Marginalia written while reading Volume 3 of “A History of Chinese Philosophy,” edited by Ren Jiyu [!]
(October 1964)
Part Five
The Period of Reunification under a Unified Feudal State and Local Warlordism
( Sui, Tang, and Five Dynasties) — Philosophical Thought
Chapter Five: Buddhist Sects in the Sui and Tang Dynasties
Philosophy
(Part II)
[ l]
This book, edited by Professor Ren Jiyu of the Department of Philosophy at Peking University, was published by the People’s Publishing House in October 1964. What follows are excerpts from the sections annotated by Mao Zedong. Ren Jiyu (1916–2009), a native of Pingyuan County in Shandong Province, was a Chinese philosopher and at that time a professor at Peking University.

How correct!
Section One: The Relativism and Sophistry of the Huayan School [I I]
(1) The Idealist Categories of the Huayan School
From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, Lenin scientifically elucidated the relationship between the particular and the general in the process of human cognition. The particular and the general are intrinsically linked and inseparable. Viewed solely from the perspective of this intrinsic connection, the Huayan School does possess a certain element of dialectical thinking; however, their idealistic, inverted starting point leads them to refuse to acknowledge the objective existence of individual things. Instead, they focus excessively on the “connections” (pratītyasamutpāda) among concrete entities, exaggerating and absolutizing these connections to the point of virtually negating the very existence of the “particular.” In reality, what they term “relationships” (pratītyasamutpāda) are nothing more than relations that exclude objective reality, and thus remain thoroughly idealistic.
It is worthwhile to consult Lenin’s instruction:
“Subjectivism (skepticism, sophistry, and so forth) differs from dialectics [1]
The Huayan School is one of the major schools of Chinese Buddhism, named for its reliance on the Avataṃsaka Sūtra as its principal scripture. It is also known as the “Xian Shou School” because its founder, Fazang, was bestowed the title “Master Xian Shou” by Empress Wu Zetian of the Tang Dynasty. The Huayan School adopts an objective idealist view of the world, with its representative doctrine being the “Four Realms.” According to this school, principle (li) constitutes essence, while phenomena (shi) represent appearance; all things are merely illusory manifestations of the underlying principle. Consequently, ultimately speaking, all phenomena mutually encompass and harmonize without obstruction, devoid of distinction or opposition—each is all, and all is each. In the history of Chinese philosophy, the Huayan School has paid relatively close attention to the explication of categories, exhibiting elements of conceptual dialectics, and it exerted considerable influence on later philosophical traditions, particularly on Neo-Confucianism represented by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi.

Marginalia written while reading Volume 3 of “A History of Chinese Philosophy,” edited by Ren Jiyu
in that, in (objective) dialectics, the distinction between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics, the absolute is present within the relative. By contrast, for subjectivism and sophistry, the relative is merely relative and excludes the absolute” (
Collected Works of Lenin, Volume 38, People’s Publishing House, 1959 edition, p. 408).
From the scientific conclusions of classical authors, it is evident that relativism, idealism, sophistry, and agnosticism form a continuous spectrum. Marxist philosophy truthfully reveals the objective existence and developmental reality of the world, affirming that the materiality of the world, the motion and development of matter, and their inherent laws are all absolute and objectively existing realities that do not depend on human subjective will. To deny this fundamental principle inevitably leads one into the quagmire of idealism. Relativism, however, precisely mystifies and sacralizes the “relative,” effectively abolishing the notion of the eternal and immutable laws governing the development of the material world. As a result, even the basic principles underlying the evolution and change of things are reduced to mere relativity, rendering any talk of objective dialectics entirely self-contradictory.
In summary, among the various schools in the history of Chinese philosophy, the Huayan School stands out for its meticulous elaboration of categories. It addresses such pairs as the particular and the general, identity and difference, origination and cessation, time and space, totality versus singularity, and so forth. From an epistemological standpoint, its theoretical framework contains valuable insights. Nevertheless, because it approaches reality from an inverted idealist worldview, everything is distorted and turned upside down. Rather than fostering deeper, more scientifically grounded understanding, it actually pushes people further down an anti-scientific path.
We hold that categories are forms in which certain universal properties and internal relationships of objective things are reflected in thought. The relations between opposing categories are themselves reflections of the contradictory movements inherent in objective reality.
All idealists, however, take precisely the opposite stance. They first deny the objective existence of the world and, by extension, reject the idea that categories are reflections of the universal nature of objective things. Within their philosophical systems, opposing categories become nothing more than conceptual games. Categories cease to serve as tools for grasping the laws governing the existence and development of things and are instead repurposed as instruments for defending idealist doctrines. Consequently, under the sway of their idealist worldview, categories inevitably become divorced from practical cognitive activity, reducing them to empty abstractions.