, or other places in Asia, isn't it the same pulling out? Their own country—don't they say they have a population of 200 million? But they can't endure a long fight. They send out several hundred thousand troops, but their forces are limited.

(Turning to the interpreter) What's your name?

Liang Feng: Liang Feng.

Chairman Mao: As in a cool summer breeze? (All laugh) Did you learn when you were young, in Vietnam?

Liang Feng: Yes.

Chairman Mao: After fighting for a few years, don't just look at your own difficulties; see the enemy's difficulties, too. It's not just a few years of fighting, but over a dozen years. Japan surrendered in 1945, so 23 years have passed, and your country still exists. You had three imperialist countries invade you—Japan, France, America—but your country still exists and is developing.

Phạm Văn Đồng: Yes.

Chairman Mao: I say we made a mistake, which was convening something called the Geneva Conference in 1954. Chairman Hồ wasn't very happy at the time; he was reluctant about the South. He said the morale of the people in the South was very high. I'm not clear on how that meeting started; it was probably proposed by the French.

Premier Zhou: France proposed it, and the Soviet Union suggested it too. In February 1954, the Soviet Union first proposed resolving the Austrian issue. Stalin had died, and Khrushchev had come to power.

Chairman Mao: It would have been better to fight another year, to delay negotiations until Ngô Đình Diệm's army was nearly wiped out. At that time, were there also Northern troops in the South?

Phạm Văn Đồng: At that time, we were fighting nationwide, even in Laos.

Chairman Mao: Sweep them all away together. There was some international opinion pushing for a meeting. It was exactly when France was about to withdraw, the U.S. hadn't yet arrived, and Ngô Đình Diệm was in dire straits that we gave them a hand. I've talked about this with you before, and also told Comrade Hồ Chí Minh; we said it was one of our mistakes. I always think we missed an opportunity then. The treaty called for withdrawing troops. But it didn't create any major problem—just killing people. Killing leads to war again. War brought the Americans in. First they were called advisors, then they directly sent troops, no longer acting as advisors. (All laugh) Now they're saying they want to be advisors again. (All laugh)

Phạm Văn Đồng: This time, they can't possibly be advisors anymore.

Chairman Mao: They will still want to be advisors, I think.

Phạm Văn Đồng: Then we should ask Comrade Thập Cúc for his opinion.

Thập Cúc: Uncle Mao, this time Chairman Hồ and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party instructed us, ordering us to fight to the end in the South, until not a single American invader remains on our soil. So even if the Americans want to be advisors again, they won't succeed.

Chairman Mao: That's good.

Thập Cúc: Uncle Mao, we've shed blood and sacrificed, fought for so many years. Can we possibly go back to the way things were without any progress? Absolutely not allowed.

Chairman Mao: For them not to be advisors, I'm afraid it will still take some time.

Thập Cúc: Right. We will persist and fight on, until our South is completely liberated, and we achieve the reunification of the motherland. We do this following Chairman Hồ's instructions, and also according to Uncle Mao's opinion; it's also the opinion of our Party Central Committee and the aspiration of the entire Vietnamese people.

Chairman Mao: That's good. Fight and talk at the same time. Talk is possible, but talking them away is also difficult.

Phạm Văn Đồng: They won't leave. They sit down, but they won't leave.

Chairman Mao: Fight, then. The U.S. mainly relies on aircraft. It has 9 to 10 divisions in South Vietnam, more than during the Korean War. In Europe, it has 5 divisions, 200,000 men, but actually, their numbers aren't full. As for how many divisions it has at home, I'm not too clear.

Huang Yongsheng: There are 9 more divisions.

Phạm Văn Đồng: But their most elite divisions are in South Vietnam.

Chairman Mao: But it's insufficient. One lack is manpower, another is equipment, and another is experienced men; all have been pulled to South Vietnam.

I don't understand—what great benefit does the U.S. get for its capitalism by reaching into Southeast Asia? Do you say it's to plunder resources? Of course, there are resources. Indonesia has oil, Malaya has rubber, you have those too, and tea. But as for grain, I don't think the U.S. has much need.

Phạm Văn Đồng: But when the Americans fight us, they cast their eyes farther afield.

Chairman Mao: When fighting the South, they cast their eyes on the North, even on China. Because it's imperialist.

Of course, imperialism wants to fight. They hope to turn countries like ours into their colonies. But for example, in China, we were a semi-colony for over 100 years. What exactly did they plunder away? China's industry was underdeveloped, and agriculture was also underdeveloped.

Premier Zhou: There were raw materials.

Chairman Mao: What raw materials? Soybeans, mainly needed by Japan.

Premier Zhou: Oil hadn't been exploited yet.

Chairman Mao: They said China had no oil at all, didn't develop iron and steel, and even less machinery. Japan built some textiles; the British mined coal.

Premier Zhou: Some were developed, but mainly consumed within China.

Chairman Mao: I think one of their aims is to extinguish the fire. Where a fire breaks out at your place, they want to extinguish it. The second is arms capital. To extinguish the fire, fire-extinguishing machinery must be manufactured, and that brings profits. They spend over 30 billion [dollars] annually at your place.

The U.S.'s pattern is that they don't like long wars. Their wars usually last about four years. At your place, the fire isn't going out; instead, it's burning even stronger. Their capitalists split into factions—this group reaps more profit, that group reaps less. With uneven spoils, internal turmoil erupts. All these contradictions can be exploited.

Phạm Văn Đồng: In this war, the U.S. has spent a huge amount of money, so they still want to persist.

Chairman Mao: But the other faction, the monopoly capitalists who earn less, are unwilling to persist. This issue can be seen in the election campaign speeches of the two parties. Especially, an American journalist recently published an article saying one must beware of falling into another trap. This man is Lippmann. He said they've already fallen into a trap in Vietnam, and the problem now is how to figure a way to crawl out of this trap. He's also afraid of falling into other traps. So your undertaking has promise. That year, I talked with Chairman Hồ in Hangzhou. By then, the fighting had started, but there was no bombing yet.

Premier Zhou: In 1966.

Chairman Mao: My voice wasn't very good then. I said the U.S. would probably have had about enough by this year, because this is their election year. No matter which president comes to power, this problem exists. Now, should they continue fighting or withdraw now? I think if they continue fighting, their difficulties will increase. All of Europe didn't participate; this is different from the Korean War.

Phạm Văn Đồng: Yes.

Chairman Mao: In the Korean War, Britain participated, and Türkiye participated.

Phạm Văn Đồng: France also participated.

Chairman Mao: France?

Premier Zhou: Yes, a very small number.

Phạm Văn Đồng: Just one regiment.

Chairman Mao: We had no impression of France's participation.

Premier Zhou: Belgium also participated.

Chairman Mao: Scraped together to make 16 countries.

Premier Zhou: Apart from Syngman Rhee, it was 15 countries.

Chairman Mao: But similar to the Vietnam War, Japan and Chiang Kai-shek didn't participate.

Phạm Văn Đồng: They were smart.

Chairman Mao: Yes.

Phạm Văn Đồng: Sometimes we worry that Japan might participate.

Chairman Mao: Japan probably won't participate. It's possible they might help a little economically. Manufacturing arms is profitable for them. I think the Americans overestimated their own strength in the past. Now they're using their old approach again, dispersing their forces too widely. It's not just us saying this; even Nixon says this.

Their forces are dispersed not only in the Americas, Europe, and Asia, but even within Asia, their forces are scattered. In South Korea, they still have over 40,000 men, two divisions. As for the army, there's one division in Hawaii. Their air force and naval bases also need people to guard them.

You Vietnamese comrades may mainly see the American planes, the American 9 divisions and 4 brigades. But you also have to think on behalf of the American ruling class. If you were the U.S. President, what would you do? Originally, I didn't believe they would attack North Vietnam; later, those words missed the mark. Now they've stopped bombing North Vietnam, and those words are on the mark again. Perhaps they will resume bombing, and my words will be off the mark again. But one day they will be on the mark—they will stop bombing again. So I think it's good for you to make several kinds of plans. In short, for all these years, their army has not attacked North Vietnam; they haven't blockaded Haiphong Harbor, nor bombed the urban area of Hanoi. They've kept something in reserve. There was a time when they said they would "pursue relentlessly." But your planes fly back and forth from within our country, and they don't "pursue relentlessly." So those are empty words.

Phạm Văn Đồng: We have noticed all this.

Chairman Mao: You've all noticed? Your planes coming and going from our airports—they simply don't mention it. Another example: so many Chinese work at your place. They know about it, but they haven't said a word, as if it never happened.

Phạm Văn Đồng: (Smiles) They "don't know."

Chairman Mao: But that portion of people who are useless now can be withdrawn. Have you discussed this?

Premier Zhou: It's been raised; we need to discuss it with them. Comrade Lý Ban will stay, along with the ambassador and military attaché. We plan to discuss it with them.

Chairman Mao: If they return, we'll go out again, then!

Phạm Văn Đồng: We are considering this issue.

Chairman Mao: You consider which ones can stay and which don't need to. Keep those useful to you; withdraw those who are useless now. Later, if they become useful again, send them back.

Phạm Văn Đồng: We understand Chairman Mao's meaning.

Chairman Mao: This is like your planes using Chinese airfields. Use them when transfer is needed; when not needed now, don't use them. That's roughly how it is.

I agree with your policy—I am in favor of both fighting and talking. Some of our comrades are simply afraid that you might fall into the Americans’ trap. I don’t think that will happen. Isn’t this negotiation just like fighting a war? It’s through fighting that we gain experience and derive principles. Sometimes one does fall for tricks—take, for instance, what you said about the Americans not keeping their word.

Pham Van Dong: Sometimes even when it's in writing, they still don’t keep it.

Chairman Mao: Johnson once openly said that sometimes even treaties can’t be counted on.

But there are always rules to things. Take your negotiations, for example—are you really going to negotiate for 100 years? Our premier said that if Nixon negotiates for another two years without resolving the issue, it will be tough for him to win re-election. (Pointing to Le Thanh Nghi) He is the chief representative for the negotiations, right?

Premier Zhou Enlai: This is Comrade Le Thanh Nghi. The negotiation representative is Comrade Xuan Thuy, and now it’s Comrade Le Duc Tho.

Chairman Mao: Oh! All with the surname Le.

Pham Van Dong: Just as Chairman Mao said earlier, we are both fighting and talking. But we must fight to a certain point before the enemy will sit down to negotiate. And even after they sit down to talk, we must continue fighting. Only in this way can we take a high stance, speaking as the victor, the strong, the one determined to fight to the end. At the same time, we must make the enemy see their inevitable defeat. Our attitude has always been like this. Without this stance, it is impossible to defeat the enemy. In the South, we must keep fighting fiercely, striking the enemy hard while vigorously carrying out political struggle. The situation in South Vietnam today is excellent. The Paris talks have become a new source of encouragement for the people of the South. Our compatriots believe that since the North has already defeated the enemy, the South will certainly do the same.

Chairman Mao: I heard that upon hearing about the negotiations, American soldiers cheered. I wonder if that’s true.

Muoi Cuc: Reporting to Chairman Mao, the American soldiers were extremely happy when they heard about the negotiations and held celebrations. The U.S. ordered them to fight, but many U.S. units refused. Some soldiers even wrote notes on their helmets saying, "I’m going back to the U.S. soon, please don’t shoot me." The puppet troops are also in a panic. Many say, “If you, Nguyen Van Thieu, want to fight, go and do it at Khe Sanh yourself.” The puppet military and political officials are all very nervous. Our compatriots, fighters, and cadres in the South are all overjoyed. We see this as a timely moment, and we must strike even harder. As we’ve observed, it was the fierce fighting that forced the U.S. to halt the bombing of the North. Now, in the South, we must fight even more fiercely to force the Americans into defeat.

Chairman Mao: The American soldiers, cheering and hoping for negotiations—that’s good. Is it just a fraction who want to go home, or is it many?

Muoi Cuc: The number is considerable. Right now, we’re stepping up our combat efforts while also intensifying our work against the enemy and puppets.

Chairman Mao: That’s good. I heard that American soldiers are living in tunnels now, just like you. What do you do during the rainy season?

Muoi Cuc: When it rains, we cover the tunnels with nylon sheeting. In places where the water table is high, we build above-ground shelters and cover them with earth.

Premier Zhou: Their clothes are soaked most of the time during the rainy season.

Chairman Mao: How many months does the rainy season last?

Muoi Cuc: Six months.

Chairman Mao: That long?

Muoi Cuc: The heaviest rainfall is concentrated within three months—May, June, and July.

Chairman Mao: So now it’s the dry season?

Muoi Cuc: Now it’s the end of the rainy season, and the dry season is about to begin.

Pham Van Dong: Our country is long and narrow, so the climate is not uniform.

Muoi Cuc: Uncle Mao, Chairman Ho and the Political Bureau of the Vietnam Workers’ Party Central Committee asked us to go to the North to report on the situation in the South and receive their directives. As always, Chairman Ho and the party’s Political Bureau instructed us to come here with Comrades Pham Van Dong and Le Thanh Nghi to report on the Southern situation to Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin, and other leading comrades from China. The other day, when we heard from Comrade Zhou Enlai that Chairman Mao had praised and encouraged us, we were overjoyed.

Chairman Mao: That was right here, during our discussion.

Muoi Cuc: Every time we achieved a victory in the past, Chairman Mao either wrote us a letter or addressed us directly. Those letters and speeches became the greatest motivation and inspiration for our fighters and cadres in the South. Our compatriots, fighters, and cadres in the South see it very clearly: none of our victories are possible without the tremendous assistance from Chairman Mao, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Chinese people.

Chairman Mao: Very little, truly—it’s mainly your own doing.

Muoi Cuc: It’s a lot.

Chairman Mao: You are a unified nation, a unified party, a unified army, and a unified people. Whether in the South or the North, you share a single will—that’s good.

Muoi Cuc: The spiritual support is most important to us. No matter what difficulties we face, as long as we have the support of the Chinese Party and people, we can keep fighting, no matter how long it takes. Material aid is also very important. That we have forced the Americans into the tunnels is largely thanks to Chinese weapons. Now even their heartland, Saigon, is unsafe—and that’s also thanks to Chinese weapons.

Chairman Mao: (Smiling) You seem to lean a bit towards the theory of “weapons decide everything.” (Everyone laughs.)

Pham Van Dong: On this point, we do indeed lean somewhat towards that theory.

Muoi Cuc: The human factor is the main thing, but without weapons, it won’t work either.

Chairman Mao: You can’t rely only on your bare hands—you need weapons in your hands.

Muoi Cuc: As Chairman Mao said, it takes rifles plus millet.

Chairman Mao: (Smiling) Then I, too, have a bit of that theory of weapons deciding everything.

Pham Van Dong: China has given us weapons, and also grain.

Muoi Cuc: Our fighters and cadres in South Vietnam are well aware that Chairman Mao is deeply concerned about their health. In particular, besides weapons, you also give us foodstuffs.

Chairman Mao: Have some of them been shipped over?

Muoi Cuc: Some have already arrived—including egg powder, soy flour, and monosodium glutamate.

Pham Van Dong: All of it is excellent.

Chairman Mao: (Smiling) You should thank Sihanouk.

Pham Van Dong: We understand this Sihanouk.

Chairman Mao: (Smiling) He just wants a bit of a toll. Spending some money on the toll is acceptable—worth it, quite worth it.

Pham Van Dong: We’ve already done the calculations, and the toll is greater than what he got in U.S. aid.

Chairman Mao: Exactly.

Muoi Cuc: In the past, U.S. aid to Cambodia was less than 20 million dollars a year. Now the annual toll from China has already surpassed that figure. It’s to their own advantage to help us.

Chairman Mao: Right.

Pham Van Dong: The greatest benefit for them is that we safeguard Sihanouk. His border is defended by South Vietnam.

Muoi Cuc: And, in addition, China works to win him over.

Chairman Mao: He also sways back and forth quite often. He is very afraid the U.S. will withdraw completely—he said the U.S. shouldn’t withdraw entirely. He mentioned this twice, most recently in Paris, saying that American soldiers shouldn’t be stationed in Cambodia but could be in places like the Philippines or Thailand, to prevent a Chinese invasion of them. Still, his remarks are a sign that the Americans want to pull out. When they pull out, Sihanouk panics, and so does Thailand. The first to panic is Nguyen Van Thieu. So the world now is a very chaotic one. Many countries lack their own strength and have to rely on strong powers for support—just like Sihanouk. Even the Japanese bourgeoisie still needs the U.S. now. Japan says it welcomes negotiations, but actually, I suspect it’s not so enthusiastic. Because with war, their capitalists can make a fortune—much of the U.S. munitions are manufactured in Japan.

Pham Van Dong: We’ve noted this as well and found it odd. In many ways, it seems the Japanese want to contribute to ending this war, but we’ll have to see how things really unfold.

Chairman Mao: Some people say one thing but think another. Once the Korean War stopped, many Japanese industrial enterprises collapsed. They profit by having the U.S. fight the war.

Pham Van Dong: That’s the best strategy for them.

Chairman Mao: This also includes the bourgeoisie in the Philippines. They don’t send many troops of their own, but they make money by letting the U.S. use the Philippines as a base for rest and recuperation. Thailand does the same.

Pham Van Dong: We see Thailand very clearly, too. But the decision on whether the Americans stay or go is not in their hands—it is in the hands of the Vietnamese people. All of us in Vietnam are determined to fight on until the American imperialists are completely driven out. Going forward, we plan to concentrate our forces on fighting in the South, launching some very large-scale campaigns.

Chairman Mao: Your spring offensive tactics were quite effective. I once asked whether you might fight a battle like Dien Bien Phu. At that time, I didn’t know your approach was that of segmenting the battlefield. Is that segmentation extremely strong? Is it carried out in every province?

Muoi Cuc: Yes.

Pham Van Dong: But this situation does not prevent us from encircling the enemy in Saigon, as well as in other bases and along the highways. We are also considering fighting a major battle like Dien Bien Phu. But to fight such a large-scale battle, we must be very certain of success beforehand.

Chairman Mao: Right. You need a solid base area for that. Without one, it’s difficult to link up and commit concentrated forces.

Another issue: the puppet government fears the Liberation Front immensely. Some Americans say the group truly effective and influential among the people in South Vietnam isn’t the Saigon government but the Liberation Front. This wasn’t said in Congress but reported by journalists, though they don’t name names—they just say “so-called official sources.” The question is, which is the genuine government that holds real authority in South Vietnam: Nguyen Van Thieu’s or Nguyen Huu Tho’s? That’s the crux of the matter. So, outwardly they boast about how remarkable Nguyen Van Thieu is and claim he won’t go to Paris, but in reality, the truth is quite different. The U.S. knows that without the Liberation Front’s participation, the negotiations can’t be resolved. Have you seen this material?

Muoi Cuc: Yes, I have. They are now in great difficulty.

Chairman Mao: What the U.S. respects is the Vietnamese Party and government, headed by Chairman Ho, and the Liberation Front, headed by Comrade Nguyen Huu Tho. It looks down on Nguyen Van Thieu’s whole operation—because it’s useless.

Pham Van Dong: Right.

Chairman Mao: The U.S. has given them loads of money, but a large portion goes right into their own pockets.

Pham Van Dong: The representative sent to Paris by Nguyen Van Thieu made some anti-American remarks. Our representative asked Harriman why they allowed him to curse the U.S. Harriman said: he says those things precisely to show that he’s not a puppet.

Chairman Mao: He welcomed his anti-American remarks. That Harriman team will probably be replaced. Nixon wants to send new people in.

Pham Van Dong: That is certain.

Comrade Le Duc Anh, do you have anything to report to Chairman Mao?

Le Duc Anh: I report to Chairman Mao that most of our troops are currently undergoing political and military training. They are preparing to receive the weapons provided by Chairman Mao and the Communist Party of China, getting ready to fight even more fiercely in the South and shatter the most elite U.S. forces on the Southern battlefield. This is also in line with Chairman Ho’s instructions. We believe that, with past experience, we will surely achieve even greater battlefield successes in the days ahead. I report to Chairman Mao that in the recent period, we have heavily damaged the 25th Infantry Division, the 1st Infantry Division, and armored regiments. In August, our offensive in Tay Ninh inflicted 12,000 casualties on the Americans, destroyed 1,100 armored vehicles and tanks, and knocked out nearly 100 artillery pieces. When our infantry charged their tanks, the enemy abandoned their vehicles and fled. They are terrified of our ground forces, because we have the weapons Chairman Mao gave us—the 40 mm rocket launchers.

Chairman Mao: Is that weapon really that effective?

Le Duc Anh: It’s extremely effective against tanks. Once it hits, the tank bursts into flames, and the American soldiers inside die in a cluster. That’s why they fear the 40 mm rocket launcher the most.

Chairman Mao: In the past, when we fought the Japanese, we didn’t have anything like that.

Huang Yongsheng: During the Liberation War, we didn’t have it either.

Premier Zhou Enlai: It still wasn’t available during the Korean War.

Chairman Mao: Things are quite different now compared to then.

Pham Van Dong: Once it hits, the tank melts right away.

Le Duc Anh: The American GIs inside get burned—roasted like pigs.

Muoi Cuc: Even a 41-ton tank will catch fire.

Chairman Mao: Then we should give you more of those 40 mm rocket launchers.

Huang Yongsheng: Transport is difficult. The launchers themselves are easy to move, but the main problem is the ammunition.

Le Duc Anh: The puppet troops now see that the American soldiers are far too timid, and to a certain degree, they have lost confidence in them.

Chairman Mao: They look down on the American GIs?

Le Duc Anh: The American troops despise the puppet soldiers, and the puppet soldiers don’t trust the American troops. In short, both the American and puppet troops are afraid of our Liberation Army.

Chairman Mao: That’s probably how it is.

Le Duc Anh: Recently, from October 25 to November 7, one brigade of U.S. forces in South Vietnam staged a rebellion and refused to go to the front lines. They’re still making trouble now. They belong to the 1st Infantry Division. In August of this year, we killed that division’s major general. After we killed him, the American troops in the division celebrated by drinking.

Muoi Cuc: It’s because that major general was exceptionally fierce.

Chairman Mao: Uncivilized.

Le Duc Anh: In the Tay Ninh battle, we engaged 16 companies of the 1st Brigade of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division and wiped out 14 of those companies. Even the Americans acknowledge that.

Chairman Mao: Where is Tay Ninh?

Le Duc Anh: Northwest of Saigon, about 60 kilometers from the Cambodian border.

Chairman Mao: The 25th Division—we’re quite familiar with it. We fought them before.

Premier Zhou Enlai: In Korea.

Chairman Mao: It was because Peng Dehuai made mistakes that we failed to wipe them out. At that time, Comrade Wen Yucheng, you were also in Korea — which unit were you with?

Wen Yucheng: Commander of the 40th Army. The U.S. 1st Division was also in Korea at the time.

Premier Zhou: That was the 1st Cavalry Division.

Chairman Mao: The 1st Infantry Division didn't go. The 1st Cavalry Division also had considerable combat capability.

Huang Yongsheng: It was their elite unit.

Chairman Mao: Back when we fought the United States, we had an idea — we always wanted to devour one or two of their divisions. But we couldn't swallow them whole; we could only take out part of them. However, if we had concentrated our forces to strike the 25th Division, we could still have gradually wiped it out, though it would have taken several days, or one or two weeks. It was completely isolated at the time.

Huang Yongsheng: Our equipment back then was also inadequate.

Chairman Mao: One U.S. division had 800 artillery pieces, while our three armies together had only 800 — meaning one of their divisions had more artillery than nine of our divisions combined, counting all types of guns.

Pham Van Dong: Now in South Vietnam, U.S. equipment has been strengthened enormously compared to then.

Chairman Mao: It's even stronger than back then — 18 years have passed. Nearly done there?

Lê Đức Anh: I report to Chairman Mao: we are now fighting in such a way that the United States cannot sit or lie at ease anywhere in South Vietnam. Our artillery can reach every corner of South Vietnam; even the most heavily defended U.S. bases can be struck by us.

Chairman Mao: (Laughs) They curse you for fighting recklessly, indiscriminately hitting everything without distinguishing right from wrong — as if the Americans themselves distinguish right from wrong.

Lê Đức Anh: They know our weapons are provided by China. We believe that in the future we will fight even better, concentrating our main forces to wage larger battles of annihilation, while also finding ways to attack the main U.S. bases and rear areas.

Chairman Mao: Your consolidation and training are very necessary. Using negotiations as a cover to carry out several months of consolidation and training is essential. To fight relatively large battles, you can only do so a few times a year — two, three, or four times at most. At other times, fight smaller actions while the main forces undergo consolidation and training.

Thập Cúc: That is not how we have been doing it.

Chairman Mao: The fiercest fighting we had with the United States was in three campaigns — three battles in one year.

Premier Zhou: Those were the most intense.

Chairman Mao: You can't fight like that every day; there's no such opportunity. The troops need consolidation, training, replenishment, weapons, ammunition, and grain transport — there are so many problems.

Thập Cúc: One must prepare well and have the troops properly consolidated and trained before fighting. This is extremely necessary — at least once a year.

Chairman Mao: Consolidation and training can be short or long — some lasting two or three months, others a few weeks. The time between two campaigns is exactly the period for consolidation and training.

Thập Cúc: That is how we are doing it now. The troops are currently undergoing consolidation and training, summing up experiences, making material preparations, preparing the battlefield, and getting ready to fight big — to strive for even greater victories. Peace talks are one thing; the decisive factor remains on the battlefield.

Chairman Mao: Correct.

Thập Cúc: When we conduct consolidation and training with the troops, we also guard against them harboring illusions about the peace talks.

Chairman Mao: That is possible. In any given period there is a tide of thinking; harboring illusions is also possible. But such tides last only a short while and will gradually pass.

Thập Cúc: During our visit to the North this time, Chairman Hồ and the Political Bureau of the Vietnam Workers' Party instructed us that the enemy, having been defeated, has no choice but to accept peace talks. Yet the enemy remains very stubborn. So we must grasp well the ideological link, uphold a thoroughgoing revolutionary spirit, fight on a large scale, and win great victories on the battlefield. We must put your thinking into practice.

Chairman Mao: That is good.

Pham Van Dong: All of us comrades present here — Comrade Thập Cúc, Comrade Lê Đức Anh, and the others — are deeply grateful to Chairman Mao for taking the time to speak with us. Chairman Mao's remarks today, along with what Premier Zhou and Comrade Kang Sheng relayed to us from Chairman Mao the other day, have made us all very happy. We believe these words of Chairman Mao's are entirely correct and correspond to the situation in Vietnam and to our struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation.

Chairman Mao: But what I've said is not necessarily correct — it depends on how the situation develops in the future.

Pham Van Dong: When I say this, I take that into consideration.

In the end, the key is whether we can master the laws governing this war, for only that can play the decisive role. This is what Chairman Mao told Comrade Thập Cúc, myself, and several other Vietnamese comrades a few years ago. Here, I once again thank Chairman Mao and the other leading comrades of the Chinese Communist Party. I pledge to you that we are determined to fight on resolutely until final victory. That will be our best way of thanking Chairman Mao, the Chinese Communist Party, and the 700 million Chinese people for the support you have given us.

Chairman Mao: That is good.

Pham Van Dong: I wish Chairman Mao good health and a long life.

Chairman Mao: Thank you. I wish Chairman Hồ good health and a long life. And to the other comrades in the Political Bureau — I wish them good health.

Pham Van Dong: Thank you, Chairman Mao.