Chairman: Welcome, friends. A very warm welcome to our Japanese guests. The peoples of our two countries should stand united against a common enemy. We should assist each other economically to improve the living standards of our people, and we should also cooperate culturally. Your country is more advanced than ours in economy, culture, and technology; therefore, it would hardly be appropriate for us to speak of helping you. Rather, it is you who have much to offer us.

As for politics, are we not supposed to support one another politically? Or are we to remain in opposition—as we were several decades ago? Such antagonism would benefit neither you nor us. On the contrary, if we were to work together, both sides would gain. That period of confrontation twenty years ago served as a valuable lesson for the Japanese people just as it did for the Chinese people.

I have often discussed this matter with Japanese friends. They would express their deep regret over the Japanese imperial army’s aggression against China. To which I reply: “Not at all! Had your imperial forces not invaded nearly half of China, the Chinese people would never have united to resist you, and the Communist Party of China would never have come to power. Thus, the Japanese imperial army was, in fact, an excellent teacher—not only for us but for you as well.” Yet what has been the outcome? Has Japan not ended up under U.S. control? The same fate awaits Taiwan and Hong Kong, South Korea, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand. The United States has extended its reach across the entire Western Pacific and Southeast Asia—a grip that is far too tight. The U.S. Seventh Fleet is the largest naval force in the world, boasting twelve aircraft carriers, six of which belong to the Seventh Fleet alone. There is also the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. When we fired artillery barrages at Kinmen in 1958, the Americans panicked and redeployed part of their Third Fleet eastward. The United States controls Europe, Canada, and virtually all of Latin America except Cuba. It has now expanded into Africa, where it is engaged in combat in the Congo. Are you not afraid of the Americans?

Sasaki: Allow me, on behalf of the five Japanese organizations visiting China, to offer a few brief remarks.

Chairman: Very well.

Sasaki: We are deeply grateful to the Chairman for taking time out of his busy schedule to receive us and for sharing such insightful thoughts. I am delighted to see that the Chairman remains in robust health, tirelessly striving day and night for the advancement of socialism in China and for leading the global socialist movement. On behalf of all of us, I wish to express our profound respect.

Chairman: Thank you!

Sasaki: Today we heard from Chairman Mao a remarkably magnanimous address. In the past, Japanese militarism invaded China, inflicting immense suffering upon your people. For this, we feel deeply apologetic.

Chairman: There is no need for apologies. Japanese militarism actually conferred great benefits upon China, enabling the Chinese people to seize power. Without your imperial forces, we could never have achieved victory. On this point, my views differ from yours; indeed, there exists a certain tension between us. (Laughter and lively response from the audience)

Sasaki: Thank you.

Chairman: Let us leave the past behind. In a sense, those past events even proved advantageous to us. Consider this: the Chinese people rose to power. At the same time, your own monopoly capital and militaristic tendencies also played a role, awakening millions upon millions of Japanese citizens. Even some of the generals who once fought in China have since become our friends. Over a thousand former war criminals returned to Japan and wrote letters to us. With one exception, all expressed goodwill toward China. Such are the strange ways of the world. What is the name of that one person?

Zhao Anbo: His name is Iimori, and he currently serves as a judge.

Chairman: Out of over a thousand individuals, only one opposes China—and by extension, the Japanese people themselves. This is a matter worthy of reflection. Please continue, Mr. Sasaki.

Sasaki: Chairman Mao asked whether we fear the Americans. China has already completed its socialist revolution and is now working toward the full realization of socialism. Japan, however, still has a revolutionary path ahead and must yet embrace socialism. To ensure the success of Japan’s revolution, we must defeat the United States, which effectively controls Japan’s political, military, and economic spheres. Therefore, we not only need not fear the United States; we must actively oppose it.

Chairman: Well said!

Sasaki: During our visit to China, we had the privilege of exchanging views with Premier Zhou Enlai, Mr. Liao Chengzhi, Mr. Zhao Anbo, and other Chinese comrades on Sino-Japanese relations, as well as on the broader Asian-African and international contexts surrounding these issues—namely, imperialism and both old and new forms of colonialism. Through these discussions, we gained valuable insights and identified numerous areas of common ground. Upon our return home, we will spare no effort to advance the socialist movement in Japan and to strengthen cooperation between our two nations.

Chairman: Excellent!

Sasaki: The Japanese Socialist Party and the Japanese people generally regard Japan as an integral part of Asia. As such, it is imperative that Japan maintain close ties with China, with whom we share deep historical and cultural affinities. We hope that China will likewise recognize Japan as a fellow Asian nation and engage in cooperative endeavors with us.

Chairman: Indeed, mutual cooperation is essential. The peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are united in their opposition to U.S. imperialism. Many in Europe, North America, and Oceania also oppose American hegemony. Even some within the ranks of imperialism itself have voiced resistance—for example, General de Gaulle’s stance against the United States serves as clear evidence of this. Based on these observations, I propose the concept of two intermediate zones: Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute the first zone, while Europe, North America, and Oceania form the second. Japan’s monopoly capital likewise belongs to the latter category. Although your monopolists may oppose us, they are nonetheless dissatisfied with U.S. dominance.

At present, a segment of Japanese society openly opposes the United States, while another group remains firmly aligned with it. Over time, I believe many within the latter camp will also reject U.S. domination. After all, Japan is a great nation—one that dared to challenge the United States, Britain, and France; that bombed Pearl Harbor; that occupied the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia; and that advanced as far as eastern India. It was only due to swarms of mosquitoes and frequent typhoons that the Japanese forces failed to penetrate further inland, suffering heavy losses. The idea that such a powerful capitalist class should allow U.S. imperialism to sit atop its head seems inconceivable to me. I do not advocate another attack on Pearl Harbor, nor do I suggest reoccupying the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, or Malaya. Nor would I recommend launching further campaigns against Korea or China. Instead, I envision a Japan that achieves complete independence and establishes friendly, mutually beneficial relations with Asia, Africa, Latin America, and those in Europe who are likewise committed to resisting U.S. imperialism—relations that encompass economic cooperation, cultural exchange, and fraternal solidarity. Would that not be preferable?

You mentioned earlier that Japan is poised for revolution and will eventually follow the socialist path. That is a most accurate assessment. The peoples of the world are all destined to tread this same road—to bury imperialism and monopoly capital in the dustbin of history.

Are there any further questions? By all means, raise whatever concerns you may have. Let us discuss them together. After all, this is a symposium. You represent five different organizations, do you not?

Sasaki: (Addressing the Japanese delegates) Each organization, please have one representative speak!

Kuroda: Rather than posing a question, I would like to share some reflections on the Japan-China Friendship Movement.

Chairman: Very good!

Kuroda: Initially, the Japan-China Friendship Movement attracted primarily socialists and labor activists. More recently, it has gradually drawn in broad segments of the population. This evolution reflects both a significant shift and a positive development worthy of note. From a political standpoint, the movement was once dominated by progressive parties—in Japan, chiefly the Socialist and Communist Parties. Now, even elements within conservative circles have begun to join. Similarly, among the general populace, participants previously consisted mainly of workers, farmers, students, intellectuals, and small business owners. Increasingly, however, even sections of the monopoly capital are embracing the friendship movement, particularly those eager to engage in trade with China.

Chairman: I am aware of this remarkable transformation. Merely engaging in small-scale trade without involving large enterprises or the monopoly sector would fall short of capturing the full significance of this initiative.

Kuroda: The emergence of pro–China sentiment within conservative circles and among certain sectors of the monopoly class has indeed sparked internal divisions and conflicts within these groups. This is a prominent trend of late. Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect these particular factions to fully align with our position. Consequently, a struggle persists: behind those conservative figures and capitalists reluctant to move forward lies the influence of the United States, which continues to manipulate them. Thus, confronting these reactionary elements within the conservative establishment and the monopoly sector is, in essence, a direct challenge to U.S. hegemony. Overall, the campaign to restore diplomatic relations between China and Japan has evolved into a nationwide popular movement. Another distinctive feature of the Japan-China Friendship Movement is the deep affinity the Japanese people feel toward China—manifest either openly or latent. This sentiment constitutes a powerful driving force behind the push for closer ties and the resumption of formal diplomatic relations. The Japanese harbor no comparable emotional connection to the United States or the Soviet Union; their bond with China, however, is uniquely strong.

Chairman: The Chinese people, too, take great pleasure in interacting with representatives of the Japanese people and are keenly interested in the future of our bilateral relations. As you can observe, wherever you go in China, you will encounter Chinese citizens who warmly welcome you. They understand that times have changed and circumstances have shifted. Both China and Japan have undergone profound transformations, as has the global landscape. Yesterday, I received dozens of friends from Asia and Africa right here in this very room. Among them were fifteen African brothers—Black Africans and Arabs—fifteen Asian friends, and one Australian guest. Today, you number thirty, whereas yesterday there were thirty-one. One of you is Mr. Nishizono, a distinguished Japanese figure. There are also two representatives from Thailand, a country with which we currently maintain strained relations. These two delegates happened to attend an economic conference in Pyongyang. Notably, however, there were no Indians present. (The audience erupts in laughter.) Do you suppose Indians universally oppose the Chinese? Certainly not. Large segments of the Indian population are, in fact, friendly toward their Chinese counterparts. I am confident that the Indian people also enjoy cordial relations with the Japanese. Of course, their government remains subject to imperialist and revisionist influences, heavily shaped by external powers. Three nations have provided India with weapons to use against us: the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Is that not curious? The Soviet Union, after all, was once our staunch ally. Following the Twentieth Congress in 1956, however, relations began to deteriorate, growing steadily worse thereafter. The Soviets withdrew all of their experts from China—over a thousand individuals—and canceled hundreds of contracts. They then publicly denounced the Chinese Communist Party. Since they chose to criticize us, we naturally engaged in debate. Recently, they have sought to halt even this public discourse, proposing a three-month moratorium. We countered that even three days would be unacceptable. (Laughter) We explained that we had been waging war for twenty-five years—first the Chinese Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War for twenty-two years, followed by the Korean War for three years—totaling twenty-five years. I remarked, “I myself am no warrior; my profession is that of an elementary school teacher. Who, then, taught me to fight? First came Chiang Kai-shek, then the Japanese imperial army, and finally U.S. imperialism. For these three teachers, I am profoundly grateful.” Fighting, in truth, holds no great mystery. I have endured twenty-five years of warfare without sustaining a single injury. Starting from absolute ignorance, I learned to wage war step by step. War, of course, entails casualties; over those twenty-five years, our armed forces and the civilian population suffered losses amounting to millions upon millions. Does this mean that the Chinese population has dwindered with each passing conflict? Far from it! As you can see, our population now exceeds six hundred million—far too large to rely solely on armed struggle. Instead, we have opted for intellectual battles—debates conducted through written arguments—which entail no loss of life. For several years now, not a single soul has perished in these exchanges. We remain prepared to continue this approach for another twenty-five years. We have entrusted the Romanian delegation with conveying our invitation to the Soviet friends: Romania has come precisely to facilitate this cessation of public polemics. I understand that Romania and the Soviet Union have since resumed their own verbal skirmishes. (Laughter)

The crux of the matter lies in the dynamics between a major power seeking to dominate numerous smaller states and those smaller states resisting such domination. It is akin to the United States controlling Japan and other East Asian nations, prompting a corresponding backlash. Two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—are attempting to exert hegemonic control over the entire globe. I, for one, find this notion utterly unacceptable. Perhaps you concur; let them proceed if you so choose. (The foreign guests express dissent.)

Hosozaki: I spent many years unjustly imprisoned. As a decent, law-abiding citizen, I was denied the opportunity to care for my ailing wife. Faced with such an oppressive regime, I could never emulate the Chairman’s magnanimity. My recent visit to China aboard the Chinese freighter “Liaoyuan,” departing from Kobe, was accompanied by a heartfelt send-off orchestrated by local friendly organizations. Boats adorned with flags and playing music conveyed our departure, while Japanese police vessels patrolled nearby, adopting a markedly different posture. Upon our arrival in China, high-ranking officials and ordinary citizens alike welcomed us with open arms. I sincerely hope that Japan will soon follow suit, becoming a nation where both government and people can jointly extend hospitality to Chinese visitors.

Chairman: Did you disembark in Shanghai?

Hosozaki: Yes. A corrupt government such as Japan’s ought to be swiftly overthrown and replaced by a people’s government; otherwise, genuine friendship cannot be realized. I bear no ill will toward the authorities who wronged me. As I grow older, I intend to include in my will instructions for my children to rise up and overthrow the government.

Chairman: How old are you?

Hosozaki: Sixty-seven.

Chairman: Younger than I! If you live to see the age of one hundred, you will witness the collapse of all imperialist powers. Your resentment toward the Japanese government and its pro-U.S. faction mirrors our own past feelings toward the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek. Who, after all, was Chiang Kai-shek? He initially collaborated with us during the Northern Expedition, which took place between 1926 and 1927. However, by 1927 he had turned against the Communists, dismantling worker unions numbering in the millions and peasant associations comprising tens of millions. Chiang Kai-shek was, in effect, our first teacher in the art of warfare—an experience that lasted a full decade. At the outset, we possessed no organized military force; by the end of that period, we had amassed an army of 300,000 soldiers. Unfortunately, internal errors led to the collapse of our southern base, forcing us into the Long March spanning 25,000 li. Present among us are Comrade Liao Chengzhi and myself. How many troops remained at that juncture?

From 300,000, our numbers dwindled to 25,000. Why, then, do we owe gratitude to the Japanese imperial army? Because it was precisely when we clashed with them that we regained the ability to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek. Subsequently, our forces expanded to 1.2 million soldiers, and we established a base capable of supporting 100 million people. Surely, we have every reason to be thankful!

Ara Tetsuo: I would like to pose a question. Earlier, the Chairman spoke about two major powers vying for global dominance. In Japan, there exists a peculiar situation: Okinawa and the Bonin Islands are under U.S. occupation, whereas to the north, adjacent to Hokkaido where I reside, lie the Kuril Islands, which are controlled by the Soviet Union. From our perspective, these islands are occupied territory. It is said that the Kurils were assigned to the Soviet Union pursuant to the Potsdam Declaration, which Japan did not sign. We have long sought their return through diplomatic channels, yet to no avail. I would greatly appreciate hearing the Chairman’s thoughts on this matter.

Chairman: The Soviet Union has indeed seized far too much land. At the Yalta Conference, Outer Mongolia was granted nominal independence and formally separated from China, though in reality it remained under Soviet control. The territory of Outer Mongolia is substantially larger than that of the Kuril Islands. We have previously raised the possibility of returning Outer Mongolia to China, but were informed that this was not feasible—during a visit to China by Khrushchev and Bulganin in 1954. Furthermore, the Soviets annexed Bessarabia from Romania and portions of eastern Germany, forcibly relocating all Germans to the West. They also carved out a region from Poland to grant to Belarus, compensating Poland for the lost territory. Similar arrangements were made in Finland. Whenever possible, they extended their borders. Some even speculate that they might attempt to incorporate Xinjiang and Heilongjiang into their sphere of influence. Their military presence along the border has been steadily increasing. In my view, none of these territorial claims should be entertained. The Soviet Union already possesses an enormous expanse—over 20 million square kilometers—with a population of merely 200 million.

Japan, by contrast, has a population of 100 million but a landmass of only 370,000 square kilometers. More than a century ago, territories east of Lake Baikal—including Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and the Kamchatka Peninsula—were ceded to Russia. The tally of such historical grievances remains unsettled. We have yet to settle accounts with them. Therefore, the Kuril Islands present no real issue for us; they rightfully belong to Japan.

Soga: Among the thirty of us, our delegation—the Socialist Research Institute—is the youngest, and we are actively engaged on the front lines. We are eager to learn about the founding principles and organizational ethos of revolutionary political parties. We are left-wing members of the Socialist Party and are engaged in a struggle against the reformist and structuralist currents within the party leadership.

Chairman: How many of you are there? Soga: Eleven in total. From our perspective, the party cadres and parliamentarians appear rather sluggish—perhaps because they are older. (The Chairman interjects: “That includes me as well.”) We would greatly appreciate it if you could share insights into the conduct and spirit of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership. Please elaborate.

Chairman: This is a topic with which I am quite familiar. I myself participated in the bourgeois democratic revolution of 1911, led by Sun Yat-sen, and later served as a soldier. From that time onward, I devoted thirteen years to study—six dedicated to Confucianism and seven to capitalism. I engaged in student movements, opposing the government of the day, and later joined mass protests against foreign aggression. At no point did I contemplate forming a political party; I knew nothing of Marx or Lenin. Consequently, I had no intention of establishing a communist organization. I once adhered to idealism, Confucianism, and Kant’s dualism. It was only later, as circumstances evolved, that I became involved in the founding of the Communist Party in 1921. At that time, there were seventy members nationwide, from whom twelve delegates were elected to convene the inaugural National Congress. I was one of those delegates. Among my colleagues were Zhou Fohai and Chen Gongbo, both of whom later defected from the Party to join Wang Jingwei’s puppet regime. Another comrade went on to become a Trotskyist and now resides in Beijing. While I and the Trotskyist remain alive, the third surviving member is Vice Chairman Dong Biwu. The others either perished or betrayed the cause. From the Party’s inception in 1921 until the Northern Expedition in 1927, we understood only that revolution was necessary, but we lacked clarity regarding its methods, strategies, and policies. It was only through practical experience gained in struggle that we gradually came to grasp these matters. Take the land question, for instance: I spent ten years studying rural class relations. Similarly, I devoted another decade to understanding warfare before truly mastering it. When the Party experienced a right-wing deviation, I stood firm as a leftist. And when “left” opportunism emerged, I was labeled a “right” opportunist. No one paid me any heed, leaving me isolated. I recall that there was a bodhisattva statue renowned for its spiritual efficacy, but it had been thrown into a latrine, rendering it foul-smelling. Later, during the Long March, we held a pivotal meeting known as the Zunyi Conference, at which the stench dissipated and the statue once again exuded a fragrant aura. Subsequently, we undertook another decade-long rectification campaign, guided by the principle of “learning from past mistakes to prevent future ones and curing the illness while strengthening unity.” Through earnest self-criticism and sincere dialogue, we managed to persuade errant comrades to correct their course. Finally, at the seventh Party Congress in early 1945, we succeeded in unifying the Party’s ideological line. It was only then that we were able to counter the combined offensive launched by U.S. imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, ultimately defeating them after four years of arduous struggle.

Your question pertains to the Party’s style of work. Fundamentally, however, it revolves around policy—specifically, political, military, economic, and cultural policies, as well as organizational guidelines. Merely adopting vague slogans without concrete, detailed policies is insufficient.

In recounting my own journey, I describe it as a transition from ignorance to enlightenment, from idealism to materialism, and from belief in a deity to atheism. To claim that I was a Marxist-Leninist from the outset would be inaccurate. Likewise, to suggest that I possessed comprehensive knowledge from the beginning would be equally misleading. At seventy-one years of age, I still have much to learn, and I strive to do so daily. Without diligent study and thorough investigation, no policy can be formulated—or, more importantly, no sound policy can be crafted. Clearly, I did not begin life as a paragon of virtue. I have harbored idealistic and theistic beliefs and have also endured numerous defeats and made many mistakes. These experiences have served as lessons for me, just as the errors of others have done. Should we discard all those who have erred? Absolutely not! We have instead chosen to unite. Take Chen Shaoyu, for example—he remains a member of the Central Committee and espouses revisionist ideas, residing in Moscow. Or Li Lisan, whom some of you may know—he too is still a Central Committee member. Throughout our Party’s history, successive leaders have made critical errors. The first generation, represented by Chen Duxiu, ultimately succumbed to Trotskyist leanings. The second, including Xiang Zhongfa and Li Lisan, fell prey to “left” opportunism. Xiang Zhongfa eventually defected and disappeared. The third leader, Chen Shaoyu, presided over the longest period—four whole years—yet his misguided policies led to the collapse of our southern base, reducing our Red Army from 300,000 to 25,000 soldiers. The fourth, Zhang Wentian, now a candidate member of the Politburo, formerly served as ambassador to the Soviet Union and as vice minister of foreign affairs, but later adopted revisionist views. Eventually, it was my turn to lead. What, then, does this succession of leaders reveal? Despite facing perilous conditions across four distinct generations, our Party has never collapsed. This is because the masses are committed to revolution, and the majority of Party members and cadres share this aspiration. With appropriate, contextually relevant policies—political, military, economic, cultural, and organizational—we can move forward and continue to develop. Should our policies prove inadequate, regardless of whether we call ourselves the Communist Party or any other name, failure is inevitable. Today, many communist parties worldwide are being steered by revisionist leaders. Globally, there are over a hundred communist parties, broadly categorized into two types: revisionist and Marxist-Leninist. The latter frequently accuses us of dogmatism. In my view, these revisionist parties are less compelling than your own. You oppose structural reform, whereas they embrace it. We simply cannot find common ground with them, but we can communicate effectively with you.

Sasaki: Chairman Mao, despite your overwhelming commitments, have graciously shared such meaningful insights with us. We are deeply grateful.

Chairman: How long have I been speaking? Over two hours now.

Hosozaki: Thank you, Chairman Mao, for your instructive remarks. During my previous visit with Suzuki Shozaburo, you mentioned that you had never read Sun Tzu’s Art of War. There is a Japanese proverb that goes: “Though one may study the Analects, one may still fail to grasp their essence.” Thanks to your wisdom, you have nonetheless demonstrated a profound understanding of military strategy without ever having read Sun Tzu. Naturally, we cannot compare ourselves to you. Nevertheless, after listening to your talk, I have come to realize that one need not pore over Marxist texts to gain insight; rather, we can learn from the many teachers that surround us.

Chairman: Indeed, U.S. imperialism and Japan’s monopoly capital serve as invaluable instructors, compelling you to think critically and innovate. That said, it remains essential to study Marxism, revisionist literature, idealism, and even American pragmatism. Otherwise, we lack the tools for meaningful comparison. If you do not engage with writings on structural reform, you will never truly comprehend what it entails. So what, exactly, constitutes “structure”? Simply put, it refers to the superstructure—the overarching framework. The most fundamental component of this superstructure is the military. How, then, does one reform it? The theory of structural reform was pioneered by the Italians, who grappled with the challenge of modernizing their armed forces and police, which numbered in the hundreds of thousands. The next crucial element is the legislature. Many of those present today are members of parliament. In reality, legislative bodies are predominantly dominated by representatives of the government and monopoly capital. When they hold the majority, they invariably find ways to advance their agendas—whether by amending electoral laws or pursuing other reforms. Take visa issuance, for example: it falls squarely within the purview of national governments. Neither you nor we can dictate this process; we can only issue visas while they decline to reciprocate. On August 6th of this year, at the International Conference Against Nuclear and Hydrogen Bombs, the question of visa reciprocity arose. This was not about whether you would be granted entry; you had already arrived. Like you, I, too, remain skeptical of structural reform and opposed to any trilateral pact. Nearly ninety percent of the world’s nations have signed such agreements, leaving only a handful yet to do so. Sometimes, however, the majority errs while the minority is correct. Four centuries ago, Copernicus proposed the heliocentric model of the universe, a notion that met with universal disbelief across Europe. Galileo, an Italian scientist and physicist, embraced this revolutionary idea. As a result, he, like you, was imprisoned. How did he manage to escape? By signing a document affirming that the Earth was stationary. No sooner had he stepped out of prison than he declared the Earth to be in motion once more. In this regard, you have acted more wisely than he did. As for your inability to care for your wife, such stories abound. I have three brothers; two were killed by the Nationalist forces. My own wife fell victim to the same regime, as did my sister. Even my nephew and my son, who was martyred in Korea by U.S. bombing, were claimed by the Nationalists. My family has been almost entirely wiped out, yet I remain. Countless Chinese families, too, were annihilated by Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, do not despair, dear friend. Look instead to the bright future that lies ahead. (The audience erupts in enthusiastic applause)