A: That was in Myanmar. At that time, our army was under British control, as Britain ruled the Indian subcontinent. We gained independence in 1947.
Mao: 1947? We became independent two years later than you did.
After the Japanese left, the Americans came again. Back then, our command center was in Yan’an. Yan’an had a population of only seven thousand, including the surrounding countryside—it was essentially a rural area. We also maintained several base areas, divided into more than a dozen regions, all of which were isolated by the enemy.
A: I have read many books about your struggles during that period, as well as Chairman Mao’s writings. Even today, our Military Academy and Tactical School still use Chairman Mao’s works as textbooks. The problem we face now is that if we were to engage in a large-scale war against an enemy with a much larger population and superior equipment,
we cannot simply copy the operational methods of Britain or the United States. Instead, we must learn from the Chairman’s experience and, of course, develop our own approaches. Only then would we dare to fight an enemy three times our size.
Mao: Your territory is vast, and your population is large. Our way of fighting was: you fight your way, and I’ll fight mine.
Whether it was the Japanese or the Americans, none of them could defeat us. They would fight their way, while we fought ours. In fact, when they fought their way, they couldn’t find us; but when we fought ours, we could locate them. We took on one division after another—attacking the weaker ones, those that were isolated. By eating away at them bit by bit, their strength gradually diminished. Let me use the analogy of ten fingers: I strike at one finger without touching the other nine. Once that finger is gone, they can no longer make a fist. Then, seizing opportunities to cut off more fingers one by one until only half a finger remained, Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan.
A: The Chairman’s methods have been tested in practice, whereas ours have yet to be. If we were to actually go to war, we still don’t know how it would turn out. Our approach to warfare can also be summarized in two sentences: When defending, rely on firepower rather than throwing human bodies into the fray; when attacking, focus on the enemy’s weak points and commit all available forces.
Mao: When striking at one finger, I would use three or four fingers. Specifically, this means concentrating superior forces.
A: You should deploy overwhelming force against a specific target.
Mao: Sometimes, in a single campaign, we would annihilate one division, only for another to arrive. We’d eliminate that one, and then another would come along to be eliminated as well. By continuing in this manner, we could gradually destroy the enemy’s living strength.
You should also compile a simple manual—no more than twenty thousand words, perhaps thirty to forty thousand at most—and distribute it to officers and soldiers. The thicker military treatises become, the less useful they are.
A: The Chairman is absolutely right. No one reads thick books anymore. Later, we burned all the British military texts, keeping only concise, clear pamphlets, mainly focused on how to defeat the enemy.
March 4, 1965: Mao Zedong met with Muhammad Ayub Khan, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Commentary on a request report from the International Department [1]
(March 10, 1965)
Comrade Zhao Yimin, please send one copy in Chinese and one in English for my review. Please inform Comrade Chen Ping121: I have read their statement and am very pleased with it. It is a Marxist statement that is both clear-cut and powerful.
Mao Zedong
March 10th
Comments and Revisions on the Article “On the Splitting Conference in Moscow”
(March 11th, 17th, and 18th, 1965)
To Comrade Kang Sheng:
I have made a few minor revisions131. Please consider whether they are suitable.
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Comments and Revisions on the Article “On the Splitting Conference in Moscow”
To Comrade Kang Sheng:
I have reviewed it and approve it. I also agree that you may return to Beijing tomorrow.
Mao Zedong
9:00 PM, March 17th
The CPSU leadership exerted tremendous effort, employing both soft and hard tactics, scrambling in every possible way, and finally managed to convene a fragmented meeting. The scene was bleak and disheartening—a splintered, ill-organized gathering.
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The new CPSU leadership has adopted certain slogans previously put forward by Marxists and Leninists, attempting to create the illusion that they have undergone a transformation and are now distinct from Khrushchev’s revisionism and separatism.
This situation bears a striking resemblance to how U.S. imperialism has appropriated many of the CPSU leadership’s key slogans. Khrushchev’s policies of peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition, peaceful transition, and détente—
Comments and Revisions on the Article “On the Splitting Conference in Moscow”
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Comrades Xiaoping, Peng ZhenIl l, and Kang Sheng:
If you can stay for another day, I would like to speak with you once more. Please make arrangements accordingly.
Mao Zedong
4:00 AM, March 18th
I would also like to ask Comrades Han Xianchu and Chen Zaidao121 to stay for two more days—to meet on the tenth and fly back to Beijing on the twentieth. Could this be arranged? Please let Han and Chen decide.
On March 14, 1965, Mao Zedong shook hands with Wilcox, General Secretary of the New Zealand Communist Party, who was visiting China.

Archival photo
On March 19, 1965, Mao Zedong met with Chen Ping, General Secretary of the Malayan Communist Party, in Wuhan.

On March 1st, 1965, Mao Zedong met with Adler and Corfman, American experts working in China.

Archival photo
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In 1965, Mao Zedong was in Wuhan.

Archival photo
In 1965, Mao Zedong strolled along East Lake in Wuhan.

In 1965, Mao Zedong was in Wuhan.

Mao Zedong and others sent a telegram of condolence upon the passing of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej
(March 20, 1965)
To the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party, the State Council of the Romanian People’s Republic, and the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People’s Republic in Bucharest:
We were deeply saddened to learn of the unfortunate passing of Comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party and Chairman of the State Council of the Romanian People’s Republic. On behalf of ourselves and the Chinese people, we express our profound sorrow and deepest condolences.
Comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej led a life of relentless struggle. He was a loyal son of the Romanian people, a revered leader, a close friend of the Chinese people, and an outstanding fighter in the international workers’ movement. Under his leadership, the Romanian people launched the August 23 Armed Uprising and embarked on the path of socialist construction, achieving remarkable victories. He made significant contributions to upholding the principles of fraternal relations between parties and countries, maintaining the unity of the socialist camp, safeguarding the unity of the international communist movement, and defending world peace. His passing is not only a great loss for the Romanian people but also for all socialist peoples and working people around the world.
At this tragic moment, we firmly believe that the Romanian Workers’ Party and the Romanian people will transform their grief into strength, strengthen their unity, persist in their struggle, and continue advancing toward victory.

--- Notes

[1] This commentary was written on a request report submitted by Zhao Yimin, Deputy Minister of the CPC Central Committee’s International Department, on March 5, 1965. The report concerned the Malayan Communist Party’s request that our party forward its statement on the international communist movement to other leftist parties. The report stated that on the afternoon of March 4th, responsible comrades from the Malayan Communist Party entrusted our department with delivering to the CPC Central Committee “The Statement of the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party on the International Communist Movement,” which included one copy each in Chinese, Malay, and English. Additionally, ten copies of each version of the statement were provided, requesting that the Chinese side transmit them to ten fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties in North Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). The report outlined specific procedures for preparing the transmission and sought instructions. The main content of the Malayan Communist Party’s January 31, 1965, statement on the international communist movement was to expose the CPSU leadership’s continued adherence to Khrushchev’s revisionist line even after his downfall, emphasizing that open theoretical debates could help distinguish right from wrong and promote genuine unity within the international communist movement. This statement was published in the People’s Daily on April 2, 1965.
[2] Chen Ping, who at the time served as General Secretary of the Malayan Communist Party.


[1] This article, originally titled “On the Splitting Subcommittee in Moscow,” was reviewed by Mao Zedong on March 11, 1965, when he changed the title to “On the Splitting Conference in Moscow.” The article was initially divided into four sections without any subheadings. During a discussion held at Mao’s residence on March 18th, it was decided to add the following subheadings: First, What Kind of Conference Is This? Second, What Has the New CPSU Leadership Done? Third, Answering Several Questions; Fourth, Uniting on the Path of Marxism-Leninism and Revolution. The article was subsequently published in the March 23rd issue of the People’s Daily and the third issue of Red Flag magazine in 1965, under the revised title “On the March Conference in Moscow.”
[2] Parts One and Two of this document represent Mao Zedong’s two sets of comments on the draft of “On the Splitting Conference in Moscow.” The first set was written on the revised draft dated March 10th, while the second was penned in a letter sent by Kang Sheng, alternate member of the CPC Central Political Bureau and secretary of the Secretariat, to Mao Zedong on March 17th, 1965, accompanying a revised version of the article for Mao’s review. The letter read: “After returning, Xiaoping and Comrade Peng Zhen and I made some further revisions. If the Chairman reviews it tonight, we will return to Beijing tomorrow; if he reviews it tomorrow, we will return the day after.” At that time, Mao Zedong was in Wuhan.
[3] See parts Three through Six, where the text printed in Song typeface represents additions and revisions made by Mao Zedong.


[1] Khrushchev, formerly First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, was successively removed from both positions on October 14th and 15th, 1964.
Slogans such as “tension reduction,” “complete and thorough disarmament,” “two major powers dominating the world,” “jointly aiding India,” “jointly supporting reactionary forces in various countries,” “jointly using the United Nations to suppress revolutionary movements worldwide,” and “opposing China”—all these slogans or conspiratorial plans have been completely taken up by U.S. imperialism! The CPSU leadership has been closely collaborating with U.S. imperialism, exchanging intelligence, jointly opposing communism, the people, revolution, and national liberation movements, all in order to jointly maintain imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary forces in various countries, standing firmly against all revolutionaries around the globe.
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In order to effectively carry out the struggle against imperialism and reactionary forces in various countries, and to further consolidate the unity of the international proletariat, we must continue to expose the true nature of modern revisionists, help those who are unclear about the truth to understand it, assist those who hesitate on the revolutionary path to advance together with the revolutionary masses, and isolate to the greatest extent possible those modern revisionists who serve as accomplices to imperialism and reactionary forces, carrying the struggle against Khrushchev’s revisionism through to the end.
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Throughout the history of the international communist movement, Khrushchev’s tenure was merely a brief episode—far shorter than the performances of earlier revisionists like Bernstein or Kautsky. From now on, anyone attempting to practice “Khrushchevism” without Khrushchev will inevitably resemble him, remaining just a fleeting interlude.
[1] Bernstein, leader of the right wing within the German Social Democratic Party and the Second International.
[2] Kautsky, a member of the German Social Democratic Party and one of the leading revisionists of the Second International.


[I] Xiaoping, namely Deng Xiaoping, who at the time served as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. Peng Zhen, who was then a member of the CPC Central Political Bureau and secretary of the Secretariat.
[2] Han Xianchu, who at the time held the position of Deputy Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army and Commander of the Fuzhou Military Region. Chen Zaidao, who served as Deputy Minister of the PLA’s Armed Forces Supervision Department and Commander of the Wuhan Military Region.