(Not reviewed by Chairman Mao)

(October 7, 1964)







　　Time: 3:30–5:00 p.m., October 7, 1964

　　Place: Yinan Hall, Zhongnanhai

　　Attendees:

　　North Korean Delegation—Chairman Choe Yong-geon (head of the delegation), Vice Head Pak Kim-seop, and members Pak Yong-chun, Pak Se-chang, and Kim Woo-jong

　　Chinese Delegation—Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Wu Xiuquan, Liu Xiao, and Ge Buhai

　　Interpreters: Chinese side—Jiang Longqiu; North Korean side—Jeon Deok-man

　　Record Keepers: Lü Feiqian and Yang Chuncheng






　　Chairman Mao: When are you leaving?

　　Chairman Choe Yong-geon: We leave tomorrow.

　　Chairman Mao: Have you had any contacts with other delegations?

　　Choe Yong-geon: We’ve done some work.

　　Chairman Mao: Which side has done more—the Vietnamese comrades or you?

　　Choe Yong-geon: In Beijing we met with the Romanian, Albanian, and Vietnamese delegations. While resting at the Great Hall of the People, we spoke with the President of Mali, Prince Sihanouk, and the President of Congo-Brazzaville.

　　Premier Zhou: The President of Mali intends to visit North Korea.

　　Chairman Mao: Is that the young man who doesn’t talk much?

　　Premier Zhou: Sometimes he speaks, sometimes he doesn’t.

　　Chairman Mao: The President of Mali is a very good and shrewd person. We should take this opportunity to make more contacts, do some work, and unite together.

　　Choe Yong-geon: We’ve been making the most of our time to get things done.

　　Premier Zhou: Sihanouk said he plans to visit North Korea next year.

　　Choe Yong-geon: Sihanouk has formally invited me to visit Cambodia. According to him, I should go to Cambodia first, and then he will come to North Korea. I have decided to visit Cambodia and then return to North Korea. I have decided to visit Cambodia.

　　Chairman Mao: Are you afraid of the heat?

　　Premier Zhou: December would be better.

　　Choe Yong-geon: Heat is no problem; distance is no problem either.

　　Chairman Mao: Cambodia is not only better than India and Souvanna Phouma’s Laos, but also better than certain so-called socialist countries. They expelled the U.S. aid mission, turned down $20 million a year in military and economic assistance from Washington, and even sent away the American ambassador, leaving only a chargé d’affaires behind.

　　Choe Yong-geon: He is very resolute in his anti-imperialist stance.

　　Premier Zhou: The newspapers have published Sihanouk’s farewell address. Has Chairman Choe read it?

　　Choe Yong-geon: Yes, it was quite good.

　　Premier Zhou: It quoted a passage from “The Internationale.”

　　Chairman Mao: This time I urged him to study Marxism-Leninism and recommended two books: “From Utopian to Scientific Socialism.” I asked whether he had read it, and he said he had. I also suggested “The Communist Manifesto,” written jointly by Marx and Engels. He said he would look into it. He added that he himself couldn’t become a Communist Party member, though his son might. (Laughter)

　　Choe Yong-geon: The fact that he knows he cannot join the Party shows a certain level of political awareness. (Laughter)

　　Chairman Mao: As a young man, I was steeped in feudalism and capitalism—Confucianism and Kant’s dualism. For reasons I still don’t fully understand, I somehow ended up joining the Communist Party. Imperialism pushed me into it: China’s imperialist lackeys, feudal forces, and warlords steered me toward communism. That’s what we call an objective historical process, independent of individual will. At the time, my own inclinations lay with Confucius and Kant, not with Marx, Engels, or Lenin. It was the October Revolution that drew me in. People were moving in two directions: one toward counterrevolution, the other toward revolution. Later, I became a Communist Party member, but we were unprepared for armed struggle—there was labor agitation and peasant mobilization, with workers forming picket lines and arming themselves, and peasants likewise taking up arms. Yet we weren’t ready to fight. After all, having weapons means being prepared to use them. Back then, there were tens of millions of organized peasants and several hundred thousand to a million organized workers. But within just three months, Chiang Kai-shek swept us all away. That was the result of Chen Duxiu’s right-wing opportunism. Of course, we ourselves were also somewhat immature. Chiang Kai-shek, however, was far more astute. He aimed to annihilate the Communist Party through force. Our ranks dwindled from 50,000 members to fewer than 10,000—some were killed, others surrendered, and the vast majority simply gave up and left the Party. Only a small fraction learned the lesson and adopted Chiang’s own methods of violence: if you kill me, can I not kill you in return? It was only then that we retreated to the mountains to continue the struggle. Some people seem to think I’m exceptionally wise, but that’s not true. I was quite foolish—indeed, it was the enemy who taught me those lessons.

　　I often share this experience with others. I see that your situation was similar. In the early days of the Korean Workers’ Party, there was no real unity; divisions ran deep, and the Comintern did not recognize your party.

　　Pak Kim-cheol: The Comintern even ordered the dissolution of our party.

　　Chairman Mao: Then came the Japanese invasion, which served as a harsh teacher for both us and you. Your country was occupied, and Northeast China became your rear base—Northeast China has always been your rear area. You carried out activities and fought battles there, with comrades like Yang Jingyu and Zhao Shangzhi cooperating with you.

　　Premier Zhou: Korean comrades took the lead in waging guerrilla warfare in the rural areas of Northeast China.

　　Chairman Mao: (Turning to Pak Kim-cheol) Have you ever been in combat?

　　Pak Kim-cheol: Following the instructions of the Prime Minister, I engaged in underground work inside the country and never held a gun. At that time, we were all preparing to join the guerrilla forces and participate in armed struggle. However, the Prime Minister directed us to conduct underground operations in the cities.

　　Chairman Mao: (Turning to Choe Yong-geon) When did you receive military training?

　　Zhu De: At the Yunnan Military Academy.

　　Premier Zhou: It was the same academy where Zhu De and Ye Jianying studied.

　　Zhu De: He took part in the Guangzhou Uprising.

　　Premier Zhou: Many Korean comrades sacrificed their lives during that uprising, which is why we should erect a monument in Guangzhou to commemorate them.

　　Chairman Mao: Therefore, our two parties must unite closely and cooperate wholeheartedly, without drawing distinctions. You can utilize the entire Northeast region. I have told the Vietnamese comrades that Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong serve as their rear bases, and they should make full use of these areas. These provinces also constitute the rear area for Southeast Asia. I have similarly explained to the Japanese that China is their rear base.

　　We need to prepare for a possible imperialist invasion. If the United States were to attack China, it could not act alone; it would have to bring Japan, the South Korean reactionaries, and even Chiang Kai-shek into the fray. Whether European countries would join is uncertain.

　　Deng Xiaoping: Probably only a few.

　　Chairman Mao: Essentially, the U.S. would not dare to strike without Japan’s participation.

　　Premier Zhou: Japan has invaded before.

　　Chairman Mao: The Japanese fought against us for fourteen years and came to understand our tactics. Broadly speaking, our approach was: wherever they wanted to advance, we would let them go; wherever we intended to move, we would do so. If they sought to capture Chongqing or Xi’an, we allowed it, thereby dispersing their forces. As for Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Nanjing, we let them enter—this was our strategy. Of course, we also needed fortifications similar to those used by the Koreans. We had to construct front-line positions, second-line defenses, and tunnels, so that the entire population, the Party, the government, and the army would be on alert. Even if they decided to drop atomic bombs, some places might not withstand the blast, and they could break through. Let them come in—welcome, welcome… The deeper they penetrated, the better it was for us. That’s exactly how the Japanese operated: the deeper they went, the more advantageous it was for us. We complained that they didn’t attack Xi’an or Chongqing. Had they done so, it would have been more beneficial for us and detrimental to Chiang Kai-shek.

　　There are many unforeseen factors that only become clear in hindsight. The Korean War presented just such a case. At the time, we assumed Japan would join the conflict while the United States would stay out. In reality, it was the opposite: the U.S. intervened, while Japan remained neutral. When American forces reached the Yalu River, we went into battle. Initially, they didn’t know whom they were fighting; it was only after the engagement that they realized it was our army. Another issue was that our forces were insufficient—only five armies—and many of the troops were prisoners of war who feared the Americans. Only 20% were genuinely determined to aid North Korea; another 20% were reluctant; and 60% were swing voters, following orders and going when required. Ultimately, nearly everyone ended up participating. A fourth unexpected factor was the failure of political work. And perhaps most surprising was our misjudgment of Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang. Peng served as commander of the front lines, while Gao was in charge of the rear, yet they formed an anti-Party clique. Peng not only opposed the Korean Party but also our own Party. His history of opposition dated back a long time, rooted in factional struggles within our own military. This time, Khrushchev played a role. Peng first established close ties with Khrushchev during a visit to Moscow, which emboldened him to challenge the majority of the Central Committee members and myself personally. At that time, He Long, Ye Jianying, and Lin Biao were ill and unable to attend, and Peng refused to go unless Deng Xiaoping accompanied him. This episode serves as a profound historical lesson—one that has shaped my life and that of everyone present here. Why am I recounting all this? To remind us to remain vigilant in the future.

　　Now you have accomplished much: industry has developed, and your military has been strengthened. Should an enemy attack, we would be prepared. How many armies are currently stationed in Northeast China?

　　Deng Xiaoping: There are eight armies, the largest concentration in the country, supported by artillery, air force, and various other branches.

　　Chairman Mao: That’s far more than we had back then. Both you and we need to intensify our preparations.

　　For the U.S. to launch an attack, it would have to violate the sovereignty of three countries: North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. This was essentially Japan’s strategy during its earlier invasions—a rather clumsy approach. First, they occupied Northeast China for five years, then advanced into North China. This gave most of our population time to prepare, fueled widespread anti-Japanese sentiment, and prompted Chiang Kai-shek to strengthen his defenses. Only later did they push further south, attacking North and East China, Wuhan, Changsha, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong, gradually penetrating from north to south. I doubt the U.S. would repeat such a tactic. There are two possibilities: they may or may not proceed in this manner.

　　If they seek a quick victory, the best option would be to seize Tianjin and Beijing first, severing the connection between Northeast China and the interior. This is the fastest route. The train journey from Tianjin to Beijing takes only two hours, and the terrain is flat—making it the most vulnerable point. Next comes Shanghai, our second major industrial center (the first being Northeast China). By controlling the Yangtze River and cutting off communication between the north and the south, they could isolate the southern regions. This scenario is the most likely. On the other hand, capturing Guangzhou alone would have limited strategic value and fail to resolve many of the underlying issues. I’d like you to help us consider: if imperialism does decide to attack us, how might they do so? If I were the U.S. Chief of Staff, (laughter) I’d target Beijing first, followed by Shanghai and Nanjing. Even if the enemy managed to occupy Shanghai, Nanjing, and Beijing, we wouldn’t be completely overwhelmed. Among the world’s imperialist powers, Japan remains our primary adversary; Turkey ranks second, and the United States third. Does that mean the British military is incapable of fighting?

　　Choe Yong-geon: Yes.

　　Chairman Mao: Precisely because of this, the U.S. hesitates to act without Japan’s involvement. The Americans have too many fronts to manage—Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Nevertheless, we must remain actively prepared. Most of our industries are located along the coast: Dalian, Anshan, Shenyang, Tianjin, Beijing, Qingdao, Shanghai, and even Nanjing.

　　Deng Xiaoping: Xi’an as well.

　　Chairman Mao: Xi’an serves as a rear base. Should the Soviet Union attack us, Xi’an would become the front line, with Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, and Inner Mongolia forming the outermost defensive belt. What do you think Khrushchev will do?

　　Choe Yong-geon: At present, he seems unlikely to act.

　　Chairman Mao: Doesn’t he constantly talk about peacefully resolving border disputes? (Laughter) We, however, are adopting a more assertive stance, pointing out that the Tsarist regime once annexed over 1.5 million square kilometers from us, and that during the Yalta Conference in World War II, Outer Mongolia was secretly ceded to the Soviet Union without China’s consent—an area of 1.54 million square kilometers. There is also the region of Tannu Uriankhai, which likewise became a Soviet autonomous republic through unclear and arbitrary means. Should we reclaim these territories? We have no intention of doing so; we merely raise these points rhetorically. Marx, Engels, and Lenin all acknowledged that China had been subjected to aggression—this is precisely what we are emphasizing.

　　Premier Zhou: Stalin even recognized Mongolia as part of China in 1942.

　　Chairman Mao: Our purpose is simply to create some tension, in order to facilitate the conclusion of a more reasonable border treaty. This is a secret—please keep it confidential. (Laughter)

　　Choe Yong-geon: I fully understand.

　　Chairman Mao: Let us broaden the discussion to include Japan’s islands, which should rightfully be returned to Japan. Originally, these islands belonged to Japan, but were later occupied by the Soviet Union.

　　Premier Zhou: Not only the Japanese Socialist Party, but also the Liberal Democratic Party, opposes this claim.

　　Chairman Mao: I also raised the question of why East Prussia wasn’t handed over to Ulbricht. If it had been, life in East Germany would have been much easier. With a population of 17 million, adding East Prussia would have brought the total to 20 million. Why, then, did the Soviets insist on keeping that territory?

　　In response, Khrushchev flew into a rage, accusing me of pursuing a “Hitlerite” policy, while he himself adhered to “Marxist-Leninist principles.” (Laughter) I argued that Hitler had never actually seized foreign lands; what happened instead was that others had taken 1.54 million, 1.5 million, and so on, from us. I was merely voicing these claims. If that were true, then Marx, Engels, and Lenin would all be “Hitlers,” leaving Khrushchev as the sole “Marxist-Leninist.” (Laughter)

　　As for your territory, it was not I who encroached upon it, but rather emperors like Sui Yangdi, Tang Taizong, and Empress Wu Zetian. Your current border lies east of the Liao River, a boundary imposed by feudal forces that drove the Korean people to settle along the Yalu River. Feudalism was indeed a powerful force.

　　Pak Kim-cheol: We have no desire to reclaim the land east of the Liao River. We are satisfied with the existing border.

　　Chairman Mao: Therefore, we should regard the entire Northeast as your rear base. This extends beyond the Liao River basin.

　　Choe Yong-geon: We are content with the border.

　　Pak Kim-cheol: The border between our two countries was already settled in 1962. Premier Zhou Enlai handled the matter with great clarity, reaching a fair resolution regarding Mount Paektu and Heaven Lake. The Prime Minister is very pleased with the outcome. Utilizing the Northeast as a rear base and defining the border are two distinct matters.

　　Chairman Mao: It’s not just the Northeast; the entire country can serve as a rear base. If an enemy were to attack Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing, that scenario would actually benefit you. In such a case, we would no longer be engaged in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, but rather in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid China. (Laughter)

　　How does that sound? Shall we wrap up? We still have a meeting scheduled with the Romanian delegation. We’ve been talking for over an hour. Do you have any comments?

　　Choe Yong-geon: None. The Chairman shared many valuable insights, for which we are deeply grateful.

　　Pak Kim-cheol: Could the Chairman please elaborate on the Prime Minister’s recent visit to Northeast China?

　　Choe Yong-geon: In September, the Prime Minister took a vacation in Northeast China to familiarize himself with the region and held talks with Premier Zhou and Comrade Deng Xiaoping. He brought along several economic officials to inspect the industrial facilities there. Upon returning home, the Prime Minister convened a Political Committee meeting and reported on his findings. He noted that his views aligned perfectly with those of Premier Zhou and Comrade Deng. Economically, China has made tremendous progress and laid the groundwork for continuing the Great Leap Forward. The Prime Minister expressed strong support for China’s continued advancement.

　　Pak Kim-cheol: Based on his observations during the trip to Northeast China, the Prime Minister has issued directives within the Party. We must simultaneously pursue peaceful development and prepare for war, integrating these two objectives. On the industrial front, we have already undertaken some measures; metallurgy and chemical industries should now operate underground.

　　Chairman Mao: You’re doing well, whereas we’ve been slow to act. We need to relocate some coastal factories inland and place a select few underground. Industries should establish second- and third-tier production sites. Otherwise, if the front lines are destroyed, we’ll be left without steel or machinery. Such relocation is feasible: an entire factory can be moved, or only half, or a significant portion. However, completing this task will take several years. Mining, coal, and forestry operations, on the other hand, cannot be relocated; alternative solutions must be devised in the rear areas. Forests and mines may also contain oil reserves. I’ve heard that you have no oil resources, but I find that hard to believe.

　　Pak Kim-cheol: With the assistance of Chinese technicians, we are currently conducting exploratory drilling. Initial geophysical surveys indicate promising results, particularly in Anzhou, across from Shandong Province in China.

　　Chairman Mao: Exactly! Both Shandong and Hebei provinces, which border the Bohai Sea, do possess oil reserves.

　　That concludes our discussion.