The Two Parties and Two Countries of China and Vietnam Must Cooperate to Oppose the Common Enemy¹

(June 24, 1964)

Mao Zedong (hereafter referred to as Mao): Our two parties and two countries must cooperate to oppose the common enemy. Your affairs are our affairs, and our affairs are your affairs. That is to say, our two families unconditionally oppose the common enemy together. You bear a heavy burden, while our burden is currently lighter than yours. We must share it, and preparations must be made. During the Korean War, we also made some preparations beforehand. We dispatched five armies to the Yalu River. Looking back now, the preparations at that time were insufficient. The five armies, each with three divisions, totaled over 150,000 men, less than 200,000. Later, we continued to increase them. Now, regarding the southern front, we should also make preparations, not like during the Korean War, but more adequately and better. Your current conditions in South Vietnam are better than those in South Korea, and the conditions in Laos are also better than those in South Korea.

Liu Shaoqi (hereafter referred to as Liu): Our current situation is also different from back then. At that time, we had just defeated Chiang Kai-shek, and hadn't done much in economic and national defense construction.

Mao: You must prepare for all possibilities. The first is like the Korean War, preparing for them to send troops to attack North Vietnam. If we are prepared and they don't come, well, that's fine. The second is that they don't come to North Vietnam but fight within the scope of South Vietnam.


Liu: Another possibility is that American troops do not come to attack North Vietnam, but American planes come to bomb.

Mao: If we are prepared, we have nothing to fear, no matter what happens. I hear that the United States is helping Nguyễn Khánh expand his army. The larger Nguyễn Khánh's puppet army expands, the better; it's a good target for you to strike. If you can deal with the puppet army alone, we won't be needed, and we’ll stay in the rear. Once you’ve nearly wiped out the puppet army, the United States will become more isolated. At that time, if the United States rashly attacks North Vietnam, the Chinese army should move in. It would be better for us to adopt the form of volunteer troops.

Văn Tiến Dũng (hereafter referred to as Văn): The military personnel we send to South Vietnam are dispatched secretly. Since it's the same country, there’s no need for the form of volunteer troops.

Mao: Do you send cadres? Do you send troops?

Văn: We mainly send cadres, but also some troops. Almost all military cadres above the battalion level are sent from the North, and we also send some company-level and platoon-level cadres for technical work. Company-level and below commanders and other cadres are generally appointed from local cadres.

Mao: That’s good. Revolutionary soldiers should be capable in all areas, not only mastering military work but also learning political work, economic work, cultural work, and mass work.

Văn: Our comrades in the South sometimes hold cultural performances and evening parties twenty kilometers outside Saigon city. Many people even come out from Saigon to watch, sometimes over ten thousand people. They come on bicycles, motorcycles, and cars — thousands of vehicles at times. When they return, not a single vehicle is lost.

Mao: The situation in South Vietnam is indeed different from South Korea. You are engaged in armed struggle in South Vietnam — first, the burden is heavy, and second, you are doing well. You have a good opportunity to train your army. After we finished fighting, there have been few battles for us. In recent years, we only fought a spell against India along the border, involving only five divisions.


Yang Chengwu¹ (hereafter referred to as Yang): Actually, only four divisions fought, and not in their entirety. Additionally, one regiment fought in the Ngari region.

Mao: We fought for only about ten days, with gaps in between. Without an opponent, there’s no fighting. On the Sino-Indian border, we initially let them advance, and they were very arrogant. Only after they had penetrated deeply did we strike back, chasing them several dozen kilometers.

Liu: After that, they behaved more honestly and didn’t dare to come again.

Mao: We released all the captured prisoners, returned the seized guns, artillery, and vehicles, and withdrew our troops twenty kilometers behind the traditional customary line. Afterward, they didn’t dare send troops to fight. Now we have no war anywhere. We lack opportunities for further training — I feel it’s a bit regrettable. I’m a “warmonger,” after all. In others’ eyes, you also like to fight and aren’t so “civilized.”

Văn: Revolutionary war must be fought.

Mao: You have the opportunity to train your army in the South Vietnam war, which is very good. Engaging in revolutionary war, not only the army but also the people and the Party are tempered.

Chen Ziping² (hereafter referred to as Chen): Consequently, people call us “adventurers.”

Mao: Who is an adventurer must be analyzed concretely. When your troops in South Vietnam completely withdrew northward, Ngô Đình Diệm’s³ men started killing everywhere, so you had to rise and fight again. Is not fighting, sitting and waiting for Ngô Đình Diệm to come and kill, the only way not to be adventurous? Your renewed two-pronged struggle was correct. You proposed political struggle as the main focus, supplemented by military struggle — we agree and share responsibility. Now you still pursue the two-pronged approach; currently, armed struggle is actually the primary focus, supplemented by political and diplomatic struggle, and we agree.


There’s also the issue of fearing or not fearing the United States. If you fear them, and they are polite as a result, then maybe it’s good to fear. If fearing them makes them withdraw, then how is that not good? The problem is, the more you fear them, the more they bully you — then what should you do? There’s no choice but not to fear and to act. It’s not that either we or you invited the United States; they forced their way in themselves. In my view, the less you fear them, the less they dare to bully you arbitrarily.

Liu: If you don’t fear them, they will actually respect you more. With no fear from either China or Vietnam, they will have to consider more carefully before acting. U.S. President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, while others loudly called for attacking China and Vietnam, have also spoken several times. When they talk about Vietnam, they also mention China — they can’t be separated. It seems they cannot afford to ignore the reactions of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Mao: Previously, the United States was also inseparable from Chiang Kai-shek and from Ngô Đình Diệm, and we weren’t afraid. In the end, the losers will be they, not us.

Mao: If the fighting is not painful or serious, it won’t solve the problem. Better to stir things up — then it’s easier to solve. Currently, in South Vietnam and Laos, the enemy still holds a military advantage, and the problem is not yet easy to resolve. In a few years, as revolutionary forces grow stronger through fighting and counterrevolutionary forces diminish, the problem can be resolved under better conditions.

The important thing is to destroy the enemy’s effective strength. China had Chiang Kai-shek, you know. His nature was unchanging. He thought he held military superiority and convened a National Assembly in Nanjing, electing himself president, and our representatives there were driven back. He launched a massive offensive against us, including attacking Yan’an. Yan’an and all county towns north of it, except for two, were occupied. At that time, I withdrew from Yan’an but did not leave northern Shaanxi. At its closest, Chiang’s army was only about one kilometer from our Party Central Committee and General Command. They didn’t know then


we were so close. My main force consisted only of three platoons, firing shots here and there — they had no idea of our numbers. When Chiang’s army approached Yan’an, some suggested that I should leave when they were twenty li away. I said no hurry. At ten li, I also said no hurry. At two li, I said we could go now. Go where? To the enemy’s rear. There were no Chiang Kai-shek troops there, and the common people were with us. We fought in northern Shaanxi for a year, destroying the enemy’s effective strength bit by bit. Eventually, we not only returned to Yan’an but also expanded the liberated areas. In war, sometimes it’s better for the enemy to come and fight us than for us to go and fight them.

Mao: Fighting with American soldiers, you’ll get used to it gradually. You can not only kill, wound, and capture American soldiers, but also shoot down American military aircraft and sink American warships of various sizes. I hear you killed several dozen American soldiers in a restaurant in Saigon. Is that true?

Văn: Yes, it happened. We have some work teams specifically targeting American soldiers.

Mao: Have any been captured?

Văn: Yes. Some American prisoners were later released, and about ten are still held now.

Mao: After capture, conduct propaganda and education, then release them — that’s good. For puppet troops, do you capture them and release them, or use them to replenish your own forces?

Văn: Some are released, some are supplemented. Many of those released and returning to their hometowns have joined our militia organizations.

Mao: Capturing prisoners, releasing some, and supplementing others into your own troops — good. They’ve all received military training; just add political training and they can be used. When we fought Chiang Kai-shek, sometimes one-third of our fighters were prisoners, sometimes two-thirds. All we had to do was remove the Kuomintang white-sun emblem from their caps and replace it with the red star, and they could


be commanded to fight. Some had no time to change emblems and still tore off the white-sun cap emblem, demanding a replacement, fearing they’d be mistaken for Chiang’s troops if killed. Why was that possible? Because soldiers come from the common people in the first place.

IV

Mao: They (referring to He Long¹ and others) never attended military academies to study military science before leading troops into battle. Neither did I. I’m not saying we shouldn’t have military schools now, but rather that to engage in revolution and armed struggle, you don’t necessarily have to learn military matters first — you mainly learn through war. Probably your company and battalion commanders in the South also learned through war.

Văn: Regimental-level cadres all attended military academies in the North. Battalion-level cadres also came from the North. Company-level, platoon-level, and squad-level cadres were all promoted on the spot, and none of them had studied.

Mao: Our Comrade Shaoqi studied for a year before joining the revolution, in a warlord’s academy.

Liu: I attended the Hunan Military Academy. A friend asked me to take the exam together — I passed, he didn’t. At that time, I wasn’t yet eighteen.

Mao: In the past, you hadn’t attended military academies, and the French army couldn’t defeat you. Chiang Kai-shek’s officers were all graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy. Over ninety percent of our military cadres led troops into battle without prior military study; some later received a bit of training in instructional corps. Above the level of military region commander, except for a few individuals, none had previously attended military academies.

He Long: After joining the revolutionary war, I attended our own military and political school. Yang Chengwu studied in northern Shaanxi.

Yang: I entered the Red Army University in Wayaobao.


Mao: In 1936, the Red Army University asked me to lecture on the question of revolutionary strategy. Fine, so I consulted reference books, considered how to summarize the lessons of the domestic revolutionary war, and wrote lecture notes. I read the Nationalist military materials, read some military works from Japan, Russia, and Western European countries, including Clausewitz’s military works, and also looked at a bit of military data compiled by the Soviet Union and ancient Chinese military texts like Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, but the main focus was summarizing the lessons of China’s ten-year civil war. The lecture notes I wrote were titled *Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War*. I hadn’t finished it—there were still sections on strategic offensives, political work, and Party work yet to be covered—but because the Xi’an Incident occurred, I had no time to continue writing. The main part was done, so I stopped lecturing. The book is there, and you can just read it. The comrades at the Red Army University helped me out—they didn’t make me teach, so I wouldn’t have written it otherwise. Being a teacher has its benefits; it helps organize one’s thoughts.

There was another accidental occurrence: in 1937, the Yan’an Anti-Japanese Military and Political University asked me to lecture on philosophy, so I wrote *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*. It took a few weeks’ time, and for several nights I didn’t sleep. After writing them, I delivered one lecture. During the lecture, it was stipulated that no one should read books or take notes, because reading and writing would distract from listening. I spoke for only two hours or so. After that, I never had another chance to be a teacher. When they came to ask me to teach, I had to study, read books, think over problems, and summarize lessons—this also had its benefits.

I’ve talked too much today. I, too, am a petty intellectual, much like you all, not a big intellectual. I’ve said all this to clarify one point: the field of military affairs may seem profoundly deep at first glance, daunting and intimidating, but actually, it’s not like that at all. You all are witnesses to this.

Note:
Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist, best known for his major work *On War*.

--- Notes

¹ This text, parts one to four, is part of Mao Zedong's conversation with the Vietnam Friendship Delegation led by Chief of General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army, Văn Tiến Dũng.


¹ Nguyễn Khánh, then Prime Minister of the South Vietnamese regime.


¹ Yang Chengwu, then Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
² Chen Ziping, then Vietnamese Ambassador to China.
³ Ngô Đình Diệm, served as “President,” “Prime Minister,” and “Minister of Defense” of the South Vietnamese regime from 1955 to November 1963.


¹ He Long, then Vice Chairman of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council.