(March 29, 1966)







Time: 11:00 AM to 12:30 PM, March 29, 1966

Location: Shanghai

Participants:

Japanese side: Oka Masayoshi, Kurahara Korehito, Yonehara Itaru, Sunama Ichiryo, Kudo Akira

Chinese side: Kang Sheng, Zhao Yimin, Wei Wenbo, Zhao Anbo

Translator: Lin Liyun

Recorder: Wang Xiaoxian



[Miyamoto Kenji (1908–2007), one of the main leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, a political activist, literary critic, and theorist. From 1928 to 1931, he studied in the Economics Department of Tokyo Imperial University, where he began to come into contact with Marxism as a student. In May 1931, he joined the Japanese Communist Party. After being released from prison in October 1945, he participated in the work of rebuilding the Party. At the 4th Congress of the JCP in December of the same year, he was elected a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. At the 6th Congress of the JCP in December 1947, he was elected a member of the Central Political Bureau and Chairman of the Central Control Commission. At the 6th National Conference of the JCP in July 1955, he was elected a standing member of the Central Political Bureau, Secretary of the Secretariat, Head of the Central Organ Department, and head of the editorial board of the central organ newspaper. At the 7th Congress of the JCP in July 1958, he was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee, a position he held until 1970. From the 11th Congress of the JCP in 1970, he was Chairman of the Central Political Bureau. In 1977, he was elected a member of the House of Councillors of the Diet of Japan. After the 16th Congress of the JCP in 1982, he was continuously Chairman of the JCP Central Committee. He visited China many times. During his tenure in major leadership positions in the JCP, he proposed a series of political and theoretical viewpoints that had an important impact on the JCP's formulation of its political line and guiding policies. In September 1997, Miyamoto Kenji retired as Honorary Chairman at the 21st Congress of the Japanese Communist Party.]






Chairman Mao (hereinafter referred to as Chairman): Do you have any other opinions?

Miyamoto: I will now offer a few opinions on the questions raised by Comrade Mao Zedong yesterday.

On the question of how to evaluate the leadership of the CPSU. We believe that although the CPSU leadership has always been beautifying U.S. imperialism, as the people of the world have become increasingly clear about the facts of U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, they have had to start adopting a two-faced policy. They have publicly expressed support for the four propositions of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-point statement of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, and have begun to provide aid to South Vietnam. They have consistently engaged in splittist activities in the past and present, but now they have also begun to talk a little about unity. Towards this kind of opportunist, that is, revisionist two-faced policy, we must use revolutionary two-handed tactics based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. In the international communist movement, on the one hand, we hold high the banner of unity against the U.S., and on the other hand, we struggle against the compromise policy and splittist policy of the CPSU leadership. The revisionists' aid to Vietnam is not commensurate with their national strength; we should demand that they provide more aid to Vietnam, thereby intensifying the contradictions between them and U.S. imperialism. Although the Soviet Union has ulterior motives in aiding Vietnam, the anti-aircraft guns it provides are, after all, one of the important factors in shooting down American planes. The Vietnamese comrades have requested their aid and have thanked them. As long as it is beneficial to Vietnam's anti-U.S. struggle, we should try to pull them in. Although the CPSU leadership compromises with the United States, there are still contradictions between the Soviet people and the United States, and between the Soviet social system and the American social system. If the CPSU leadership wants to take the capitalist road, the Soviet people will rise up and struggle, which will cause contradictions within the CPSU leadership and within the CPSU. The process of our implementing the revolutionary two-handed policy is also the process of promoting change within the CPSU. We believe that in the anti-U.S. united front, how to evaluate the revisionist parties, especially the revisionist parties that have ruling power over their own people, including the parties of Eastern Europe, depends on what attitude they take in the struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam. This is one of the bases for judging them. On the one hand, the CPSU leadership attempts to resolve the Vietnam question according to the line of peaceful coexistence; on the other hand, they will also understand that if they refuse to support the struggle of the Vietnamese people, they will be isolated among the peoples of the world. The Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, attended by 82 countries, passed a militant anti-U.S. resolution. The representatives of the Soviet Union and other revisionist countries also had to express support. Therefore, we believe that the current situation is importantly different from the situation when Lenin established the Third International: there are more socialist countries than at that time; the national liberation movements, the struggles of the people in capitalist countries, and the struggle for peace have also developed. This is different from the situation where the social democrats of the Second International openly supported the imperialist war of that time. Today, the Soviet Union cannot openly support the U.S. imperialist war of aggression in Vietnam. The balance of forces has changed. If they openly support U.S. imperialism and refuse to support the Vietnamese people, then the truth will be known to all the world. But in reality, they have no choice but to adopt an attitude of supporting the Vietnamese people. Therefore, today we are in a position to adopt roundabout tactics, on the one hand exposing the two-faced policy of revisionism, and on the other hand, broadly winning over and uniting the masses. Towards revisionist parties, towards non-Marxist-Leninist parties, when conditions permit, a united front policy can be adopted. Of course, this does not mean uniting with them unconditionally at all times and acting according to their propositions. For example, after Lenin established the Third International, although he clearly knew that the leaders of the Second International and the Two-and-a-Half International had an unstable alliance with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and that they proposed establishing a united front to deceive the masses, Lenin still sought their participation in the united front on issues such as the struggle for the 8-hour workday, relief for the famine-stricken people of Russia, and opposition to Russian capitalists. Lenin's purpose in doing so at that time was to win over the masses under their influence. This point is worthy of our study. At present, we are engaged in united action with the Socialist Party in our country. The Socialist Party is not a Marxist-Leninist party; it does not adopt a truly revolutionary line, but speaks of peaceful revolution. But on the other hand, they cannot but struggle against U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, so we can form a united front with the Socialist Party under the condition that the JCP holds the leadership. Of course, in the process of the united front, we must pay attention to maintaining our independence in principle and theory. The ulterior motive aspect of the revisionists' so-called unity and united action should be criticized, pointing out that their words and deeds are inconsistent. We have sharply criticized them for talking about unity on the one hand while colluding with Shiga and others on the other; for talking about the anti-U.S. struggle on the one hand while beautifying the diplomatic line of the Sato cabinet on the other. In the international united action against the U.S., we must grasp the banner of the anti-U.S. struggle and the banner of unity, and at the same time, we must criticize and expose the revisionists' incomplete and ambiguous views in theory and practice within the mass movement. We do not believe that the slogans put forward by the revisionists are genuine. However, we must educate the masses through actual struggle, so that the masses can see clearly the two-faced policy of the revisionist leadership and take a correct stand in international united action. Therefore, on the Vietnam question, we must clearly propose support for the four propositions of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five demands of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front. We must not be deceived by the peace talks conspiracy of U.S. imperialism; this premise must be made clear. In the international democratic movement, the revisionists agree to some resolutions and then violate them. We can seize this opportunity to expose them and win over the masses under their influence. For example, at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, a resolution was made to support the movement to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs led by the JCP. At that time, the Soviet Union also approved this resolution, but recently it has been engaged in conspiratorial activities in violation of the resolution. We cannot therefore say that this resolution should not have been made at that time; rather, it should be used as a weapon to criticize revisionism. It cannot be said that sitting together with them in meetings in the international democratic movement is to beautify them. One should not adopt the attitude of "a gentleman does not approach danger," but should have the spirit of "how can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger's den," and expose them in actual action. Simply put, this is our opinion. We also discussed these opinions during the talks between our two parties.

Chairman: I have read all the materials from the talks between the two parties, and you already mentioned some of your opinions yesterday.

Miyamoto: On the question of how to evaluate the CPSU leadership and how to conduct the struggle, the opinions of the two sides differ. Therefore, we suggest that a joint communiqué be drafted in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences. In terms of expressing a clear position, this communiqué may not be satisfactory enough for either side. However, both parties are separately carrying on the struggle against imperialism and revisionism. If a joint communiqué can be issued while generally affirming these two points, we think it is better to issue one, which is why we undertook the drafting work. We believe that the communiqué that has now been drafted is not the product of a lack of courage and strategy in the struggle against imperialism and revisionism. We believe that in the international communist movement, the contradictions within the CPSU are intensifying, and the contradictions within the CPSU leadership are also intensifying. The future struggle will be very complex, but we firmly believe that Marxism-Leninism will achieve final victory. The process of the failure of U.S. imperialism's policy of aggression and war is also complex, but it will ultimately fail. The question is how to shorten its process. In this respect, the basic direction of our two parties is the same, but the methods of struggle are different. This is because we are the Communist Party of a capitalist country. At present, two-thirds of the world's population and more than 80% of the countries have not been liberated. These masses are increasingly demanding the formation of a united front in the anti-U.S. struggle. The masses in capitalist countries are also dissatisfied with the ambiguous foreign policy of the Soviet Union. But they have indeed provided anti-aircraft guns and missiles to Vietnam. So, if we say that they are not in the slightest opposing the U.S. and aiding Vietnam even on partial issues, the masses in capitalist countries will not be able to accept it. That is why we have adopted the aforementioned attitude. This is in line with the situation in Japan and also conforms to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Through these talks, we have also come to understand the arguments you have not publicly put forward in your anti-revisionist articles. The Chinese comrades have also come to understand the arguments we have not put forward in our articles, I suppose. The points of agreement between the two sides should be maintained in the future, and the points of disagreement can continue to be studied and await the test of practice; they cannot be imposed on others. In the talks between the two parties, both sides affirmed that the four Asian parties whose territories are violated by U.S. imperialism should strengthen their unity and mutual alliance. As for whether the Soviet Union has already become a capitalist country, this is a major international issue, and each party can have its own view. If there is an opportunity, these four parties should still exchange opinions with each other and make a scientific judgment. I heard that after Khrushchev's downfall, the Korean comrades once suggested to Mao Zedong that the parties get together to talk about these issues. We also feel that the situation is now complex, and there are quite a few differences among the four Asian parties on the views of some specific issues. We hope to take the issue of strengthening the cooperative relations between the parties as a topic for joint study in the future.

After the preparatory meeting for the 81-Party Conference was held, the CPSU again violated the principles affirmed by that meeting. In the struggle against this error of the CPSU, the Communist Party of China played a great role. We give a very high evaluation to this. After the 81-Party Conference, we have not had many opportunities for contact. This time, we visited Korea after a lapse of four and a half years, and it was our first time in Vietnam. In the future, in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and in the struggle against Khrushchev's splittist line, the parties should seek common ground as much as possible, and for some different opinions, they should study them with each other. This issue is particularly important at present. I have finished my remarks.

Chairman: Thank you. I don't have much to say either, just a few words. This attitude of yours is welcomed by the CPSU leadership, that's the first sentence. But we do not welcome it, that's the second sentence. It seems a communiqué cannot be issued. It doesn't matter if a communiqué is not issued; just issue a news report. We never issued a communiqué with the Indonesian party at all, and we haven't issued communiqués with many parties. Recently, we only held talks with the New Zealand party and did not issue any communiqué. This thing, a communiqué, is a kind of formalism. We have issued several joint statements with the Japan Socialist Party because the Socialist Party needs them. This kind of thing is also tantamount to waste paper; the reason they need it is for elections. Just issuing a news report will be fine, right? Is that acceptable? You were originally unwilling to issue one; it was we who proposed it to you. I said this was not right, it should have been proposed by you. If a joint communiqué is issued today, neither side will be happy.

Miyamoto: We do not insist on issuing one. I firmly believe that our position will not be welcomed by U.S. imperialism, nor will it be welcomed by Soviet revisionism. This point is also where our two sides have different opinions.

Chairman: I agree with one sentence you said, that is, the opinions of the two sides have common points and different points. As for who is right and who is wrong, let's wait a few years and see. Each proclaims itself to be Marxist-Leninist; whether it is or not, we can wait and see. Don't proclaim yourself to be a Marxist-Leninist party, thinking that your own party is more correct than others. As for who is a Marxist-Leninist, whose viewpoint is more correct, we still have to wait and see, it still has to be proven in practice. For example, China considers itself to be relatively correct; whether it is relatively correct or not, we also have to wait and see.

Miyamoto: I agree with this point. The two sides have exchanged views on theory, and it needs to be further verified in practice. The differences of opinion in the talks should also be handled in this way.

Chairman: Let's wait and see. There is a saying in China, the sky will not fall. We can continue to talk in the future when there is an opportunity. Let's leave it at that.

Miyamoto: Good.

Chairman: (Asks Kang Sheng) Has Beijing issued a news report?

Kang Sheng: Only a news report about a banquet was issued.

(Our staff member described what Oka Masayoshi had said about the *Akahata* correspondent in Beijing reporting on the delegation's departure from Beijing.)

Chairman: Then, according to the Japanese side's opinion, it will be fine to just issue a news report about your arrival in Guangzhou. It won't mention that I met with you, nor what issues were discussed, nor that you went to Shanghai, only that you arrived in Guangzhou. Goodbye! The communiqué will not be issued; neither side will have a mental burden, and we can be relaxed and happy.

Please give my regards to Comrade Nosaka Sanzo.