In the past, many people always believed that Vietnam could not defeat the United States.
Their main reason was that Vietnam had a small population and poor material resources,
while the United States had a large industry and a large military. On the surface, this seemed
correct, but in reality, it was not. The United States had too many weapons, but they had
nowhere to use them. For example, if a Vietnamese fought an American in close combat,
would their planes only kill the Vietnamese while leaving the Americans unscathed?
Therefore, in close combat, their weapons were useless. In terms of courage and combat
effectiveness, they are even more inferior to you. When a country invades another country,
the people of the invaded country dislike it. The Vietnamese people dislike Americans, and
even the puppet army dislikes them because they control the people. This way, they are
alienated from the people and become extremely isolated. Your victory in this war is certain;
it will just take some time, but not for long.
When the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954, the 17th parallel was drawn. In the five
years between 1954 and 1959, they slaughtered over a hundred thousand of your people.
You were forced to take up arms and engage in armed struggle. Initially, you had a guerrilla
group of a dozen or so men, but through 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1965, your situation
gradually developed to the present situation. Previously, you thought the enemy's defenses
in major cities were tight, making it difficult to penetrate. But this time, with your attack, it
seems you can penetrate them. Now is a favourable time. You can use this opportunity to
expand your forces, expand your territory in the countryside, and annihilate more of the
enemy's effective forces. The major cities can be put on hold, just as Hanoi and Haiphong
were left alone during the war against the French, leaving them for later.
At the current stage of the South Vietnam War, I suggest you organize several field corps.
Each corps should consist of 30,000 to 40,000 troops, and annihilate 4,000 to 5,000 enemy
troops in each battle. After each victory, they would replenish their forces with ammunition,
food, and medicine, and then fight again. A field corps should fight three or four battles a
year (one every three months), annihilating the enemy's organized and effective forces.
These corps should be able to fight far from their home bases, either in this tactical zone or
in another. In this way, the enemy's organized and effective forces can be annihilated
piecemeal. To defeat isolated enemy forces, tunnels can be dug to approach the enemy,
engaging in close combat and night fighting, rendering enemy aircraft and artillery fire
ineffective. Tunnels can be dug in three or four directions. Unlike underground tunnels,
these tunnels can be excavated and should allow for troop movement and the transport of
ammunition. A certain force should also be organized to attack enemy reinforcements.
Therefore, a field corps should have a larger strength, perhaps 30,000 to 40,000. That is, the



purpose of fighting a battle like the one at Dien Bien Phu was to inflict a fatal blow on the
enemy.
These opinions are for your reference. You will make your own decisions based on your
circumstances. I believe the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party will find new
solutions under new circumstances.

[1] This is part of a conversation between Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh, Chairman of the
Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and President of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam.