I heard that on the afternoon of February 16th, some people caused a disturbance in
Huairen Hall, opposing the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Opposing the Central Cultural
Revolution Group is opposing me and our Party! Over the past six months or so, the Central
Cultural Revolution Group has done a tremendous amount of work. Comrades Boda, Jiang
Qing, Kang Sheng, and others have all done a tremendous amount of work. Have you seen
it?
Tan Zhenlin, Xu Xiangqian, and Chen Yi attacked the Party and were full of nonsense.
The Central Cultural Revolution Group resolutely implemented the spirit of the Eleventh
Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee. Their achievements are paramount and
important. If I were to give them a score, I'd give them 97. Whoever opposes the Central
Cultural Revolution Group, I will resolutely oppose! You want to dictate the Cultural
Revolution, but I tell you: it's absolutely impossible!
You all want to stir up trouble, so go ahead! It's simply because the Cultural Revolution has
failed. I'll leave immediately, and Comrade Lin Biao will leave too. We'll return to
Jinggangshan and start the revolution all over again. You say Jiang Qing and Chen Boda
aren't up to the task, so reorganize the Cultural Revolution Group and make Tan Zhenlin the
leader, Chen Yi and Xu Xiangqian deputy leaders, and Yu Qiuli and Bo Yibo members. If that
doesn't work, bring back Wang Ming and Zhang Guotao. If the force isn't enough, then
invite the US and the Soviet Union in. Execute Jiang Qing and Chen Boda, exile Kang Sheng,
and do whatever you want with the others. That's all that matters, right? You've achieved
your goal, haven't you?
What kind of veteran revolutionary is Tan Zhenlin? I'm still here! You, Chen Yi, want to
overturn the Yan'an Rectification Movement. Will the entire Party agree? Tan Zhenlin and
Chen Yi are both veteran Party members. Why are they speaking from a bourgeois
perspective? I propose: The Politburo should hold a meeting to discuss this matter. If one
meeting doesn't work, hold two. If one month doesn't work, hold two. If the Politburo can't
resolve it, mobilize all Party members to solve it!

Comments on the Red Flag Editorial Draft, "We Must Treat Cadres Correctly" [I]
(February 18 and 22, 1967)

1
Returned to the Premier:
I agree with your opinion. We will discuss it before publishing it, and incorporate the idea of
the "three-in-one" approach. [2] Furthermore, all important editorials should be published
in this manner.
Mao Zedong
February 18, 8:00 p.m.
2
Publish as is.

[1] The Red Flag magazine editorial, "Cadres Must Be Treated Correctly," was submitted by
Chen Boda, head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Cultural
Revolution Group, to Premier Zhou Enlai for review on February 17, 1967, and forwarded by
Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong on February 18. This article was included in the February 18th
draft submitted by Zhou Enlai for review. Mao Zedong made some revisions during the
interrogation. On page 8, regarding the use of cadres who have made mistakes, the editorial
stated: "Some cadres can still be recruited to participate in the temporary power structure of
the proletarian revolution and the joint seizure of power." Mao Zedong revised the phrase
"some cadres" to "many cadres." At the end of the draft editorial, Mao Zedong deleted the
following three slogans: "Long live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!" "Long live
Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line!" "Long live Chairman Mao, the great teacher,
great leader, great commander, great helmsman!" In addition, there were some textual
revisions. This second part was written on the revised draft of the editorial submitted for
review on February 22nd by Chen Boda and Guan Feng and Wang Li, deputy editors-in-chief
of Red Flag magazine, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's
Cultural Revolution Group. Chen Boda and others wrote on this draft: "A meeting chaired by
the Premier raised some revisions. We have made another revision." This editorial was
published in the fourth issue of Red Flag magazine, published on March 1, 1967, and was
reprinted in advance by the People's Daily on February 23rd.
[2] On February 18, 1967, when Zhou Enlai forwarded the draft editorial to Mao Zedong, he
wrote: "This editorial is very important and timely. I think it is well written. I propose that it
be discussed at a meeting of the Party, government, military, and cultural circles before

publication." Zhou Enlai underlined three paragraphs in the second section of the editorial,
"The Combination of Revolutionary Cadres with the Broad Masses of the Revolutionary
Masses," and noted: "In this section, you can explain and clarify the three combinations at
the local level and within government agencies." In the draft submitted for review on the
22nd, two paragraphs were added to this section. One paragraph read: "Experience has
shown that in provinces and cities where power needs to be seized, temporary power
organs combining the 'three combinations' must be established." This "three-in-one"
temporary power structure is composed of leaders of revolutionary mass organizations that
truly represent the broad masses, representatives of the local People's Liberation Army
garrison, and revolutionary leading cadres. In industrial and mining enterprises where power
needs to be seized, a "three-in-one" temporary power structure must also be established,
composed of revolutionary cadres (leading cadres, general cadres, and technical personnel),
worker representatives (veteran and young workers), and militia representatives. In Party
and government organs where power needs to be seized, the principle of combining
revolutionary leading cadres, revolutionary mid-level cadres, and the revolutionary masses
must be implemented. Only in this way can a representative and authoritative leadership
team be formed to lead the broad revolutionary masses and successfully accomplish the
battle to seize power from the handful of capitalist-roaders in power within the Party.
Another passage reads: "In establishing a "three-in-one" temporary power structure, the
current focus must be on resolving the issue of correctly treating revolutionary cadres."

Comments on the Beijing Garrison's Two Summary Reports on Military Training in Colleges
and Middle Schools [I]
(February 19 and March 23, 1967)

1
Comrade Lin Biao:
(1) These two documents should be circulated nationwide immediately. (2) Universities,
middle schools, and upper elementary schools will conduct military training once a year, for
a period of twenty days. After classes begin, during the twenty days of military training, the
training time should not exceed four hours per day. At the same time, the school curriculum
will be reduced by four hours per day. (3) Party, government, military, and civilian
organizations, with the exception of the elderly, will all middle-aged and young people
undergo military training for twenty days each year. Please proceed as appropriate.
Mao Zedong
February 19th
After Premier [2] has read these two documents, send them to Comrade Lin Biao.
2
Don't publish any of them.
Experiences elsewhere have surpassed those in Beijing. Some of my comments are also
inappropriate for the new situation, so they should not be published.
Mao Zedong
March 23

[1] Following Mao Zedong's February 14, 1967, instruction regarding a newspaper's
investigation and summary of the military training experience at two Beijing middle schools,
the Beijing Garrison of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) produced two summary
reports on February 18 regarding the pilot program for short-term military and political
training at five universities, including Peking University and Tsinghua University, and at
Beijing No. 2 Middle School and No. 25 Middle School. Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central
Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, submitted these reports to Mao
Zedong for review on February 19. The first report was written on the front page of the
previous report submitted by Lin Biao for review. On March 4, Chen Boda, head of the
Cultural Revolution Group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and
Wang Li, a member of the group, wrote to Mao Zedong, stating: "Comrade Fu Chongbi,

Commander of the Beijing Garrison, advocates publishing the military and political training
at universities and middle schools in the newspapers. They also advocate revising and
publishing the two documents on military and political training in Beijing approved by the
Chairman. Please make your decision, Chairman." The second report was written on the
reports of Chen Boda and Wang Li. The two summary reports of the Beijing Garrison were
neither circulated nationwide by the Central Committee nor published in newspapers.
[2] Premier refers to Zhou Enlai.