(Not reviewed by the speaker)

(January 17, 1967)

Time: 17:00–19:00, January 17, 1967

Location: The former Beijing Hall, Great Hall of the People

Participants:

Malayan side: Musa Ahmad (Chairman of the Malayan Communist Party), Li Andong (Deputy General Secretary), Chen Rui (Member of the Political Bureau), Chen Tian (Member of the Central Committee)

Chinese side: Kang Sheng, Liu Ningyi

Interpreter: Wu Yingguang

Recorder: Huang Wei

Chairman Mao (hereinafter referred to as the Chairman): In the past few days, you have had several discussions with Comrade Kang Sheng. They have been very necessary and very good. You have put up a big-character poster for us.

Our Party is not without problems. You must lend a hand to help our Cultural Revolution achieve victory. Without this Cultural Revolution, we would have no way at all. This has been talked about for many years. Although my reputation is great, they still go about doing things in that way. In Beijing, no one listens to me; the *People’s Daily* doesn’t listen to me. Over the past few years, I haven’t read the *People’s Daily*. The same goes for the Central Propaganda Department, the Central Organization Department, and the broadcasting station. Have you visited these places yet? You can go and take a look. The broadcasting station has foreign experts, and there might be some of your people there too. The conservatives at the broadcasting station are very formidable. So there is a need to seize power. In Beijing, I have no way. Here, criticism of *Hai Rui Dismissed from Office* was not allowed; later, Shanghai published an article by Yao Wenyuan criticizing *Hai Rui Dismissed from Office*, putting them in check.

There are factions within our Party. You probably didn’t know this before. On the surface, it seems harmonious, but in reality, the struggle is very intense. Was the main target the democratic parties, or was it the power-holders within the Communist Party? It was not until the winter of the year before last that they admitted the main target was the power-holders within the Party taking the capitalist road.

Regarding some of the issues you raised, I have been bureaucratic; all along, I have never managed the Liaison Department. When you came, they didn’t even let me know and prevented you from having contact with me. Wang Jiaxiang, Li Qixin—these individuals are very bad; Li Qixin is a local tyrant.

Chen Ping (hereinafter referred to as Chen): You cannot blame the Chairman. The Chairman is very busy; China’s problems are very complex, with many matters to attend to.

Chairman: There are indeed many matters, but as the Chairman, I must take responsibility. For over ten years, I failed to grasp the key link. From the Zunyi Conference in 1935 to the 7th National Congress in 1945, there were ten years. During that time, we conducted a two-and-a-half-year Rectification Movement, and there was still struggle. After entering the cities in 1949, it all fell apart. Surrounded by the bourgeoisie, everyone did their own thing and established independent kingdoms. I didn’t know about the issue of sending work teams. (Turning to Liu Ningyi) Did your Liaison Department send any?

Liu Ningyi (hereinafter referred to as Liu): Yes, we sent three work teams to the Southeast Asia Research Institute, the Latin America Research Institute, and the foreign language training class. We have made the mistake of implementing the bourgeois reactionary line.

Chairman: (Speaking to the foreign guests) You should set fire to them—shake them up.

Liu: It’s been intense. The Liaison Department is also being shaken up now.

Chen: Over the past few years, we have also had some feelings about this, but they were not deep. This Cultural Revolution has also helped us.

Chairman: Regarding the struggles within our Party, you may not have known about some of them in the past. Some you may have known, such as the struggles against Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, and Peng Dehuai. As for the struggle with Comrade Liu Shaoqi over what path, policies, and guidelines to adopt in socialist education, it began in the summer of 1964. The Twenty-Three Articles formulated in 1965 were the result of this struggle.

We should be grateful for Nie Yuanzi’s big-character poster. We merely had it published, but that publication caused an enormous stir. On June 1, I notified Comrades Chen Boda and Kang Sheng in Hangzhou to publish this poster. In early August, the Red Guards appeared at Tsinghua University Affiliated High School, and I wrote a letter supporting them. I just caused these two troubles. Another matter was during the 11th Plenary Session: on August 4, I wrote a big-character poster criticizing some people for not following the mass line. Our Party used to talk constantly about the mass line, the so-called “mass line,” but in reality, it wasn’t like that at all; some people simply did not follow the mass line. We also talked a great deal about serving the people, but I have my doubts: do some ultimately serve the people or the bourgeoisie?

In May last year, Beijing added two army divisions. At that time, some in the Central Committee were unreliable, so in Hangzhou in May, it was decided to send two additional army divisions.

Now the workers in Shanghai have risen up. Have they learned about it!?

Chen: We’ve seen it in the newspapers and heard it on the radio.

Chairman: Shanghai is in a very tense situation. You can go to Shanghai to take a look and seek out Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan.

In the past, Shanghai was taken over by the People’s Liberation Army, not by mobilizing the masses to take over themselves. There were many retained personnel there—millions of former Guomindang personnel on the mainland, and we still aren’t very clear about their circumstances. Many in the publishing and literary and art circles in the past were quite bad; they haven’t undergone reform.

There are also impurities within our Party. In 1936, a group of our Party members was arrested by the Guomindang, and later their recantations were published in Beijing newspapers, after which they were released. This matter was decided by Liu Shaoqi. Among these turncoats were Bo Yibo (Vice Premier, Director of the Economic Commission), An Ziwen (Head of the Central Organization Department), Liu Lantao, Yang Xianzhen, Liao Luyan, and Zhao Lin. A considerable number.

Kang Sheng (hereinafter referred to as Kang): The Red Guards are more formidable than us. They posted big-character posters on the streets calling for the arrest of the big traitors Bo Yibo and Liu Lantao.

Chairman: Your own work at home is of course the top priority. The problems in Southeast Asia are related to you, and we must also pay attention and help you.

Have you gone out to see the big-character posters?

Chen: We’ve seen the posters at Tsinghua University, the Central Propaganda Department, and the Ministry of Culture. At the time, we thought it strange that the Central Propaganda Department had asked Chen Yuan to sort out materials.

Chairman: You can go and visit the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission needs a great revolution. The Foreign Affairs Office as well. Liao Chengzhi also has problems. We have already taken over the Shanghai Municipal Committee, but it hasn’t been announced yet. It’s not easy to seize power from the power-holders within the Party who have infiltrated the Party and taken the capitalist road; just last week, Shanghai was still in their hands.

Some people are very strange; they’re deathly afraid of the Red Guards. Chen Pixian grew up in a base area. Cao Diqiu came out of the Suzhou Reflection Institute. Why are they afraid? Because they’ve established families.

We have now shut down ten newspapers and magazines: *Beijing Daily*, *Beijing Evening News*, *Frontline* magazine, *China Youth Daily*, *China Youth* magazine, *Workers’ Daily*, *Health News*, *Sports News*, *Drama News*, *Ta Kung Pao*.

Kang: *Guangming Daily* is also in danger.

Chairman: *Guangming Daily* is relatively good, isn’t it!

Kang: Some past vulnerabilities in *Guangming Daily* are being seized upon.

Chairman: If we’re going to talk about the past, the *People’s Daily* also has plenty of problems! But you can’t blame Tang Pingzhu. Isn’t Tang Pingzhu relatively good?

Kang: Now some people are raising questions about him. I’ve heard that he studied in Japan in the past, worked as a Japanese-language teacher, and later did political work. His history during the Anti-Japanese War period is not very clear. During the Liberation War, he went south.

Chairman: Do you have any acquaintances in Shanghai?

Chen: No.

Chairman: You can go to Shanghai, find Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, and ask them to brief you on the situation.

Chen: They are all very busy.

Chairman: It is precisely when they are busy that you should go. The workers in Shanghai have already risen. In 1949, when Shanghai was liberated, the workers welcomed the People’s Liberation Army to take over. Now they have risen up themselves to take over; they’ve taken over factories, offices, and schools. The articles they’ve written, like the *Letter to All Shanghai People*, the *Urgent Circular*, and the *Ten Articles*—I couldn’t have written them even if I tried.

In November, the rebel organizations in Shanghai numbered only 1,000 people. The Shanghai Municipal Committee helped develop the Red Guards, whose numbers reached 400,000. But after two months, the rebels have grown to one million. The leftists in Beijing were all suppressed in the beginning and were also a minority. If it weren’t for those people suppressing and besieging them, the leftists couldn’t have been forged. The same goes for the broadcasting station and universities like Tsinghua and Peking University; now their leftists have also become the majority.

A few days ago, trains weren’t running between Shanghai and Beijing. The head of the Shanghai Railway Bureau’s dispatching office wouldn’t issue orders, and dozens of trains couldn’t move. Leftist workers arrested him and dispatched the trains themselves. Then later, Beijing stopped dispatching trains. This was engineered by Minister of Railways Lü Zhengcao and his lot. They printed many leaflets saying the Red Guards beat people, inciting workers to strike. Now they’ve been dismissed from their posts.

Kang: Lü Zhengcao was in the same clique as Peng Zhen.

Chairman: (To Liu Ningyi) Where are they staying?

Kang: Staying inside the Liaison Department compound.

Chairman: Doesn’t your Liaison Department have an American who posted a big-character poster against you? Let them participate in the movement as well!?

Liu: Ke Fulanke’s big-character poster has already been posted in our department. They have also participated in our department’s criticism meetings.

Chen: Our comrades also want to participate.

Kang: That’s permissible.

Chen: In the past, there were restrictions, and we had objections. We couldn’t see many of the external big-character posters; sometimes we went to the streets to look at them. Seeing them is also an education for us.

Chairman: Let them see! Invite them to put up big-character posters and set fire to the International Liaison Department. We are internationalists; why are we practicing nationalism? We should open up, rectify our style openly. We should let them participate in the revolution; don’t let them stand on the sidelines as observers—it’s not good. You can copy Ke Fulanke’s big-character poster for them!

Kang: Ke Fulanke wrote me a letter requesting to participate in the movement. I expressed welcome for their participation.

Chairman: I’ve already seen Ke Fulanke’s big-character poster.

Kang: Li Dunbai from the Broadcasting Administrative Bureau is participating very actively in the movement.

Chairman: The minority faction among Beijing’s students has already become the majority. For the workers, it’s still hard to say, but the trend is that they will inevitably become the majority.

Regarding the five questions you raised, I agree with your opinions and do not agree with those of the Liaison Department. Of course, the blame for this should be placed on Wang Jiaxiang.

Kang: But tracing it back to the root leads to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.

Chairman: After you arrived in China, when I wanted to meet you, they told me it wasn’t convenient for me to meet with you.

Kang: They said Comrade Chen Ping was bad and didn’t want to carry out armed struggle; they said Comrade Chen Ping had opinions about the Chinese Party. The facts are not like that at all; people still deeply love Chairman Mao. It’s just that people do have opinions. Some of the ways they handled things were very despicable: if they disagreed with one or two points in a telegram, they would suppress it and not send it. They were afraid that if the Chairman met with Chen Ping, their problems would be exposed.

Chairman: Even if I were in Wuhan or Hangzhou, they could still notify me!

Kang: There was a joint opinion document on the Malayan Communist Party issue between the Chinese and Soviet Parties.

Chairman: We didn’t know about it. In it, there was a point saying that to carry out armed struggle, you must border on a socialist country. That point is illogical. If that were so, how could the October Revolution in the Soviet Union have succeeded? All these things should be overturned. During the October Revolution, which socialist country did the Soviet Union border on? Without the October Revolution, where would there be any socialist country?

Chen: In 1965, we issued a statement concerning the international communist movement. I heard the Chairman had a note on that document of ours, which comrades from the Liaison Department verbally conveyed to us. We haven’t seen it. Could it be borrowed for us to take a look?

Chairman: Oh! Is that so? I’ve forgotten. It can be shown to them.

Kang: Comrade Li Andong is planning to return soon.

Chairman: From where will he leave? How long will it take? Is he going via the overland route?

Li Andong (hereinafter referred to as Li): Passing through the underground communication lines in Vietnam and Thailand.

Chairman: Is it easy to travel? How long will it take to arrive?

Li: We frequently have people coming and going; they all take this route. If it goes smoothly, it might take three months.

Chairman: Since you pass through Thailand, you must understand the Thai language, then?

Chen: Correct, one needs to know some Thai.

Chairman: The base areas and guerrilla forces are schools. With these, you can train cadres and gain experience.

In the past, I was a primary school teacher and had no preparation at all for fighting a war. I wasn’t even fit material for warfare. I have to thank Chiang Kai-shek; he killed people, and we couldn’t stay in the cities, so we had to go to the mountains to wage guerrilla warfare. Once we started fighting, it was for ten years. Wang Ming’s line caused us great suffering. What you don’t know, you can learn.

The British and the reactionaries are also teachers by negative example for you. Without their oppression, you wouldn’t be able to have base areas.

(To Li Andong) How long have you been here?

Li: I came here in April 1962. It’s been almost five years.

Chairman: How old are you?

Li: I was born in 1917, so I’m 50.

Kang: Comrade Chen Ping has a question regarding how to advance the revolution in Southeast Asia. I would still like Comrade Chen Ping to present his views.

Chen: I don't have a comprehensive understanding of the overall situation, so I'll just speak casually. Article 25 of the general line of the international communist movement states that Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the center of the world revolutionary storm, and Vietnam is the focal point of revolution in Southeast Asia. In my view, the entire Southeast Asian region is the focal point of revolutionary struggle. In this region, imperialist rule is relatively weak, and many countries rely on U.S. imperialist support. As things stand now, India cannot become a revolutionary force. Japan was once a revolutionary force, but now it cannot be either. The conditions of the people in this region are not bad, and they are close to China. The revolution in Southeast Asia should proceed faster than in other regions.

Chairman: There must also be genuine Marxist-Leninist parties.

Chen: We should concentrate our forces on Southeast Asia.

Chairman: Do you have any contacts here with the Indonesian and Burmese comrades?

Chen: We do. In Indonesia, we still have some comrades lying low there, but for now we dare not contact the Indonesian comrades.

Chairman: The situation in Indonesia is unclear; we need reliable information.

Chen: We have an idea: should the Chinese Party devote greater efforts to supporting the revolution in Southeast Asia? There are two approaches: one is to concentrate forces on Vietnam while making only minor efforts elsewhere; the other is to launch major efforts in several places simultaneously, so that the United States cannot concentrate its forces on Vietnam.

Chairman: The regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are vast. I agree with your view; we should focus on studying Southeast Asia.

Kang: Countries in this region have experience in armed struggle, such as Malaya, Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines.

Chairman: How long have you been engaged in armed struggle?

Chen: During the anti-Japanese period, it lasted 3 years and 8 months. In 1945 we made a mistake and handed our guns over to the British. We resumed the struggle in 1948 and have continued to this day.

Chairman: From 1948 to now, that is already 18 years.

Kang: Comrade Chen Ping says the Geneva Conference had a great impact on them. Later, they held the Baling talks.

Chairman: It now seems the Geneva Conference was a mistake. I said to Pham Van Dong that the mistakes of the Geneva Conference harmed you. In 1954, Vietnam withdrew its troops to the north, and Ngo Dinh Diem killed 160,000 people in South Vietnam. Later, in 1959, South Vietnam resumed armed struggle, which has now lasted 7 years. Vietnam suffered as a result. I talked it over with the Vietnamese comrades, but they believe it should still be retained and that there are still benefits.

That joint opinion was drafted after returning from the Geneva Conference, wasn't it?

Kang: The 1954 joint opinion of the Chinese and Soviet parties was drafted during a stopover in Moscow on the way back after the Geneva Conference ended. In 1951, Stalin also drafted opinions on the India and Indonesia issues.

Chairman: In the future, we must be cautious in matters concerning fraternal parties and foreign affairs; we must not issue rash directives.

Kang: Comrade Xiao Zhang, in his report, regarded our Party as their superior Party.

Chairman: That is not good. Who was the superior? It was Wang Jiaxiang.

Kang: Also Li Qixin and Lian Guan. (Reads a passage from Xiao Zhang's report stating that the CPC was the superior party of the Malayan Communist Party.) When this report was printed, we did not express opposition. That was very wrong.

Chairman: Their feelings at the time are understandable. It was written during a difficult period.

Chen Rui (hereinafter Rui): At that time, our Central Committee was facing difficulties—economic hardship, and the fighting was extremely arduous—so we sent Xiao Zhang to China to seek instructions on how to find the right path forward. Wang Jiaxiang asked Xiao Zhang to write this report. After it was written, Wang Jiaxiang and Li Qixin successively spoke to Xiao Zhang and me, saying that since we were in great difficulty, we might consider shifting our approach and ending the war. We accepted this advice. Then came a joint opinion.

Chairman: When was that conversation of ours? Was it after that conversation that Xiao Zhang returned?

Rui: That conversation took place around January or February 1956. I left in 1959. During that conversation, the Chairman described the situation after the defeat of China's Great Revolution. I recall the Chairman saying at the time that as long as one has courage, difficulties can be overcome, and Communists never utter the word "surrender"—if they surrender, they can never hold their heads high again. I went back and conveyed this to Comrade Chen Ping.

In 1950, Lian Guan gave us an opinion, saying that our armed struggle was too rash and too "leftist," that our forces should be scaled back, and that we should not fight until we ran out of ammunition, and he asked Li Ying to go back and convey this. In 1951, Li Qixin came again and asked us which path the Malayan revolution was taking—the Soviet path or the Chinese path.

Chairman: Whether the Soviet path or the Chinese path, wasn't the October Revolution about fighting? What path? Fighting is the path.

Chen: We are responsible for what we ourselves have done. We accepted this advice and must bear responsibility for it.

Chairman: This is historical experience; we must draw lessons from it. In the past, you encountered people like Wang Jiaxiang, Li Qixin, Lian Guan, and Fang Fang. In the future, there will still be such people. When faced with such matters, one must examine them carefully and resist. They simply looked down on you. At that time, you were in difficulty, and they wanted you to end the war. There were such people in the past, and there will still be such waverers in the future.

(To Chen Rui) Haven't you finished yet?

Rui: In 1954, they also drafted a joint opinion on the Malayan Communist Party.

Chairman: Such audacity—to handle such a major issue without going through the Central Committee. I have no impression of it; I don't know whether I ever saw that opinion.

Kang: Judging from Wang Jiaxiang's letter to the Chairman, the Chairman did not see it.

Chairman: Afterward, you suffered as a result. At that time, you hadn't started talks yet, had you?

Rui: Not yet. At that time, they wanted us to shift our approach. We raised the question of how to shift, because based on our experience, when our troops had demobilized in the past, as soon as they left they were beheaded. They said it would be fine as long as we did the mass work well. But I didn't believe that. Later, when the situation for peace talks emerged, that’s why we had the Baling talks.

Chen: When peace talks emerged, we had weaknesses.

Chairman: At that time, the British had a need, and Rahman also wanted to gain political capital through such talks.

Chen: If it was not instigated by the British, then at least it was with their tacit consent. The British pushed Rahman forward to do it.

Chairman: That view is plausible. How many troops do you have?

Rui: There are 550.

Chairman: We should not fear being few; as long as there are people.

We were the same in the past. After the failure of the Great Revolution, our Red Army shrank from 300,000 to 30,000, leaving only one-tenth. The Wang Ming line educated us. Without suffering losses and without committing "left" and right errors, one cannot gain experience and lessons. Do not regard mistakes as entirely negative; they also have a positive side and can play an educational role.

They said things like not being close to socialist countries, being a small country, an island country, and having well-developed transport means armed struggle cannot be conducted—these are non-Marxist-Leninist and constrain our thinking. Although you made mistakes and handed your guns to the British, and later rose up again only to encounter difficulties and be reduced to just over 300 people, it is good as long as there are seeds remaining.

You can study China's experience and lessons as material for reference. Chen Duxiu's right-opportunist line caused the Party to suffer great losses, leaving only over 10,000 members. Did the Party collapse? It did not collapse. Later, it continued the struggle and grew to 300,000. "Left" opportunism caused the Party to suffer losses again, leaving it with 30,000. When Japan attacked, there was again right-opportunism. At that time, Comrade Liu Shaoqi wrote a book titled "How to Be a Good Communist." Under those circumstances, he did not discuss whether political power should be seized, whether it could be seized; if it was to be seized, what method should be used to seize it—by armed struggle or some other means. It solved no problems and was merely for intimidating people. He himself was not so proficient! Many Party members had a very low level of education and were illiterate; you could not demand that every Party member be so proficient in Marxism-Leninism. Taking up guns to fight is, after all, for the purpose of seizing political power. He did not raise such a question. He said China had no Lenin or Stalin. Doesn't China have Liu Shaoqi? But how did that turn out?

Kang: The core of Liu Shaoqi's 1949 speech in Tianjin was threefold: (1) China's capitalism was not too much but too little; (2) the laboring people did not oppose exploitation but welcomed it; (3) capitalists were not guilty of exploitation but had rendered meritorious service by exploiting.

This viewpoint is Kautsky's viewpoint. In his book "The Bolshevism in a Dead End," Kautsky said: "The revolution that occurred in Russia can only open the way for the full development of capitalism, and only after capitalism has achieved a high level of development can a socialist society be established."

After the October Revolution, there were also intense debates within and outside the Soviet Communist Party about which path the Soviet Union should take. People like Sukhanov and Bukharin held that Russia had an undeveloped economy and a backward agriculture, could not build socialism, and should implement capitalism. Lenin refuted this view. Lenin said: since building socialism requires certain conditions, why couldn't we first use revolutionary means to secure the prerequisites for attaining such conditions?

Chairman: The Social Democrats say that revolution is needed but there are no cadres. It is just like Deng Zihui saying that cooperativization is needed but there are no accountants. Lenin said: if there are no cadres, why not train them in the course of revolution? Only revolution can produce cadres.

Kang: During the Cultural Revolution, the emergence of the Red Guards trained cadres.

Chairman: As with our old schools—6 years of primary school, 6 years of middle school, 5 years of university, a total of 17 years of study. Study is certainly necessary, but 17 years is too long; cadres must be trained in struggle. Gorky only studied for two years in elementary school. I don't believe one necessarily must attend university; I myself never went to university. In the past, I studied Confucian books for 6 years and Western schools for 7 years—13 years in total. Some people looked down on me and said I was incompetent.

Chen: Li Qixin once said to us: There is not a single university graduate in your Malayan Communist Party Central Committee.

Chairman: Our Central Committee has very few university graduates. Lu Dingyi and Zhang Wentian were university graduates, and they were no good. The history they studied before was history of emperors, kings, generals, and ministers. Confucius and Mencius never attended university. Of course, one must read books, but reading too much is harmful. My children have studied for over ten years, and the more they read, the more foolish they become.

Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian—all went bad one after another. Qu Qiubai surrendered to the Kuomintang. But the Party did not perish. There will always be good people; there will always be people to carry on the armed struggle. This is an international phenomenon. During the period of the Second International, after Engels died, people like Bernstein and Kautsky filled Europe with a foul atmosphere. Later it was saved by Lenin. At that time, the Bolsheviks were a minority, with only 80,000 Party members at the time of the October Revolution. Lenin and Stalin did not anticipate the emergence of Khrushchev. That doesn't matter; it can educate the people, serving as a teacher by negative example. There is nothing so extraordinary about Kosygin and Brezhnev either. The emergence of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Wang Jiaxiang is nothing so extraordinary either.

Kang: They also had a Loi Tek; he was the Secretary-General of the Malayan Communist Party and was a traitor.

Chairman: What was his nationality? British?

Kang: He was Vietnamese.

Chen: Loi Tek was Vietnamese. There are two accounts regarding this man. The first says he betrayed the Party in Hong Kong; the second says he was arrested and turned traitor in Vietnam and was later sent to Britain for training. In 1930, Ho Chi Minh, on behalf of the Far Eastern Bureau, came to Malaya to attend the founding congress of the Malayan Communist Party. Later, the British sent spies to infiltrate the Malayan Communist Party, and all its Central Committee members were arrested. Under these circumstances, Loi Tek fled to Malaya, infiltrated the Party, and became Secretary-General.

Chairman: With such a person emerging, nearly all your Party's Central Committee members were arrested, but your Party did not collapse, and you continued the revolution. Of course, you suffered many disasters.

Chen: At the time, the Central Committee members arrested were mainly in the cities. Central Committee members in the army and rural areas were not arrested.

Chairman: That is one lesson. Are you finished with your accounts? You haven't yet responded to them, have you?

Kang: We have made mistakes. When we make mistakes, we admit them.

Chairman: That is how it should be. When there are mistakes, one should admit them. If you don't admit your mistakes, no one will trust you.

Chen: We have also made many mistakes.

Chairman: At the Fourth Plenum in 1931, the Soviet Union drafted a resolution for our Party, propping up people like Wang Ming and Qin Bangxian. People like us were knocked down and regarded as not having a shred of Marxism-Leninism. I said that even having 1% Marxism-Leninism would be good. After they came back, they caused the loss of over 90% of the Party organizations in the base areas. After the Zunyi Conference, we were fairly confident in dealing with Chiang Kai-shek, but they didn't believe we could overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and looked down on Yan'an, because the big cities like Shanghai, Nanjing, and Beijing were in the hands of the imperialists. So we also suffered losses—over 90% of the Party's strength was lost. Wang Ming still won't admit his mistakes. He writes articles in Moscow opposing us. He is still a member of the Central Committee. At the next Party Congress, he probably won't be re-elected. As for whether Liu and Deng can be re-elected, my opinion is that they should still be re-elected. Within the Party, there will always be left, center, and right; it's not good to be that clean. But it is very risky—the Red Guards may not agree.

Chen: Unless they truly correct their mistakes, we will not agree to elect them. They cannot be allowed to muddle through. According to the lessons and experiences of the CPSU, the most dangerous thing within a party is double-dealers.

Chairman: Nowadays many people shout "Long Live." I just don’t believe it. Some are genuine, some are false. Both the leftists and the rightists exploit this banner of mine, calling themselves the so-called Defenders. They have given me many titles, such as commander, helmsman, "great commander," "great helmsman," "great teacher," "great leader." I think none of these are necessary.

Chen: At least one should be kept.

Chairman: In the future, if there are problems, you can always come to me. I am very happy to receive you.

Chen: We hope the Cultural Revolution will be carried out deeply and thoroughly, beating the drowning dogs, otherwise it will be dangerous. China is the center of the world revolution. People all over the world, including the Malayan people, place great hopes on China. As long as China does not change its color, it doesn’t matter if other countries change theirs. The Soviet Union has a population of 200 million, China has 700 million. The level of awareness among the world’s people today is vastly different from 30 years ago. If China changes its color, the world revolution will suffer a major setback, and our revolution will also be set back for many years.

Chairman: In fact, many units have already changed, such as the radio stations, *People’s Daily*, and the Central Propaganda Department. Relatively concentrated criticism began in October the year before last. This is a major event for the people of the world, the people of China, and the people of Malaya.

Chen: We did not expect the problem to be so serious. Later, we saw the materials from the "Three Family Village"; they were very aggressive, openly cursing the Central Committee. There must be support from someone like Khrushchev. There were rumors in the past: after Khrushchev stepped down, Malinovsky once told the Chinese Party and Government delegation that since Khrushchev had fallen, your Chairman Mao should also step down. This revealed the hidden secret. If it had only been Peng Zhen alone, he would not have dared to be so brazen. There must have been a big red umbrella, someone giving orders.

Chairman: Your suspicion was correct.

Chen: This is a good thing. This is a major matter concerning us.

Chairman: You must lend a hand.

Chen: This revolution must absolutely be carried out deeply and thoroughly.

Chairman: That is hard to say. Even if it is deep and thorough this time, it may resurface in another ten years. Of course, it should be avoided.

Kang: They were the first fraternal party to put up a big-character poster against us. They want to establish a radio station.

Chairman: We should help them establish it.

Kang: Do you want to share a station with Thailand’s radio, or do you want to establish one independently?

Chen: It is better to establish one independently. For broadcasting to Southeast Asia, multiple languages should be used.

Kang: Comrade Chen Ping also raised the issue of our past recognition of Malaya’s independence. Also, the statement Nan Hanchen issued expressing willingness to recognize Lee Kuan Yew.

Chairman: Why act so hastily? You recognize him, but he does not recognize you. Talk it over with the Foreign Ministry. Such matters should be discussed with them in advance.

Chen: I have a second request: I ask the Chairman to give us a permit to visit the Foreign Affairs Office, the Foreign Ministry, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and the Liaison Department to read the big-character posters. We feel that although we are two separate parties, there should not be too much strict separation.

Chairman: We must uphold internationalism, not nationalism.

Kang: You can go wherever you want. To the comrades of the Malayan Communist Party, we keep our doors open.

Chen: A third hope: I take the liberty of proposing that in the future, when the Chairman reviews the Red Guards, it would be best to do so from the city tower rather than going among the masses. We saw on television the Chairman walking into the crowds of the masses, and we were very worried. Of course, doing it the first one or two times may not have been a big problem. But if it happens often, it becomes dangerous.

Chairman: Thank you all. It is indeed a bit risky. I will be more careful from now on.

Chen: We are very concerned about the Chairman’s safety. If an accident occurs, the matter would be enormous, affecting the world revolution.

Chairman: Thank you. Let’s end the discussion here.