Printed Express [2], Cultural Revolution Office.
The problem this comrade raised [3] is quite common and deserves attention. The Jinan Air
Force publicly declared their support for the Provincial Revolutionary Committee on May
5th, and the Jinan Military Region on May 6th. Both the Army and Air Force have reported to
the Central Committee, and the problem has begun to be resolved. However, in many other
provinces and cities, some have been resolved, while others have not.
Mao Zedong
May 13th

[1] Qin Houde, formerly a cadre at the Communications Station of the Jinan Military Region
of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, was dismissed from his post in September 1966 and
subsequently assigned to civilian work. Trapped in the Cultural Revolution-intensified region,
he was not accepted. In March 1967, he joined the Jinan Military Region Command's
support for the Left.
[2] Refers to the "Express" compiled by the Office of the Cultural Revolution Small Group of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.
[3] In a letter dated April 21, 1967, Qin Houde addressed to Chen Boda (then head of the
Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee), Kang Sheng (then advisor to the
Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee), and Jiang Qing (then deputy head
of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CPC Central Committee and advisor to the Cultural
Revolution Group of the entire army), and forwarded to Mao Zedong and others, he wrote:
On March 4, I participated in the military region's support for the Left. Based on my personal
experience and understanding over a month, I feel that the support for the Left by the
troops stationed in Jinan was entirely correct before February 10. However, since February
10, when they entered factories and schools, there have been numerous problems. These
are primarily manifested in the following ways: First, they supported the conservatives, not
the leftists, and their support for the conservatives crushed the revolutionaries. The People's
Liberation Army, instead of supporting the leftists, has become a backer of the conservatives.
Second, they engaged in a "merging two into one" policy, using conservative organizations as



the core to unite revolutionary mass organizations. Disagreement from these organizations
was considered separatism and a disruption of the grand unity. Third, on the issue of
"grasping revolution and promoting production," some units failed to prioritize revolution.
Fourth, some propaganda teams adopted a crude and brutal attitude toward so-called
counter-revolutionary organizations, creating a sense of fear. Fifth, there were differences of
opinion between the Provincial Drafting Committee and the Jinan Military Region's Cultural
Revolution Defense Command. Comrades in the army supporting the Left expressed
dissatisfaction with Wang Xiaoyu, the chairman of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee,
and were even more hostile to the speeches of other members of the Provincial
Revolutionary Committee. Recently, the tensions had escalated to a tit-for-tat level. Sixth,
comrades in the army were deeply antagonistic to revolutionary organizations such as the
"Red Guard Shandong Command" and the "Shandong Revolutionary Workers' Rebellion
General Command." This opposition had become public, with mass organizations supporting
both sides constantly demonstrating and sometimes engaging in armed conflict. Seventh,
the Jinan Military Region's Cultural Revolution Defense Command became a forum for
conservatives to lodge complaints, while the Provincial Revolutionary Committee became a
forum for revolutionaries to lodge complaints.