Excerpts from a Conversation with Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou
(June 10, 1966)

Mao Zedong (hereinafter referred to as Mao):

Since ancient times, it has always been inexperienced people defeating experienced armies; those without guns defeating those with guns; and few people defeating many people. Isn't that how you were? How many people did you have during the August Revolution?

Ho Chi Minh (hereinafter referred to as Ho):

There were a total of more than five thousand party members, not many troops.

Mao: Your army probably only had a few hundred people at the beginning, and later a thousand or so. Before 1927, weren't you helping us? At that time, we had tens of millions of workers and peasants, organized in trade unions and peasant associations. The peasants had peasant self-defense forces, and the workers had pickets, but they were not prepared for the enemy to kill people. By the first half of 1927, in four months, it was all swept away, almost like the situation in Indonesia now. Of the 50,000 party members, less than 10,000 remained, only two out of ten. Where did the other 40,000 go? Some were killed; some surrendered; a large number quit, scared out of their wits, afraid to be active, and left the Party. Only eight or nine thousand people continued to work. I was forced to go to Liangshan. I wasn't prepared to fight before, I was a primary school teacher. I was forced to go to Liangshan that year. After seven or eight years of messing around, I fought some losing battles, but mostly winning battles. The army grew to 300,000, including guerrillas who had left production. However, in those ten years, we encountered three "Left" opportunist lines. The first was Qu Qiubai; the second was Li Lisan and Xiang Zhongfa; the third was Wang Ming. What was the result? The fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign failed. At that time, we were driven out of the army. I was "expelled" from the Party once and driven out of the army three times. Actually, I was expelled from the Central Politburo.

Excerpts from a Conversation with Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou

There were rumors that I was expelled from the Party and became a democratic personage. I was the secretary of Jinggangshan, the special committee secretary of the region, and I couldn't even participate in the branch. They tried every means to fix me, and later they said that I could be a division commander. That's how it was, I was a democratic personage for more than half a year. Later, it was clarified that I had not been expelled from the Party, and I became a party representative and political commissar again. That was in 1928. They said that the mistakes I made were, first, that I burned too few houses; second, that I killed too few people; and third, that I spoke out, why did I say "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"? They issued notices everywhere, saying that I was a "Left" opportunist, and that political power could still grow out of the barrel of a gun. Later, there were several times when I was misunderstood by comrades within the Party and driven out of the Red Army. I became a commoner and did local work in Fujian. At that time, Comrade Lin Biao agreed with me. He was in the army under the leadership of Zhu De, and his army supported me. My own Autumn Harvest Uprising army, however, replaced me. Those who had a long-term relationship with me replaced me, and those who didn't know me very well supported me. Don't you think it's strange?

Ho: There's nothing strange in the world.

Mao: Do you have this kind of experience? You had a smooth journey, becoming the leader of the Party from the beginning.

Ho: You're right, I had a smooth journey, and I haven't suffered any opposition.

Mao: You have Marx to protect you. Your Marxism is more than mine.

Ho: I don't admit it.

Mao: Why don't people oppose you?

Ho: Our Party is small, our country is small, and our army is small. The other leaders of the Party and the army are all younger than me, which is also a reason.

Mao: You are a veteran, but there is also a disadvantage, you have not suffered setbacks, you have no experience.

Ho: That's right.

Mao: Everyone calls you "ten thousand years." I am different from you in this respect.

Ho: Precisely because of this, you have more experience.

Mao: Many times I was overthrown. Once in Jiangxi, after winning the first, second, third, and fourth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns, they said that I had made mistakes, that I had consistently followed a right opportunist line, and that I had not a shred of Marxism-Leninism. Even a shred would have been good, but there was not a shred. They thought they were 100% Marxist-Leninist. They said that my way of fighting was also opportunist. They said that I should attack big cities, but I didn't. Just like you say now that not attacking big cities is also right opportunism. If you attack, and they attack, you have to retreat again. Now, of your 800,000 enemies, only 200,000 can maneuver; the other 600,000 have to guard highways, airports, seaports, and cities of all sizes. On this point, you will win.

Ho: I report to you that we now have several battalions around Saigon.

Mao: But don't attack Saigon or seaports. Don't occupy other provincial capitals for the time being either. If you occupy them and they come to recover them, you have to run out again.

Ho: Now we have a special forces unit that goes into the city to attack the American embassy and airports. We are not planning to attack big cities right now.

Mao: That's good. It's good to go in and out occasionally, like attacking seaports. Because you have people on the inside to cooperate, and people to destroy the barbed wire and trenches. Get a few hundred people in for a surprise attack; fire artillery from the outside. After a few hours, the few hundred people come out again. That's good, we used to do that a lot. After attacking some small cities, you can collect a lot of information, including enemy newspapers and maps; you can also expand the source of soldiers, expanding by thousands in a few days. Like when we attacked Ji'an in Jiangxi. We had 30,000 people, and the enemy only had a brigade, a few thousand people. We stayed for ten days and expanded the army by ten or twenty thousand. Later, we also attacked Zhangzhou in Fujian, which I sent Lin Biao to do. We annihilated an enemy division, obtained a lot of weapons and ammunition, and also obtained a lot of rubber shoes from Chen Jiageng, who was a large overseas Chinese capitalist in Singapore, doing rubber business; we also obtained a batch of Marxist-Leninist books. Why would the Kuomintang have Marxist-Leninist books? Their libraries also have them, for the purpose of studying us. Such as Lenin's *State and Revolution*, *Two Tactics*, as well as world economic geography, the history of social development, and Deborin's historical philosophy, etc.

Excerpts from a Conversation with Ho Chi Minh

Mao: I am very familiar with Deborin. Stalin criticized him as a Menshevik. He did not agree with Stalin, nor did he agree that Lenin had opened a new stage in philosophy. After he turned eighty, Khrushchev awarded him a medal, and he died in the last year or two. The people who criticized Deborin before are now revisionists, such as Mitin, Yudin, and Rosenthal.

Revisionism has also appeared in China now. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun are all your friends, and also my friends. Didn't you ask, did we know before? We knew. Peng Zhen has made a series of mistakes, and I wanted to remove him a few years ago. Beijing is an independent kingdom, no one can interfere, it's worse than your Hanoi. I can't interfere, Comrade Liu Shaoqi can't interfere, Comrade Zhou Enlai can't interfere, and Comrade Deng Xiaoping can't interfere. Regarding Luo Ruiqing's problem, when Peng Dehuai was rectified in 1959, someone proposed that he be the Chief of General Staff, and some of us did not agree. Later, the comrade who proposed him as Chief of General Staff was rectified by him, for a total of six years. The person who proposed him was his superior, and now he is being rectified by him in return. I advise you, not all of your people are loyal to you. The majority may be loyal, but a small part may only call you "ten thousand years" in words, but actually hope you die early. When he calls you "ten thousand years," you have to pay attention and analyze. The more they praise you, the less reliable they are. This is a very natural law. A party doesn't split? There's no such thing. Everything is the division of one into two. This is not my invention, it was invented by Lenin. What is my invention? It is clear that Lenin said it in *Philosophical Notebooks*. Lenin did not talk about the three principles of dialectics. "Unity of opposites," "transformation of quantity into quality," and "negation of the negation" were copied by Marx and Engels from Hegel, mainly copied by Engels, Lenin did not copy. He said that the unity of opposites is the core of dialectics, but it needs to be explained and developed. He did not have time to explain and develop it. We abide by Lenin's principles and do not engage in three principles. Stalin violated Lenin's principles and engaged in four principles, called "connection," "transformation of quantity into quality," "development," and "unity of opposites." We don't listen to Stalin either, we believe in Lenin. I am just following his instructions to explain and develop them. According to this law, everything is the division of one into two, the unity of opposites. Things always have two opposing sides. If your party only has complete unity and no opposing sides, it is not in accordance with reality. All the parties in the world split. Marx and Engels did not expect that their successors Bernstein and Kautsky would become anti-Marxists, and the parties they founded and led—the German Social Democratic Party, the French Socialist Party, etc.—became bourgeois parties after their deaths. If you don't pay attention to this, you will suffer. Although Lenin expected that Zinoviev, Trotsky, Bukharin, and other oppositionists would emerge, his method was not to kill people. From 1917 to 1924, in less than eight years of holding power, Lenin died. During this period, he mainly engaged in theory. He did a little work on trade unions, not much. He did no work on peasants at all, and did not even come up with a program for the peasant movement. During the October Revolution, he temporarily used the program of the Populists as the program of the Bolsheviks. At the meeting of the Soviet of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, Lenin said not to discuss this program too much. The Populists could not implement their own program, and their proposal to "go to the people" was also inappropriate. Later, the Populists became spokesmen for the rich peasants.

You said before that you made mistakes, that the land reform should not have been so "Left," and that too many people were killed. I think too few were killed. You published *Humanities* and *Fine Products*. You are afraid that the masses will stage demonstrations, and you asked us for tear gas.

*Humanities* and *Fine Products* are just like *Beijing Daily* and *Beijing Evening News*. All crows under the sky are equally black. As long as we understand, we are prepared, and the majority of the Party is prepared, we are not afraid. We are all over seventy years old, and one day Marx will invite us. Who the successor will be, whether it will be Bernstein, Kautsky, or Khrushchev, is unknown. We must be prepared, there is still time. In short, we must divide one into two, and not just look at those who are shouting "ten thousand years" now.

Ho: Now four provinces in China are helping seven provinces in Vietnam, such as Guangdong helping our Quang Ninh province, etc.

Mao: Helping with what?

Ho: Helping with agricultural production, water conservancy, improving rice varieties, cattle breeds, and also helping to build small power plants, small factories, and improving agricultural implements, etc.

Mao: Has your steel plant been built?

Ho: It has already started production. Enemy planes have also started bombing nearby.

Mao: How much steel is produced annually?

Ho: Very little, there is no steel rolling equipment yet.

Mao: Do you have coal mines and iron mines there? Where does the iron sand come from? Does it come from China?

Ho: Vietnam has coal and iron. China also sends a little.

Mao: Without steel and without mechanical industry, the country does not have a complete set of industries.

Ho: You may remember that it was after seeing you, and with your encouragement, that I built the steel plant.

Mao: I am most concerned about the iron and steel industry and the mechanical industry.

Ho: The equipment and experts of our Thai Nguyen Steel Plant are all from China.

Mao: You can start from small-scale and gradually develop. In ten or twenty years, you can build it up. Small steel rolling mills can be brought from China, and new technologies can be used for steelmaking. We have already started using oxygen steelmaking. Some new technologies can also be brought from China. Initially, don't rush, don't do too much, we suffered from rushing and doing too much, we had 1,700 basic construction projects in one year. After a few years, it didn't work, and then we reduced it to more than 700. You see, we reduced it by 1,000, some have already been completed, and the unfinished basic construction units are like lungs and tumors. At that time, we were greedy for big, greedy for much, and greedy for complete. It's a pity you didn't go to Jinzhou to take a look. There are many small industries there. Without funds, cadres and workers each contributed a little, without money to build houses, they built thatched sheds. Now many new products have come out. Some large factories are very backward, such as Anshan Iron and Steel, which has 160,000 workers and produces five or six million tons of steel annually, but it has a backward side.

Mao: ... Chen Duxiu, from 1921 to 1927, a total of seven years; later he ran away, ran to the Trotskyites. The second dynasty was Qu Qiubai, he was "Left," and only lasted three or four months. What I just said about being driven out of the Politburo, someone spread rumors that I was expelled from the Party and became a democratic personage, was also at this time. The third dynasty was Li Lisan and Xiang Zhongfa, who were very "Left" for a few months and wanted to attack big cities. The fourth dynasty was Wang Ming, whose time was the longest, ruling for four years. He never went to the base areas, but his people did. All five base areas had people he sent; the Kuomintang-controlled areas also had his people; Peng Zhen was implementing Wang Ming's line. The fifth dynasty was Zhang Wentian. Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, and Lu Dingyi are Kuomintang people.

Ho: Did they join the Kuomintang in the past?

Mao: During the first Great Revolution, when the Kuomintang and the Communist Party cooperated, that doesn't count. I also participated, it was the Party that wanted us to participate. There is no definite evidence against them, only suspicion. They all worked in the Kuomintang-controlled areas for a period of time.

Ho: Were they bought off by the Kuomintang?

Mao: Peng Zhen was arrested by the Kuomintang, we don't know how he got out. Why weren't their mistakes discovered after they had infiltrated the Party for so long? We had discovered their mistakes, such as Peng Zhen making mistakes when running the Party School in Yan'an. He also made mistakes in Jin-Cha-Ji, which have only been revealed now, we didn't know in the past. Nie Rongzhen knew, he was the commander and political commissar of Jin-Cha-Ji. Yang Chengwu was also from Jin-Cha-Ji. Peng Zhen was in Jin-Cha-Ji for less than two years, implementing Wang Ming's line. Wang Ming's line at this time was different from that during the ten-year civil war. During the ten-year civil war, Wang Ming's line was "Left," advocating attacking big cities; during the War of Resistance Against Japan, Wang Ming's line was right, it was capitulationism. Later, Wang Ming also ran away, to Moscow, we sent him there. He is still writing articles under a false name to scold us. In addition, there was Zhang Guotao who ran away, he was a member of the Central Politburo at the time, the leader of the Fourth Front Army, and is now a special agent in Hong Kong. The director of the General Political Department at Jinggangshan, the political commissar who replaced me, and the Minister of Logistics, also betrayed the Party and ran to the Kuomintang side. You see, every dynasty has traitors. Chen Duxiu betrayed, Qu Qiubai wrote a confession after being arrested. Xiang Zhongfa (actually the Li Lisan line) led the enemy to arrest people after being arrested; after the enemy arrested everyone, they killed him too, quite stupid. Wang Ming also became a traitor after being arrested. He was arrested several times, we don't know how he was released. In the Northeast, he was arrested by the Japanese; in Shanghai, he was arrested by Chiang Kai-shek! Then he was released. Rao Shushi was arrested in the New Fourth Army, it is not clear how he was released. Peng Dehuai was a Kuomintang company commander, fought against us, and later speculated, and has always made line mistakes. Luo Ruiqing cooperated with Peng Dehuai. Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing, Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun are all in the same gang, why were they only exposed after so long? We wanted to take a look? They are also colluding with foreign countries.

Ho: Isn't it very dangerous to leave them behind?

Mao: It is very dangerous. But until a certain opportunity, they don't expose themselves, and we don't rectify them. Like Peng Dehuai, he made mistakes every time, we just criticized him, but he holds grudges. During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, he was the commander, and after returning to China, he was the Minister of National Defense for seven years. How many generals did he pull away? Less than ten generals and civil officials were pulled away by him. In these five dynasties of our Party, the leaders were not good, and the revolution failed. Two major failures: the Great Revolution failed when Chen Duxiu led in 1927; the Long March in 1934, 300,000 troops became 25,000, wasn't that a failure? But the Party was not eliminated, there were still 25,000 troops, and after eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, it became one million again. At this time, we had experience. After Chen Duxiu's right opportunism, Wang Ming's "Left" opportunism, and Qu Qiubai and Li Lisan's three "Left" opportunisms, we had experience, which enabled us to make a summary. Therefore, we must thank these people for educating us. First of all, we must thank the Kuomintang and imperialism. Secondly, we must thank the right opportunists, the "Left" opportunists, and the traitors. Otherwise, we cannot be educated by Marxism alone.

Mao: Our recent struggle started last November and has been going on for more than seven months. Initially, Yao Wenyuan launched the attack, he is a young man, discussing the issue of incorruptible officials, etc. Don't you approve of incorruptible officials? You say there are incorruptible officials in the world, I have never seen one. No official is not corrupt, only the degree of corruption varies, there are no truly incorruptible officials.

Ho: My father was a county magistrate, and he was not corrupt.

Mao: Not necessarily, you were still young at that time, you didn't know if he was corrupt. Being a county magistrate is quite something.

Ho: He was dismissed after a few months.

Mao: That's because he didn't have time to be corrupt. If he was a county magistrate for a year or two, I think he would be slightly corrupt even if he wasn't very corrupt.

Kang Sheng: No official is not corrupt, officials and corruption are inseparable.

Mao: Now we are not dealing with the matter of incorruptible officials and corrupt officials, we are engaging in the Great Cultural Revolution, engaging in the educational circles, literary and art circles, academic circles, philosophical circles, historical circles, publishing circles, and journalistic circles. The literary and art circles are divided into many circles, including the drama circles, film circles, music circles, fine arts circles, and sculpture circles; the drama circles are further divided into Peking opera and hundreds of local operas.

Mao: Today, I only slept for two hours, because I have something on my mind, I want to see you, Uncle Ho. I inquired about what time you would be up, and knowing that you get up at five o'clock, good, I will see you at seven o'clock. The day before yesterday I slept for eight hours, yesterday I slept for eight hours, today two hours of sleep is enough. In the summer, sometimes I don't sleep for several days. During the Lushan Conference, I didn't sleep, after speaking, I went swimming, and after coming back, I spoke again, it was to rectify Peng Dehuai. Now, the main thing is to look at the big-character posters; the newspapers are also very lively. The big-character posters are very powerful, they have a mass character, and they are vigorous. You can go to Zhejiang University to take a look, go in disguise at night, wear a mask to take a look; this is a good way to mobilize the masses to rectify reactionary elements.

Ho: I also saw big-character posters in China in 1957.

Mao: Not as deep and widespread as this time. This time, hundreds and thousands of people, large and small, may be overthrown, especially in the academic circles, educational circles, journalistic circles, publishing circles, literary and art circles, universities, middle schools, and primary schools. Because we had no one at that time, we accepted all the Kuomintang teachers. Teachers in universities, middle schools, and primary schools, those who run newspapers, those who perform operas, those who write novels, those who paint, those who make movies, we had very few, we took in all the Kuomintang people. These people have all infiltrated our Party. Once I say this, you will understand the reason for the Great Cultural Revolution.