(Not reviewed by the person himself)

(June 10, 1966)

Location: Hangzhou
Time: June 10, 1966
Participants: Kang Sheng, Wu Xiuquan, Jiang Qing
Interpreter: Liang Feng
Recorder: Wen Zhuang

Hu Zhiming (hereinafter referred to as Hu): I see your health is better than last year.

Chairman Mao: (hereinafter referred to as Chairman): You, Uncle Ho, I think you can live to be 150 to 200 years old.

Hu: That's too much.

Chairman: I'll be about done this year or next.

Hu: We don't permit it, nor do we approve.

Chairman: Because we in China talk about 73 and 84. I'll be 73 next year. This is a difficult pass.

Hu: Not necessarily.

Chairman: If the King of Hell doesn't invite me, I'll go myself. Du Fu has a poem that says:
"Debts for wine are common wherever one goes, but for a man to live to seventy has been rare since ancient times." According to this, I should also be dead. You are not included, because you still have to fight America.

Hu: Chinese comrades also have to fight America.

Chairman: I want to go fight, but you won't let me. Will you let me go? Not just to the North, but also to the South, to walk the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Hu: I can't guarantee it.

Chairman: Isn't dying in China and being buried in China the same as dying in Vietnam and being buried in Vietnam? One doesn't have to die in China. To be killed by the Americans would be very good.

Hu: How many kilometers can you walk in a day?

Chairman: I'll start with 10 kilometers, then 20 kilometers in the second week, and 30 kilometers in the third week.

Hu: The enemy has already taken notice of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and frequently bombs it with B-52s.

Chairman: When the planes come, I'll hide in the woods.

Hu: I want to go to Thanh Hoa and Nghe An, but they won't let me.

Chairman: That's not right. You should go. Let's go together, walk your trail, and go to the South. If we are to die, we'll die together.

Hu: I want to go. I've sought the opinions of our comrades separately, but they don't agree.

Chairman: Don't seek opinions. Just get in a car one night and go.

Hu: Wherever I go, the security comrades follow, never leaving my side. I can't shake them off.

Chairman: Like a prisoner, no freedom. The French say, "Give me liberty, or give me death."

Hu: If Chairman Mao wants to see Vietnam, we all welcome it, as long as it is within the realm of possibility. Due to frequent enemy air raids, if we go by a low standard, we would only invite you to see the area near Hanoi in the North. Let me go back and discuss it with our Central Politburo.

Chairman: I won't notify anyone else, won't tell anyone in the country. I'll just slip away and go, and even you won't know.

Hu: Forgive me for saying this: I'm afraid this is a fantasy.

Chairman: It's liberalism, not a fantasy. I also want to go to Africa. Why must revolution be made in China? I'll go abroad to see and learn some experience.

Hu: I'm afraid it can't be realized.

Chairman: You're always pouring cold water on me.

Hu: Based on my little experience, that's how it is.

Chairman: Neither in your South nor in your North has a single main leader been killed by bombing. Among the people we sent, the highest-ranking was at the regimental level; a regimental political commissar was killed by bombing. It was because he had no experience. With this experience, no more main cadres have been killed by bombing. In your South, we haven't heard of any deaths or injuries among cadres at the regimental or divisional level either.

Hu: Very few, very few.

Chairman: On the contrary, before 1959, after 1954, that is, after the Geneva Accords, in the years 1955, 56, 57, 58, 59, a great many people died. It is said there were 160,000. I don't know if there were that many. They were killed by Ngo Dinh Diem. Revolution is brought about by killing. So many people were killed. At that time, you withdrew completely, withdrew to the North, leaving only one squad, with only four or five rifles. I told Comrade Pham Van Dong that the Geneva Accords were a failure; you and we both made a mistake. This mistake educated us, at the cost of 160,000 lives, and then we started again from one squad and gradually developed. How many people are there now, over 200,000?

Hu: Including the guerrillas, more than 200,000.

Chairman: How many does the enemy have?

Hu: Nearly 300,000 American troops, and over 500,000 puppet troops.

Chairman: A total of over 800,000.

Hu: That's roughly it. America is still gradually increasing its troops.

Chairman: Then what about you? He has 800,000, do you have over 300,000?

Hu: Possibly. Seven divisions of regular forces; in addition, each province has one to two battalions, each county has one to two companies; there are also militia and guerrillas.

Chairman: Since ancient times, it has always been the inexperienced people who defeat the experienced armies; those without guns who defeat those with guns; the few who defeat the many. Isn't it the same for you? How many people did you have during the August Revolution?

Hu: There were over 5,000 Party members in total, not much of an army.

Chairman: Your army probably only had a few hundred people at the beginning, and later a thousand or so. Before 1927, weren't you helping us? At that time, we had tens of millions of workers and peasants organized in trade unions and peasant associations. The peasants had peasant self-defense corps, and the workers had pickets. But we were not prepared for the enemy to kill people. In the first half of 1927, in a matter of four months, they were wiped out. It's similar to the situation in Indonesia now. Of 50,000 Party members, less than 10,000 remained; only two out of ten were left. Where did the other 40,000 go? A batch was killed; a batch surrendered; a large batch quit, their courage broken, they dared not be active and left the Party; there were still eight or nine thousand who carried on. I was a person forced to go up Liangshan. Before, we were not prepared to fight; I was a primary school teacher. That year I was forced to go up Liangshan. After messing around for ten years, we fought some losing battles, but mostly won. The army grew to 300,000, including guerrillas who were detached from production. However, in those ten years, we encountered three "Left" opportunist lines. The first was Qu Qiubai; the second was Li Lisan and Xiang Zhongfa; the third was Wang Ming. The result was the failure of the fifth counter-encirclement campaign. At that time, people like me were driven out of the army. I was "expelled" from the Party once and driven out of the army three times. Actually, I was expelled from the Central Politburo, and there were rumors that I was expelled from the Party and became a democratic personage. I was the secretary of Jinggangshan, the secretary of the special regional committee, and couldn't even attend branch meetings. They tried every means to fix me, and later said I could be a division commander. Just like that, I was a democratic personage for over half a year. Later it was clarified that I had not been expelled from the Party, and I became a Party representative and a political commissar again. That was in 1928. They said my mistakes were, first, I burned too few houses; second, I killed too few people; third, I said the wrong thing, why did I say "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." They sent out notices everywhere, saying I was a "Left" opportunist, how could political power grow out of the barrel of a gun. Later there were several more times when I was misunderstood by comrades inside and driven out of the Red Army. I became a common person, doing local work in Fujian. At that time, Comrade Lin Biao was with me and supported me. He was in the troops led by Zhu De, and his troops supported me. But my own troops from the Autumn Harvest Uprising removed me. Those with long-standing relations with me removed me, while those I didn't know well supported me. You see, isn't that strange?

Hu: Nothing is too strange in this world.

Chairman: Do you have this kind of experience? You had smooth sailing, becoming a Party leader from the start.

Hu: You are right, I had smooth sailing and never encountered opposition.

Chairman: You have Marx's blessing. You have more Marxism than I do.

Hu: I don't admit it.

Chairman: Why don't people oppose you?

Hu: Our Party is small, our country is small, and our army is small. The other leaders of the Party and army are all younger than me, which is also a reason.

Chairman: You are a senior, which also has a disadvantage: you have not suffered setbacks, you have no experience.

Hu: Correct.

Chairman: Everyone calls you "Long Live." On this point, I am different from you.

Hu: Precisely because of this, you have more experience.

Chairman: I was struck down many times. Once was in Jiangxi. The first, second, third, and fourth counter-"encirclement" campaigns were won, yet they said I had made mistakes, that I consistently followed a right opportunist line, without a shred of Marxism-Leninism. It would have been better if there was a shred, but there was none at all. They considered themselves to have a 100% Marxist-Leninist line. They said my way of fighting was also opportunism. They said we should attack big cities, but I didn't. Just like now, if you don't attack big cities, it's also right opportunism. If you attack, and the enemy counter-attacks, you have to withdraw again. Among your 800,000 enemy troops now, only 200,000 are mobile; the other 600,000 have to guard roads, airports, seaports, and cities big and small. On this point, you will be victorious.

Hu: I report to you, we now have several battalions around Saigon.

Chairman: But don't go and attack Saigon or Da Nang. Don't occupy other provincial capitals for the time being either. If you occupy them, the enemy will come to recover them, and you'll have to run out again.

Hu: We now have a type of special operations force. It is this type of force that goes into the city to attack the American embassy and the airport. We are not preparing to attack the big cities right now.

Chairman: This is good. It's good to go in for a moment and then come out, like the attack on Da Nang. Because you have your people as inside support, the barbed wire, trenches, etc., are all sabotaged by someone. Get a few hundred people in for a surprise attack; fire artillery from the outside. A few hours later, the few hundred people come out again. This is good. We also fought like this many times before. When we broke into some small towns, we could collect a lot of materials, enemy newspapers, libraries; we could also expand our troop sources, expanding by several thousand people in a few days. For example, we attacked Ji'an in Jiangxi. We had 30,000 people, the enemy only had one brigade, a few thousand people. We stayed for 10 days and expanded our army by ten or twenty thousand. Later, we also attacked Zhangzhou in Fujian. I went with Lin Biao. We annihilated an enemy division, got a lot of weapons and ammunition; we also got many rubber shoes from Tan Kah Kee, he was a big Chinese capitalist in Singapore in the rubber business; we also got a batch of Marxist-Leninist books. Why did the Kuomintang have Marxist-Leninist books? They had them in their libraries, for studying us. Such as Lenin's "The State and Revolution," "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution," as well as world economic geography, the history of social development, Deborin's philosophy of history, etc.

I am very familiar with this person Deborin. Stalin criticized him as a Menshevik. He disagreed with Stalin, and also disagreed that Lenin had opened a new stage in philosophy. After he turned 80, Khrushchev awarded him a medal. He only died in the last year or two. The people who criticized Deborin before have now become revisionists, such as Mitin, Yudin, Rosenthal, and others. Revisionism has now also appeared in China. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun, are all your friends, and also my friends. Didn't you ask if we knew before? We did know. Peng Zhen made a series of mistakes. A few years ago, I already wanted to remove him and have Comrade Wan Xiaotang from Tianjin take his place. Comrade Zhou Enlai also agreed. Beijing Municipality is an independent kingdom, no one can interfere. Worse than your Hanoi. I cannot interfere, Comrade Liu Shaoqi cannot interfere, Comrade Zhou Enlai cannot interfere, Comrade Deng Xiaoping cannot interfere. Regarding Luo Ruiqing's problem, when we were rectifying Peng Dehuai in 1959, someone proposed him to be Chief of the General Staff, and some of us did not agree. Later, the comrade who proposed him for Chief of Staff was rectified by him, for a total of 6 years. The person who proposed him was his superior, and now in turn is being rectified by him. I advise you, not all of your people are loyal to you. The loyal ones may be the majority, but a small part may only call you "Long Live" with their mouths, while in reality they hope you die soon. When he calls you "Long Live," you must pay attention, you must analyze. The more someone flatters you, the more unreliable they are. This is a very natural law. A party that doesn't split? There's no such thing. All things are one divides into two. This is not my invention, it's Lenin's invention. What is my invention? It was clearly stated by Lenin in his "Philosophical Notebooks." Lenin did not talk about the three principles of dialectics. "The unity of opposites," "the transformation of quantity into quality," and "the negation of the negation" were copied from Hegel by Marx and Engels, mainly by Engels. Lenin did not copy them. He said that the unity of opposites is the core of dialectics, but it needs to be explained and developed. He did not have time to explain and develop it. We abide by Lenin's principle and do not engage in the three principles. Stalin violated Lenin's principle and came up with four principles, called "connection," "transformation of quantity into quality," "development," and "unity of opposites." We don't listen to what Stalin said either. We believe in Lenin. I am merely abiding by his instructions to explain and develop them. According to this law, all things are one divides into two, the unity of opposites. Things always have two opposing sides. If your party only has complete unity and no opposing side, it does not conform to reality. Parties all over the world split. Marx and Engels did not expect their successors Bernstein and Kautsky to become anti-Marxists. The parties they founded and led—the German Social Democratic Party, the French Socialist Party, etc.—became bourgeois parties after their deaths. If you don't pay attention to this, you will suffer. Although Lenin anticipated that oppositionists like Zinoviev, Trotsky, and Bukharin would emerge, his method was not to kill people. From 1917 to 1924, he held power for less than 8 years before he died. During this period, he mainly focused on theory. He did a little trade union work, but not much. He did no peasant work at all, not even a program for the peasant movement. During the October Revolution, the Populists' program was temporarily used as the Bolsheviks' program. At a meeting of the Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies, Lenin said not to discuss this program too much. The Populists could not implement their own program; they proposed "going to the people," which also didn't work. Later, the Populists became spokesmen for the rich peasants.

You said before that you made mistakes, that land reform should not have been "Left," that too many people were killed. I think too few were killed. You had "Renwen" and "Jiapin." You were afraid of mass demonstrations and asked us for tear gas. "Renwen" and "Jiapin" are just like the "Beijing Daily" and "Beijing Evening News." Crows under the sky are all black. As long as we understand and are prepared, and the majority of the whole Party is prepared, we are not afraid. We are all over 70, and one day we will be invited by Marx. Who the successor will be, whether it's Bernstein, Kautsky, or Khrushchev, is unknown. We must be prepared, there is still time. In short, it is one divides into two. Don't look at how everyone is shouting "Long Live" now.

Hu: I suggest you take a rest and let me report on the general situation in Yan'an. (Hands a copy of "General Situation in Yan'an" to the interpreter to read.) I have been active openly in Yan'an.

Chairman: But it wasn't in the papers. The local people all welcomed you. I think we should hold a mass rally of tens of thousands here to welcome you. How about it? I'll be there. We'll issue a news report saying Chairman Hu is in China, has been to Yan'an and other cities, and was welcomed everywhere.

Hu: I object.

Chairman: Why object? The Chinese people like the Vietnamese people.

Hu: It was decided in my country that my trip to China would be secret. Yan'an was special.

Chairman: You didn't follow discipline in Yan'an, but you'll follow it in Hangzhou?

Hu: In Yan'an, Comrade Wu Xiuquan is to be held responsible. If I had known it would be done this way, I would not have approved either. But it doesn't matter if the masses in Yan'an found out.

Chairman: Why does it matter if people here find out? The day before you leave, or on the day itself, we'll hold a big rally, and then you'll run.

Hu: Thank you, but I object.

Chairman: Comrade Wu Xiuquan can decide, but I can't? I also have my needs. There are rumors that I am seriously ill. In May and June of last year, I was indeed seriously ill. When you came to Hangzhou, I was a bit better. This year is better than last year. Issuing a news report will show that I am not dead yet.

Hu: People know you are not dead even without a report. You cannot die. I will continue to report on the situation in Yan'an. I visited many places, and the changes are great. I went to the place where you used to live. I met the old village head of Zaoyuan Township, Yang Chengfu. The people of Yan'an all miss you and hope you will visit once. (Shows photos to Chairman Mao).

Chairman: You see, I am a bureaucrat. You have gone for the second time, but I haven't been back since I left, even though I lived there for 12 years.

Hu: The local people knew I was going to meet Chairman Mao and gave me a task: to send you their greetings. They dare not ask you to go, but if you do, they will be happy. Personally, I think it would be good if you could go. The changes are great.

Chairman: I also want to go.

Hu: Not only has the city changed, but the people have also changed, especially the children. Every one of them is chubby and rosy-cheeked. When I first went, there were very few children; now they are everywhere. I also went to Yan'an University and saw the terraced fields. I saw the plot of land you used to farm. This time, they entrusted me to give you five jin of millet grown on that plot.

Chairman: Do you have millet there? Do you have wheat, corn, beans, sweet potatoes?

Hu: No millet or wheat. We have corn, beans, and sweet potatoes. We have introduced a type of Nanning rice, a very good variety.

Chairman: Exchanging varieties is beneficial.

Hu: Now four provinces in China are helping seven provinces in Vietnam, for example, Guangdong is helping our Quang Ninh province, etc.

Chairman: What are they helping with?

Hu: Helping with agricultural production, water conservancy, improving rice and cattle breeds, and also helping to set up small power plants, small factories, improving farm tools, and so on.

Chairman: Has your steel plant been set up?

Hu: It has started production. Enemy planes have also started bombing nearby.

Chairman: What is the annual steel output?

Hu: Very little, and we don't have rolling equipment yet.

Chairman: Do you have coal and iron mines there? Where does the iron ore come from? From China?

Hu: Vietnam has coal and iron. A little also comes from China.

Chairman: Without steel, without a machine-building industry, a country does not have a complete industrial system.

Hu: You may still remember, it was after I met you, under your encouragement, that the steel plant was built.

Chairman: I am most concerned about the steel and machine-building industries.

Chairman: The equipment and experts for our Thai Nguyen steel plant are all from China.

Chairman: You can start with small-scale and develop gradually. In a dozen years or so, it can be done. Small rolling mills can be brought from China, and new technology can be used for steelmaking. We have already started using oxygen for steelmaking. Some new technologies can also be brought from China. In the beginning, don't be too hasty, don't do too much. We suffered from being too hasty and doing too much, starting 1,700 capital construction projects in one year. After a few years, it didn't work, so we scaled down to over 700. You see, we cut 1,000. Some were already completed, but the uncompleted capital construction units are like a head with ringworm. At that time, we were greedy for big, many, and comprehensive. It's a pity you didn't go to Jinzhou to see. Many small industries were set up there. There were no funds, so cadres and workers each contributed a little. With no money to build houses, they put up thatched sheds. Now many new products are being produced. Some big factories are very backward, for example, Anshan Steel, with 160,000 workers, produces 5-6 million tons of steel a year, but it has a backward side. There are also some small factories in Shanghai, I heard you saw them. The factory director, deputy director, secretary, engineers, and technicians all do not detach from production, they work like workers. Which ones did you see?

Hu: I can't remember, but I saw that the scale was small, production was efficient, and the distance between cadres and workers was not great. According to what they told me, although the factory was small, its income was increasing day by day. Some had over 300 workers.

Chairman: Over 100 workers is already remarkable. The worldwide standard for a large factory is 30 people; below that is a small factory, above is a large factory. This is also a superstition, the superstition of big and comprehensive. I think small and refined is better. The majority of factories should be like this, with a few large ones, like the Fushun coal mine. In addition, China has another lesson: the layout is very irrational, 70% is on the coast, only 30% is in the interior. We have now made initial moves. One factory is divided into two, one divides into two. We move half or a third of it.

Hu: Vietnam now emphasizes local industry in each province.

Chairman: Right.

Hu: Of course, it's even smaller than in China.

Chairman: Smaller is better.

Hu: If the fighting goes on for a long time, each locality can solve its own problems.

Chairman: Right. Handicrafts should also be paid attention to.

Hu: For example, our Quang Binh province is bombed very fiercely by enemy planes, almost every day; but they produce their own soap, bowls, dishes, matches, etc. These are things that could not be produced locally before.

Chairman: The French were very vicious. Apart from the Hong Gai coal mine, they left you nothing.

Hu: They also moved the machinery from the Hong Gai coal mine; what they couldn't move, they destroyed, and they took the blueprints with them. Later, China and other fraternal countries helped us restore production.

Chairman: I heard there is a large power plant near the coal mine. How much electricity does it generate?

Hu: The Uong Bi power plant, I don't remember clearly how much electricity it generates. I only know that this plant supplies power to the mines, to Haiphong, and even to Hanoi. Now, enemy planes have bombed it.

Chairman: What if Hanoi and Haiphong are heavily bombed?

Hu: We will move to other places.

Chairman: Right. We moved for 22 years. From 1927, to 1937, 1947, isn't that 20 years? We only reached Beijing in 1948, 1949, isn't that 22 years?

Hu: If enemy planes heavily bomb Hanoi, all the government offices will gradually move into the mountains, just like during the war of resistance against France. Now, the factories have already started to move.

Chairman: That's good.

Hu: The schools have been dispersed, and the children have been evacuated from Hanoi.

Chairman: What is the population of Hanoi?

Hu: 1.03 million, with 500,000 in the city proper.

Chairman: How many people are left now?

Hu: Only 150,000 have been evacuated, mostly students and children, but some who left have returned.

Chairman: They just need to drop bombs. People are like that. We were bombed and killed into going up the mountains. Before Chiang Kai-shek's great terror, I had not thought of going up the mountains. He started killing people, and I thought, I still have two legs and two hands. I first did some investigation and research, and learned that two legs can walk, and two hands can carry things. I had never fired a gun in my life, never been wounded. I was a soldier, that was in 1911, I learned to use a rifle, and received squad, platoon, company, and battalion drill training. Six months of drill training is enough, or three months is enough. At that time, we were going to fight the Qing dynasty, but because of the North-South peace talks, the fight didn't happen. Sun Yat-sen was no longer the provisional president, Yuan Shikai took over. I studied for a total of 13 years. Six years studying Confucius, so I have feudalism in my head; seven years studying capitalism, so I also have capitalism in my head. It's good to see these as history. At that time, there was no Marxism-Leninism in my head, only Washington, Napoleon, Cromwell.

Hu: In what year did Chairman Mao start reading Marx's books?

Chairman: In 1917, after the victory of the Russian Revolution, some pamphlets appeared in China. There was a little before that, for example, the "Communist Manifesto" had been translated, and Kautsky's "The Class Struggle" had also been translated.

Hu: In which year did the "May Fourth" Movement happen? Was it 1919?

Chairman: Yes. During the "May Fourth" Movement in 1919, China did not yet have a Communist Party. At that time, I was studying and working in Beijing, in the lowest position, with only 8 silver dollars a month. In winter, I would hide in the library, which already had heating. I ate two meals of mutton buns every day.

Hu: Was that the time of the work-study movement?

Chairman: Yes. I was involved in this, and sent many people away.

Hu: Comrades Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, and others went to France at this time.

Chairman: Yes. I am a very stubborn person. I sent many people abroad, but I myself did not go abroad. I thought that things in China had not yet been figured out. I have only been to Moscow twice, and also to a British place—Hong Kong.

The comrades in Beijing have already told you, our Party has had five dynasties. The first dynasty was Chen Duxiu, from 1921 to 1927, a total of 7 years; later he ran away, ran to the Trotskyites. The second dynasty was Qu Qiubai, he was "Left," and only lasted three or four months. What I just said about being driven out of the Politburo, and some people spreading rumors that I was expelled from the Party and became a democratic personage, was also at this time. The third dynasty was Li Lisan and Xiang Zhongfa, which lasted a few months, very "Left," wanting to attack big cities. The fourth dynasty was Wang Ming, his time was the longest, ruling for 4 years. He never went to the base areas, but his people did. There were people he sent to all five base areas; there were also his people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas; Peng Zhen was one who implemented the Wang Ming line. The fifth dynasty was Zhang Wentian. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, and Lu Dingyi are Kuomintang people.

Hu: Did they join the Kuomintang in the past?

Chairman: During the first great revolution, the period of KMT-CPC cooperation, that doesn't count. I also joined; the Party wanted us to join. For them, there is no definite evidence yet, only a suspicion. They all had a period of working in the Kuomintang-controlled areas.

Hu: Were they bought by the Kuomintang?

Chairman: Peng Zhen was arrested by the Kuomintang. How he got out, we don't know. Why did they infiltrate the Party for so long without being discovered? We had noticed their mistakes, for example, Peng Zhen made mistakes when running the Party school in Yan'an. He also made mistakes in Jin-Cha-Ji, which are only being exposed now; we didn't know in the past. Nie Rongzhen knows, he was the commander and political commissar of Jin-Cha-Ji. Yang Chengwu was also in Jin-Cha-Ji. Peng Zhen was in Jin-Cha-Ji for less than two years, implementing the Wang Ming line. The Wang Ming line of this period was different from that of the ten-year civil war; during the ten-year civil war, the Wang Ming line was "Left," advocating attacking big cities; during the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Wang Ming line was rightist, it was capitulationism. Later, Wang Ming also ran away, to Moscow, we sent him. He still writes articles under a pseudonym to curse us. In addition, Zhang Guotao also ran away. He was a member of the Central Politburo at the time, a leader of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, and is now an American spy in Hong Kong. The director of the General Political Department in Jinggangshan, the political commissar who succeeded me, and the head of logistics, all betrayed the Party and went over to the Kuomintang side. You see, several dynasties were all betrayals. Chen Duxiu betrayed, Qu Qiubai wrote a confession after being arrested. Xiang Zhongfa (actually the Li Lisan line), after being arrested, led the enemy to arrest people; after the enemy finished arresting people, they killed him too, quite stupid. Wang Ming also became a traitor after being arrested. He was arrested several times, and we don't know how he was released. In the Northeast, he was arrested by the Japanese; in Shanghai, he was arrested by Chiang Kai-shek, and then released. Rao Shushi was arrested when he was in the New Fourth Army, it's not clear how he was released. Peng Dehuai was a Kuomintang regimental commander, fought against us, and later became an opportunist, and has always made line-related mistakes. Luo Ruiqing collaborated with Peng Dehuai. Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing, Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun, they are all one gang. Why did it take so long to expose them? We wanted to wait and see. They also collude with foreign countries.

Hu: Isn't it very dangerous to let them stay?

Chairman: It is very dangerous. But until a certain opportunity arises, they don't expose themselves, and we don't rectify them. Like Peng Dehuai, he made mistakes repeatedly, we just criticized him, but he held a grudge. During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, he became the commander, and after returning to the country, he was Minister of Defense for 7 years. How many generals did he pull away? Less than 10 generals and civilian officials were pulled away by him. In these five dynasties of our Party, the leaders were not good, and the revolution failed. Two great failures: the great failure of the revolution in 1927 under Chen Duxiu's leadership; the Long March in 1934, when an army of 300,000 was reduced to 25,000, wasn't