Do a Good Job of Third Front Construction and We Will Not Fear the Outbreak of War[1]
(January 23, 24, 1965)

I
The troops should not engage in those gaudy, flashy things, should not indulge in those frills. Qi Jiguang long ago pointed out in his *Essential Military Affairs* that we should not pursue things that merely look good, but should develop things that can actually be used in combat.

Our technology must catch up with and surpass international levels. I don't care what country, I don't care what bomb—atomic bomb, hydrogen bomb, we must surpass them all. Focus on Third Front construction. Once we have built up our bases for steel, national defense, machinery, chemicals, petroleum, and railways, then when war comes we will not be afraid. What if we fail to complete it and war breaks out? We will fight them with conventional weapons. In the past we had no airplanes, no artillery, and no high explosives, yet we still won! Even if fighting breaks out, we can continue construction—you fight your war, I'll carry on with my construction.

II
I know a little about military affairs. From the Zunyi Conference onward, through the Long March and up to the Party's Seventh Congress, our thinking became relatively unified. When Hu Zongnan[1] attacked northern Shaanxi, we were at Wangjiawan with only a few of us left. Ren Bishi[2] and Lu Dingyi[2] urged me to leave; I said I would not go. At that time I still had one company. When the enemy drew near, I first withdrew one platoon—they could not figure out how many troops I had—and then later withdrew another platoon, still keeping one platoon in reserve. When they were fifteen li away, it was time to move. They both wanted me to go east; I said west, because the enemy wanted exactly to drive us eastward. And indeed! The enemy's rear is always empty. If you want to talk about hardship, when the Liu-Deng Army[3] crossed the Yellow River southward and thrust into the Dabie Mountains—that was real hardship.

III
After the full-scale civil war began, the military struggle in every liberated area was likewise conducted this way. Let the enemy come in. In form it appeared favorable to the enemy, and the enemy was quite pleased. Within less than a year, the enemy was eaten up piece by piece by us; they had no food. It was the same in every base area, such as when Chen Yi and Su Yu[4] withdrew to the Jiaodong Peninsula. The Kuomintang troops reoccupied territory all along the way and seized some places. We persisted for only one year and then launched the strategic counteroffensive. For instance, the Liu-Deng Army struck out for the Dabie Mountains for an entire year. At that time, many people were extremely pessimistic and all said, "It's no good!" Who exactly was no good—was it Chiang Kai-shek who was no good, or were we no good? Of the places Chiang Kai-shek occupied, except for Taiwan, we have occupied them all.

IV
In military work, one must first attend to strategy. I have never studied the four major courses of instruction—weaponry, tactics, fortifications, and terrain—and the like. Let others attend to those things. I pay no attention at all to the four major courses of instruction, nor do I understand them. I only study strategy and campaigns. Let some of the enemy in; if we can eat them up, we eat them up; if we cannot, we leave them there.

Every province must pay attention to Third Front construction. Set up the arsenals, organize the local forces—do this for five years, spending only 600 million yuan each year, and the comrades in the army will be able to rest easy. Imagine if a situation like the Japanese occupation occurred, with places occupied everywhere. If you don't have two hands, how can you manage? There will be not only difficulties transporting ordnance and weapons, but also insufficient quantities.

V
How should ordinary people take air defense precautions? Every house should dig a hole—dig it yourself. In peacetime use it as a storehouse to store things. In wartime, when enemy planes come, use it as an air-raid shelter. It would be best to dig some tunnels. If a bomb is dropped here, you can still run over there and can still fight. All the big cities like Beijing can do this, completed over however many years. Otherwise, when an atomic bomb is dropped, we will have no choice but to all flee, allowing them to occupy everything safe and sound. We must make them encounter enemies everywhere—there are militia in the villages, and there must also be militia in the cities. Take this house of mine, for instance. Why can't a hole be dug under the bed? Everyone should dig. Learn from the tunnel warfare in North China.

[1]
Sections I through V of this text are part of the remarks and interjections made by Mao Zedong while presiding over an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, listening to Yu Qiuli, First Deputy Director of the State Planning Commission, report on the formulation of the Third Five-Year Plan for national economic development.

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Complete Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 47

I
Do a Good Job of Third Front Construction and We Will Not Fear the Outbreak of War

[1] Hu Zongnan—During the War of Liberation, served as Director of the Xi'an Pacification Office of the Kuomintang Army, commanding his troops in attacks on the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

[2] Ren Bishi—During the War of Liberation, served as member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. Lu Dingyi—During the War of Liberation, served as Director of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee.

[3] The Liu-Deng Army—Refers to the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army commanded by Commander Liu Bocheng and Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping.

[4] Refers here to the units of the East China Field Army commanded by Commander and Political Commissar Chen Yi and Deputy Commander Su Yu.

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Complete Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 47