(October 5, 1964)

Mao Zedong (hereafter Mao): We are very grateful to you. You are on the front lines, waging a heroic struggle. We share the same enemy as you—U.S. imperialism. However, for now they have not yet reached the Chinese mainland. They are fighting in your place, not only in the south but also striking the north. In fact, you have also struck at them.

Pham Van Dong (hereafter Pham): They struck us first.

Mao: They struck you first.

Pham: They may strike again.

Mao: They will strike again. Right now, there is no telling how long the United States will keep fighting. Fight them for as long as they want to fight. It seems the United States can be fought. Your past experience proved that France could be fought, and now you are proving that U.S. imperialism can also be fought. Our past experience likewise proved that Chiang Kai-shek could be fought, that Japanese imperialism could be fought. The Korean War proved that U.S. imperialism could also be fought. If you fight them, they feel comfortable. If you do not fight them, they become unhappy.

Pham: That might be so.

Mao: The more thoroughly you fight them, the more comfortable they feel. Take France, for example. After you fought them, they wanted to negotiate peace with you. Algeria hurt France badly, so France made peace with Algeria. Facts show that the more it hurts, the more comfortable it feels.

In August this year, I spoke with Comrade Le Duan [1]. That was right after the first Gulf of Tonkin incident. I told Comrade Le Duan at the time that some of our Chinese comrades were overly enthusiastic. He said that was not the case—that the demonstrations in China involving hundreds of thousands or even millions of people were very good. I said I was not referring to that; I meant that sending troops to help you was overly enthusiastic and not good—it would not benefit the struggle. For us in China to get deeply involved, there are issues of timing, location, whether you even want us there, how to fight, language barriers, and many other problems. I said it is better to act steadily. Troops can be stationed in the areas of Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Hunan.

Pham: Comrade Le Duan reported back to the Central Committee after returning home.

Mao: It seems you agree! In my view, it is not a question of us going to South Vietnam, nor is it a question of you in the north sending a great many troops there.

Pham: We think the same.

Mao: Comrade Le Duan said you planned to send one division. Perhaps you have not sent it yet; when you send it will depend on the situation. Whether the United States will strike the north is still uncertain. Right now, the problem of South Vietnam alone cannot be resolved; if they also strike the north, even fighting for a hundred years, they will not be able to pull their legs out, so they must think it over. The United States has said many threatening things—talking about pursuit, pursuing into your country, even pursuing into our country, and attacking our air force. I think the meaning of this talk is to keep us from launching a large-scale fight: as long as our air force does not go and strike their warships, the question of pursuit will not arise. Is that the meaning? The United States has a guilty conscience. So do not think we are the only ones who fear the United States; the United States also fears us, and they fear even more.

Pham: Very correct. They fear us even more; they have bigger headaches than we do.

Mao: The U.S. problem is a global problem. It is not just this piece of Southeast Asia—it also involves issues in Europe, Africa, Latin America, its allies, and so on. France disapproves of it, and Japan also disapproves of it. After the second Gulf of Tonkin incident, all of Europe ignored it, and Japan also ignored it. After a long time passed, The New York Times published a commentary saying the U.S. government had handled things badly.

Zhou Enlai (hereafter Zhou): The second Gulf of Tonkin incident was on September 18.

Mao: We must not be impatient. Some comrades in our General Staff are a bit anxious. I told them not to be so impatient.

Pham: We also have this thinking. The United States faces great difficulties; expanding the war is no simple matter. Therefore, we consider finding ways to confine the war in South Vietnam to the scope of a “special warfare” and to defeat the enemy within the bounds of “special warfare.” We must strive to prevent U.S. imperialism from turning the South Vietnam war into a local war, and strive to prevent the war from expanding into North Vietnam. We must adopt very skillful approaches and avoid provoking it. Our Central Committee Politburo has made a decision on this, and today we report it to Chairman Mao. We believe this can be achieved.

Mao: It can.

Pham: If the United States launches a local war, we will fight, and we must fight to win.

Mao: Victory can be achieved. In South Vietnam, there are several hundred thousand troops. You can fight them, destroy half of them, or even eliminate all of them—it is possible. The United States cannot send very many troops to South Vietnam. The U.S. troops now in South Vietnam are all from the naval system—some naval forces. In naval terms, however, the Western Pacific outnumbers Europe. The Sixth Fleet is in the Mediterranean. In the Western Pacific region—including Hawaii, Honolulu, and your area—there is the Seventh Fleet. Right now, four aircraft carriers are near you. On August 2, they were scared off by you. Back during the shelling of Kinmen, the United States concentrated six of its twelve aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Strait. This time they again wanted to redeploy the Sixth Fleet to the East, but halfway through, seeing that nothing had happened, they announced they would rest in Singapore, later rested in the Philippines, and then returned to the Mediterranean. That is how nervous the United States is.

As for the question of the United States recklessly expanding the war into North Vietnam and how the fighting would proceed—I discussed this with Comrade Le Duan. Of course, you must build fortifications along the coast; it would be best to construct works like those in Korea to prevent the United States from breaking in. If the United States is determined to break in, they could still force their way in. Pay attention to your methods of fighting. Do not use your main force to slug it out with them; preserve your main force. “As long as the green hills remain, there is no fear of running out of firewood.” Your territory is large, yet the population is concentrated in the Hanoi area—what is to be done? In my view, if the United States is determined to fight and breaks in, we should still adopt the method we used against Japan in the past: let them go wherever they want. Their rear will be undefended. In the past we established many base areas in the rear of the Japanese-occupied zones. It was the same in the Korean War. The United States fought all the way to the Yalu River, and only then did we send in our troops, fighting a battle of which the United States was unaware. Once the fighting broke out and the United States was defeated, they realized we had committed troops. The United States will remember this lesson, and when they want to fight you they will also pay attention to this point. Take the French, for example: They were not devoured in the Hanoi area, but they were devoured at Dien Bien Phu. Dien Bien Phu was not some extraordinary place of yours; who knows why the French fell for that. So, let us watch the situation and then decide.

We are prepared for the United States to invade the Chinese mainland. But if they want to fight, they will also need to make use of Chiang Kai-shek and South Korea to help; the Americans alone will not come. We are not afraid. The same method applies: build fortifications along the coast while also being prepared for them to enter. China’s territory is quite large; let them go wherever they want. This method is relatively good. We will fight guerrilla warfare with them. Devour them wherever possible; to devour them, you must lure them into the country’s interior. Do not devour too much at one go. Just like eating—if you take too big a mouthful, you cannot chew it. Take small bite after small bite, and you can chew it all up. This method is what the United States fears most. In my view, when fighting countries such as the United States and Japan, this is the only method. In the past, Hitler fought the Soviet Union all the way to the outskirts of Moscow, but later the Soviet Union still devoured Hitler bite by bite.

Now we have deployed two echelons—a first echelon and a second echelon—in the areas of Yunnan, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan. Learning the lesson from the early days of the Korean War, when military preparations were insufficient, this time we have deployed somewhat more troops. These are just some thoughts. We must be prepared while remaining prudent—hold the troops in place and do not be so impatient. Our air force and navy are both holding in place, conducting exercises and training within our own country. We are in full agreement with you on this point. Your main force in the north is also holding in place; your navy and air force are also holding in place, not provoking others. The south is different: there, wherever they can be devoured, devour them. Right now, how exactly the United States will resolve this—there is no set plan yet.

Liu Shaoqi (hereafter Liu): The Americans have already sent word to meet them in New York.

Mao: Is that so?

Liu: They have replied that meeting in New York is no good, proposing to meet in Geneva, to talk at a Geneva conference.

Pham: According to the Soviet ambassador to Vietnam, on the one hand they meet with U Thant [1], on the other hand with Rusk [2]. The representative of Canada on the International Commission in Vietnam has also talked many times about finding ways for us to meet with the Americans.

Mao: Talking a bit may also be beneficial. You are already qualified to negotiate—whether the talks succeed or fail is another matter. We too have gained the qualification to negotiate. We are currently negotiating with the United States on the Taiwan issue and Sino-American relations. The venue is Warsaw, and the talks have been going on for over nine years.

Zhou: Over 120 sessions have been held.

Mao: And we must keep talking. During the Geneva talks, at one point the United States did not want to talk anymore and withdrew its representative, leaving behind one person responsible for communications. We gave them a hard time: we sent a letter telling them to send a representative to talk, and set a deadline. In the end, they came anyway. However, they did not meet the deadline we set, arriving a few days late, and called our letter an ultimatum. At that time, some people on our side also said there was no need to set a deadline—setting a deadline is an ultimatum, and we need not use such harsh language, saying what would happen if they did not come. Later, Dulles [3] announced that the first point was agreed, but the second—arriving within our deadline—was not.

This time you came to Beijing and did some work, engaging with various parties in Indochina, and also with Africa and Cuba. Such engagement is very good.

Once I received your southern delegation. The delegation head told me that when fighting the French some people feared the enemy’s air force. Now the people in the south are no longer afraid of the enemy’s air force. The air force cannot accomplish much—it cannot kill many people, nor destroy many houses. We fought for over twenty years without an air force. The air force kills very few people; wounding and killing the enemy depends mainly on the army. The U.S. Air Force is the same. When troops move at night, the role of the air force is very small. Of course, in daytime operations the air force can play some role. Our country has a bit of an air force, but it is very weak; the navy is also weak. We rely mainly on the army. The enemy does not fear our air force or navy; they fear our army and fear our common people.

Let us stop here!

Pham: Comrade Le Duan has already reported Chairman Mao’s views to our Central Committee. We have thoroughly discussed the question of North and South Vietnam as a whole, and we are in agreement with Chairman Mao’s views. The south must fight, and the north must be well prepared, but caution is required.

Mao: Our views are in agreement.

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[1] Le Duan, then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers’ Party.
[2] U Thant, then Secretary-General of the United Nations.
[3] Rusk, then U.S. Secretary of State.
[4] Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State from January 1953 to April 1959.