Speech During the Work Report [I]
(November 26, 1964)
If there is no clear objective in warfare, troops will just surge forward—what are they supposed to fight? They rush up blindly and retreat just as blindly. Without a well-defined strategic vision or a proper understanding of the enemy situation, such actions are bound to fail.


We should study Stalin’s experience. He neither constructed fortifications nor relocated factories, nor did he prepare for guerrilla warfare; instead, he ordered only a hasty retreat. We should also examine Chiang Kai-shek’s experience: he hardly moved any industries at all. Relying on foreign support, he managed to hold onto Chongqing only because our forces in the enemy rear kept the Japanese army occupied.


Why did the Nationalist government build the Changsha–Duyun–Guiyang line rather than the Sichuan–Hubei route? What was the reasoning behind that choice? The Qing dynasty never completed the Sichuan–Hubei Railway, which sparked widespread unrest, leading them to opt for the northern route. We need to consult historical records, compare these options, and conduct a thorough analysis.


The Records of the Three Kingdoms mentions how Huang Quan accompanied Liu Bei on his eastern campaign. After Liu Bei suffered a defeat, Huang Quan found himself cut off north of the Yangtze River with no viable escape route and was thus forced to surrender to Cao Wei. Some among those who had already defected spread rumors claiming that Liu Bei had executed Huang Quan’s family. Cao Pi even intended to hold a memorial service for them, but Huang Quan insisted it was unnecessary, asserting that Liu Bei would never have killed his kin. Subsequent verification confirmed his assertion—that it was simply a matter of having no way back home.


Sichuan has a population of seventy million and covers an area of four hundred thousand square kilometers. How was Liu Bei able to establish his kingdom here? Similarly, why did Chiang Kai-shek ultimately retreat to Chongqing? There must be some underlying logic to these decisions.


I have spent ten years studying the Land Revolution, focusing on the critical period around 1927. Even today, we still preserve the very rudimentary program drafted at its inception. Gaining practical combat experience also took a full decade. At first, our guiding principles were reduced to just a few concise phrases: “When the enemy advances, we retreat; when they halt, we harass them; when they tire, we strike; when they withdraw, we pursue.” Later, strategies like “luring the enemy deeper” were developed, gradually building up our accumulated expertise. Nowadays, acquiring such experience no longer requires so much time.


During the Civil War, we made certain mistakes and lost control of southern China, forcing us to withdraw to the north. Had we not lost the south, we would never have been able to advance into the north or establish so many base areas there. The northern regions boast a larger population, greater territory, and vast plains; without those setbacks, we could not have reached them. It seems that making errors can sometimes be beneficial—if not for those mistakes, we would never have arrived in the north. For instance, Chen Duxiu’s error was unavoidable: if it had not occurred, Chiang Kai-shek would not have resorted to mass arrests, and no one would have taken to the mountains. It was precisely because of that mistake that Chiang began rounding up people, prompting others to join the resistance movement.