(October 10, 1965)
You keep talking about war all the time. What if they don’t come to fight? Wouldn’t that be like King You of Zhou lighting beacon fires for no reason?
“It was I who raised the alarm. If we don’t sound the alarm, what will happen when they do attack? We can’t afford not to prepare for war; better safe than sorry. Setting up the Large and Small Third Fronts would solve the problem. It’s back to the Yan’an approach—‘establishing a strong base near mountains and water.’ Otherwise, won’t someone end up beheading us? But it won’t be us doing the beheading. Who will do it? The Americans.”
“The real solution won’t come until fighting breaks out—only when the enemy drops an atomic bomb can the situation be resolved. The U.S. hasn’t dropped one yet; once it does, things could turn out even better. The Americans aren’t so formidable after all. China is vast, and in any conflict there will always be places they can’t reach. The key is to properly develop the Large and Small Third Fronts. During the Decade-long Civil War and the Eight-Year War of Resistance, there were always areas the enemy couldn’t penetrate. During the War of Resistance, the Japanese couldn’t get everywhere. In the civil war, Chiang Kai-shek couldn’t reach certain regions. Back then, we didn’t have as many troops as we do now, so there were bound to be places they couldn’t reach. Later, during the War of Resistance Against Japan, only Xiang Ying stubbornly refused to follow our line. Comrade Chen Yi fought vigorously against him. Xiang Ying opposed establishing base areas and insisted on relying on the Kuomintang, which ultimately led to failure. Comrade Chen Yi, however, implemented the Central Committee’s policy: he went behind enemy lines, set up base areas through guerrilla warfare, and expanded our forces to several hundred thousand. It was at that time that I wrote ‘Strategic Problems of Guerrilla Warfare,’ arguing that guerrilla warfare is a strategic issue and fundamentally changing the nature of the war. The question of guerrilla warfare was hotly debated at the Luochuan Conference, which eventually adopted the principle of mountain guerrilla warfare—primarily guerrilla tactics while reserving the option of mobile warfare when conditions allowed. Many people at the time couldn’t grasp this idea. The North China Military Region even issued a document drawing on the experience of the Battle of Pingxingguan, advocating for “mobile guerrilla warfare.” But that was just the old way—concentrating forces to annihilate the enemy. The First, Second, and Third Encirclement Campaigns all followed this model. By the time of the War of Resistance, though, we had only about thirty thousand troops. We couldn’t mass our forces to destroy the Japanese; we had to seize territory and build up our strength instead. The question was: should we disperse our forces to expand our occupied zones and establish base areas, or concentrate them for decisive battles? Which course would benefit our country more, and which less? Some even claimed that if Taiyuan and Shijiazhuang fell, the nation would be doomed. Why such a view? Because they had forgotten the class struggles of previous years, losing sight of the balance of class forces. After Shanghai and Taiyuan fell, I wrote an article warning against two forms of capitulationism. Without understanding class struggle, it becomes impossible to clearly discern the relative strengths of friend and foe—the big picture fades from view, leaving only fragmented impressions. Class struggle is a major issue.
“Now, building the Large and Small Third Fronts seems quite proactive. Small Third Fronts mean small base areas, while Large Third Fronts imply larger ones. If war breaks out, the enemy certainly won’t be able to occupy every single village or town—certainly not all medium-sized and small cities either. During the War of Resistance, the Japanese never reached Xi’an or Chongqing. Ideally, they’d surrender a year later than they actually did, but they wouldn’t listen to us. Even today, whether the enemy will comply isn’t certain; we need to consider two possibilities. One is that they’ll launch a large-scale attack soon, as we’ve been urging. The other is that they may not act at all—something beyond our control. This isn’t Lenin’s era anymore. Back then, Lenin signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany as a compromise to preserve revolutionary forces. Now, our goal is victory. South Vietnam has already been fighting for a year, and we’re formulating plans; we can’t afford to hesitate. Yu Qiuli reported that five years of preparation were needed, but I argued for three and a half years—or perhaps a bit longer, counting from the second half of this year. Why three and a half years? Primarily to observe how the tone of the U.S. presidential election evolves. We shouldn’t be overly fearful of America; we should engage in some propaganda.
[1]
Yu Qiuli, at the time First Deputy Director and Secretary-General of the State Planning Commission.

Pham Van Dong said that the Americans are much easier to deal with than the French. The Americans have learned one crucial lesson: they know how to disarm collaborators first before confiscating weapons. When there are puppet forces involved, the Americans prefer to eliminate those collaborators before collecting their arms; otherwise, it would reflect poorly on their image. Nowadays, some people still feel apprehensive about confronting the Americans. Fighting the Americans also requires a certain amount of propaganda—how else could it work? It’s like Northerners going south and endlessly describing how enormous the mosquitoes are or how dangerous the snakes are. Why do hundreds of millions of people live down there? In fact, many Northerners have moved south, settled down, started families, married Southern women, and grown accustomed to that way of life; now they’re reluctant to return to the North. Among those present here, there are only two individuals originally from the north! As soon as I arrived in the South—at Guangzhou—I caught a cold. In Hunan, I was unable to speak for half a month, my voice hoarse, until I reached Jinggangshan, where I began to recover, and by the time I descended the mountain, I was fully well. Last year, while in Hubei, bacteria managed to infiltrate my system as well. Bacteria truly have a knack for getting into every crevice.
“We must prepare not only for imperialism to attack us, but also for a joint offensive by imperialism and revisionism against us.”
[!]
Pham Van Dong, at the time Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
[2]
Refers to Li Xuefeng, First Secretary of the CPC North China Bureau, and Liu Lantao, First Secretary of the CPC Northwest Bureau, who were present at the meeting.
[3]
Refers to Tao Zhu, First Secretary of the CPC Central-South Bureau, who was also present.

Archival photo
On October 10, 1965, Mao Zedong met with model workers from industry and agriculture, representatives of the People’s Liberation Army, and members of youth study and observation groups representing various ethnic minorities, all of whom had attended the National Day celebrations.