On the Question of Building Local Armed Forces and Preparing for War[1]

(July 15, 1964)

We must build up local armed forces. Some provinces should set up an ordnance factory. First engage in repairs, then move on to manufacturing; they must be able to produce light weapons and explosives. Now we should detach 100,000 workers from the several hundred thousand in the central ordnance factories and assign them to the provinces to establish provincial ordnance factories. Then recruit another 100,000 new workers to replenish the central ordnance factories.

Of the more than one hundred divisions nationwide, we should give one division to each of the dozen or so coastal and border provinces to serve as a backbone. Take ten or eleven or twelve divisions and assign them to the provinces, under the dual leadership of the Military Commission and the provincial party committee and provincial military district. In peacetime, they will engage in militia work; in wartime, they will disperse by battalion, be replenished and expanded with militia, fight the enemy, and be under the leadership of the respective provinces. Once each province has a division, their enthusiasm will surge. When war comes, each province can manage on its own; how can the central authorities attend to so much? If cut off, how can you not fight independently? To whom should these divisions be assigned? One each to Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hebei, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Xinjiang. (Zhou Enlai and Peng Zhen:[2] Anhui should also get one.) Good. Out of more than one hundred divisions, take eleven or twelve and assign them to the provinces to properly build up the core militia. When something happens, with this division as the backbone, we can fight the enemy.

[1] Sections I to III are part of a talk by Mao Zedong while listening to a work report by Zhou Enlai and others.
[2] Peng Zhen was then a secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, first secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee, and mayor of Beijing.

II

Our method of fighting is: when I can devour you, I devour you; when I cannot devour you, I will not let you devour me. When the time is not ripe, my main force will not fight you head-on but will break contact with you. When the time comes that I can devour you, I will devour you, bite by bite, and finally devour you completely. It is nothing more than you occupying some of my territory, which sounds bad in terms of reputation. Bad reputation is just bad reputation; the main issue is not whether the reputation is good or bad, but the question of final victory. (Luo Ruiqing:[1] In the Second World War, the enemy reached the outskirts of Moscow.) It was somewhat more difficult for the enemy to reach Moscow; reaching Beijing would be somewhat easier. Even if Beijing is lost, it does not matter. If lost, we will not go to Chongqing; the democratic personages may go. We will go into the caves between Beijing and Taiyuan and fight the enemy from there. It is good to let the enemy despise us; it does not matter. Chiang Kai-shek always despised us. When he entered Yan’an, he had 250,000 men, and we had just over 20,000. I had only one company of three platoons with me, led by Wang Dongxing.[2] When the enemy was twenty li away, ten li away, I still did not leave; I only left when they were a few li away. As long as he did not reach Baota Hill, I would not leave. Some said we should leave; I said no, because the work was not yet done, the headquarters was not yet organized, the troops were not yet assembled—how could we fight? Only when he reached Baota Hill did I leave. This happened several times; I simply would not leave. And what was the result? Not a single person died, and in the end, was it not the enemy who was defeated? Therefore, do not fear anything; do not panic.

Do not think the Americans are so fierce; they are very afraid of us. When the War of Liberation was nearing victory, they calculated every day how far we were from Qingdao; as soon as we approached, they slipped away. They slipped away from Qingdao,



and slipped away from other places too. The Americans are very fierce, but they are quick to slip away, quick to run. Only the British were stupid; they did not slip away, and later sent ships to pick them up, were captured by us, and only then escaped again.[1]

III

So it does not matter if the enemy despises us, looks down on us. What does it matter if he despises us? It may even be beneficial.

Some coastal and border provinces must set up ordnance factories to produce light weapons and bullets. In peacetime, learn to manufacture and accumulate some materials. Xinjiang should gradually stockpile ordnance materials. With the ability to manufacture and with materials available, production can begin when needed. Arm yourselves, achieve the state where every man fights on his own, and with preparation there is nothing to fear.

As soon as there are signs of war, factories must be relocated and dispersed into the mountains. Can so many factories in Shanghai be left to the enemy? No.

The two iron and steel bases at Panzhihua and Jiuquan have not been firmed up. These two bases must be firmed up. If materials are insufficient, do not build other railways; concentrate on building the Chengdu-Kunming line. If necessary, the rails of the Neijiang-Kunming line can even be dismantled to build the Chengdu-Kunming line first.

[1] This refers to the “Amethyst” incident during the War of Liberation. On April 20-21, 1949, as the People’s Liberation Army was crossing the Yangtze River in battle, four British warships, including HMS Amethyst, intruded into China’s inland waterway, the Yangtze River, sailed toward the PLA defense zone, and obstructed the crossing. A military clash occurred between the Chinese and British sides. The British warships opened fire, killing and wounding over 250 PLA personnel. HMS Amethyst was damaged by PLA fire and forced to anchor in the river near Zhenjiang; it later escaped from the Yangtze on the night of July 30.