(November 1965)
We must vigorously develop both the First and Second Lines of Defense. Twenty billion yuan may not be enough; even thirty billion might fall short. Once our rear areas are fortified, there will be no real waste if the enemy does not attack. It is beneficial to stockpile food—after all, we need to eat. Similarly, keeping some cotton cloth on hand makes sense, since we inevitably require clothing. As for guns, artillery, and ammunition, if they are not needed in battle, they can at least be recycled as scrap metal. Digging tunnels merely consumes some labor.


Do we have Type 37 anti-aircraft guns? What about other types of artillery? When war breaks out, we should not rely on the central authorities; self-reliance is essential. The central government currently has neither grain nor textiles, and while it still possesses some weapons, these too will likely be exhausted once hostilities begin. Historically, we have depended on rear-area supplies of arms and ammunition only twice: during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and in the Sino-Indian border conflict. In reality, once actual fighting commences, the central leadership can do little more than issue orders.


When an enemy lands, they always seek out weak points. Why would they choose Qingdao, which has been so heavily fortified? Instead, they might opt for locations like Longkou or Chengshantou, where Japanese forces previously made landings. The very places that seem most secure and are thus lightly defended are precisely where the enemy is most likely to strike.


It is better to let the enemy enter, allow them to gain a foothold and taste initial success, thereby luring them deeper into our territory, where we can then annihilate them. First, we must destroy them.
[I]
Parts one through three of this document consist of excerpts from discussions held by Mao Zedong during his inspections of Shandong, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces with Comrade Tan Qilong, First Secretary of the Shandong Provincial Committee of the CPC, Comrade Li Zhaohua, First Secretary of the Anhui Provincial Committee of the CPC, and others.


One battalion, then a regiment, followed by a division.


Vietnam has fought so well—can we do the same? What is your assessment of the Americans? If we refrain from any “provocations” over the next three to five years, we can successfully establish both the First and Second Lines of Defense, and our efforts will not be in vain.


Are there any troops stationed along the Jinpu Railway line? Are there any local divisions? During the War of Resistance, we had only three divisions; now there are over a dozen at the local level. Relying solely on the central government for military support in future conflicts is unrealistic. Having even a single local division greatly simplifies matters.


Historically, the army’s three primary tasks were combat, fundraising, and mass work. Today, however, the military is mainly engaged in production and pays relatively little attention to mass work. We ought to revive those traditional three functions: preparing for war, engaging in production, and conducting mass work.


Comrades who serve as secretaries of provincial and municipal party committees were formerly part of the military, but now that you are working at the local level, you tend to pay less attention to military affairs. Conversely, military officers, having focused exclusively on military matters, often neglect their responsibilities in local governance. Neither approach is correct. Those responsible for local work must also oversee military issues, and those handling military duties should likewise manage local affairs.


A local division has already been assigned to you, hasn’t it? With a local division and the establishment of the Second Line of Defense, local areas will be well-equipped. Likewise, once the central government completes its First Line of Defense, it too will be adequately prepared.


Regardless of whether the Americans will invade, we must make preparations on two fronts. The Americans do harbor some fear of us. Vietnam’s coastline is quite short, and the U.S. dared only occupy a few coastal cities without advancing further inland—primarily because of concerns about long supply lines and the risk of being encircled. China, by contrast, boasts over ten thousand kilometers of coastline. If the enemy were to capture Shanghai, would they dare proceed to Suzhou?