(December 2 and 7, 1965)
Comrade Lin Biao:
I am in full agreement with your view. The situation in the 55th Division is probably much the same as that in other divisions, arms, and services. May I suggest that this document 121 be forwarded to all Military Regions, all arms, all services, and all armies, down to the division-level Party committees, for their reference. Those who do not truly believe in giving priority to politics—those who pay lip service to it while secretly spreading a compromising (i.e., opportunist) line of their own—deserve our vigilance. Please make the appropriate decision.
Mao Zedong
December 2, 1965
When forwarding this document, please first present it to Comrades Shaoqi, Enlai, and Pengzhen13 1 for their review.

Comrade Lin Biao:
This letter should be circulated together with [Document] 4.
Mao
December 7
Since Comrade Pengzhen will not be coming here for the time being, there is no need to send this for his review.
[1] This first item is a note written by Mao Zedong on December 2, 1965, on a report submitted by Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, from the CPC Lanzhou Military Region Committee concerning the emphasis on political work within the 55th Division during its emergency war preparations. On the report, Lin Biao had written: “Chairman: From this document, it can be seen that if war breaks out, the situation in other units would likely be similar to that of this unit.” The second item is a note Mao wrote on a letter Lin Biao sent him on December 3.
[2]
Refers to the report by the CPC Lanzhou Military Region Committee on the emphasis on political work during the 55th Division’s emergency war preparations. The report states that in mid-to-late September, the 55th Division was ordered to prepare for war urgently and move toward the Sino-Indian border. However, due to changing circumstances, it instead conducted a week-long exercise involving both motorized and foot marches. The report notes that, based on these preparations and exercises, the following aspects demonstrate relatively effective implementation of Lin Biao’s instructions to prioritize political work:
First, over the past few years, thanks to steadfast adherence to Mao Zedong Thought—actively studying and applying Chairman Mao’s works, strengthening class education, and carrying out the “Four Goods” campaign—and especially through this year’s implementation of Lin Biao’s directives on prioritizing politics, significant results have been achieved across the board. This has fundamentally raised the troops’ class consciousness and strengthened their resolve to contribute to the revolutionary war. After receiving their mission, the troops remained mentally stable, highly motivated, eager to engage in combat, and actively volunteered to take the lead and serve as vanguard, displaying intense class hatred toward the class enemy. Second, a mindset of constant readiness has been further consolidated, fostering a swift and rigorous combat style. Upon receiving orders, the unit assembled quickly, gathered scattered personnel promptly, launched ideological mobilization and organizational adjustments swiftly, and distributed supplies without delay. Third, attention to the troops’ ideological concerns has been thorough and meticulous. By focusing on representative issues, facts were quickly clarified, and problems were patiently resolved through persuasion.
Fourth, strict enforcement of policy and discipline has been ensured. Essentially, wherever the unit went, it propagated Mao Zedong Thought, did good deeds, and left a positive impact behind. The main problems exposed during the preparations and exercises include: First, some cadres remain unconvinced that the foundation of prioritizing politics is sufficiently strong; under conditions of heavy workload and limited time, there have occasionally been tendencies to deviate from this principle. Second, routine preparations for war have not been adequately implemented, and education on the wartime situation has been one-sided. Third, the training of newly appointed grassroots officers has not been sufficiently emphasized, resulting in weak leadership and command capabilities and a lack of effective methods, which became particularly evident during these preparations. Fourth, political work itself still suffers from metaphysical thinking and bureaucratic formalism—mere showmanship, going through the motions, indiscriminate slogan-chanting, and excessive demands for statistical data.
[3]
Shaoqi refers to Liu Shaoqi. Enlai refers to Zhou Enlai. Pengzhen was at the time a member of the CPC Central Political Bureau and Secretary of the Secretariat.
[4]
Refers to a letter Lin Biao wrote to Mao Zedong on December 3, 1965. The letter reads: “I have received the Chairman’s remarks of December 2 regarding the 55th Division’s emphasis on political work. These remarks will serve as a powerful impetus for the upcoming political work conference, guiding next year’s and future political efforts. If the military does not strengthen its political work, it will not only fail to withstand the test of war but also see an increase in instances of defection to the enemy. Other negative consequences, such as the deterioration of relations between the army and the people, are also likely to rise. I fully agree with the Chairman’s remarks and hereby intend to follow his instructions by sending copies to Comrades Shaoqi, Enlai, and Pengzhen in Beijing, as well as to the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission, before distributing them to party committees at or above the division level.”