( April 9, 1964 )


Comrade Luo Ruiqing,
Approved as proposed.
12 1
Mao Zedong
April 9, 1964
[1]


This is Mao Zedong’s instruction on the report concerning the combat readiness plan for the Xinjiang region, dated January 21 and submitted on March 15, 1964, by Luo Ruiqing, Secretary-General of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and Vice Premier of the State Council.
[2]


The report on the combat readiness plan for the Xinjiang region pointed out: In the Xinjiang region, the Khrushchev revisionist clique is indeed intensifying the creation of border tensions. Its intentions may be twofold: one is defensive, the other is offensive. Judging from the current situation and specific conditions, of the two aforementioned possibilities, the former is greater and the latter is smaller. However, we must heighten our vigilance at all times and make all necessary preparations to counter an attack by the Khrushchev revisionist clique. Should it launch an attack against us, it might adopt three scales of warfare: large-scale, medium-scale, and small-scale. The possibility of a large-scale attack is relatively small, while the possibilities of medium-scale and small-scale attacks are relatively greater; in particular, a small-scale attack could occur at any time. Our various preparatory work should be based on the premise of a large-scale attack, so as to ensure the initiative and be prepared without peril. The guiding principle for combat readiness in the Xinjiang region, according to the Chairman’s instructions, is that the most important and most fundamental issues in the Xinjiang region are, first, the economic issue, and second, the political issue. So long as production is done well, the people’s livelihood is improved, and, in addition, politics is placed in command, relying on the working masses, the Xinjiang region will become even more consolidated. In the military aspect, our combat readiness in the Xinjiang region must implement the strategic thinking of active defense, striking only after the enemy has struck, and preparing for protracted warfare. The report put forward opinions on issues such as the basic determination, the organization, deployment, and tasks of the troops, national defense engineering construction, the adjustment and strengthening of the command structure of the Xinjiang Military Region, and various types of support.