Commentary on an Article
(December 28, 1963)
Comrades Liu and Deng[I], the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Foreign Affairs Office:
This analysis of document 1211 is quite good. It is recommended to write another article[II] for public publication. We should carefully study the situation in Asia and offer well-reasoned criticism. Please complete the draft within half a month, revising it through multiple rounds of deliberation, and adopt an offensive stance. At the same time, Hillman’s speech should also be published. If half a month is not feasible, one or two months will do as well.
Mao Zedong
December 28
Returned after reading, signed by Mao.
[I]
(1) Basic Assessment of China.

It holds that:
1. China is “a fiercely hostile force that is antagonistic to the West and poses a threat to its neighbors”; the “greatest and most troublesome problem” confronting the United States in the Far East is precisely China.
2. China adheres to a revolutionary course that has “reached a dangerous level,” yet it will not readily take risks.
3. The Chinese regime and its leadership are firmly established, and there is currently no prospect of a change in its foreign or U.S. policies.
4. In the long run, there remains the possibility of peaceful evolution in China.

(2) Main Components of U.S. Policy Toward China:

1. The “primary objective” of U.S. policy toward China is to prevent it from “subverting the free world or its neighbors, or launching aggression.” To achieve this, it is necessary to establish an encirclement around China to “contain” it and stabilize the Far East.
2. The U.S. seeks to have China accept the “two Chinas” arrangement as a precondition for improving Sino-U.S. relations.
3. Continue to maintain non-recognition of the PRC and the embargo against mainland China, while at the same time sustaining Sino-U.S. talks and keeping diplomatic channels open.
4. The long-term strategy is to “pursue a policy of preserving strength and remaining firm while being prepared to negotiate,” which would “best facilitate certain changes within mainland China.”

(3) The Essence of the “Open Door” Policy. Although the tone of this speech is relatively moderate and even mentions a so-called “open door” policy toward China, it does not indicate any fundamental shift in U.S. policy. What Hillman refers to as the “open door” pertains to China’s own policy adjustments; in other words, it is predicated on China changing its stance.

(4) Some New Expressions:

1. The speech, in effect, implicitly acknowledges—with a critical undertone—that past U.S. assessments and policies regarding China were unrealistic, calling for a “sober evaluation” of the China question and urging “mutual understanding and respect.”
2. Currently, the emphasis is more on stabilizing the situation in the Far East and Asia, with the primary focus remaining on containing China from the periphery.
3. The speech affirms the possibility of peaceful evolution in China and advocates for a long-term policy aimed at promoting such an outcome.
4. It reaffirms the “long-established effectiveness” of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, suggesting that a similar approach could also be applied to China in the long term.

From these points, it appears that, while maintaining the current stalemate in Sino-U.S. relations, Hillman’s speech nevertheless leaves room for certain flexible measures that might be adopted in the future.

(5) Background and Significance. This speech clearly serves to justify and explain U.S. policy toward China. According to Western reports, the address was the result of prolonged deliberation and preparation, reflecting a concentrated study of the China issue by the U.S. government. It constitutes a blueprint for the current U.S. policy toward China. The policy outlined in the speech likely enjoys bipartisan consensus and the agreement of major interest groups, and is expected to remain largely unchanged for some time to come. On the other hand, it also underscores the difficult position of U.S. authorities on this matter: facing considerable pressure both domestically and internationally, they felt compelled to provide the necessary clarifications.
[3]

--- Notes

Liu refers to Liu Shaoqi. Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, who at that time served as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council.
[II]
Refers to the article “A New Interpretation of U.S. Policy Toward China—Several Observations on Hillman’s Speech of February 13” published in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ internal publication “New Developments,” issued on December 26, 1963. The article states that on February 13, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Edwin O. Hillman delivered a speech at the Federal Club in San Francisco concerning U.S. policy toward China. This was the first policy statement on foreign affairs made by a U.S. official since President Johnson took office, and also represented a comprehensive exposition by U.S. authorities on their China policy in a long time. The article analyzes Hillman’s speech and outlines its main points from the following aspects:


On February 19, 1964, the People’s Daily published an observer’s article titled “The Dead-End Path of U.S. Policy Toward China.”